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The partition of India that accompanied that nation’s independence in 1947 
created the additional state of Pakistan; by 1971, this Pakistan had fractured into the two 
independent states of Pakistan and Bangladesh. This dissertation seeks to expand our 
temporal and spatial understanding of the sub-continent’s partitioning by examining the 
experiences of a group of South Asian Muslims across time and space. As this 
dissertation will show, South Asia’s partitioning includes more than the official history of 
boundary creation and division of assets, and more than the people’s history of unbridled 
violence. I have oriented my investigation around a single institution, the Aligarh Muslim 
University, and spoken to former students of the 1940s and 1950s, whose young lives 
were shaped by the independence and partition of India.  The memories of these former 
students of Aligarh University offer a lens for examining the “multiple realities” of 
partition and the decolonized experiences of South Asian Muslims.  
The educational institution at Aligarh, founded in 1875, had long been concerned 
with cultivating a sporting, activist, masculine identity among its students; Muslim 
League leaders further empowered that identity as they recruited students for election 
work in support of Pakistan. The students embraced the values of the demand for 
Pakistan that appeared to be consistent with the values engendered at Aligarh. This 
dissertation uncovers the history of these students throughout the 1947 partition and 
beyond. It explores unexpected histories of trauma among communities who “chose to 
stay” but later experienced a powerful discontinuity in independent India. It exposes 
contradictions evident in remembered histories from Pakistanis who express triumph and 
grief at the prospect of Pakistani independence. Finally, this dissertation assesses the 
position of Muslims after partition and how the “disturbances” that began in the late 
1940s continue to affect them today in both lived and remembered experience.   
As a site for examining the “disturbances” of partition, Aligarh University proves 
to be a hub of a community that was and remains deeply disturbed by the changes 
partition wrought. 
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 1 
 
Introduction 
Understanding a Long Partition 
 
“The Partition of the Indian subcontinent was the single most traumatic experience in our 
recent history.” –Alok Bhalla1 
 
“The collective subjects who supposedly remember [the past] did not exist as such at the 
time of the events they claim to remember.  Rather, their constitution as subjects goes 
hand in hand with the continuous creation of the past.” –Michel Rolph-Trouillot2 
 
The partition of India that accompanied that nation’s independence from British 
colonization in 1947 created the new state of Pakistan, initially divided into East and 
West wings.  By 1971, this Pakistan had fractured into the two independent states of 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, and so the end of empire in India set off a chain of events that 
have had a profound effect on all of the citizens of South Asian states. This dissertation 
seeks to expand our temporal and spatial understanding of the sub-continent’s 
partitioning by deepening our understanding of the experience of a particular group of 
Muslim citizens across time and space.  I have oriented my investigation around a single 
institution, the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), and spoken to former students of the 
1940s and 1950s, whose young lives were affected by the independence and partition of 
India.  This institution played a critical role in the development of South Asian Muslim 
identity long before the movements for independence and partition captured Indian 
                                                
1 "Introduction" in Alok Bhalla, ed., Stories on the Partition of India (New Delhi: Indus, 1994), vii. 
2 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1995), 16. 
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imaginations, and was a hub of political activism in favor of Pakistan in the years just 
prior to 1947.  In the wake of the 1947 partition, some of the students left for the 
opportunities that Pakistan presented, some were displaced by the violence that tore 
through Punjab, Delhi and Bengal, some chose to stay rooted in ancestral homes, and 
some pursued the dream of Muslim independence in East Pakistan, only to have that 
dream upended by a movement for a Bengali national identity that resulted in the 
independence of Bangladesh in 1971.  I use the memories of these former students of 
Aligarh University as a lens for examining the “multiple realities” of partition and the 
decolonized experiences of South Asian Muslims.3  Ultimately, I hope that this analysis 
will offer a new way of looking at the partitioning of the subcontinent that allows 
historians to broaden our understanding of what it has meant for the people who live in 
the three post-partition states. 
The independence and partition of India have typically been narrated through a 
restricted geography and set of images.  The enduring picture is of Punjab, and 
sometimes of Delhi wracked by “senseless” violence, train massacres, abduction and 
rape, betrayal and disbelief.  As in the epigraph above, partition is frequently 
characterized as a moment of violence in which communal passions overwrote the 
idealized history of peaceful coexistence between communities.  I argue that to examine 
partition merely as a moment in history is to deny it historical continuity, to place it 
outside the pale of South Asian history, and to deny communities of survivors the 
                                                
3 David Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative," The Journal of 
Asian Studies 57, no. 4 (Nov. 1998). 
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possibility of a future.4  If partition “occurred” on August 14-15, 1947, then that history 
ended with the striking of the clock, and everything that has come afterward, including 
the 1971 independence of Bangladesh, belongs to a different historical story.5  A 
reconceptualization of partition with attention to its continuities and not just its cleavages 
can create space for historians to speak about the experiences of communities throughout 
what historian Vazira Zamindar has called a “long partition,” one still being lived in 
communities throughout the region.6   
My analysis similarly examines a broad timeframe, but rather than examining a 
long, singular Partition experience, I prefer to think of a long process of “partitioning.” 
The process of partitioning differs from the events subsumed under the heading Partition 
by leaving space for the changes in perception between communities within 
neighborhoods and across borders.  As this dissertation will show, partitioning includes 
more than the official history of boundary creation and division of assets, and more than 
the  history of unbridled violence. The history of the sub-continent’s partitioning must 
include the implications of the creation of Pakistan for all South Asians and especially 
                                                
4 Tan and Kudaisya note the difficulty that both the Indian and Pakistani states have in trying to incorporate 
partition and its violence into a continuous national history. In this context it seems fitting that that during 
the fiftieth anniversary of partition, the dead were honored with a moment of silence. Tai Yong Tan and 
Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London: Routledge, 2000), 2-3.  
5 Even as a practical consideration, it is important to remember that partition’s migrations carried on in 
earnest through 1947 and 1948 (my own family left Aligarh, India in October, 1947) and up through the 
1950s, and even into the 1960s in response to communal riots in both East (Pakistan) and West (India) 
Bengal. Willem van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
132. Vazira Fazila- Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Sarmila Bose’s new work on the 1971 Bangladesh War 
demonstrates the danger of disconnecting the history of the war from its political antecedents. Sarmila 
Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011). 
6 Most recently, Vazira Zamindar has used a similar strategy by examining the experience of “divided 
families.” Zamindar, The Long Partition. 
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Muslims (and not just the violence that has been termed the “birth pangs” of the nation7), 
a history of the Muslim nationalist movement that inspired young, elite Muslims to fight 
elections for Muslim candidates “even if they be lamp posts.”8 In addition, it is critical to 
interpret the students’ activism historically—that is, to separate the activism from its 
outcome, the creation of Pakistan. This history of partitioning considers the aspirations of 
those seeking independence as much as the experience of citizens in post-partition states. 
I have used the shifting boundaries of memory as a gateway into this longer history. The 
memories of partition survivors reveal the complexities of partitioning. Memory presents 
a dynamic interaction of past and present, telling us much about both even as it is further 
complicated by the passage of time.  
The production of personal history is a process that is both deeply rooted in past 
experience and reflective of present circumstances.  Lewis A. Coser describes this 
twofold process in terms of its “cumulative and presentist aspects.”9  The refashioning of 
the past is continuous with it and constructive of it.  The many perspectives visible here, 
and the important impact of personal experience on memory formation seems to belie the 
existence of collective memory, but in fact, it is the presence of the collectivity that 
undergirds each of these narratives. At the moment the narrators incorporate themselves 
                                                
7 Tan and Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, 29. 
8 Iqbal Shafi, "Brigadier Iqbal Shafi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 9, 2010," 
(Rawalpindi: May 9, 2010). M.A. Jinnah, "Message to the Musalmans of the Frontier Province, November 
27, 1945," in Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Lahore: Sh. 
Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), 247. 
9 Lewis A. Coser, introduction to On Collective Memory by Maurice Halbwachs, trans. and ed. Lewis A. 
Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 26. 
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and their experience into a group, they form self-justifying narratives based on that group 
and begin to use its memories and language to define their outlook. 
The case of Muslims is unique as they are now spread among three states, two of 
which were founded on an expectation of Muslim solidarity, and one of which was 
arguably founded in opposition to it. To examine these experiences, this study examines 
the stories of dozens of narrators who share the formative experience of having been 
educated in Aligarh—in the Aligarh Muslim University and/or Aligarh Women’s 
College—and whose experiences diverged after 1947 as they made life choices that 
determined their futures as citizens of India or Pakistan and later Bangladesh. My 
analysis of India’s partitioning incorporates oral narratives I have collected in India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh from men and women whose communities were affected by the 
departure of Muslims from North India for the freshly minted “Muslim homeland.”  
Whereas Gyanendra Pandey and others have written on “high profile” and 
“disturbed” places like Delhi and Punjab, my own research seeks to look at places that 
may not have been as dramatically wracked by violence, but whose inhabitants 
nonetheless faced significant choices about belonging.10  The question about whether a 
place was “disturbed” is, to me, not only about physical violence but also about the 
rearrangement of community patterns and the introduction of new forces and new faces 
                                                
10 Gyanendra Pandey, "Partition and Independence in Delhi: 1947-48," Economic and Political Weekly 
Sep. 6-12, 1997, 2261, 71. For other studies of “high profile” sites see Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of 
Silence: Voices from the Partition of India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000). Veena Das, ed., 
Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1990). Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, Borders & Boundaries: Women in India's Partition (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1998). 
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into communities that changed the ways in which they operated.  These kinds of changes 
are obvious in places like Amritsar, Lahore and Delhi,11 but we see them also in Aligarh 
and the towns in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) from which many Aligarians 
came. As Mushirul Hasan remarked at the 2002 Indian History Conference, “A major 
lacuna in existing accounts is the absence of major studies on the United Provinces (UP), 
a region that nurtured the ideology of Muslim nationalism.”12 The interviews I have 
conducted with former Aligarh students address this lacuna by looking at their approach 
to Muslim nationalism within the university, what changes they experienced in the 
University itself and in their hometowns and villages throughout North India, particularly 
in UP and Eastern Punjab.  Finally, it looks at the position of Muslims after partition and 
how the “disturbances” that began in the late 1940s continue to affect them today in both 
their lived and remembered experience.  Aligarh itself remains “high profile” as a site of 
Muslim organization, but has not previously been examined as a critical site of partition, 
in part because, as every former student of that era will tell you, there was no violence at 
Aligarh University in 1947.13 This has not limited partition’s impact, for Bangladeshi 
scholar Meghna Guha Thakurta has suggested that the “the fear of being dispossessed, 
                                                
11 Ian Talbot, Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
12 Mushirul Hasan, "Partition Narratives: Presidential Address at the 31st Indian History Congress, Bhopal 
28-30 December, 2001," Social Scientist 30, no. 7/8 (July- August 2002). This lacuna has also been 
addressed in recent work by Venkat Dhulipala. Venkat Dhulipala, "Rallying the Qaum: The Muslim 
League in the United Provinces, 1937-1939," Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 3 (2010). 
13 Paul Brass’ work on riots in Aligarh argues that violence became more frequent in Aligarh city after 
1947 (and as a result of it), but notes the absence of violence there during partition. Paul R. Brass, The 
Production of Hindu- Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2003). 
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the fear of not belonging” caused people to flee even if they had not witnessed a single act 
of violence.14 As a site for examining the “disturbances” of partition, Aligarh can provide 
a useful entry-point by identifying a group of Muslims whose community was and 
remains deeply disturbed by the changes partition wrought. 
The disruptions of partition were caused not only by violence, but also by 
changing patterns within communities of Muslims and Hindus that were reconfigured by 
partition’s migrations. Historian Gyan Pandey has addressed the necessity of 
understanding the multiple faces of what he considers the singular event of Partition. He 
describes several conceptions of “partition:” the demand for Pakistan, the partition of 
Bengal and Punjab, the partition of families and communities, and the partition caused by 
migration and displacement of individuals and families from homes. The question of how 
we name and identify these partitions, he argues “determines not only the images we 
construct but also the questions we ask.”15 The initial investigations of partition indeed 
asked different questions than we ask now, some sixty-five years on.16  
The earliest responses from professional historians documented the negotiations, 
the formal processes of Britain’s Transfer of Power to the new states. They revealed the 
complexity of the political landscape, but their investigations concluded on August 15, 
                                                
14 Meghna Guha Thakurta, "Uprooted and Divided," Seminar: Porous Bodies, Divided Selves, no. 510 
(February 2002). 
15 Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism, and History in India (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 15. 
16 H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan, Jubilee series ed. (Karachi; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eye-Witness Account of the Partition of India 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1961]). R. J. Moore, Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government 
and the Indian Problem (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). G. D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning; a Survey of the 
Events Leading up to and Following the Partition of India (New Delhi: Bhawnani, 1949). 
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1947 when that work was officially complete.17 As such, the early literature focused on 
“causes,” to an extent, “the birth pangs of the nation,” and the difficulty of official 
administration, but incorporated few stories of Indians’ lived experience. Simultaneously, 
poets and literati struggled with the meaning of partition for people on the ground; they 
captured the fears and anxieties of people caught in the upheavals of partition, and their 
writing defined the tropes through which partition is often defined.18 Decades later, as the 
fiftieth anniversary of the independence of India and creation of Pakistan approached, 
scholars redoubled their efforts to understand partition’s meaning. For the first time, the 
domain of history and the domain of stories came together as historians sought personal 
histories of partition from those affected by the violence that, Pandey argues, “was 
Partition.”19 The questions that I ask of partition build on this prodigious literature, but 
seek to expose the complications of the entities that have been accepted as the logical 
outcomes of partition, namely the two states of India and Pakistan. I present an 
investigation of a group caught in the middle of the vociferous state-making at the heart 
of the partition drama: the Muslims. The “Muslim Question” presented the central 
conflict of the independence movement, and the stumbling block  that forced the 
partition. How should the state deal with a substantial minority population, linked at least 
nominally by their shared faith, who felt entitled to a share of power, but who would 
                                                
17 Nicholas Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Transfer of Power (London: H.M.S.O., 1970-
1982). 
18 The All India Progressive Writers’ Association including: Sadaat Hasan Manto (“Khol Do,” “Toba Tek 
Singh”), Ismat Chughtai (“Roots”) , Krishan Chander (“Amritsar: Azadi se Pehle,” “Amritsar: Azadi ke 
Bad”), Faiz Ahmad Faiz (“Freedom’s Dawn”) and Josh Malihabadi was particularly active.  
19 Pandey, Remembering Partition, 5, Butalia, The Other Side of Silence, Menon and Bhasin, Borders and 
Boundaries. 
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largely be excluded from a legislative role in a parliamentary democracy? The solution of 
this conflict was the creation of Pakistan, but, this dissertation argues, that solution not 
only failed to solve the Muslim Question, it spawned a whole new set of Muslim 
questions. As a result, the questions I ask seek to expose those post-partition questions 
through an investigation of partition’s meaning for a group of people caught at the core of 
the conflict. 
For the Muslim students at the Aligarh Muslim University, the partitioning of the 
subcontinent introduced a new emotion. While they had been aware of discrimination and 
the ostensible threat of communal riots, it was not until 1947 and after that they 
experienced actual fear for their personal safety. This is acutely obvious when they speak 
about the events of partition in 1947, and the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, 
but is also traceable in their relationship to employment, the state and the challenges of 
being part of “the minority community” in Hindu majority in India.20 This “fear of not 
belonging” has lasting implications for how we analyze India’s partitioning.21 The fear 
that these narrators experienced during partition has colored their relationship to state and 
society ever since, making clear that the realities of the South Asian partitioning are very 
much part of the present. Partition’s “unrelenting immediacy”22 emerges clearly in 
remembered narratives that represent an ongoing negotiation between past and present. 
                                                
20 Although there are many minorities in India, Muslims are the largest, and have been treated before and 
after partition as “the” minority community. 
21 Guha Thakurta, "Uprooted and Divided." 
22 Jasodhara Bagchi and Subhoranjan Dasgupta, "The Problem," Ibid., no. 510 (February 2002). 
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By examining reconfigurations of social experience like this, we can take 
seriously Pandey’s critique of a view of partition violence that construes it as a “problem 
of origins.”23  To reduce partition to a history of its causes, he suggests, is to isolate it as a 
culminating, anomalous event with a single set of explanations.  Ultimately, the “problem 
of origins” is insufficient to explain the trauma, which itself disrupts the continuity of the 
pre-existing situation, that is, the origins themselves. I would add that the reduction of 
partition to a “moment” strategically fails to consider the ongoing outcomes of 
partitioning in communities throughout the subcontinent. These oral histories foster the 
consideration of “partitioning” as a process of navigating many disruptions; they allow 
me to incorporate contemporary reflections on partition and its reverberations into the 
narration of it.   
These histories also create space to look at other episodes of nation and state-
making.  The 1971 liberation of Bangladesh appears here not as a spontaneous eruption 
of regional enthusiasm but as an integral part of a longer process of negotiation that 
involved a particular identity politics as well as a reaction to West Pakistani 
suppression.24  This led East Pakistanis to challenge the unity of the Two Nation Theory 
and to seek separation from their Muslim “brethren” and fellow “countrymen.”  Further, 
the narrators whose stories I have recorded throughout South Asia, who speak from 
inside the borders of three different post-partition states, envision their own history as 
continuous even though official narratives and most of the partition historiography has 
                                                
23 Pandey, Remembering Partition, 49. 
24 Ahmed Kamal, State against the Nation: The Decline of the Muslim League in Pre-Independence 
Bangladesh 1947-54 (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2009). 
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enforced the totality of partition’s rupture. The narrative of rupture is certainly present, 
but it appears in surprising places. Thus, Aligarian migrants from North India to Pakistan 
minimize the sense of rupture, whereas those who remained in India feel the loss of 
unified India more acutely in the decimation of the size and power of the Muslim 
community in India. Aligarians in Bangladesh narrate a sense of rupture associated with 
the liberation from Pakistan in 1971 but sometimes yearn for a united subcontinent which 
might elide the sense of loss that they feel in being separated not only from fellow 
Bengalis in India, but fellow Muslims in Pakistan. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
These narratives point to a variety of experience not typically included in studies 
that focus on Partition as a unique and terrible event that took place primarily in Punjab 
and Delhi. As David Gilmartin has suggested, the problems with narrating partition 
should encourage historians to “place the tension between multiple realities and the 
production of shared moral meaning at the very heart of the partition story.”25  To explore 
these tensions in what has been characterized as a moment of rupture is to complicate a 
view of history that has become codified in official and collective memory.  I suggest that 
if, as historians, we can treat Partition as “partitioning,” as a process rather than as a 
concise moment, we can create space to address its “multiple realities.” A more complete 
history requires a narrative of partition that acknowledges the forces at work in the long 
process of national mobilization that brought independence in the subcontinent, and also 
                                                
25 Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative," 1070. 
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the long process of negotiating the present and future that is still taking place within 
communities on all sides of the borders long after they were drawn.  These oral narratives 
provide rich material in which to search for meaning, “shared” or otherwise; they allow 
us to see Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi independence within the context of shifting 
boundaries of community and belonging, not just as the outcome of lines too hastily 
etched on a map.  To look at partition in this way means gazing through the lens of 
communitarian, sometimes communal, state and individual politics through which 
Muslims see themselves and are seen by others throughout the subcontinent.  
In the case of historical memories, Michel Rolph-Trouillot argues that “the 
collective subjects who supposedly remember [the past] did not exist as such at the time 
of the events they claim to remember.  Rather, their constitution as subjects goes hand in 
hand with the continuous creation of the past.”26  I argue that the lived reality of Muslim 
experience in South Asia lends itself to a continuous reading because the subjects that 
populate this reading are still being constituted.  A mere sixty-five years after partition, 
the role of Muslims in the struggle for freedom, the fight for independence, the pursuit of 
liberation and the place of Muslims as citizens in the three post-1947 states is far from 
settled. 
How is it possible to use personal accounts to examine partition’s “multiple 
realities?”  It is established that AMU was a central site for the training of Muslim 
leadership before and after partition.  By looking at the experience of its students, who 
have contributed so much to the trajectory of South Asian history, but share the formative 
                                                
26 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 16. 
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experience of being students of Aligarh, I will examine the points of convergence and 
divergence in their stories of their own experiences that can help us to understand the 
position of this group of South Asian Muslims in the years during and after partition.   
Ultimately, the slippage evident in these stories between personal, communal and 
national memory serves to highlight partition’s multiple realities.  The national stories 
that these narrators read back onto their experiences during and after partition make it 
possible for us to see the same story through more than one lens.  Thus we recognize 
discontinuity between remembered experiences without forcing those experiences into 
historical boxes defined by calendrical events and bounded by specific geographical 
spaces.  We also leave space to recognize continuity of priorities and values between 
stories and across borders.  South Asian partitioning emerges more clearly as a lived 
experience when we expand the temporal and spatial framework in which it transpires.  
We can shift the perspective away from a few “high profile” sites where it is easier to see 
partition as an anomalous moment, inconsistent with the narrative of national 
realization—as it appears in India—or as a triumphal accomplishment marked by heroic 
sacrifice—as it appears in Pakistan. This strategy allows us to see that it may be both and 
neither, less and more. It also exposes the fact that how partition is perceived may be as 
significant to our understanding of it as the events that transpired in its very execution.27  
In lower profile but much more common stories partition appears “incomplete,”28 
                                                
27 Pandey, Remembering Partition, 6-7. 
28 Philip Oldenburg, ""A Place Insufficiently Imagined:" Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 
1971," Journal of Asian Studies 44, no. 4 (Aug. 1985). 
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“conjured,”29 exclusive, gendered, bigoted, vital, temporary, “ever-present,”30 failed, 
promising, inevitable, accidental.  At these sites, the complexities of partition’s multiple 
realities come into view. 
 
The argument for examining partition’s continuities is not entirely new, rather the 
initial wave of popular histories of partition, spurred by Urvashi Butalia’s The Other Side 
of Silence, emerged out of the recognition of a powerful continuity between the riots of 
1947 and the anti-Sikh violence that followed the assassination of Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi in 1984.31 Scholars like Veena Das and Urvashi Butalia recognized for the first 
time the continuity between this violence and the violence of Partition in which the many 
were punished for the crimes of the few.32 This realization bred curiosity about the 
possibility that failures in information distribution and protection of victimized 
communities were systemic, a pattern established during the 1947 partition.  The official 
histories of partition told a sanitized story of diplomacy (or lack of it), military action and 
high level negotiation, but the experience of the people who lived in areas disturbed by 
partition violence was absent. The two significant attempts to represent the experience on 
the ground had been composed by a British official and an Indian judge, and while they 
sought to quantify and describe the carnage they nonetheless conveyed a sense that the 
                                                
29 Ayesha Jalal, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 27, no. 1 (Feb. 1995). 
30 Butalia, The Other Side of Silence, 5. 
31 Ibid., 4. 
32 Veena Das, "Specificities: Oral Narratives, Rumour, and the Social Production of Hate," Social Identities 
4, no. 1 (Feb. 1998). 
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reader was looking down on the bloodbath from above.33 Butalia and others, including 
Kamla Bhasin and Ritu Menon in their Borders and Boundaries  and Gyanendra Pandey 
in Remembering Partition, turned to oral histories to collect the untold stories of these 
times, to create an archive of personal stories as a way of filling the historical narrative 
with lived experience.  It was the recognition of this powerful moment of continuity 
between 1947 and 1984 that led to the creation of a new historical thread linking the 
communities and geography of South Asia across the border drawn by Cyril Radcliffe 
that summer of 1947. 
While 1984 triggered a sense of déjà vu for these scholars, it became a part of 
their intellectual biography more than a framing device for examining partition. These 
histories are concerned with understanding the consequences of a serious rupture in moral 
continuity and through them, partition became Partition, monolithic and untouchable.34 
This study seeks to take that initial recognition of continuity, and combine it with 
Pandey’s recognition that partition changed fundamentally the subjectivity of everyone 
involved to suggest that partition—its violence, its boundaries, its prejudices, its 
disruptions—altered permanently the subjectivity of all involved, and that to understand 
this we must examine those subjectivities beyond the calendrical boundaries of Partition. 
How has the process of partitioning affected the subjectivity of Muslims throughout the 
subcontinent? How has their experience been determined by these dynamics? How can 
                                                
33 Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eye-Witness Account of the Partition of India, Khosla, Stern Reckoning; a 
Survey of the Events Leading up to and Following the Partition of India. 
34 Pandey, in particular, deploys literature on memory and trauma from the Holocaust to suggest that 
similarly Partition may be a “limit case” of historiography, an episode so horrifying it is unique. Pandey, 
Remembering Partition, 45. 
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we use these episodes as a lens to understand their experience, and how can we use their 
experience to better understand ongoing processes of partitioning? 
This dissertation examines the relationship between a group of individuals who 
emerged from a tightly regulated social, educational and political environment at a 
formative time in the histories of their nations and states, passed through the crucible of a 
traumatic separation and now look back on their past both as individuals and members of 
different collectivities. How they imagine their place within these collectivities affects 
how they remember their experiences during the disruptions of the 1947 partitioning. 
Their identities are relational, determined through experience, memory and comparison.   
This examination differs from other studies of partition memory in several ways. 
Memory has helped to define our understanding of the experience of partitioning as it 
unfolded in 1947, but this study places a consideration of the dynamics of individual and 
collective memory at the heart of the examination to argue that the definition of partition 
as an “event” creates a kind of unreal discontintuity that separates experiences before and 
after August 1947. The critical difference here is about meaning, and the oral narratives 
are a rich source of meaning. For as historian Alessandro Portelli argues, “The first thing 
that makes oral history different... is that it tells us less about events than about their 
meaning.”35 That is, the question of facticity in oral history is more determined by the 
meaning of the fact, than its historical verifiability.36 This should not imply that the 
                                                
35 Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 50. 
36 Oral historian Paul Thompson, with reference to Portelli addresses the issue of facticity, “What the 
informant believes is indeed a fact (that is, the fact that he or she believed it) just as much as what ‘really’ 
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historian’s work is only in analyzing the story. In fact, thoroughly developed historical 
context is required to understand the story’s meaning at all. It is significant though, that 
the act of remembering South Asia’s partition serves to create continuity for individuals 
and communities and should not necessarily be considered separately from our 
understanding of partition’s impact on individuals, communities, institutions and states. 
Incorporating memory allows the historian to consider the ongoing experiences and 
effects of the partitioning that continue today through acts of terrorism, discrimination, 
the resilience and power of religious difference,37 and the persistent lag in Human 
Development indices typical of Indian Muslims.38 In Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
considering the effects of partitioning means looking at the relationship between minority 
and majority discourse and its implications for the unity of Pakistan and the creation of 
Bangladesh. 
Further, this study pursues the idea that the generation of students in the Aligarh 
Muslim University prior to 1947 shared a formative experience before dispersing when 
the new borders had been drawn in August. Their dispersion in 1947 and the years 
following it meant that the values of the environment of the university were dispersed 
across a wide geography. That their involvement in fighting for Pakistan was based on 
the close relationship between the advertised values of Pakistan and the Aligarh 
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University meant that their expectations for the future were more than just casually 
molded by this experience. They form a type of diasporic community and the experiences 
that they shared prior to partition allow me to conceive of them as a group or groups after 
partition. By examining the dispersal of these groups of mostly young men, I incorporate 
a much broader geography than has typically been examined in partition studies. That is, 
I must move beyond the consideration of “border areas” in Punjab and Bengal and the 
metropolises of Delhi and Calcutta to think about smaller regional towns like Aligarh and 
the districts from which these narrators hail.  
 
THE TROUBLES OF HISTORY 
The studies of partition that have come from India are centered on narratives of 
often violently traumatic experiences by those who migrated from Pakistan areas and 
those who experienced the “vivisection” of their country, the undermining of their 
respected leadership who advocated a “composite culture” theory of Indian belonging, 
and who witnessed, even if not personally, the seemingly senseless violence plaguing 
Punjab, Bengal and North India. These studies have failed to investigate other 
experiences of India’s partitioning, ones that may not have been driven by physical 
violence, or forced migration. To some extent, these experiences have been covered in 
the fictional literature of partition—in Intizar Husain’s Basti, or Ismat Chugtai’s short 
story “Roots”—but, with the exception of Mushirul Hasan’s defensive essays about 
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Aligarh during the 1940s, these have not been the focus of historical inquiry.39 These 
other experiences do not as easily establish a binary of aggressor-victim; they do not 
necessarily fit easily into national narratives of becoming, and they require an 
understanding that India’s minorities may not have felt at home in its “composite 
culture.” Many of these narratives, in fact, reveal significant slippage where personal 
narratives meet national ones. Indeed the ongoing effects of the division of the country 
into differently defined units continues to impact minority communities in all three states.  
Thus, Riazur Rahman Sherwani, a nationalist and Congress supporter who 
worked for Congress candidates in 1946 in Aligarh town even as his own father ran on a 
Muslim League ticket in their rural home district, described his unwillingness to blame 
Muslims for the partition of India, as the Indian national story would have us believe. 
“Actually,” he told me, “Only Muslims were not responsible for partition.  The blame 
rests on others also.  The British Government was also involved in that process, the 
Congress leadership also was responsible for it.”40 This view lays Sherwani open to 
accusations of disloyalty in an environment (India generally, Aligarh in particular) where 
the Muslims have worked tirelessly to demonstrate their allegiance to the Indian state as a 
way of making up for the transgressions of the Muslim League and its support for 
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Pakistan.41  It also exposes the complicated position of Nationalist Muslims who may not 
be willing to blame their “community” for the divided outcome of the independence 
movements.  
The creation of Pakistan has become so intimately linked to the violence of 
partition, that even Pakistani narrators lay “blame” for the creation of Pakistan at the feet 
of Congress leaders Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel even as they herald the triumph of 
the Muslim League’s demand for independent statehood. This narrative reveals an 
important slippage between the narrative of triumph and the narrative of the oppressed 
minority that demands state protection and accommodation. It occurs because the 
“sacrifices” made by those who lost their lives during partition must be justified by the 
triumph of the state, yet narrators cannot accept the stigma of having created the 
conditions in which partition’s violence took place. This slippage illuminates a theme that 
runs throughout this argument, that if partition was imagined as an answer the “Muslim 
Question” it did little to “solve” it, but rather spawned a variety of persistent Muslim and 
minority questions that continue to trouble the post-partition states. 
 There are some surprises in the narratives collected here. For one, only a few of 
the individuals I interviewed who migrated from India to Pakistan had returned to India 
since 1947. I seemed to encounter fewer stories of divided families in Pakistan than I did 
in India. It seemed that almost everyone in India had a relative, or one side of the family 
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who had gone to Pakistan, whereas the Pakistanis told me that all of their family 
migrated.42 This created the impression that Pakistan remained part of the Indian Muslim 
imaginary much more than India did for the Pakistani imaginary. Whereas several 
Pakistani narrators described leaving India behind like so many kitchen utensils, and 
rarely have returned to India, Indian narrators described periodic visits to India for 
weddings or to visit family members and imagine their families as “divided.”43 In fact, far 
more Indians cite the influence of their families in their decision to remain in India. 
Pakistanis, conversely, emphasize their independence. Even Sayyid Hamid, whose 
brother migrated to Pakistan said, “There was no discussion, but perhaps he thought that 
career-wise, it was a better proposition for him.”44 Pakistanis proclaim their financial 
superiority over Indian Muslims, often describing Indian Muslims as “poor” or 
“backward,” but there is very little nostalgia, little sense that their origins lie in a country 
which they cannot easily visit. My interview with Pakistani Brigadier General Iqbal Shafi 
illustrates this well. Even as he told me that the triumph of achieving Pakistan 
outweighed any sense of loss at leaving India, he lamented, “But, of course, I miss 
Aligarh, I wish Aligarh was in Pakistan. I wish Delhi was in Pakistan, and Lucknow...”45 
While he recognized the geographic dislocation of Aligarh, the insurmountable spatial 
discontinuity, he also argued for a continuity of “Islamic values” that he learned in 
Aligarh. For Shafi and other Pakistani Aligarians, the university occupies a unique 
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position because the Pakistanis have incorporated it so fully into their collective history 
that it is as if it is not in India at all, but a seamless (though inaccessible) part of Pakistan.  
The Aligarh of pre-partition, for those who remained in India, however, is equally 
inaccessible. Its reputation and experience were so catastrophically affected by the 
Muslim League activity and the events of 1947 that we find a sense of trauma and 
discontinuity that I do not find in Pakistan with relation to Aligarh. Though 
geographically located only ninety miles from New Delhi, the Aligarh of today remains 
emotionally isolated from India, and especially from India’s national story—and this 
isolation has long been part of the Aligarh dynamic and part of its unique identity—that I 
have considered those alumni who remained closer to the university to occupy a different 
perceptive/analytical space from those of their contemporaries who left Aligarh and 
settled elsewhere in India. The university provides a protective boundary for those within 
its walls, but outside, Muslim graduates are more exposed, and must overcome the 
challenge of being an “Aligarh Muslim” with its shadow of disloyalty. Professor of 
History Mohammad Amin told me that in the years after partition in Delhi one avoided 
mentioning one’s experience in Aligarh, because having been a student there was not the 
boon it should have been, but was a “black mark” on one’s record.46 Pakistanis have had 
to adjust to the contemporary reality of geographic dislocation with ideological continuity 
but Indians have faced the opposite: geographic continuity and ideological dislocation. 
The nostalgia of displacement comes from those who remain close to the University, not 
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from those who are far away. This irony lends strength to my suggestion that it is 
worthwhile to look at “disturbed” places that were not affected by violence.  
 
THE QUESTION OF CHOICE 
My approach to the migration decisions of these narrators as matters of “choice,” 
may be difficult to accept. As a scholar coming of age in the wake of the remarkable 
investigations of partition violence and gendered nationalism published during the 1990s, 
I have benefited from these investigations, but do not seek to repeat them. This literature 
focuses on communities of people who lived in disputed territories (like Punjab) or who 
were driven out of their homes by violence or the threat of violence. In the existing 
literature, however, there are already a few examples of individuals exercising “choice” 
over where to go and what to do during the upheavals of partition.  
Urvashi Butalia recounts the story of her uncle who remained in Pakistan, 
converted to Islam, married and raised his children there. When he explained his 
reasoning, he was not motivated by a desire to profit from the family’s abandoned 
property as his sister suspected, rather he said, “I’d had little education. What would I 
have done in India? I had no qualifications, no job, nothing to recommend me.”47 This 
story about opportunity and the lack of it is remarkably similar to many told by Aligarh 
graduates who settled in Pakistan and remarkably different from the majority of the best-
known stories of partition displacement.  
                                                
47 Butalia, The Other Side of Silence, 28. 
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Bangladeshi scholar, Meghna Guha Thakurta notes that for many there was a 
matter of conscious choice, many families whose members were in government service 
“were given the option to take up equivalent work on the other side. Some families, 
however, had to decide in a very short period of time, so that people who exercised the 
option also had to reach a hurried decision.”48 Soldiers in the army and other government 
servants were given some options, based on their religious background, to “opt” for 
settling in India or Pakistan. Muslims in areas that would become India could opt for 
either service, as could Hindus in Pakistan areas. Hindus in India, and Muslims in 
Pakistan however, were naturalized to that state; they were given no option. Both Butalia 
and Zamindar detail accounts of government servants who opted for one side, and then 
changed their minds and sought to migrate to the other (this happened in both 
directions).49 This investigation does take the question of “choice” seriously, and 
interrogates it, too, for signs of coercion. Particularly in the case of women, their 
“choice” was often circumscribed by their family’s desire to see them well- married at a 
time when so many educated and eligible young men had moved to Pakistan.50 Among 
the narrators who participated in my oral history project, only one narrator, from the 
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Eastern UP city of Saharanpur, described his family being “forced” out of their home.51 A 
few others—Ather Siddiqi from Saharanpur; Zahida Zaidi from Delhi; and a few from 
Meerut—mentioned riots, but Siddiqi, for instance, described his family’s move to 
Moradabad as a “migration” rather than an escape.52 By decentering the Punjab as the 
dominant site of partition, other partition stories have the chance to emerge. The question 
of choice looks entirely different in cities that were not sites of significant violence. 
Professor Emeritus Irfan Habib suggested that opportunity motivated educated Muslims 
to leave for Pakistan. He said, “soon the idea that they will get high posts in Pakistan… 
they would get recorded property of Hindus in Sindh, and if they were Punjabis, in 
Punjab. That had begun to have its own attraction.”53 This movement stopped, however, 
once the Indian state developed public sector engineering services because “they got 
higher pay here, why should they go?” Pakistani narrators advance an almost identical 
narrative, particularly those who graduated with degrees in engineering up to the mid 
1950s. Those who graduated later, however, found jobs in India (Ahmad Rashid, Majid 
Ali Siddiqi) and made successful careers in the public services.  Thus, Indian narrators 
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recognize the power of Pakistan’s pull for those seeking career advancement, and Habib 
even recognizes the difficulty India had in matching it. However, for those who remained 
in AMU as professors, their own lives were marked by the intimacy of the university, and 
they felt privileged to have been able to stay.54 
Thousands of people who fled their homes during the months of violence that 
spanned August 1946 in Calcutta, Bihar and Noakhali, to March 1947 in Rawalpindi to 
August, September and October 1947 in Lahore, Amritsar, and Delhi feared for their 
lives. Many had either witnessed violence or were aware of its threat. Many, including 
the women at the heart of Menon and Bhasin’s research, still bear its scars. But the 
presence of groups of people who migrated for other reasons, whose lives were also 
disturbed by partition’s refiguring of states does not undermine or threaten the integrity 
of those experiences. Rather, their stories help us to develop a complex understanding of 
partition experience and to examine other sites of disturbance. These are the “multiple 
realities” of partition, that even as people fled for their lives, others carefully considered 
their career choices, examined their options, imagined their futures. It is a shortcoming of 
the histories of partition violence that they occlude those futures by positing Partition as 
an emotional rupture of such force that the future becomes unimaginable.  
It is a commonplace to recount the large numbers of people who migrated (10-15 
million) and even of those who died (up to 1 million). Butalia cites the figure of 75,000 
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women who became victims of sexual violence, abduction or rape.55 The official estimate 
of abducted women corroborates this figure, with 50,000 Muslim women held in India 
and 33,000 Hindu and Sikh women held in Pakistan.56 But 12-14 million of those 
migrants survived, re-established themselves, married, bore children, built futures. Many 
more even than that faced futures disrupted by partition, in towns whose demographics 
had shifted, in universities whose survival became uncertain, in homes where neighbors 
felt like strangers, where they experienced fear. It seems reasonable to offer them a place 
in partition historiography, a place as actors, not just as bystanders, witnesses to violence. 
This investigation seeks to do that. And while it may seem unpleasant to move away from 
the visceral experiences of partition violence that, as Gyan Pandey has argued 
“constituted” partition,57 it is time to do just that, to open partition as a site of analysis to 
a larger segment of South Asian society. For in it, we may find a depth of experience that 
helps us to understand the particular terms under which different groups and communities 
live in the three post-partition states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
 
NARRATORS 
It is critical first to understand who these narrators are, and what draws them 
together. While I began with an assumption that it would be possible to use the Aligarh 
Muslim University as a central organizational node of analysis, from the outset I 
                                                
55 This appears to be the number cited by Kamlaben Patel in her book Mool Suta Ukhde (Torn from the 
Roots). Butalia, The Other Side of Silence, 34, 105. 
56 The recovery numbers were much lower, “12.552 for India and 6,272 for Pakistan.” Menon and Bhasin, 
Borders and Boundaries, 70. 
57 Pandey, Remembering Partition, 4-5. 
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perceived that there would be several “groups” within this collectivity, whose 
experiences, perceptions and narratives would likely bear the imprint of their different 
attachments. Initially, I expected nationality and national narratives, allegiance to the 
state stories of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to define these groups, but my research 
revealed that in addition to those obvious divisions, groups can be further defined by the 
political perspectives they held in their youth—the Leftists at Aligarh, for instance—or 
by their experiences of partition, or by their choice to remain attached in some way to the 
university, or to establish a life separate from it.58  
They are Muslim.59 For some, this defines a religious practice, for others a 
collectivity with which they feel a sense of commonality. It should not be understood 
here as a definition of their personal faith, though the sense of “belonging” to a Muslim 
collectivity undoubtedly affected the decisions they made with regard to attending 
Aligarh in the first place and their experience during and after their time there. Only two 
narrators spoke at any length about personal religiosity during their time in Aligarh: the 
Leftist Professor of History Iqtidar Alam Khan who, in any case, later disavowed this 
behavior; and Zafar Mohammad Khan. Many others, rather, described their efforts to 
evade the religious regulation in the Aligarh University. Today, however, in both India 
                                                
58 See Appendix 1 for Biographical data on each of the narrators, and abstracts of the interviews. 
59 A.K. Mathur is an exception, the only non-Muslim I was able to interview. A.K. Mathur, "A.K. Mathur: 
Personal Interview with Amber Abbas September 30, 2009," (Lucknow: September 30, 2009). 
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and Pakistan, many narrators use religiously charged language, and some made a special 
effort to demonstrate their devotion or to suggest its importance to me.60 
Most of the narrators come from families that were either in government service, 
as Ather Siddiqi, Masood ul Hasan, Waheeduddin Choudhri and Mohiuddin Khan; or 
were landholders, some with large estates, as Riazur Rahman Sherwani; and some with 
small estates, as Majid Ali Siddiqi and M.A. Rashid. Only two narrators came from 
educators’ families: Iqbal Shafi and Irfan Habib;61 but many became educators and 
professors: Iqtidar and Iftikhar Alam, Irfan Habib, Asloob Ahmad Ansari, Ather Siddiqi, 
Saeeda Kidwai, Zahida Zaidi, Fatima Fari Rahman, Shahid Rashid, Wazir Ahmad 
Razzaqi and Masood ul Hasan. Few come from families with military backgrounds (the 
Police was more common), though many of the narrators themselves, particularly those I 
interviewed in Pakistan, served in the military, first under the British Indian Army and 
later in Pakistan: Major Generals Ghulam Umar, Wajahat Husain and Brigadier General 
Iqbal Shafi, and Wing Commander Baaquie among others. In East Pakistan, Habibur 
Rahman tried to join the Pakistan Air Force in 1949 to become a pilot but he was deemed 
too small at only ninety pounds! He went on to a career in Law. Many of these 
informants were professional Engineers, and whereas, in this group, the military men 
                                                
60 This was especially true of Mohammad Yunus and Colonel Shamsi in Lucknow. YM (Anonymized), 
"YM (Anonymized): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 7, 2008," (Lucknow: August 7, 2008). 
Mohsin Jalil Shamsi, "Colonel Mohsin Jalil Shamsi: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 11, 
2008," (Lucknow: August 11, 2008). 
61 A.K. Mathur also came from an educator’s family. His father was the principal of a Hindu College in 
Aligarh City. Mathur enrolled at Aligarh for his Intermediate in 1957, and passed out with his M.Sc. in 
1965. After his marriage, his wife taught in Aligarh and so they remained in the city until 1978. However, 
because he is so much younger than the majority of informants, his interview figures only minorly here. 
Mathur, "A.K. Mathur: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas September 30, 2009." 
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were primarily in Pakistan and the professors primarily in India,62 there were Engineers 
in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Among them: Z.A. Nizami, Zakir Ali Khan, (in 
Pakistan); Engr. Waheedudin Chowdhury, Mohiuddin Khan, Salahuddin Choudhury 
(Bangladesh); Majid Ali Siddiqi, Syed Saghir Ahmad Rizvi, and Ahmad Saeed (India). 
The women I interviewed were primarily educators: Saeeda Kidwai, Zakiya Siddiqi, 
Fatima Fari Rahman. 
They were students in the Aligarh Muslim University during the 1940s and 
1950s.63 Almost all of the narrators share the experience of the residential life in Aligarh 
University, a unique institution in its time in India, and those who were non-residents 
(day scholars like Wajahat Husain, Iqbal Shafi and Irfan Habib) still had an attachment to 
a residence hall and understood the significance and dynamics of the residential 
experience. Though the female narrators were not full-time students of the university, 
they (like Zahida Zaidi and Saeeda Kidwai) attended under various schemes of separation 
and integration over this time period, with many living in the hostel of the Aligarh 
Women’s College,64 and attending post-graduate classes in the university. During their 
stay at the university, almost all of these narrators, male or female, had an awareness of 
the political changes afoot in the country, and generally concur that the Muslim League 
                                                
62 The Aligarians I interviewed at the Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology in Karachi, 
Pakistan ( including Z.A. Nizami, Abdul Rashid Khan, Zakir Ali Khan and others) are indeed educationists 
now, but began their careers in other professions. 
63 Bangladeshi Professor of English Akhtaruzzaman, Indian Engineer A.K. Mathur, and Indian Communist 
S.M. Mehdi are exceptions. 
64 For more on the Women’s College see Gail Minault, Secluded Scholars: Women's Education and 
Muslim Social Reform in Colonial India (Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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agenda was broadly persuasive at Aligarh, though many of them deny sympathy for its 
utopian ideals.  
 The moment of decision marks a critical shift in the constitution of this group, 
which has, until this point in the story, seemed broadly unified. Of the seventy-two 
individuals I personally interviewed, thirty-two moved to Pakistan between 1947 and 
1965 (two originally hail from Lahore), with the majority shifting in 1947 or ’48. Many 
claim to have acted independently, as Major General (Ret’d) Wajahat Husain or Major 
General (Ret’d) Ghulam Umar. Others, particularly women, migrated later, when they 
married Pakistani men (who often had roots and family connections in UP),65 or in the 
case of men, because their other family members had settled in Pakistan and urged them 
to come.66 
Another twenty-eight narrators chose not to leave India, sometimes because they 
never supported the idea of Pakistan as in the case of Professor Irfan Habib and Professor 
Riazur Rahman Sherwani, but often because the circumstances in their families 
(attachment to land or community, or a father’s attachment to Congress nationalism), or 
their own youth prevented them from making an independent decision, as in the cases of 
Professors Ather Siddiqi and Masoodul Hasan. Among these twenty-eight, there is an 
important divide that colors their perspective on many of the issues we discussed, that is, 
whether they remained in Aligarh and attached to the university, or whether they found 
                                                
65 Umar, "Khadija Minhaj Umar: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas January 4, 2008." Fari Rahman, 
"Fatima Fari Rahman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas January 4, 2008." 
66 Wazir Ahmad Razzaqi, "Professor Wazir Ahmad Razzaqi: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas, May 
21, 2010," (Karachi: May 21, 2010). 
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employment beyond Aligarh’s protective boundaries. Among these twenty-eight, all with 
an association to Aligarh University, seventeen have remained close to the institution. 
There are those who remained in Aligarh, who repeatedly talk about being lucky to be 
there, about how once they got that job they were set, didn’t have to worry (Ather 
Siddiqi, Masoodul Hasan). Then there are those outside of Aligarh (Professor 
Mohammad Amin, Ahmad Rashid, Majid Ali Siddiqi,67 Saghir Ahmad Rizvi) who seem 
willing to admit more adversity for Muslims. The remaining eleven live in Lucknow and 
New Delhi where many of them were engineers as Zafar Mohammad Khan, Ahmad 
Saeed, and Saghir Ahmad Rizvi, scientists, or educationists, as Professor Mohammad 
Amin, and Sayyid Hamid. One narrator, Ram Advani, a non-Muslim, shifted from 
Lahore to Lucknow during 1947. 
Finally, there is a small group who settled in East Pakistan—the majority of them 
ethnic Bengalis or Sylhetis—and these narrators later supported Bangladeshi 
independence. Among these nine Bangladeshi narrators, only M.A. Rashid, originally 
hails from Lucknow, in UP, and is a native Urdu speaker. Their ethnicity marks a 
difference not only in their post-’47 experience, but it also means that their identity in 
Aligarh was objectively different from those students (and narrators for this study) who 
largely hail from the Urdu-speaking areas of UP. The Bengali former students offer a 
unique perspective on the culture of tolerance and brotherhood at the university—their 
habits of food and dress were different—and while they generally remember their 
                                                
67 Majid Ali Siddiqi lays the blame for status disparity between Muslims and Others on: the caste system, 
corruption, communalism, all of which he said, have intensified since 1947. 
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experience positively, they were aware of “difference” in a way that Urdu-speaking, roti 
eating UP-wallahs were not.  
Throughout this analysis one or two narrators may represent these different 
groups, and their definition is some ways fluid. For example, some East Pakistanis shared 
Leftist sympathies with their slightly younger North Indian fellows, but shifted to 
Pakistan nonetheless. It is key to recognize that Aligarh’s environment has long been rife 
with factional allegiances, and whereas I may have expected the pressures of family and 
community to affect the decisions of these young men during the independence 
movement and the demand for Pakistan, their actions were also tied up with attachments 
to local groups and leadership. 
 The data, experiences and stories I have collected from this large body of 
interviews comprises a significant data set, and certainly I have been unable to use all of 
it. My analysis has been guided by the issues that appeared to be of importance to my 
narrators, the experiences they spoke about and the significance of Aligarh and partition 
in their own lives. I have drawn on the literature of collective and generational memory to 
understand how a narrator’s experience at Aligarh and during partition might impact his 
or her later experience and how the relationship between past and present can shift the 
reading of an event or experience. The basic premise is that partition’s impact did not end 
when the major migrations did, or even when the violence did. Partition’s impact on the 
lives of Muslims in all three post-partition states is ongoing, and to understand the 
experience of Muslim South Asians, we should examine these long processes of 
partitioning. 
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ON LANGUAGE 
As in all of the interviews I conducted, those cited here contain a mix of Urdu and 
English. In the interest of preserving the tone of the interviews, I have italicized portions 
spoken in Urdu that I have translated. The translation is complicated, however, by the 
frequent “code-switching” that narrators employ, often switching languages several times 
within even a single sentence.  Since its inception, English has been the primary medium 
of instruction at Aligarh. Many of the informants have also worked and published in 
English-dominant environments. However, most of their interpersonal interactions have 
always taken place in Urdu. As Majid Ali Siddiqi reminded me, English medium schools 
were far less common during the British period, therefore most students communicated in 
“Urdu. In Aligarh, it was Urdu. Because, there was reason about it. You know, the 
English schools have cropped up later on, after independence.”68 Thus, particularly when 
narrators speak of their early life, many remember it in an Urdu idiom and discuss it in an 
Urdu medium. In Pakistan and Bangladesh narrators seemed comparatively comfortable 
speaking in English. In India, however, many of the interviews I conducted were 
primarily in Urdu and I have translated them into English. This ease with multiple 
languages would have been a sign of a well-rounded education in Aligarh, and I made no 
effort to circumscribe the narrators’ preferred mode of communication, only asking for 
                                                
68 He also mentioned that Hindi became compulsory after independence and “I wanted to have English 
because without English you cannot go higher, you cannot study Engineering or Medical; you can’t do 
anything without English. So two languages had become compulsory. Third choice was either Urdu or 
Arts. So, Urdu, I have love for Urdu so I took Urdu. I took three languages and two mathematics and other 
science.” Majid Ali Siddiqi, "Majid Ali Siddiqi: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 2, 2009," 
(Lucknow: October 2, 2009). 
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clarification if my own Urdu failed me. The boundaries between languages and idioms 
were frequently unclear and it is difficult to discern a pattern. 
Funny things happened, however, and sometimes things did not go as planned. 
For instance, the following exchange established the parameters as I turned on the 
recorder during my interview with Retired Pakistani General Iqbal Shafi:  
Brigadier Iqbal Shafi: I’ll be talking mostly in Urdu, is that alright? 
AA: That’s alright. Either way is perfectly fine.  If I don’t understand, I’ll ask you to clarify. 
BIS: No, no I’ll make it very simple, but we will talk in “mixed language” okay? 
 
Throughout our one hour interview he used Urdu only for two purposes: to quote another 
speaker (sometimes quite emotionally as he remembered their words) and to quote the 
poetry of Iqbal. The frequent invocation of poetry to make a particular point is a common 
conversational device, and Shafi, and others, deploy it frequently. Urdu was thus 
distinctly marked during our interview to distinguish his words, opinions, and 
experiences from those of others. Several other narrators also used Urdu this way, in 
interviews otherwise conducted in English.  
 
ORAL HISTORY 
I conducted these interviews in a time of tremendous social change in the 
subcontinent. In the years following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
United States, Pakistan was increasingly drawn into a theater of war on its western 
border. The tensions created by this situation exerted far less pressure on the narratives in 
2005 and 2006 than they did in my later rounds of interviews, beginning in January 2008 
after the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. By the time I arrived to 
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conduct interviews in 2010, the turmoil in the country after the assumption of power by 
the Pakistan People’s Party led by Asif Ali Zardari had created such a terrific anxiety that 
it became difficult to keep interviews focused on the subjects of my research. The 
interviews are a work in progress, a site “in which narrators revise the image of their own 
past as they go along.”69 This is incredibly important, because their anxieties about 
Pakistan emerge in their recounting of its creation. The history they were remembering is 
colored by the present they were experiencing as they spoke. Eventually, I did have to 
stop interviewing in Pakistan because the present was too present in the interviews for 
my taste. By May-June 2010, the security situation in the country had deteriorated to a 
point that it had taken over every conversation, every interaction. As an American at a 
time of growing anti-American sentiment in the country, I didn’t fear for my safety, but 
for the integrity of my research. 
 In India, similarly, I arrived at a time of palpable tension between India and 
Pakistan. In November 2008, terrorists held Bombay hostage for three days as they 
attacked a number of sites associated with foreigners (the Taj Palace Hotel) and Jews 
(Nariman House). These events and others altered the relationship between non-Muslim 
Indians and their fellow Muslim citizens in that it created an impression that terrorist 
violence came from outside, rather than inside India. This removed some pressure from 
India’s Muslims, who for decades, and particularly in the 1990s, were frequently 
suspected of perpetrating anti-state violence. However, it deepened tensions between 
India and Pakistan and this affected many of my interviews with Indian Muslims. 
                                                
69 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, 61. 
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 Whereas in Pakistan I had been quite open about my own family’s links to 
Aligarh (my father’s mother’s family is from Aligarh and their home still stands on the 
“City Side”), and the fact that my grandfather and several uncles attended Aligarh 
Muslim University, in India I became cautious about revealing this information. In fact, I 
sometimes didn’t mention it until quite late in the interaction, when a narrator would 
become curious about me and my motives in collecting his story. Then I would tell him, 
“My father was born here, but now my family is outside.” “Outside” is a euphemism for 
“abroad” and in this case allowed me to mask the fact that my family is in Pakistan. What 
most often followed was a brief investigation into what family I came from, but my father 
was too young to be known, only five when his family migrated. Occasionally a narrator 
might remember my great-uncle, now Major General Wajahat Husain (who was friends, 
for instance with Nawab Sahib Ibn-e-Saeed Chhatari), but more often than not, this 
conversation ended with shrugged shoulders and the reminder that “It was a big 
university.” In the context of the personal interaction, it was never a problem that my 
family was in Pakistan, but I feared that if I revealed it too early it might affect people’s 
willingness to share their true feelings about the state’s creation, and their assessment of 
the people who moved there. In fact, I did sometimes have people beg my forgiveness, 
but then express frankly that they mistrusted Pakistanis, or found them crass, or 
dishonest.   
 I was glad to hear these assessments because I had expected them and it gave me 
a sense that despite my presence, people trusted their feelings, having lived with them for 
so long, I was not there to change their minds, only to understand its contents. 
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 In Bangladesh I was also apprehensive about sharing my history in Pakistan, but 
as the Aligarians there are so few, I wanted to share with them the fact that I had recently 
lived in Aligarh and was particularly curious about their experience there. The 
Bangladesh chapter of the Aligarh Old Boys’ Association was particularly helpful in 
locating narrators for me, and they invited me to speak at their annual meeting on Sir 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan. This event gave me the opportunity to meet several senior 
Aligarians who I convinced to sit down with me. I was surprised to find, however, much 
less anxiety about Pakistan than I expected. This older generation, while they were active 
in the movement for Bangladeshi independence, had also been active in demanding an 
independent Pakistan. They believed in its ideals, but were disappointed in its realities. 
Many of them expressed a sense of loss at having gained independence from Pakistan, for 
although they hated the oppressive tactics of the government and army (which they often 
specifically referred to as Punjabi), they still believed in the value of state federation. 
Some hastened to share stories with me of their experiences and travels in Pakistan prior 
to 1971.  
 Many narrators received me as they would a granddaughter come home to do a 
report on her history. They invited me for tea and we sat together in the sitting room as I 
asked them to share their stories with me. In the earliest interviews I conducted, in 2005 
and 2006 with narrators in Pakistan, I found them quite keen to help me to understand the 
whole trajectory of Pakistan history and to make sure I had the “correct” story.70  In these 
                                                
70 I have also written about this in my M.A. Thesis submitted to the University of Texas in 2006. Abbas, 
"Thinking through Partition: Finishing the Narrative (Unpublished Master's Thesis)." 
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interviews, I found myself interrogating narrators on questions of how they related to 
their own history, and to the state of Pakistan. In India, when I was living in Aligarh, my 
interviews were more driven by an attempt to understand the atmosphere of the university 
during the 1940s and 50s, and I asked many of them questions about their participation in 
university and political activities. In Bangladesh, I was curious about how the 
Bengali/Sylheti students were received in Aligarh, how they coped, and how things 
changed for them after 1947. As such, each body of interviews has a distinctly different 
texture. Only in Pakistan did I conduct interviews over a long period of time, from 2005-
2010. Across this time period, as I noted above, the tensions and anxieties changed 
markedly and this is reflected in the interviews, as it inevitably must be. 
 Oral History interviews are unstable; they are highly dependent on context. A 
document, once written, may have been written in response to a particular context and 
may be interpreted differently over time, but its content remains the same. An interview, 
even the same questions, would be different if conducted under different circumstances. 
Oral history interviews are inherently dynamic, determined by the positioning of the 
interviewee, the interviewer and the context that surrounds both. As a young female, 
foreign, non-Muslim researcher (along with any number of other identity markers that 
people may have understood), my experience must be different from that of a man, or a 
Muslim or a South Asian. Any combination of these variables, if reconfigured, would 
create a different outcome. As it was, I was often welcomed as if a long-lost member of 
the family, reminded of my duties to community, family and faith (sometimes explicitly 
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as narrators read me passages from the Qu’ran71), and this served to remind me of my 
commitment to the story I was there to tell. 
 As a historian, I am a party to the data I have collected. The narrators have 
told their stories, but it remains up to me to apply an interpretive lens, to draw out the 
meaning inside the words they uttered. My interpretation may only be one of many, and 
perhaps someday these interviews will be the subject of other research, other 
dissertations. And when they are read under different historical circumstances, the 
anxieties and meanings that seemed so important to me and to the narrators as we created 
them, will inevitably appear different, and indeed they will be different. 
 
NOTE ON NAMES 
Throughout this work I refer repeatedly to many of the 72 individuals I 
interviewed between 2005 and 2010 in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Among them are 
retired army officers, professors, professionals, mothers, and teachers. The first time they 
appear, both in text and in citation it is with their full name and, in the case of retired 
army officers or professors, their rank. I have also included 1-2 sentence biographies in 
the footnotes on this first appearance. Ordinarily, I would address them, as is customary 
in the Indian subcontinent, by their least common name.  Therefore, Major General 
Wajahat Husain (Ret’d) is General Wajahat.  I addressed Professor Irfan Habib, as most 
people do, as Irfan Sahib; Professor Habib would seem to refer to his father, Professor 
Mohammad Habib. However, the question of a professional rank seems to interfere with 
the fact that at the time of the stories they are recounting, they were all students, not 
                                                
71 Yunus, "Mohammad Yunus: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 7, 2008." 
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differentiated by rank. The risk of including their rank is to unwittingly authorize certain 
narratives over others, and this is certainly not my intent.  Thus, in the body of the text, I 
have tried to be consistent in naming the narrators without their rank. This should not be 
construed as a lack of respect for their status, however, as I hope is clear from the regard I 
have for their willingness to share their deeply personal experiences with me. 
 
 42 
Chapter 1  
Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh Muslim University 
 
The Aligarh University, and its founder, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan have a way of 
occupying the past and present simultaneously. Sir Sayyid’s reputation as a reformer and 
a thinker has persisted, nearly unassailable in the minds of Aligarh Muslims; he 
represents a true path towards Muslim empowerment, and whatever difficulties the 
Muslim community may have faced are attributed to a failure to uphold the values of Sir 
Sayyid. He is therefore significant to this study for the foundational thought he gave to 
the Aligarh community, but also because he continues to exist as a powerful symbol of 
Aligarh’s ideal Muslim: faithful, educated, generous, and able to move between the 
worlds of the West and Muslim India. This chapter examines the implication of that 
symbolic power while examining the tension between the foundational values of the 
institution at Aligarh and the world outside. 
The symbolic pressure that Sir Sayyid continues to exert makes him part of 
contemporary life in Aligarh. Though dead for over one hundred years, he gazes down on 
the institution from portraits in nearly every room, and he often feels as present as the 
current administrators.  For example, former student and retired Professor of English 
Asloob Ahmad Ansari told me, “I think he was the greatest benefactor of the Muslims in 
the last several years, or centuries I should say.”1 Ansari instinctively drew Sir Sayyid 
                                                
1 Asloob Ahmad Ansari, "Asloob Ahmad Ansari: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas July 5, 2008," 
(Aligarh: July 5, 2008), Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Orient 
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into the present. The period of his leadership and the values he represented are not distant 
from Aligarh in time, but occurred “in the last several years.” His influence continues 
even now as the actions of university students, teachers and administrators are constantly 
measured against the ideals of Sir Sayyid’s “mission.” This contemporaneity is 
significant, it fortifies the link between Aligarh now and Aligarh then, and creates a 
thread by which the traditions of the past might be expected to be relevant today. Aligarh 
prides itself on the maintenance of its traditions, though these “traditions” are best upheld 
in speech rather than practice. In some cases, this emphasis on tradition in perpetuity has 
preserved outdated and dangerous prejudices over which Sir Sayyid persists as the 
overseer. 
His presence is imposing, as both an image and a guide. His values are accepted 
as perfect, nearly primordial among Aligarians the world over. Any sense that his politics 
may have had an influence in the Aligarh environment is largely absent. This history 
begins with his educational mission and his mission to reform Muslims, to rescue them 
from the decline initiated by the 1857 Mutiny. Many Aligarians profess to carry his torch 
by contributing to educational development. As Zakir Ali Khan, General Secretary of the 
Pakistan Aligarh Old Boys’ Association (since 1960) explained to me, the goals of the 
association are “exactly what Sir Sayyid has taught us: to establish educational 
institutions, to impart education, to make education available to those who cannot afford 
                                                                                                                                            
Longman, 1988). Asloob Ahmad Ansari joined AMU in 1937 and completed his B.A. in 1943. In 1946 he 
completed his M.A. in English. He went to Oxford where he received an Honors degree in English 
Language and Literature. He later became a Professor of English in Aligarh University and retired in 1987. 
He lives in Aligarh. 
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to pay.”2  The Aligarh Old Boys’ Association in Pakistan has started a University of 
Engineering and Technology in his name, and the Association in Dhaka, Bangladesh has 
purchased land for a similar project.3 Sir Sayyid himself is a watchdog over the lives of 
students in the University and the administration, and their shortcomings are often cast as 
a failure to uphold his ideals.4  
To begin to understand the symbolic power of Aligarh University and its 
traditions, this chapter examines the origin story of the Aligarh University—initially the 
Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College (MAO College)—and the intentions of its 
founder, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. An examination not only of his own life, but his 
religious experience, the environment of his youth, the particular issues brought on by the 
1857 Mutiny and an understanding of how these variables came together in the person of 
Sir Sayyid and the institution at Aligarh can help us to understand why his educational 
ideas and reforms continue to be significant.  
As this investigation will show, however, Sir Sayyid’s values were imbedded in 
the current politics of his time. His educational agenda was driven by a politics of 
                                                
2 Zakir Ali Khan, "Zakir Ali Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006," (Karachi: 
August 10, 2006). Zakir Ali Khan graduated from Aligarh in 1948 with a degree in Civil Engineering. He 
migrated to Pakistan in 1949 where he served as first assistant and later Chief Engineer in the Karachi 
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4 In 2005, as Zakir Ali Khan presented me a copy of his book Riwayat-e-Aligarh (The Traditions of 
Aligarh) he told me that the book was given to every incoming student at the Sir Syed University of 
Engineering and Technology in Karachi so that “He may become Aligarian.” Khan, "Zakir Ali Khan: 
Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006." 
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decline, a theory of Muslim “relative deprivation” that inspired a movement for reform. 
This perception of deprivation spurred a shoring up of elite Muslim values in the period 
after the 1857 Mutiny and helped Sir Sayyid to generate support for his controversial 
ideas. At the same time, this consolidation fed a homogenizing narrative that privileged 
the Muslim elite of North India and risked excluding others who did not fit into this 
narrow identity. There are aspects of Sir Sayyid’s perspective that scholars have been 
willing to ascribe to “his time and place,” for instance his ideas on educating women.5 
Less examined, however, is the influence of the narrative of unity on the attitude of 
exceptionalism that developed within the university. Sir Sayyid’s reformist ideals have 
been viewed as progressive, and indeed he resisted the prevailing anxieties of his time, 
particularly with regard to Muslim reluctance to pursue Western education. Still, they 
were in part determined by his political concerns, his unwavering loyalty to British power 
and fear that any hint of disloyalty would lead to the permanent marginalization of 
Muslims. These two narratives are interwoven in the institutional environment where it 
has become difficult to separate the value of his educational mission and the dangers of 
his political prejudices. 
What becomes visible here is the power of a narrative of decline a “discourse of 
Muslim backwardness,” how steadfastly Aligarh’s partisans hold to it, and the 
consequences of holding fast to the legacy of the founder. The university, its faculty and 
staff are fiercely protective of its narrative, and while internal relations at the university 
have long been faction-ridden, there has been a constant construction of a public narrative 
                                                
5 For an in-depth examination of women’s education in India see Minault, Secluded Scholars. 
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of unity and solidarity that has been broadly persuasive, suggesting a unity of purpose 
that does not always exist.6   
 The environment that the early leaders in Aligarh sought to cultivate prioritized 
the brotherhood of students residing within its walls.7 Sir Sayyid articulated an early 
version of his vision in 1871 when he argued that “the children of the noble, and well-to-
do Muhammadans should be kept at a distance from their homes… they should be 
brought up and educated in a particular manner, and under special care… Boarding 
houses should be opened in healthy localities… with a garden and play ground attached; 
that there should be a mosque with a Muazzin… belonging to each house;” all of the boys 
should be compelled to learn and say their prayers and  “all of them should be made to 
wear one and the same dress.”8 He cautioned that unless boys were “brought up in the 
manner above referred to, they will always remain ignorant, worthless, and exposed to all 
sorts of evils.”9 Within this environment, even non-Muslim students blended in. They 
were not compelled to observe the Muslim religious traditions, but permitted to maintain 
their own and their presence is a point of pride in the Aligarh narrative.  
                                                
6 See the recently revised version of Minault and Lelyveld’s famous article “The Campaign for a Muslim 
University 1989-1920” in Gail Minault, Gender, Language, and Learning: Essays in Indo-Muslim Cultural 
History (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2009), 220- 73. See also Chapter 3 of this dissertation for coverage of 
the 1930s and 40s. 
7 The most thorough examination of the early years of the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College is David 
Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978). It is complemented by ———, "Three Aligarh Students: Aftab Ahmad Khan, Ziauddin 
Ahmad, and Muhammad Ali," Modern Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (1975). 
8 Syed Ahmed Khan, "Translation of the Report of the Members of the Select Committee for the Better 
Diffusion and Advancement of Learning among Muhammadans of India," in Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's 
Educational Philosophy: A Documentary Record, ed. Hafeez Malik (Islamabad: National Institute of 
Historical and Cultural Research, 1872), 170. 
9 Ibid. 
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The tradition of inclusivity is central to Aligarh’s sense of self, and in 
remembering the 1940s narrators elevated this tradition as the primary explanation for the 
absence of violence on the campus during periods of communal strife elsewhere in the 
country, including in Aligarh city, separated from the university only by the Railroad 
tracks and a bridge known as the kat pulla (wooden bridge).10 This narrative also formed 
the foundation for a culture of exceptionalism and exclusivity that once appeared as a 
virtue of the residential system, but continued to trouble the institution throughout the 
1930s and 40s as the boundaries between the university and the outside became 
increasingly difficult to monitor.  
 This chapter and the next examine the conditions of the university’s founding, the 
personality and symbolic valence of its ever-present founder, and the environment of the 
university that instilled in young Muslim men a sense of solidarity backed by a distinctly 
Muslim masculine identity. This environment prepared them for the pubic life they were 
expected to lead, and by the late 1930s, the Muslim League seemed to offer the best 
opportunity for the fulfillment of that desire.  The priority of Muslim unity that defined 
the Aligarh university was repeated in the assertion of Muslim “nationhood” that was 
central to the League’s demand for independent statehood, thus linking the worlds of 
education and politics inextricably during this period. 
 
                                                
10 Paul Brass notes that none of the early pre-independence riots in Aligarh City, in 1925, 1927, and 1937 
involved Aligarh students. But in 1946-47 the Congress government paid special attention to Aligarh, 
concerned that the students would “invade” the city and they posted additional police there to prevent it. In 
March 1946 students were involved in a conflagration with a merchant that resulted in the burning of a 
market nearby to the university and sparked communal riot that left 4 dead and 16 injured. Brass, 
Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, 71- 73. 
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SIR SAYYID AHMAD KHAN  
Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the founder of the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental 
College that became the Aligarh Muslim University in 1920, emerged as a prominent 
reformer in the late nineteenth-century.  He was a mid-level colonial officer who gained 
recognition for his loyalty during and after the uprising against British power in 1857. 
The events of 1857 highlighted for Sayyid Ahmad the vulnerability of the Muslim 
position— as the deposed rulers of India— and he set about trying to rehabilitate 
Muslims who, as a whole, he felt were in a state of decline.  In his view, the mighty 
ruling class that had yielded the formidable Mughal kings had since descended to a low 
ebb in its civilizational history because of complacency and the declining attention to the 
principles of respectable, or ashraf culture. This perception of decay, of “relative 
deprivation” is key to the politics of rejuvenation that were engendered at the Aligarh 
Muslim University.11  
Sayyid Ahmad Khan was in many ways the perfect specimen for this kind of 
work.  He enjoyed the high status of the Delhi ashraf—those families who claimed 
heritage outside the subcontinent and who were considered “respectable”—and his family 
had a long association with both the Mughal court and the British bureaucracy. Sayyid 
Ahmad was raised in the home of his maternal grandfather Khwaja Fariduddin Ahmad,  
who had been vazir (Prime Minister) in the court of the Mughal Emperor Akbar Shah II 
and also served as a British-appointed envoy to Persia and as its agent in Burma.12  In 
                                                
11 Minault, Secluded Scholars, 50. 
12 Rafi Ahmad Alavi, Translation of Hayat-I-Jawed: A Biographical Account of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan by 
Altaf Husain Hali (Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 2008), 6. 
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addition, Khwaja Fariduddin was a pious Muslim, devoted to Shah Ghulam Ali, a pir 
(saint) of the Naqshbandi Sufi order.  
In addition to this distinguished lineage, Sayyid Ahmad had been trained at home 
in the traditional subjects; he knew Persian, Urdu and Arabic. Himself a prominent 
follower of the reformer Shah Wali Ullah, Sayyid Ahmad later credited both his mother 
and his maternal grandfather with shaping his sensibilities. His upbringing was 
cosmopolitan, he participated in a variety of religious festivals and commemorations 
including that of Holi, the Hindu festival of color.13 However, it was also determined by 
adherence to the norms of ashraf culture, and the traditions of the “late Mughal service 
gentry who had come to terms with the changing political and economic realities of 
British-ruled India.”14 It would seem that his unconventional upbringing—both culturally 
and religiously—prepared him for his critical role in guiding his contemporaries through 
a process of adaptation to their altered circumstances after 1857. 
The Mutiny of 1857 plays a pivotal role in most histories of the Aligarh Muslim 
University. In the collective memory, this history tells of the devastation of Muslims and 
their communities—especially Delhi and Lucknow—of the erosion of Muslim social 
status, the usurpation of land and the alienation of landholders.15  For Indians, and for 
Muslims in particular, the uprising of 1857 has taken on the valence of a “national 
trauma,” an event that significantly disrupted the “institutional underpinnings of the 
                                                
13 Ibid., 18. 
14 Minault, Secluded Scholars, 17. 
15 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 13. 
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social order.”16 Disruptions to everyday life, such as 1857, become in the collective 
memory, moments of coherence for that moral community and provide “a close link 
between self-identity and national identity.”17 As this section will show, 1857 provided 
the impetus for the formation of a concept of national identity closely identified with the 
intellectual leadership of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, embodied in the institution at Aligarh. 
Sir Sayyid is the link between the Aligarh University and the rebellion of 1857, and his 
presence in this narrative affects the way that 1857 is read in the Aligarh environment. 
The meaning Aligarh Muslims have attributed to 1857 has less to do with the 
content or events of the revolution than it does with the perception of decline and 
rejuvenation that followed it. In other words, the revolt that might be identified as the 
beginning of the Freedom Movement by those who insist on calling it “The First War of 
Independence” is less significant in itself in this narrative than the outcome that Muslims 
were finally alienated from power with the exile of Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Mughal 
Emperor who the mutineers belatedly selected as their figurehead.  The effect of the 
“national trauma” was not to disrupt an existing collective identity, but rather to create 
the conditions in which one might be formed, a moment around which a group of people 
could identify a set of grievances which might draw them together into a common 
narrative. 1857 is thus drawn into this history of collective identity and provides the 
founding conditions for a narrative of Muslim decline and regeneration led by Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan. 
                                                
16 Arthur G. Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), xi. 
17 Ibid., 37. 
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The Mutiny of 1857 was an uprising of Hindu and Muslim soldiers who feared 
that the British were trying to “take away their caste and convert them forcibly to 
Christianity.”18  Discontent over wages and the spread of British power had been 
spreading in the Company armies for decades,19 but the trigger for the revolt was a rumor 
that cartridges for the new Enfield rifle were greased with a combination of beef and pork 
fat that, if ingested, would strip one of caste.  Since the soldier had to pull the cartridge 
from its case using his teeth, he would certainly ingest the grease and it would pollute, 
and thus destroy, his caste.20  Such a stripping of caste would render a man vulnerable to 
forced conversion to Christianity as he would be cut off permanently from his own 
community.  This controversy erupted at a time of increasing suspicion of the British in 
the Bengal Army and led to the uprising that soon spread from Meerut across North 
India.21  In the end, however, the mutineers—who had installed the ailing Mughal 
Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar as their leader22—were subdued and the British regained 
                                                
18 Thomas R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1964), 47. 
19 Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race, and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-
1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 27. 
20 It is true that Muslims in India do not adhere to a rigid “caste” system as it is perceived in the Hindu 
tradition, though Muslim social hierarchy is marked by bloodlines that correspond to status. Nonetheless, 
the anxiety here is about pollution of the body, which would render it impure, and thus “outcast.” This 
question of purity was as significant to Muslims with regard to pig fat as it was to Hindus with regard to 
beef fat. One narrator sought to fully absolve Muslims of their role in the Mutiny by suggesting that the 
Hindus duped them into believing that the Enfield bullets were packed in pig fat, when it was only beef fat. 
Javid Iqbal, "Justice Javid Iqbal: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 13, 2006," (Lahore: June 13, 
2006). 
21 Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt, 46-91. 
22 Pakistani nationalist historian, I.H. Qureishi, cites this action as “proof of the popularity of the Mughal 
dynasty” which seems an inversion of priorities, as though the Mutiny was motivated by a determination to 
save the Mughal Empire from the British rather than by much more localized grievances. Ishtiaq Husain 
Qureshi, "The Causes of the War of Independence Excerpted from a History of the Freedom Movement 
Vol. 2 (1831- 1905) Pt. 1," in 1857 in the Muslim Historiography, ed. M. Ikram Chaghatai (Lahore: Sang-
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control.  The Muslims lost their “First War of Independence.”  As a starting point for the 
history of Muslim solidarity, then, it is a foreboding one. However, it is not the actual 
uprising of 1857 that marks the beginning of the period of Muslim regeneration.  In the 
Aligarh version—in contrast to the Indian nationalist one—the discontent of the sepoys 
(soldiers) is not remembered as a proto-nationalist impulse that led to the movement for 
independence from the British. In this narrative, 1857 exposed the weakness of Muslims, 
their educational backwardness, and their lack of access to positions of power.  
In the wake of the rebellion, Sayyid Ahmad did not see any potentially sustainable 
impulse that might indicate a larger revolutionary motive, or the potential for a systemic 
change that would mark the end of British rule in India. He was steadfastly loyal to 
British rule, and felt, as he suggested in his 1859 Asbab-e-Bhagavat-e-Hind (The Causes 
of the Indian Revolt), that the rebellion reflected the confluence of “many grievances 
[that] had been rankling in the hearts of the people.”23  In his estimation the rebellion was 
haphazard, rag-tag, not the outcome of a sophisticated conspiracy, and, lest we forget, the 
Indians lost: Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  
Despite this negative narrative, the period after 1857 was actually one of the 
consolidation of the ideals of the middle classes in Northern India led by the reform 
movements of Sir Sayyid and others. As Anil Seal has revealed, the Muslims in the 
North-west Provinces and Awadh (later the United Provinces, today Uttar Pradesh) did 
not suffer the extreme alienation of the Muslims in Bengal. The Muslim population in 
                                                
23 Syed Ahmed Khan Bahadur C.S.I., "The Causes of the Indian Revolt Written by Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
Bahadur, C.S.I. In Urdoo, in the Year 1858 and Translated into English by His Two European Friends, 
Benares, Medical Hall Press. 1873," 
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these Northern regions was urban, many were landholders or professionals; as late as the 
1880s, “Muslims continued to hold more than 45 per cent of all of the uncovenanted and 
judicial posts in the provinces.”24 Still, to the Muslim ashraf it is remembered as a period 
of relative deprivation during which their community fell under the suspicion of a 
shadow of disloyalty. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan deployed a tendentious narrative based on 
the experience of Bengali Muslims to mobilize sympathy for his community of well-to-
do Muslims in Northern India with the intention of elevating their status for better 
representation in the British establishment, especially with regard to Hindu competitors. 
The issue of Muslim “backwardness” had emerged as a particular problem in 
Bengal, prompting W.W. Hunter to write his famous post-Mutiny treatise, The Indian 
Mussulmans: Are they Bound in Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen? in which he 
questioned the very possibility of Muslim loyalty to the British.25  Sir Sayyid was 
appalled.  He had, in 1859 (more than ten years before Hunter’s critique) published 
Asbab-e-Bhagavat-e-Hind in which he clearly indicated that he neither perceived the 
1857 uprising to be the outcome of a conspiracy to overthrow the British ruling power, 
nor could he find any way to justify it in the context of the compulsions of Islamic faith. 
Still, with Hunter’s query, Sayyid Ahmad again found himself having to respond to the 
accusation that Muslims were somehow, inherently, ungovernable and potentially 
disloyal.  In his rejoinder to Hunter, a review published in the Pioneer, Sir Sayyid 
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cautioned that “writers should be careful of their facts when treating of any important 
subject, and having got their facts, ought to avoid all exaggeration or misrepresentation” 
lest the ideas of one Englishman be interpreted as those of the “whole English 
community.”26 The alarmist nature of Hunter’s book, and his broad questioning of 
Muslim loyalty, clearly hit a sore spot with Sir Sayyid, a self-described “cosmopolitan 
Mohammadan”27 who had gone to great lengths to expound upon the devotion of many 
Muslims to British service. In fact, Sayyid Ahmad Khan published a work documenting 
the role of loyal Muslims during the 1857 disturbances.  An Account of the Loyal 
Mohomedans of India concludes with his wish that his work had “satisfactorily 
demonstrated… that there was really no foundation whatever for the calumnies which 
would lay upon Mahomedans the blame of originating the Rebellion in 1857, as an act 
sanctioned or countenanced by their religion!”28  Through these written excursions into 
the British public sphere, and Sir Sayyid’s unabashed support for the British ruling 
establishment, he earned their favor, their ear, and became a vocal advocate for the needs 
and rights of Muslims both educationally and culturally.  
Though Hunter’s book was nominally an analysis of Bengali Muslims, as Sir 
Sayyid rightly pointed out in his response, the book “abounds in passages which lead the 
reader to believe that it is not merely the Bengal Mohammedans that the author treats of, 
                                                
26 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, "Review on Hunter's Indian Mussalmans," in Shan Mohammad, ed., Writings 
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27 Syed Ahmad Khan, "Review on Hunter's Indian Mussalmans," in Writings and Speeches of Sir Syed 
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28 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, "An Account of the Loyal Mohomedans of India," in Political Profile of Sir Sayyid 
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but the Mohammadans throughout India.”29 Hunter’s report became the basis for a 
“perception of decline” that persisted in Muslim reformist thinking through the late 
nineteenth-century and beyond. However, historians have shown “that the Muslim 
student population in modern high schools was generally proportionate to the Muslim 
numerical strength” in most of the provinces of India, except Bengal.30  Even though Sir 
Sayyid, too, resisted the implication that Muslims throughout India were “educationally 
backward” he nonetheless employed a rhetoric of decline to generate support for his 
educational movement often using the examples of alienation in Bengal as tendentiously 
as had Hunter.  Sir Sayyid coupled this narrative with a story of Muslim alienation from 
power in the wake of the Mutiny that he had developed in his Asbab-e-Bhagavat-e-Hind. 
The revolt had been caused, he suggested, by the British “treating Indians with contempt” 
and the fact that “this ill-treatment [was] more repugnant to the feelings of the 
Muhammadans.”31 The Muslims were particularly troubled by the encroachment of 
British power, he argued, because “for centuries the Mahommadan's position in India has 
been an honourable one” and the British disregard for this historical position was 
offensive.  
Paul Brass has argued that though the statistics Hunter deployed did indicate a 
measure of Muslim deprivation in Bengal, it was an irony of the Muslim nationalist 
movement that it was mobilized intensely in the United Provinces, where the conditions 
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31 Khan Bahadur C.S.I., "Causes of the Indian Revolt- Pritchett 2005." 
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that Hunter described were largely inapplicable.32 Brass draws attention to two 
contradictory arguments used by Muslim nationalists: a) that Muslims were backward 
and b) that Muslims had a historical link to power and prestige that qualified them for 
disproportionate representation in positions of power.33 I disagree that these two 
arguments were contradictory, rather their complimentarity gave them power. The 
combination of these two powerful myths, that of deprivation, and of decline as the result 
of alienation from power became the basis of a Muslim awakening that mobilized 
“Muslim national will for a competitive coexistence in the future.”34 It established a 
precedent for Muslim power and facilitated a desire to recover it. 
In the context of these grievances, Khan cast the relationship between natives, and 
particularly Muslims, in starkly gendered language. Quoting from the Bible, he argued 
that as Christians, the British had a responsibility to “inculcate friendship and love to all 
men.” He chided the ruling class for their indelicate dismissal of these social graces. “The 
Creator has instilled it into the heart of man and the instinct of animals, that the strong 
should be kind to and care for the weak. The father loves his child before the child loves 
him. The man tries to win the woman, not the woman the man.”35 It was the 
responsibility of the ruling class to win the affections of the natives, and especially the 
Muslims, who could have been “friends and supporters.” Good governance, he suggested, 
could make loyal subjects of the well-born, and loyal subjects, unlike the mutineers, were 
                                                
32 Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (London; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), 121. 
33 Ibid., 170. 
34 Khalidi, Indian Muslims since Independence, 108. 
35 Khan Bahadur C.S.I., "Causes of the Indian Revolt- Pritchett 2005." 
 57 
worthy, rather than emasculated and cowardly. Sir Sayyid reminded the British of a 
lesson they should already know, from the Book of Matthew, “’Blessed’ are the meek, 
for they shall inherit the earth.”36 It was therefore to the Muslims of his own region and 
status that Sir Sayyid turned his attention as he dedicated his life to recovering 
“respectable” Muslims from the specter of backwardness, by making every effort to 
prove their worthiness to the British ruling class even as his language complied with a 
hierarchy of power that placed Englishmen above Indians. Muslims may be able to 
become “friends” of the English, but they would not pose a threat.  
As long as Muslims had been able to look to the leader of the Mughal Empire, 
being Muslim entailed a special relationship to power, and with the demise of that 
institution (symbolic as it was) the Muslim community lacked an institutional focus.  Sir 
Sayyid’s educational movement sought to restore the link to power by preserving 
continuity with the past and looking to the future. He worked to protect the existing 
pillars of the community, and to create new ones designed to foster modern (read: 
European) values and learning.  His experience with the British had taught him that to 
garner their favor, he would have to represent an interest “which the government believed 
existed, [with] which it imagined would need help.”37 He set out to groom a class of boys 
who could become successful in the British system beyond even the boundaries of 
traditional government service. 
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In earlier days, this meant the Mughal courts, but by the mid-nineteenth-century 
the British dominated the court environment; Muslims and Hindus only had access to 
low-paying clerical work.  Armed with their traditional Persian education, young men 
apprenticed in government offices often under the tutelage or watchful eye of a relative.  
This lowly work offered benefits to the young man’s family beyond his meager salary, 
including access and prestige that could aid a family in trouble.  Young men were able to 
establish personal relationships with British officials, and many established families got 
their starts “as petty government officials; still others were rewarded for acts of 
loyalty.”38  Sir Sayyid’s relationship with Mr. Shakespear, the Collector and Magistrate 
of Bijnor, exemplifies this pattern. During the uprising, Sir Sayyid assured Mrs. 
Shakespear of his loyalty and intention to protect the Europeans of Bijnor. He told her, 
“As long as I am alive, you should not worry. When you see my dead body lying before 
your mansion, then you may do so.”39 Sir Sayyid’s loyalty during the uprising was 
rewarded with several titles and the respect of British officials. 
However, this was a system that limited the advancement of Indians, and after 
1857, Sir Sayyid came to see that traditional systems were losing social currency in the 
changing environment of British India.40  His first moves towards educational reform 
involved establishing scientific societies and supporting the translation of Western 
scientific texts into Urdu.  Eventually he settled on English as the most valuable tool for 
advancement.  However, if Muslim students were to study English, Sir Sayyid would 
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have to convince them not only of its utility in public life, but also its consistency with 
their faith and traditional values. British schools taught English and were spreading 
quickly after 1860 but the majority of their students were Hindu.  Muslims were skeptical 
of these schools that promised “enlightenment,” fearing that English education would be 
instrumental in “creating disbelief of religion in the minds of the pupils.”41 Furthermore, 
in these schools, ashraf Muslims feared, their children would have to mix with “vulgar 
people” by which they meant both Hindus and lower-class Muslims.42  Instead of risking 
this social contamination, Muslims continued to look to their traditional education and 
traditional networks of patronage as pillars of a successful career.  
Though he claimed to be organizing the community on the behalf of all Muslims, 
his efforts concentrated on the Urdu-speaking elite, the community in which he was 
raised.  The Delhi of Sir Sayyid’s youth was characterized by rigid social stratification; 
he learned an ethos of social solidarity based on status, common descent and values 
rather than on common belief.  This was the enduring legacy of his political thought.43  
His was not a territorial nationalism, but one that imagined a unique nation, led by men of 
his class, inspired by personal ambition and group solidarity. 
 
POLITICS  
It was not until the late nineteenth- century that Indian communities began to 
organize themselves into political categories, and the Muslims were no exception.  
                                                
41 Ibid., 138. 
42 Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation, 92. 
43 Ibid., 311. 
 60 
Startled by the numerical disparity between Hindus and Muslims as represented in the 
1873 census, Muslim leaders feared being seen as a permanent minority in Indian 
politics.  The codification of census data collected by the British lent concrete statistics to 
arguments about cultural influence and power.  This created a link between political 
power, numerical statistics, and religious affiliation.44  The Muslim community in India 
was fractured by sect and class divisions, but the realization that the British system of 
classification— which focused on religious categories—would determine the constitution 
of social units spurred Sayyid Ahmad to form a political organization for Muslims to 
correspond to the Indian National Congress, but with a distinctly loyalist orientation.  The 
Muslim Educational Conference sought to include all of India’s Muslims in a political 
community.  Francis Robinson writes that the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College 
“was the arena in which Muslim opinion was created and United Provinces Muslim 
leadership assembled.  The Conference was the means by which this opinion was 
disseminated among Muslims in the rest of India and this leadership imposed upon 
them.”45 
Though Sir Sayyid claimed that his goal in founding the Conference was non- 
political, intended rather to foster the social, educational and economic uplift of Muslims, 
everything about his goals and actions was political, and was constructed specifically in 
contrast to other political trends at the time, including the claims of the Indian National 
Congress to represent “all-India” interests. As David Lelyveld notes, even if political 
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agitation to unify the Muslim community in opposition to the Congress was simply a way 
of encouraging Muslims to recognize their plight, the college itself “was a profoundly 
political enterprise” and rationale for its existence was bound up with an analysis of 
“being Muslim and the nature of political power in British India.”46  Sir Sayyid feared 
British retaliation against Muslim political agitation, and because he accepted the 
inevitability of British rule—which he believed they had earned in India—politically, he 
opposed the Congress, and favored differentiating the Muslims from it.47  The effect was 
the construction of a Muslim “moral community” which had a place in the British system 
but ultimately could not reconcile itself to the status of being a permanent minority in a 
Hindu dominated society.  
Sir Sayyid remained intransigent in his opposition to Congress, despite the 
willingness of some Muslims to join its ranks as a way of finding a political voice.  In Sir 
Sayyid’s view, if Muslims joined the Congress, they risked the special concessions that 
they had received in the past through British beneficence.  For Sir Sayyid, the power of 
the Muslim community lay in its differentiation from potentially fickle Congressites, the 
recognition of the qaum as a distinct nationality with special needs, and the maintenance 
of the social standards of the ashraf.  
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Sir Sayyid used the Urdu word qaum to define this community, and though its 
meaning in different contexts has been contentious,48 for him it connoted the Muslims of 
India differentiated from the greater body of Muslims worldwide by their unique 
interaction with the Indian situation.49 Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s ideas of qaum, a broadly 
unified group of people with similar interests, helped him to draw together a Muslim 
community in North India, and to invest it with the strength and power generated by 
common interest. As Faisal Devji has pointed out, Sir Sayyid’s usage of the word qaum 
to define the Muslim community, rather than “ummat or millat, [terms] used for 
specifically religious groupings that were localizable neither in time nor in space” 
implied that among Muslims there was a “natural belonging together.”50 This usage 
marked a new dimension to the word qaum that now came to mean “nation,” and this 
shift in meaning was critical to the development of a concept of Muslim solidarity and 
political consciousness. This conception of qaum did not necessarily exclude North 
Indian Hindus especially those who may have had shared interests with Muslims. Thus, 
Sir Sayyid’s qaum was theoretically open to non-Muslims of the same social status, 
including the landholders and regional princes. He famously described the two main 
communities of India to be “two eyes of a beautiful bride” an image that suggested the 
two communities needed to work in tandem to be successful. But Sir Sayyid’s vociferous 
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efforts at uplift were aimed directly at Muslims and oriented around recovering their 
social status.  His was not a nationalism linked to territory, as the Muslim League 
demand would later become. It was broadly inclusive in some ways, marked by solidarity 
of social status and experience, not merely religious confession.  
It remains a point of pride for Aligarians that Hindus were always a part of the 
student community, that though special arrangements were made for their dietary and 
residential needs, they looked and dressed just like the Muslim students.  However, Sir 
Sayyid saw the emergence of a Hindu political group as a threat to his efforts.  He did not 
feel that Muslims should associate themselves with the Indian National Congress for fear 
of rekindling the aspersions on loyalty cast on Muslims after the Mutiny. Loyalty to the 
British was tantamount to the success of his efforts to support Muslim education. Sir 
Sayyid’s main site for organizing the qaum was the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental 
College at Aligarh, and the MAO College could not survive without British financial 
support.51 
The work of differentiating the Muslims was deeply informed by the prejudices of 
race, caste, and class, and what Mrinalini Sinha calls “the politics of colonial 
masculinity.”52  Sinha refers here to the processes by which British colonizers shored up 
their masculine identity in India in part by constructing it in opposition to the image of 
the “effeminate Bengali,” a transparently gendered and racialized category. By deploying 
gender as an analytical tool for interpreting matrices of power, Sinha includes racist and 
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classist language and action as part of the effort to fortify colonial masculinity.  As she 
suggests, the indigenous elite, including the Muslim ashraf and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
had its own investment in colonial masculinity as articulated by the British elite.   
In seeking to elevate the position of Muslims in India, Sir Sayyid sought to align 
it ever more closely— as his efforts to replicate the Cambridge model in India indicate— 
with the seemingly unassailable position of the British ruling class. Configurations of 
superiority and inferiority, inclusion and exclusion imported from imperial thinking 
highlighted the differences between “Muslims” and “Bengalis” by exploiting the specter 
of the feminized, “clever Hindu”—read as synonymous with Bengali—and 
simultaneously associating the British with supreme power. This narrative is gendered, 
embedded in structures of power that restrict creativity, and the ability to envision a 
world with true equality either for women or for racialized others.    
These narratives shored up Muslim identity by consolidating it under the values of 
the ashraf, though this represented only a small segment of Muslim society.  Sir Sayyid 
looked for symbols to draw Muslim sympathies together and settled on one of the pillars 
of the North Indian Muslim community, its language: Urdu.  A hybrid of the official 
Mughal court language of Persian and local Hindustani, prior the mid-nineteenth-century 
Urdu had primarily been a spoken vernacular. Still, it was an institution unique to the 
North Indian service gentry who occupied these overlapping milieux and Sayyid Ahmad 
felt it was under attack by advocates of Hindi (written in the Devanagari script).53 Urdu 
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had replaced Persian as the language of the courts, and though elite Muslims were 
traditionally educated in Persian, they often spoke Urdu at home.54  Sir Sayyid’s support 
for Urdu was articulated around the idea that without it, students were cut off “from 
original sources of knowledge as well as languages of political power.”55 While the 
privileging of Urdu as a “Muslim language” neglects the many rural and lower-class 
Muslims who spoke only regional languages and dialects, the destabilization of Urdu as 
an official language would certainly mean further alienation of elite Muslims.  In 
addition, Sir Sayyid’s allegiance to Urdu was one of the key issues that exposed his 
animosity towards the ascendance of Hindus in public space.56  He clearly questioned 
their eligibility to fill positions of power previously held by Muslims, and sought to 
hinder their arrival at every step.   
This basic inequality was not merely numerical, but was the result of the fact that 
Hindus had taken advantage of English education that had better prepared them for 
higher appointments.  As part of Sir Sayyid’s rhetoric of rejuvenation, then, he blamed 
the Hindus for advancing, not the Muslims for their recalcitrance.  His fear was that 
newly-educated Hindus, especially those without a history of high status, would excel in 
the competitive examination, to the exclusion of Muslim men of “good breeding.”  For 
while in Sir Sayyid’s conception, the qaum was open to Hindus as well as Muslims, it 
was drawn together by common background and experience. His anxiety about open 
competition between Hindus and Muslims was driven by fear of social transgression, the 
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upheaval that might occur if “weakly” Bengalis attained positions of power not 
determined by their hereditary social standing. In 1888 he asked his audience to imagine 
the consequences of the competitive examination system: 
Over all races, not only over Mahomedans but over Rajas of high position and the brave Rajputs 
who have not forgotten the swords of their ancestors, would be placed as rule a Bengali who at the 
sight of a table knife would crawl under his chair… I am delighted to see the Bengalis making 
progress, but the question is—What would be the result on the administration of the country?  Do 
you think that the Rajput and the fiery Pathan, who are not afraid of being hanged or of 
encountering the swords of the police or the bayonets of the army, could remain in peace under the 
Bengalis?57 
 
Sir Sayyid’s rhetoric indicates that the most threatening aspect of Bengali ascendance is 
the threat of their perceived effeminacy.  He raised the possibility that the other “nations” 
of the country would not tolerate their rule and that chaos would ensue, which they would 
be unable to control because of their irrational fear of confrontation.  Ultimately, he finds 
them unfit for public service.  Theodore Beck emerged on the side of the Muslims in this 
controversy as well, “raising the fear of ‘quick-witted Bengalis’” who would flood the 
civil services to the detriment of both Muslims and British.58 
Thus, even while Sir Sayyid supported a kind of Hindu-Muslim unity, he 
differentiated the political agenda of Muslims from that of Bengalis; he urged Muslims to 
resist alliance with the Bengali “National Congress.”59  Though he often used the label 
“Bengali” to mean “Hindu,” he associated Bengalis with a particular political agenda 
with which Muslims could never find favor. His contempt bears a hint of the taint of 
“backwardness” described by Hunter that Sir Sayyid had worked so hard to prove did not 
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apply to the Urdu-speaking elite.  Thus, while Hindus were welcome as students in the 
university, and he made much of their financial support, as political actors, “Bengalis” 
(read: Hindus) were, in his view, diametrically opposed to Muslims.60  The effect of this 
was to resist associating “martial” Muslims with “effete” Bengalis, and to avoid the 
pitfalls of being associated with a nationalist movement that might be seen to be opposing 
or undermining British authority.  
Despite the aggressively communal political rhetoric that took hold of the Aligarh 
Movement in the waning years of the nineteenth-century, there was a sense that the 
institution at Aligarh could only be successful if it was open to all of India’s peoples. Sir 
Sayyid’s oft-quoted remarks in which he referred to Hindus and Muslims as “two eyes of 
a beautiful bride,” or called himself a Hindu by virtue of being a resident of Hindustan, 
laid the foundation for the attitude of inclusion at Aligarh that persisted through many 
generations.  
One first generation Aligarian, Mohamad Ali Jauhar, published a pamphlet in 
1904 in which he reinforced the ideal of inclusion by quoting from the educational 
scheme for the university which proclaimed its goal to send its graduates “throughout the 
length and breadth of the land to preach the gospel of free enquiry, or large-hearted 
toleration, and of a pure morality.”61  This agenda outlined the “original and fundamental 
principles of the aims, objects, and policy of the Mohamedan Anglo-Oriental College”62 
                                                
60 Graham, The Life and Works of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, 176-77. 
61 Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, History of the Aligarh Muslim University (1920- 1945) (Karachi: Sir Syed 
University Press, 1998), 255. 
62 Ibid. 
 68 
and were etched in stone at the entrance to the College Hall.63  These aims were 
naturalized, not just by their linkage to familiar Victorian values, but because they were 
set in stone; the university could never waiver from these goals.  Thus, although the 
political agenda of elite Muslims was increasingly divergent from that of the Hindu-led 
Indian National Congress, on an individual level, Hindus and Muslims should get 
along.64   
North Indian narrators remember the spirit of tolerance that existed at Aligarh in 
the 1940s, remembering that Sunnis and Shias prayed in the same mosque, albeit at 
different times, and that the only way to tell a Hindu apart from a Muslim was that the 
Hindu ate vegetarian food.  All students wore the same uniform, regardless of their faith, 
the “black sherwani and white pajama…  [so that] looking from every angle you can see 
that he is from Aligarh.”65 Ideally, students identified with the university and this 
obscured their allegiance to other faiths, families, clans, or castes. One narrator told me 
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that allegiance to “the welfare of the university” was the common thread that drew the 
students together as they were all concerned to perpetuate the good name of “the alma 
mater.”66  As such, toleration and unity at Aligarh was represented by conformity to the 
values and appearance of ashraf Muslims.  Apart from Hindus, however, there were other 
groups who did not often feel entirely included by the Aligarh identity. Bengali students, 
for example, lamented the absence of rice in the offerings of the Dining Hall.67  As 
Mohiuddin Khan told me, “We had to adjust! We had to adjust. One or two of our friends 
could not, and they left! (laughs)  They could not adjust and they left Aligarh… Food was 
only the chapatti, bread or naan. [I had to change] from a rice-eating person to a wheat-
eating person.”68 Though the ethos of tolerance has remained a central “tradition” of the 
institution at Aligarh and a major point of pride for its well-wishers, its legacy is 
complicated.  
 The Hindu-Muslim strife that often resulted in riots in Aligarh and other cities, 
and that colors histories of the freedom movement in the 1940s, is conspicuously absent 
in these narratives, and narrators use this as evidence of the attitude of inclusion.  Ghulam 
Umar asked me,  
Did you know there was a special hostel at Aligarh for Hindus?  They dressed exactly the same as 
I dressed… One of the things was, if you found a Hindu student and myself, you could not 
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distinguish.  He was wearing the Turkish cap, he was wearing that sherwani and he was behaving 
exactly [as we were].  He was given vegetarian food…  There was no fighting, there was no 
prejudice, there was nothing.69 
 
In fact, the distinctions were often more marked and the separation more stark than his 
recollection suggests. Hindu students, were, for some time, “accommodated either in the 
thatched bungalows, or in hired Railway bungalows outside the University compound.”70 
This arrangement was necessitated by the overcrowded conditions in the hostels. In 1926, 
Vice Chancellor Aftab Ahmad Khan proposed the construction of the first Hindu hostel 
inside the campus since the days of Sir Sayyid.71  In the early days, Hindus themselves 
resisted sharing accommodations with Muslims, fearing that “it would be much resented 
by their relatives & caste-fellows”72 and in 1896 there were twenty-seven Hindu day 
scholars in the College, but no Hindu boarders.73 Considering the importance of the 
university’s residential environment, the dislocation of Hindus made it more difficult for 
them to be incorporated into the student body seamlessly. Hindu students were spared the 
compulsory course on Muslim theology, and were permitted to take Muslim History in its 
place, but it was not until 1949 that the curriculum was made more hospitable to their 
interests. In the Annual Vice Chancellor’s Report, Zakir Husain announced that new 
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courses would be substituted for non-Muslims: “‘Hindu Civilization’ in the High school, 
‘Muslim Civilization’ in the Intermediate, and ‘World Civilization’ at the BA Degree 
Examinations.”74 The qaum, it seems, for all its shared interests, was deeply marked by 
differences of faith, tradition and practice, and even as Aligarh sought to minimize the 
importance of those differences, over time it increasingly catered to them.  
 Theology classes were similarly separated for Sunni and Shi’a students, but Sir 
Sayyid’s attitude towards inclusion is often represented, even now, by the fact that 
Aligarh has only one congregational mosque in which both prayed.75 As Zakir Ali Khan, 
General Secretary of the Pakistan Aligarh Old Boys’ Association told me, “Aligarh never 
had any factionalism… In Aligarh we never knew [who was Shi’a].”76 There was one 
way to tell, however. As Wajahat Husain said,  
In the University there was not much distinction between Sunnis and Shi’as… Aligarh Muslim 
University had a very fine mosque, a beautiful mosque and we all used to offer our prayers, 
especially Friday and ‘Id prayers… The students used to say, ‘Which session are you attending?  
Are you going to the first show or the second show?’ The first show used to be the Sunni 
congregation and the second show used to be with the Shi’a congregation.77 
 
While this story serves as evidence of the inclusivity of the Aligarh mosque, and to some 
extent the ways in which students massaged the requirements of ritual devotion to serve 
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their own needs, he also told me that the university authorities were concerned to keep 
students in line in matters of faith. When Wajahat attempted to take the Sunni theology 
class, which was rumored to be somewhat easier, he was confronted by his professor. 
Wajahat’s father was Shi’a, but his father’s brother, an Aligarh Old Boy who had been 
Captain of the Cricket team in the 1920s, was Sunni. The professor clarified Wajahat’s 
parentage, and then routed him to the Shi’a theology course. Tolerance, it seems, was 
strictly bounded, and the boys were not permitted to use it to their advantage. Though 
Wajahat was a day scholar, the parental imperative of the residential system created space 
for his professor to remind him of his filial duties. 
 Many students describe how the residential arrangements were supposed to 
combat “regionalism” by placing boys from different regions of the country into shared 
rooms or suites. Despite these efforts, boys from areas outside the United Provinces felt 
marginalized. The impetus remained on them to adapt, to conform to the Aligarh ideal. 
They were not “naturally” a part of it, in the way that the Urdu-speaking students were. 
As Mohiuddin Khan put it, “We have always a difference, because we were non-Urdu-
speaking people. We were more friendly with the Southern Indian students and to some 
extent with Pathan students… this belt: Frontier Province, Punjab, Bengal and Assam 
were the non-Urdu-speaking areas… So this difference was there between the 
students.”78 The students who did not fit easily into the Aligarh identity banded together, 
formed organizations of their own. The Bengali and Assamese students formed the 
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“Eastern Association.”79 Pakistan’s Freedom Movement Archives are filled with petitions 
and letters from regional and parochial student groups at Aligarh. In addition to telegrams 
sent to M.A. Jinnah on behalf of specific residential halls,80 the Momin Students’ 
Association,81 the South African Indian Students’ Association,82 and the Frontier 
Students’ Association83 of the Aligarh University wrote or petitioned the Muslim League 
during the late 1940s. 
The transition to independence that took place in 1947 manifested in some 
significant changes at Aligarh, particularly with regard to the relationship between 
Muslim and non-Muslim students. Many Muslim students had chosen to settle in 
Pakistan; the campus’ population was severely depleted. During the 1947-48 academic 
year, the population of Aligarh University and its allied institutions fell from 589684 to 
4613, but these numbers mask the impact on the University population in which some 
programs were depleted by forty to fifty percent.85 New students, displaced from their 
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universities, were coming in from the Punjab and elsewhere. The first post-independence 
Vice Chancellor, the nationalist Zakir Husain, was responsible for abolishing the 
residential separation between Muslim and Hindu students. As Irfan Habib told me, 
“Zakir Husain put Hindu and Sikh students along with Muslim students in 1949 and  ’50. 
A very firm decision. He dissolved the Hindu/Sikh hostels, Ameen Hostel and others and 
said they must live together. And nothing happened. I mean, they lived together.”86 
Habib, like Zakir Husain, is deeply invested in the “composite culture” narrative of 
independent India. To him, the peace between Hindu and Muslim students in the years 
after partition, even after they were moved into shared hostels, is evidence that there was 
no substance to the Muslim League’s “Two Nation Theory.” Rather, the peace vindicated 
Zakir Husain’s choice, and Habib’s belief that the tension between Hindus and Muslims 
was largely a political construction.  Similarly, this outcome embodies the tradition of 
communal harmony that had prevailed at Aligarh since its founding. For these narrators, 
that identity was normative, supported by the ideology and institutions of Aligarh, and 
they sought to cultivate it through the rest of their lives, though as this dissertation will 
show, that ethos has been interpreted in different ways in all three post-partition states.  
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CONCLUSION 
Sir Sayyid’s idea for the College which later became the Aligarh Muslim 
University was to groom a generation of Muslims who would have the “knowledge, skills 
and values necessary to qualify them for public leadership.”87   It was no small task, but 
he succeeded in creating an environment where students learned to interact and organize 
themselves in preparation for their lives beyond the confines of the college.   
At the end of the nineteenth-century, census numbers and the British penchant for 
classification had caused communities to identify themselves politically in ways they 
never had before.  Sir Sayyid’s quest to develop an Indian Muslim identity was a part of 
this mission and one that endowed the community with more power than the 
identification of Indian Muslims as a permanent minority in a democratic political 
system, because it associated Muslims with their former position of power.  To enjoin 
Muslims to his agenda, Sir Sayyid mobilized a narrative of decline that urged them to 
work together to recover their former position of power. Over a long period of time, from 
the 1860s to the 1930s, this narrative was used again and again to rally Muslims to 
Aligarh’s cause. He could not have anticipated the notion of India as a nation-state, but 
when that became the dominating idea, his ideas would be redeployed.  
During Theodore Beck’s tenure as the Principal of Aligarh, he tended to the 
growth of the first generation of Aligarh graduates who were loyal to their institution, one 
another, and the British.  This allegiance was strictly enforced and in the debating Union, 
one topic was strictly off-limits: British rule in India. Beck was determined that the 
                                                
87 Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation, 318. 
 76 
Aligarh Union not become a forum for “Bengali-style sedition.”88  Though debate on 
religious principles was not permitted, on one occasion a Brahmin student extolled the 
virtues of vegetarianism only to be rebutted by Muslim students who overwhelmingly 
argued that “eating meat was part of the natural order a sign of strength.”  Aligarh 
Professor and Cambridge graduate Walter Raleigh added that Adam and Eve might never 
have been expelled from the Garden of Eden had they “confined themselves to roast 
beef.”89  The transparently masculine ideas supported in this environment exalted the 
strength of Muslims over Hindus and served to deepen the political gulf between them.   
As political times changed, so too, did the role of institutions like the Union, and 
by the early 1940s, when Wajahat Husain was a Senior Cabinet Member of the Union, it 
had become a centralized location for the discussion of the political role of the Muslims 
and the Pakistan Movement.  Muslim political leaders addressed the Union separately 
from the student body and allowed discussion of  “the ongoing matters of politics, 
economy and so on” and that is where Wajahat met Mohammed Ali Jinnah on more than 
one occasion.90 Zakir Ali Khan remembers that “the debating society was very rich and 
almost all leaders in those days, even the non-Muslims, used to come and lecture in 
Aligarh.”91  He placed the Aligarh Union within the context of the nationalist movement 
and showed that all leaders of the country, not just the Muslims, recognized the 
importance of Aligarh men.   
                                                
88 Ibid., 220. 
89 Aligarh Institute Gazette, December 22, 1885. Cited in Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation, 222. 
90 Husain, interview, June 13, 2005. 
91 Zakir Ali Khan, interview. 
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The racialized and gendered values cultivated at Aligarh came into play in this 
political environment as the identities of the two groups as separate “nations” under the 
“Two Nation Theory” came to be accepted at Aligarh and elsewhere.  The “Two Nation 
Theory” as Jinnah articulated it at the Muslim League Meeting of March 1940, made 
clear the differences between the Muslim and Hindu nations.  He said that the religious 
philosophies, customs, and literatures of the two groups were rooted in different 
civilizations and drew on different sources of history.  Jinnah concluded that “to yoke 
together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other 
as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that 
may be so built up for the government of such a state.”92  This theory was the basis of the 
Muslim demand for independent statehood.  Its suggestion of the total separation of 
Muslims and Hindus can be seen as the ultimate realization of the political differentiation 
between Congress and the Muslim League that Sir Sayyid and Theodore Beck had 
supported in the 1880s.93 These communal tensions found no purchase amongst the 
students in Aligarh, but were central to the political aspirations of the Muslims. In the late 
1930s, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who had just emerged as the leader of the Muslim 
League, made a move to turn the masculinized and organized student body of Aligarh 
                                                
92 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Presidential Address at the All-India Muslim League, Lahore Session, March 
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into his political footsoldiers. He empowered them with a narrative of self-reliance rather 
than weakness, fought for representation not protection, and many of the young leaders 
trained at Aligarh went on to become founders of Pakistan.  
Shortly after the passage of the Pakistan Resolution, the Aligarh Union declared 
its allegiance to the Muslim League demand for Pakistan.  In January 1941 the Aligarh 
union debated and accepted the motion that 
the best way to achieve India’s freedom and to bring about lasting peace in the country is to strive 
for the establishment of independent states in the regions of Hindu and Muslim majorities with 
effective safeguards for the minorities in each state.94 
 
The Union was fully allied with the Pakistan movement by 1941, and the idea that 
Aligarh men represented all Muslims was already deeply entrenched.  In January of that 
year, the Honorary Secretary of the Union linked the Union and the Muslim League 
demand when he said, “Pakistan now represents the universal faith of the Mussalmans of 
India and Aligarh men are determined to hasten the realization of the ideal… The Union 
is the centre to train the Muslim youth to play their role worthily in the Muslim national 
movement.”95 
  
It has been important for Aligarh graduates to uphold the vision of the University 
that they believe Sir Sayyid advocated for in his efforts to recover the status of the 
Muslim community. A staunch loyalist, Sir Sayyid believed that the path of advancement 
for Muslims was to be more like the British, never again to be seen as the instigators of a 
                                                
94 Aligarh Union Debate, January 27, 1941. Cited in Zaman Students’ Role, 49. 
95 Speech by the Honorary Secretary of the Aligarh Union, January 28, 1941. Cited in Zaman Students’ 
Role, 50. 
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rebellion against British rule as they had been in 1857.  He denied that there were any 
prohibitions in Islam or Muslim culture against learning English or studying Western 
science and justified this by suggesting that “the most glorious period of Islamic history 
was characterized by a great flowering of rationalism and science.”96  Islamic history, 
then, was informed by the same values as European Enlightenment rationality, and unlike 
the passionate, effeminate, polytheistic Bengalis leading the Congress, Sir Sayyid saw 
Muslims as martial, monotheistic, secular, and rational, thus capable of being active in 
official, public life.97 As a result, Sir Sayyid invested deeply in a politics of 
masculinization that emerged from Britain at a particularly significant point in its own 
history. These values formed the basis of Aligarh exceptionalism, and over time were 
divorced from their context to become the persistent ideal of the Aligarh University. 
Whereas Sir Sayyid’s values were intimately linked to the specificity of his political 
activities and experience, today, they remain unassailable though not always appropriate. 
                                                
96 Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation, 78. 
97 Sir Sayyid’s critique of women above as “rationally deficient” excludes them from this formulation and 
establishes a gendered understanding of Muslim-ness. 
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Chapter 2 
 Masculinity and the Aligarh Environment 
 
The enclosed environment of the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College (later the 
Aligarh Muslim University) proved to be fertile ground for cultivating Sir Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan’s ideas of Muslim manhood, as the institution trained boys for public life. The 
values on which the institution was founded combined the priorities of the British schools 
and universities, especially Cambridge and Oxford, with those of elite Muslim 
households. In so doing, they codified specific and sometimes prejudicial perspectives 
that were rooted in a specific time and place. At Aligarh, these values became timeless 
and continued to represent the ideal values of the institution throughout the period under 
study (1935- 1950). This environment bred a kind of elite masculinity and cultivated 
public men—that was Sir Sayyid’s intention—who would be prepared to represent 
Muslims as a body in the British establishment. This chapter will further examine this 
masculinizing agenda, which served, over time, to differentiate Hindus and Muslims in 
politics if not within the precincts of the university. Aligarh’s was a homogenizing 
narrative, and despite compelling evidence to the contrary—that is, that it remained a 
complex and heterogeneous environment—it is the narrative of similarity and solidarity 
facilitated by the residential university model that Aligarians seek to protect because it 
seems best to represent the ideals of the founder. 
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 As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Mutiny of 1857 was a critical turning 
point in the history of Muslim South Asia and is particularly significant for the institution 
at Aligarh as it marked the beginning of a period of reform that provided the founding 
conditions for the establishment of the MAO College and later, Aligarh University. The 
anxiety about the position of Muslims in the British system and their access to both 
vernacular and English education drove the reforms, collectively known as the Aligarh 
Movement. Another significant development critical to this tale is the shift in 
understanding about the relationship between metropole and colony that surrounded the 
uprising, and in particular the shift in perception about the relationship between colonial 
administrators and colonized peoples. In England, as this chapter will address, there was 
a distinct shift in conceptions of masculine identity that were a direct result of the 
presence of the Empire as a space of masculine rule. The subjects of that rule, too, were 
implicated in gendered hierarchies that associated loyalty with masculinity and to some 
extent similarity, and cast revolt as cowardly, effeminate.1 As Heather Streets argues, the 
theory of the “martial races” expanded during this period as the mutineers of 1857 were 
caste as “treacherous, faithless, deluded and easily incited to passion” in contrast to the 
loyal martial groups that she identifies as Highlanders, Sikhs and Gurkhas.2 In the space 
between the “unmanly” Bengal Army, and the “martial races” fell the Muslims, on whom 
much blame was laid in the aftermath of the fighting in Delhi and Lucknow.  
                                                
1 Streets, Martial Races, 8. 
2 Ibid., 11. 
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We have already seen how ardently Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan advocated for the 
absolution of the Muslim community in the wake of the Mutiny, in particular through his 
An Account of the Loyal Mohammadans of India in which he argued that “if in 
Hindoostan there was one class of people above another, who, from habits and 
associations, and from kindred disposition, were fast bound with Christians, in their dread 
hour of trial and danger, in the bonds of amity and friendship, those people were the 
MOHOMEDANS, and they alone!—and then will be effectually silenced the tongue of 
slander now so loud in their condemnation!” 3 His evidence for Muslim loyalty relies on 
the close relationship he perceived between the Muslims and the British establishment. In 
his eyes, this overriding loyalty was evidence of similarity that should have been 
testament enough to their innocence. 
Though Streets rarely mentions Muslims in her history of the evolution of the 
“martial races” theory, Thomas Metcalf’s assessment of the post-Mutiny period argues 
that “the most bitter and widespread hostility was reserved for the Muslim community” 
who were regarded as the fomentors of the rebellion.4 Their loyalty had always been 
suspect, it seems, as “to a large extent… the strong British hostility toward the Muslim 
community appears to have been based upon a priori deductive reasoning. As the former 
rulers of Hindustan, the Muslims had, in British eyes, necessarily to place themselves at 
the head of a movement for the overthrow of the British government.”5 This suspicion 
was underscored by the growth of racial feeling emerging out of the British perception 
                                                
3 Emphasis in original. Khan, ""Account of the Loyal Mohomedans"," 194. 
4 Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt, 298. 
5 Ibid., 301. 
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that the Mutiny was a “race war.” The Mutiny, writes Metcalf, inspired a more 
“avowedly imperial sentiment” that elevated the status of the British and portrayed the 
Indians as racially inferior, and unfit for self-government.  
Fears of disloyalty rocked the empire after 1857, and the need to preserve the 
superiority of the British “race” fed the valorization of militarism and the virtues of 
physical fitness and athleticism.6 During this period, the ratio of British soldiers to Indian 
sepoys in the Indian Army shifted from 1:6 to a more even ratio of 1:2.7 This shift 
buttressed the authority of British soldiers, but also created an increase in demand for 
British soldiers and officers in the empire. British rule was expanding into the hinterlands 
and required more British hands to manage it.  
This shift in power became the substance of the Muslim grievance in the post-
mutiny period. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan positioned himself as a leader of the much 
maligned Muslims, and by responding to the crisis in the language of loyalism, sought to 
recover the position of privilege that Muslims had enjoyed, and that had been marked by 
the tenure of the last Mughal emperor in Delhi (though as a symbol, the ailing emperor 
did little to support an image of Muslim martial character). There is ample evidence to 
suggest that the Muslim situation was not as dire as Sir Sayyid made it appear, that in 
fact, British support for education remained stable, they ended their policies of 
annexation of princely states, and of direct proselytization, and increasingly patronized 
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the gentry and aristocracy.8 It was the increase in “coercive power” that drove Sir 
Sayyid’s anxiety.9 His strategy, to demonstrate Muslim loyalty by aligning the elite 
Muslim identity ever more closely with a demonstrably masculinist British one fed a 
narrative of recovery, of pride in community and history that did much to draw Muslims, 
and particularly elite Muslims, together in the dark days after the uprising. 
Sir Sayyid’s Account begins with a plea not to blame the entire community for the 
misdeeds of a few. He dramatically recounts the tenor of newspaper articles and other 
works that contain “the most bitter denunciation against the Mohammedans, who are 
freely represented as being everything that is vile, treacherous and contemptible… There 
was no prickly thorn, in those awful times, respecting which it was not said that it was 
planted by a Mohammedan:- there was no fiery whirlwind that was not raised by a 
Mohammedan!”10 As he sought to offer Muslims some purchase on their downward slope 
to political oblivion, Sir Sayyid turned to the example that he had seen in England in 
1869 during his stay there with his son, Mahmud.  
As Sir Sayyid departed for England, he wrote that the improvement of relations 
between Indians and the British was critical to India’s future prosperity, and these 
relations could be improved by visiting Europe. Indians could thus “learn for the good of 
                                                
8 See Mushirul Hasan, "The Myth of Unity: Colonial and National Narratives," in Islam in the 
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10 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, "Excerpt: An Account of the Loyal Mohomadans of India," in Translation of 
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India how the British people have benefited from their trade, industry, methods of 
agriculture, hospitals, welfare systems, clean cities, prosperity and learning.”11 The 
qualities of civilized society that he outlined are linked to knowledge, comportment and 
generosity, three values that became a core element of the Aligarh ethos.  
Upon his return to India, Sir Sayyid started a journal intended to offer advice and 
guidance to Muslims. Through this journal, Tehzib ul-Akhlaq (Social Reform), Sir Sayyid 
sought to revive attention to the tenets of Islam, facilitate social harmony and encourage 
the dismissal of superstition amongst Muslims. According to Altaf Husain Hali, his 
biographer, “the writings usually lamented the degenerated conditions of the Muslims… 
The policy of the journal was simply to put before the people the correct side of the 
matter and not to force them to accept it.”12 Nonetheless, his educational reforms were 
met with skepticism, even when he sought to build consensus by soliciting the opinions 
of other thinkers through an essay contest about “The Progress of Education Among 
Indian Muslims.”13 Reporting on the results of the contest, Sir Sayyid wrote, “Muslims 
should themselves make arrangements for the education of their children if they want to 
preserve their ancient learning, secure benefits from modern learning, and to bring up 
their children according to the requirements of the age.”14 
Sir Sayyid was dismayed by the conservatism of some Muslims who felt that 
English education would harm their children. While he was dedicated to the expansion of 
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English education, particularly for Muslims, he went to some lengths to make it 
acceptable to them. Even as he looked towards the values and practices of Victorian 
England, he must have recognized the broad similarities with the lifestyles of the elite of 
North India and recognized the easy compatibility of the two societies. It is significant, 
however, that the nineteenth-century in England was a period during which priorities and 
values regarding patriarchy, the family and gender roles were changing markedly.  
During this period in Victorian England, John Tosh argues, there developed 
simultaneously a sense of fundamental sexual difference between men and women, and 
an increasing identification between masculinity and domesticity.15 These changes were  
marked by a separation of the spheres of work and home, and a growing emphasis on the 
role of men in both protecting and participating in the affairs of the household. Men were 
still allowed free exchange in the company of other men, but the privacy of home life 
grew in importance. Families who could afford it depended heavily on the labor of 
servants, thus creating a middle leisure class that entertained at home.  
The increasing value placed on domesticity, even for men, during the Victorian 
period, mirrored the scope of elite manhood in India where the protection of the honor of 
a man’s household was a primary concern. Men were expected to manage the financial 
affairs and tend to matters of work, but to maintain their family’s comfort and the 
isolation of its women. The sanctity and honor of the private sphere among the middle 
and upper classes, along with the keeping of household servants in both societies, became 
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a “badge of social position.”16 Status, in both India and England, was determined in part 
by the qualities of the household: “a non-working wife, a complement of servants and a 
tastefully furnished house.”17 Elite women were relegated to the private sphere, though, 
as Gail Minault has shown in her important work on Muslim women, they were not 
always completely deprived of education or access to the world outside.18 This emphasis 
on the structure of the domestic environment made its way into the planning of the 
institution at Aligarh, designed to take boys out of their homes and mold them into 
citizens in the college’s residential system. 
 The MAO College was informed by many of the rituals and traditions of the 
Oxbridge model. There were aspects of this system that already seemed familiar to 
Aligarh boys, raised as many had been, among extended familial networks. Sir Sayyid’s 
loyalism informed the development of the University’s traditions and even during the 
movement for independence from the British, the traditions gleaned from ancient 
universities continued to define the expressions of students and faculty alike. The MAO 
College was a distinctly Indian institution, but at the moment of its founding, it was also a 
profoundly colonial one. The foundation stone of the MAO College was laid in early 
1877 by Viceroy and Governor-General Lord Lytton, setting in stone the relationship 
between the institution and the government of India. The seal of the college, set in marble 
above the entrance to the original quadrangle, exemplifies the union of East and West 
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that Sir Sayyid envisioned. On each side of a lush palm tree are a crescent moon, the 
symbol of Islam, and the British crown. 
 
CONSTRUCTING MASCULINE SPACES AT ALIGARH 
As the empire expanded the conception of masculinity at Oxford and Cambridge 
became more muscular, predicated on notions of competition, physical strength, racial 
superiority, adventure, and action.19 Cambridge prepared men for public life by taking 
them out of the climate of the domestic environment, encouraging competition on the 
sports fields and valorizing militarism and “imperial adventure.”20 As such, education at 
Cambridge shifted from concentration on the subjects of classical learning to new 
academic disciplines: science, language, and history, and became a training facility for 
fit, confident and capable public men. Boys were, in other words, groomed for power in 
the classroom and on the athletic field. Their status was distinctly and deliberately 
gendered. They were eligible for public life because they were men coming of age in an 
environment dominated by a sense of sexual difference enshrined in the “separate 
spheres” ideology. Paul Deslandes notes in his study of Oxbridge men between 1850-
1920 that the undergraduates complained that women: their mothers and sisters, simply 
could not understand what it was like to be in the university. Not only had they left home, 
but they were building up a unique and separate society within their colleges.  
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As the century drew to a close, conceptions about masculinity continued to 
change. Whereas in the mid-Victorian period, women were seen increasingly as 
companions--and indeed many of them had benefited from a secondary education21—by 
century’s end, women were closely identified with a stifling domestic environment, and 
men increasingly sought independence away from home. The Public School system 
became normalized in this period, and boys were sent away to school often in their early 
teens. After a stint in the university, as Tosh argues, “in the late Victorian period 
disillusionment with domesticity and the hankering after a racing men-only world were 
what attracted many to careers overseas.”22  
Though the home had traditionally been seen as the sanctuary in which middle 
and upper-class male subjectivities were formed, after 1870 the household tended to be 
characterized by what John Tosh has characaterized as “a flight from domesticity.”23 The 
preserve of British manliness was increasingly called into question during this period, 
following the mid-century emphasis on the necessity of a domesticated lifestyle for the 
full realization of a masculine identity.24 This flight was prompted in part by concerns 
about the efficacy of preparing young men for public leadership within the confines of 
home. The later part of the century, for instance, was characterized by a reluctance on the 
part of young men to marry, and an emphasis on the development of a “single” life that 
emphasized adventure and glorified life in the empire. This masculine agenda was reified 
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by its resistance to the women’s movement and sought to keep women enshrined in a 
sphere of domesticity ever more sharply delineated from the sphere of public leadership. 
British feminists began to demand access to higher education, and explicitly “to 
challenge the validity of the separate spheres ideology.”25 Young colonial officers were 
trained for leadership in British public schools and universities, where men were 
separated from the feminizing influences of their mothers and sisters. 
These “men-only” realms were distinctly different from home, places where 
classmates and teachers stood in for family, where allegiance was transferred from “home 
and mother to the broader world of manly responsibility” and to the institution itself.26 
However, the residential environment of the university did not itself constitute the public 
sphere. Rather, it was a substitute domestic environment in which masculine values 
replaced feminine ones, and young men could focus on their transition to the outside 
world. Only upon leaving the university, and facing the trials of the world beyond the 
boundaries of campus, could they truly become men.27 In Aligarh, too, spaces were 
disctinctly gendered and affected many aspects of daily life there. The boundary walls of 
Aligarh set it apart from the distinctly different world outside.  Their purpose was to keep 
the wards in and the rest of the world out, especially during periods of ferment. During 
periods of political activity in Aligarh, it was the trangression of this boundary that drew 
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the most criticism. Throughout the period under study, and even today, the world outside 
the university evokes the threat of contamination and indiscipline.  
The College Sir Sayyid founded was residential so that students would be 
removed from the folk influences of their households. As at Cambridge, the geography of 
the MAO College created a masculine private sphere, bounded by walls that physically 
shut out those who were not eligible for access to this elite environment. These walls also 
kept the boys in, where they could be monitored and disciplined into the men that they 
would be when they emerged from their chrysalis.28  
The residential environment was a transitional environment, a liminal space 
between home and the world outside. Thus, it was important that it appear familiar, 
cultivate the same priorities of home. The campus was explicitly designed after 
Cambridge, but preserved the bond to the ashraf households in which the boys grew up. 
The campus was designed in the image of an ashraf haveli, with a courtyard surrounded 
by residential spaces. Students were thus sheltered from the outside world, but had space 
to move around, with easy access to the mosque, and the college’s central academic 
gathering space, the Strachey Hall. The college was a healthier home where boys would 
not be spoiled, but brought up “properly.”29 Both at Cambridge and Aligarh, women’s 
schools and colleges were outside the boundaries of the men’s colleges.30 The walls of 
the campus at Aligarh served to protect elite boys from the influences of the world 
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outside and the customs of women, for if arrival in public sphere was the goal of Sir 
Sayyid’s reforms, removal from the private sphere of the home was essential. 
Placing students in this isolated environment, where they lived, ate, and played 
together, would encourage in them a feeling for the importance of the community, like 
their understanding of family, but without the mitigating customs that Sir Sayyid believed 
boys were exposed to in the zenana, and that threatened their character development.31 
The residential system was the core disciplinary regime, as Vice Chancellor Aftab 
Ahmad Khan wrote in 1926, it was the  
most distinctive and the most important feature of our institution from its very start… 
Residential system is an organization according to which young men are kept together 
under a system which is best calculated to develop and bring out all that is best in human 
nature. This is only possible if the lives of young men are regulated according to 
principles and methods which have stood the test of time and experience. Such principles 
and methods are the basis of discipline without which no residential system, in the real 
sense of the term, is possible. Hundreds of young men, coming from different and distant 
parts of the country, and representing all sorts of ideas and manners, virtues and vices, if 
kept under proper control and effective discipline, gradually evolve a corporate life and 
character which leads to success. But if they are left unregulated and uncontrolled, the 
result must be disastrous.32  
 
He resisted the idea of any students residing outside the formal campus, with the few 
exceptions of the day scholars who lived with their families in the city. Even those 
students raised his suspicions however, and this anxiety draws attention to how important 
Aligarh’s isolation appeared to its faculty and administration. Within the campus, the 
students could be controlled, and were seen as a unified and disciplined group. When 
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outsiders penetrated this hallowed ground, it was never clear what contamination they 
might bring, and what might happen to them if they were not conditioned by the 
residential system. As a result, Aftab Ahmad Khan argued that “with the exception of 
those who live with their parents or very near relations, no student coming from outside 
should be permitted to reside in the city.”33 The boundary between insiders and outsiders 
had to be rigidly maintained.  
In the early years of the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College, however, due to a 
lack of funding, the walls did not fully enclose the campus and were thus ineffective at 
keeping students in;34 this situation was further complicated by the willingness of the 
chowkidar (gate keeper) to let the students in and out during the night.35 By the 1940s, 
these walls formed a physical barrier. Students were permitted to leave the campus to go 
into the city, but had to return to their hostels by 9:30 p.m. Restrictive though this system 
may seem, Zakir Ali Khan and others remember with pride that “this whole system was 
organized—the policing of the university system— by the students and the staff only. No 
police were involved. They were so competent that no quarreling was going on… the 
proctors, they were all students.”36 Many narrators refer to the disciplinary environment 
as a key aspect of the university’s celebrated mahol, or atmosphere. 
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This system, which restrained student movement, was one of the important factors 
that set Aligarh apart from other schools. The Proctorial Monitors, as they were known, 
were selected from among the senior students and were responsible for maintaining 
student discipline on the university grounds and off. “It is under [the Proctorial 
Monitor’s] guidance that the City, Railway Station, Cinemas in the Town and other 
places outside the University area are patrolled by these representatives of our law and 
order who can haul up any student who misbehaves himself or is guilty of any breach of 
University discipline or commits an act which is likely to lower the prestige of his fellow-
students.”37 This excerpt from the Aligarh Magazine in 1934 shows clearly how 
important the cultivation of the brotherhood was at Aligarh. Even in matters of discipline, 
boys were reminded to keep the reputations of their “fellow-students” in mind. As such, 
this regime bred a powerful sense of collective identity closely associated with the notion 
of “belonging” to the institution. At the same time, as Zakir Ali Khan emphasized, the 
disciplinary regime at Aligarh was what prepared the boys for the world outside. It 
instilled in them resilience and responsibility. “We are proud of it and that brought a lot 
of self-confidence in us. We can go anywhere, you give us any problem and then we will 
try to solve the problem…We will undertake the responsibility and we will try to resolve 
this according to the best of our ability. That is the lesson of Aligarh.”38 
This disciplinary environment was modeled closely on that of Cambridge. During 
the 1940s, Professor of History and Pro-Vice- Chancellor A.B.A. Haleem was 
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remembered especially as the administrator who enforced the rules of conduct and 
etiquette. Students remember Haleem as a stickler for the uniform; despite his high regard 
for the British, he still wore churidar (tight) pajamas and sherwani with Turki Topi (fez) 
though most teachers had dispensed with that by the mid-1940s.39 This attention to dress 
and etiquette had been an early priority of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan as he sought to align 
the priorities of the Muslims and the British.40  
The Aligarh costume was a curious mix of Eastern, Western and Turkish 
elements. Despite the punishing heat of Aligarh during much of the year, the full uniform 
consisted of a black sherwani (a long, heavy tunic with a banded collar), white straight 
pajamas still known as “Aligarh pajamas,” cotton socks, shoes and the red Turkish fez. 
This represented Sir Sayyid’s effort to choose the best elements of culture to elevate 
Muslims to the “highest level of culture” and to rescue them from contemptibility in the 
eyes of the British.41 It also created a standard to which all Aligarh students could be held 
and identified even when outside the boundary walls. When a student donned the black 
sherwani and Aligarh pajamas, he began the transformation of becoming an Aligarh boy. 
All the boys, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, with only one or two 
exceptions, wore this costume. As noted in the Regulations of the Academic Council 
included in the Calendar of 1948 the “Sikh students are exempted from wearing the fez 
and for female students the uniform is the Black Burqa- even to receive their degrees at 
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convocation.”42 A correction slip tucked between the pages further elucidates that non-
Muslim women were exempt from wearing the burqa but “shall be required to appear 
with head covered by a shawl or other proper headgear.”43 While students from varied 
backgrounds were welcomed into Aligarh’s fold, the expectation was clear that they were 
to adapt themselves to its environment, not the other way around.  
 Even young students were integrated into the system. Retired Professor Iftikhar 
Alam Khan remembers the first time he was disciplined into wearing the sherwani as a 
young boy in Minto Circle School in Aligarh.44 He had been educated in Christian 
schools where the boys wore khaki short pants and white shirts. His first exposure to the 
Aligarh sherwani was when Aligarh students came to do Muslim League electioneering 
work and stayed at his father’s home in Fatehgarh in 1945 or 46. He was upset by their 
attire and was resistant to wearing it, even after he was sent to Aligarh in 1948. He 
described the incident, saying (in Urudu): 
One day I went to Shamshad Building wearing khaki knickers and a white shirt. 
And a senior boy asked me, ‘Are you a student?’ and I said, ‘Yes.’ ‘Where?’  
‘In Minto Circle.’  
‘What dress is this?’  
‘What’s wrong with it?’  
He sent me back with another boy. He sat me on the back of a bicycle and said, 
‘Take him back, put him in a sherwani and bring him back.’45 
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The older students had power over the younger, and students who had been at the 
university longer had power over newcomers (even, oddly, if the longer tenured student 
had failed examinations and not advanced through the degree). The system of seniority, 
the tradition of grooming younger boys to respect and obey their elders is considered one 
of the key institutions in Aligarh. Many students remember that as juniors, they were 
compelled to say “salaam” to an elder before the elder had an opportunity to greet them 
first. Professor Nasir Ali, who joined Aligarh in 1939 wrote that the system “upheld the 
healthy traditions of Aligarh which constituted Aligarh culture. Any lapse on the part of 
their youngers elicited a stern admonition. These words were not uncommon ‘Partner, 
this is not done here.’ The well-meaning authorities could justifiably bank upon their 
good office in maintaining discipline. The student community in general held such 
seniors in high esteem and followed their advice unswervingly.”46  
Most students speak glowingly about this system, but Saghir Ahmad Rizvi first 
saw it as sinister. He told me that when he first arrived at Aligarh as an intermediate 
student, he was upset by the culture of seniority, and the fact that he had to obey the 
senior boy who occupied the rear portion of their rooms in Sir Syed Hall. “He was the 
senior so he used to dictate and so I have to obey him. So I passed this way, three or four 
months and then I got tired of it.”47 Rizvi left the University and completed his 
Intermediate degree in Lucknow. In contrast, Abdul Rashid Khan told me that this system 
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helped to build the solidarity of a familial environment. “It was such complete 
brothership there, and my senior loved me like a younger brother and I respected him like 
an elder. Even in front of my ‘elder brother,’ I didn’t smoke in from of him, in his 
presence. So that culture building was there.”48 That “culture building” is key to the 
creation of the powerful moral community that developed at Aligarh—its coercive 
aspects created a sense of vulnerability in the students, but they were drawn into its fold 
where they discovered strength and support.  
In a 1942 address to students A.B.A Haleem stressed 
the need for the maintenance of a high standard of discipline and explained that the most 
successful nations of the world to-day are those which have realized the value of discipline. 
Discipline is bred in the bones of the English, and we should not have any hesitation in learning 
from them whatever is good in their national life. Self-discipline is the noblest and highest form of 
discipline and it is only where self-discipline is wanting that it becomes necessary to impose it 
from above.49  
 
Haleem reminded the students of their place in the hierarchical order of empire (though it 
reads anachronistically now, as the Pakistan demand had been articulated two years 
prior). The British were at the top, with discipline bred in their bones, but their standard 
was attainable and the students, though inferior, could aspire to similar status by 
maintaining self-discipline. It became clear here that “civilization” marked by 
“discipline” could be taught. Haleem spoke to the students at a time when the majority of 
students were becoming involved in political activism for the Muslim League, an 
important transition in the life of the university as politics became a part of daily life 
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there. As we will see later, the question of discipline was critical during the 1940s, as 
students were torn between the model Haleem sought to perpetuate, and the allure of 
expressing themselves publicly. While the disciplinary challenges of the League period 
were significant because of their involvement with the political movement, students had 
always found ways to challenge the strict disciplinary environment at Aligarh.  
  Aligarh students, like students everywhere, constantly sought tested the 
boundaries set by the institution. There is ample evidence for this despite the 
protestations of Professor Nasir Ali, writing in the Aftab Hall Memoirs published in 1976 
that “there was no ragging [hazing], no teasing and no bullying at the time of admission 
or immediately after either in the hostels or in the departments. In fact such a ‘ragging’ 
was against the Aligarh tradition and strictly forbidden.”50 It is significant that his proof 
for the absence of ragging/ hazing is that it was “against the Aligarh tradition” and 
“strictly forbidden,” for this reveals the power not only of the disciplinary environment, 
and its goals of character building, but perhaps more significantly for our story, the 
importance of maintaining appearances in Aligarh. Aligarh students and Old Boys remain 
devoted to the narrative of uplift through character building that Sir Sayyid developed, 
and they maintain that it determines the character of the Aligarh environment. If a rule 
was there, this narrative suggests that the rule would have been followed. Professor Nasir 
Ali did acknowledge however, as others have shown, that this disciplinary regime may 
not have been as hegemonic as it appeared.51  
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“Introduction Night” persists as a powerful trope in this genre of Aligarh stories. 
Shortly after the students were admitted to the university, the “first year fools” were 
initiated into the Aligarh environment through a ritualized hazing event known as 
“Introduction Night.” Much secrecy surrounded this ritual and the young students were 
apprehensive for weeks, seeking to appease the elder students by strictly observing the 
protocols of greeting and respect. Masood ul Hasan remembered, that “the supposedly 
propitiatory and cajoling ‘salams’ were flung in profusion even from positions of poor 
visibility, as to the scared new-comer every ‘senior’ appeared to be a potential tormentor, 
and the very best way to soften the rigours of the evil hour was to keep the tyrants in 
good humour.”52  Professor Ali described Introduction Night this way: “it was a closely 
guarded secret, seniors would come in pitch black, beating drums and ringing bells and 
made fun of new students highlighting their peculiar idiosyncrasies and whims.”53 
Introduction Night was, in fact, characterized by ragging/hazing, where the younger 
students were expected to obey the directives of the senior students.  
Saghir Ahmad Rizvi, who earlier described his discomfort with the seniority 
tradition as a student of the Intermediate classes, had a change of heart when he returned 
a couple of years later for his Bachelor’s degree in Engineering. Rizvi’s second sojourn 
in Aligarh was markedly different. This time, he was formally introduced to the 
brotherhood. This time, Rizvi says, he was ragged by the “top-most rascal” in the 
university. The senior would tell him to do different things—none of them too shocking 
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by today’s standards—to go outside of the Hall, or stand in a certain way, and Rizvi 
remembers, “I have to do at that time whatever he says, but later on he became a good 
friend of mine.”54 The outcome of the “Introduction,” as a classic rite of passage, was that 
new students were inducted into the brotherhood.  
They were then feted at a post-Introduction breakfast, called a “Bhaiyya (Elder 
Brother) Party” which indicated that the new students had arrived, and passed through the 
crucible.55 Masood ul Hasan reflected that “on the whole these ‘baptismal exercises’ 
helped in rounding off the angularities and in the formation of a balanced personality, 
which was as much the concern of the senior fellow-students as of the teachers.”56 It is 
not difficult to see the similarities here between the ritualized induction of “embryos” by 
“fathers” in Theodore Beck’s Apostles, and the breaking-in of the Aligarh “freshers.” By 
first rendering the boys vulnerable and then cradling them in a nurturing environment, the 
“Introduction” sought to break relationships with the world outside and to rebuild them in 
the hostels.57  
Even in the context of the “Introduction” the secrecy surrounding it betrays a hint 
of the transgressive. On both an individual and group level, there was some excitement 
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about challenging the boundaries of the university’s discipline. This excitement, 
however, rarely comes out of official, written reflections on life in the university, as 
reflected in Nasir Ali’s reflections on “ragging” above. In conversation, however, stories 
of rule-breaking abound.  
Many of these transgressions, not surprisingly, involve the opposite sex. The 
proximity of the Aligarh women’s college meant that the boys of Aligarh had a distinct 
awareness of the absence of women from their campus. They interacted with girls only 
rarely, at the annual Exhibition in February, where Wajahat Husain told me that he used 
to pass notes to girls, and on the rare occasions that female students took classes in the 
University. In 1938, women were admitted to the B.A. class of the Education 
Department, with strict arrangements for maintaining purdah, and in 1939 girls attended 
the university convocation for the first time.58 Throughout the 1940s, female students 
attended the University in increasing numbers for research and post-graduate classes that 
were not available in the Women’s College.59 They remained secluded from their male 
colleagues by the veils they were required to wear, and by segregated seating divided by 
a purdah or curtain.60 A 1940 Muslim University Gazette article on women’s education 
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called these arrangements “the most important work done in the matter of advancement 
of female education among the Muslims.”61 The piece made an argument for the 
necessity of inducting women into the national body, suggesting that it would be a 
detriment to the whole Muslim community if women were uneducated. Muslims had “to 
put up a strenuous struggle for our very existence as a nation and it will be a very great 
handicap if more than half the population of Mussalmans in India is precluded from 
participating in this struggle because of its being uneducated and ignorant of its rights and 
duties.”62  
As we have seen at Aligarh, the composition of the national body was intimately 
linked to the health and presentation of the individual. The case for women was no 
exception. The compelling reasoning for inducting women into education as late as 1940, 
was that the “greatest of all handicaps is the health of woman and children which is badly 
suffering because of the ignorance of our women folk from modern rules of health and 
hygiene which comes through modern education.”63 Despite this call to raise women out 
of a degraded state, as Shahnaz Rouse has pointed out with regard to the Muslim League 
Movement, “women are directly interpellated, not as actors in their own right, but as 
(supplemental) partners in a collective national project.”64 This representation of women 
echoes the nineteenth-century reformist agenda of men like Sir Sayyid and women’s 
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literature author Deputy Nazir Ahmed, who saw women as important supporters, but 
failed to differentiate women’s goals from the goals of the nation. As Sir Sayyid had 
argued, education should draw Muslims out of the dark and unhealthy spaces of the 
zenana and into the modern world. Women were increasingly a part of the national 
awakening that was taking place at Aligarh. While they would become part of the 
national body, and thus be expected to work for its sustenance, the protection of their 
honor remained strictly the purview of their male counterparts.  
Young university students may not have been the best candidates for the 
protection of women’s honor in this environment. When the girls would file in and sit on 
the other side of the purdah, the temptation was strong to try to catch a glimpse of them. 
Perhaps, the boys hoped, they had removed their head covering, once they could “hear 
their bangles and so on and know that they had arrived.”65 The boys, surreptitiously, 
sought holes in the curtain through which they might see the girls, even sometimes 
cutting it with a small knife or blade to get a better view. They could not hide for long, 
however, and their professors caught on to their antics. Thereafter, one narrator told me, 
the classroom assistant carried a needle and thread with him; everyday he inspected the 
curtain and stitched up any holes. But, he told me slyly, sometimes, the girls used to cut 
the curtain! 
The women’s college, two kilometers away, was far enough down the road that 
the male students could not get to it without some effort. In addition, it was and remains 
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surrounded by a high wall, with recreational, residential, education and dining facilities 
all inside. The girls rarely left through the large gates, and when they did, they were 
shrouded in a two-piece burqa which Fatima Fari Rahman described as being a head 
covering with “a coat-like thing.”66 Despite these difficulties: the space between the 
campuses, and the walls around each one, Saghir Ahmad Rizvi, who led a gang of several 
boys,67 made an arrangement with the guard of the Sir Syed Hall so that they could sneak 
out at night.68 The guard was complicit, Rizvi told me, because “he knew that I am very 
naughty and all this. So I used to go out and do all sorts of things!” Rizvi insisted that 
either I wouldn’t believe him if he told me all of his stories, or that he just could not bring 
himself to tell me. But he did describe sneaking off campus at night with a gang of 
friends to ride bicycles over to the Aligarh Women’s College. Once there, they sorted 
through and read the girls’ outgoing letters home in the letter box so that they could stand 
outside the gates of the college the following day reciting snippets of those personal 
letters to try to catch the attention of the burqa-clad girl students as they passed. It was 
not at all unusual, he implied, to “pass remarks” at girls. But, as in the story above where 
the purity of the girls’ intentions was tantalizingly impugned, Rizvi told me that there 
were a few girls who would come out of the college to meet the boys, too. He told me 
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this cautiously, caught by the knowledge that telling me would reflect poorly on the 
reputation of the girls, and so as he spoke, he was careful to protect even the idea of their 
reputations. “We are on good terms and sometimes they used to-- if I tell you?-- they 
used to come out! But we respected them very much, it is not—you know.” There was 
nothing untoward, he assured me, but the very act of meeting with girls was so taboo, that 
in speaking it now he felt compelled to offer evidence as to the purity of their 
relationship: one of those girls is now married to his friend.69 The tension that Rizvi 
expressed here reveals the boys’ thrill at having broken the rules, and a powerful 
awareness of the responsibility of the adult man to protect the honor of women.  
Inside the boundary walls, the students of the college became a “brotherhood” a 
biradari. This biradari functioned in different situations, whether as religious confession, 
a political interest group, or the basis for an independent national identity. 70 The bonds of 
this brotherhood were formed on top of the already shared values of the ashraf, which, 
Lelyveld emphasizes, had less to do with birth, as in the Hindu caste system, than with 
“cosmopolitan Mughal criteria:” manners, dress, architecture, painting, literature, athletic 
skills, etc.71 The enclosed environment of Aligarh was dedicated to the cultivation of 
those ideals, and the residential system provided both formal and informal training for the 
world outside. 
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SPORTS 
One of the critical aspects of the development of masculinity both at Cambridge 
and at Aligarh was the cultivation of a competitive, sporting culture. Theodore Beck 
brought cricket to Aligarh, arguing that a successful cricket program would elevate 
Aligarh’s prestige and visibility and help to establish bonds with the outside community.  
During the Victorian period, sport was seen as an important site for the “training of a 
boy’s character… [that] helped create the confidence to lead and the compulsion to 
follow.”72 The relationship between leadership and deference was key to the training of 
colonial servants, who had at once to embrace their role as the dominant race and their 
place in a hierarchical system that they had agreed to serve. For Aligarh men, the 
inculcation of discipline was designed to nurture the ideal of group solidarity in which the 
individual was subordinated, and to encourage personal accountability to the group. 
Theodore Beck referred to this combination of independence and responsibility as 
“manly.”73 In the Principal’s Annual Report for 1895-6 he highlighted the importance of 
active physical games to “supplant the natural indolence of the East by the restless 
activity of the Englishman.”74 The sports culture complemented the residential system by 
offering a site for physical challenge, cooperation and competition. And as in late 
Victorian England, sport was tied to health, both physical and cultural. 
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Thought not much of an athlete himself compared to his older brother Shaukat, 
Mohamad Ali extolled the virtues of sport in his 1904 pamphlet when he referred to “life 
outside the lecture rooms, the life of the playgrounds” as critical to the development of 
the University environment, one of the aspects that differentiated the residential 
university from the school.75 This culture exalted the fit, physical body as the masculine 
body, complemented by a sharp mind and developed physical and intellectual skills.  
In my interviews with Aligarh graduates of the 1940s generation, many spoke of 
the sporting culture at Aligarh, modeled deliberately on that of Cambridge. Cricket was 
the Aligarh sport par excellence, but other sports, especially field hockey, earned a 
reputation, too. In 1900, there were facilities for cricket, football, and riding, including 
stables for the horses.76 In the 1940s, Zakir Ali Khan told me,  
Every facility was there. Now it has expanded a lot because there was a great stress laid on sports 
so we had a stadium for sport, we had for cricket, hockey, tennis, swimming. And every other 
thing. There was a lot of cricket… You can imagine the interest taken by the university in the 
realm of sport that in 1902, a team of Oxford University [came]… that was the first game which 
was in Aligarh.77 
 
The visit of the Oxford “Authentics,” a team cobbled together from former players and 
even a few Cambridge men, marked a high point in the history of sport at Aligarh, though 
when rains forced the end of the match, the Aligarh team had no hope of winning with 
“182 to get in the fourth innings.”78 The teams adjourned to a friendly game of football 
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on the wet ground and though this has not survived in the Aligarh telling, the Aligarh 
team beat “their heavier but less practiced opponents.”79 Unlike the examples Patrick 
McDevitt cites of English defeats at the hands of New Zealand’s “All Blacks” or South 
Africa’s “Springboks,” when organized sports tours sometimes served as “a weakening 
agent” of Empire if the British lost, the match in Aligarh is remembered fondly as a 
“good” one.80 Undoubtedly, in the more critical of the two matches played in Aligarh that 
day, the “Authentics” left the Aligarh team “morally beaten” and had reason to be proud 
of such a drubbing.81 Cecil Headlam’s account of the “Authentics’” Indian tour details 
the positive influence cricket had on Indian society, identifying the Parsees, “perhaps the 
most intelligent and progressive; …certainly the most Europeanised race in Asia” as the 
most devoted cricket players. Still, Headlam admired the culture at Aligarh, conceding 
that the Muslims of the Anglo-Oriental College, lay “claim to be considered one of the 
best elevens in India”82 and praising the “encouragement of manly sports of all kinds in 
combination with secular and religious instruction” familiar to him from England’s 
public schools.83 Aligarh men were good opponents, working towards Sir Sayyid’s 
admirable dream of reforming the Muslims so that they might “meet on equal terms the 
Europeans who are, like them, subjects of the King-Emperor.”84 This was high praise in 
1903, and it seems that sport, and the development of manly ideals at Aligarh, helped to 
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bridge the gap between white and brown, between Aligarh and “Authentics” at least on 
that day. 
This culture of sport was highly organized, a culture of play that allowed 
“authorized games at authorized times.”85 Local sports and games, kite flying, wrestling, 
gilli danda or kabaddi, found no purchase in this highly organized arena.86 Students still 
played them, undoubtedly, as Pakistan’s Iqbal Shafi remembered fondly from his 
boyhood days in Aligarh.87 In October 1943 a brief piece on the history of Aligarh sport 
appeared in the Gazette. Cricket had been established in 1878, football in 1890, hockey in 
1902, the riding club in 1894 by Theodore Morison, swimming in 1916 (Aligarh students 
remain proud of their indoor swimming pool), “But alas! Nothing is known about the 
Kabaddi Club.”88 Like many of the institutions that Beck established at the college, sports 
were deeply symbolic of the values of both British and Indian elites. Cricket was ideally 
suited for this culture because, as Ramachandra Guha suggests, “in terms of its rules, 
rituals and vocabulary, cricket is the most complex game in the world.”89 A student who 
excelled at cricket, and mastered its rules, might be seen as one who could master the 
rules of social interaction, scientific study, and advancement within the British system.90 
It is possible to look to the culture of sport at Aligarh for evidence about the values of the 
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Muslim community being fostered there. The key element of this culture that narrators 
remember was discipline.  
They remember an environment in which authority was highly respected, and 
their participation was voluntary. The team captains were highly respected with special 
rooms and privileges.91 Zakir Ali Khan, who was captain of the hockey team, remembers, 
“There were special seats reserved for the sportsmen. Special benefits and privileges 
were given to him. Those who were unable to pay the fees they were not charged the 
fees. Even meals were given to them free. Then they were decorated and looked up to by 
the boys.” 92 From the beginning of their career at Aligarh, sportsmen received 
preferential entry; they were not required to meet as high an academic standard as other 
entrants.93 They also received special housing: the cricket captain lived in the university’s 
premier accommodation, Sir Syed Hall, and General Sports/Athletics was allotted to 
Aftab Hall where rooms were otherwise reserved for the students with top academic 
honors, or those in need of financial assistance. Zakir Ali Khan was given a room in 
Aftab Hall’s Mumtaz Hostel.94 These special privileges helped to cultivate the culture of 
seniority and by spreading the captains amongst the hostels, helped to develop a sense of 
group rivalry and accomplishment. 
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By no means all of the students were involved in sports, however, and some 
viewed the sportsmen with contempt. S.M. Tonki, a student during the Khilafat days, 
remembered Beck’s influence on Aligarh’s culture, highly touted by most, with disdain. 
“This patronage had an adverse effect on the academic atmosphere of the college. Players 
and sportsmen, who neglected their studies and set a record of successive failures, were 
hailed as seniors and those who devoted their time to studies were dubbed as 
bookworms.”95 Tonki’s disgust for Beck and all that he represented undoubtedly affected 
his perspective but there was a marked tension between the life of the classrooms and the 
life of the fields that was not so elegantly balanced as Mohamad Ali made it seem. 
Masood ul Hasan told me that the approach to sports during his childhood was very 
different from that at Aligarh. He had been injured as a child playing hockey, and 
thereafter lost his interest in games. This lack of interest was not seen as problematic in 
his village, he told me because, “in those days, the formula was, a very funny formula: 
padhogay, likhogay banogay nawab; khelogay, koodogay hogay kharab (You will 
become noble if you study and write; you will become worthless if you play around) so 
that was the approach to the games!”96 Though he mentioned a moment later that 
foregoing physical activity was “unhealthy,” it seems he never developed an interest in 
games. At best, he said, he was a “witness and a side-backer.”  
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As it turns out, sports and intellectual activities were frequently linked and 
represented as the central institutions of character development in the university. Asloob 
Ahmad Ansari, now a retired professor of English, devoted his attentions exclusively to 
intellectual development. As he told me, like the sports captains, successful Union 
speakers traveled all over India for their competitions as representatives of the university 
and were treated “in a ‘special way;’ introduced… to various dignitaries who visited the 
university. Those who participated in the debates were regarded as sort of privileged 
persons.”97 The honorific language used to describe these two different categories of 
leaders at Aligarh makes clear that they occupied similar positions. Hameed Alhashmi 
was a hockey and cricket player during his student days in Aftab Hall. As Provost of the 
Hall in 1976, he suggested that during his tenure in that position “some of the best 
students were inhabitants of Aftab and I did my best to mould them to win the Inter Hall 
Sports and Games as also Literary and Cultural Championship.”98 While narrators rarely 
discussed their academic experiences, participation in the Union and sports are common 
topics, both embodying the spirit of competition, and the ethos that the successful 
individual student represented the student body and the university as a whole.  
In 1940, a few months after a chastening speech lamenting the decline of sports at 
the institution by the Nawab of Bhopal, a keen sportsman and Old Boy,99 the Gazette 
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published an article outlining the tenets of “Physical Culture at Aligarh” in which 
Aligarh’s modernity was made to hinge on the original inclusion of an emphasis on 
physical culture. Significantly, the piece emphasized the fact that this success was the 
outcome of disciplined hard work, that “sporting talents and achievements are recognized 
by the University as much as academic distinctions and equal encouragement is given in 
both.”100 Articles like these constantly reminded students of the importance of the 
university’s values and priorities. They served to perpetuate the university’s traditions 
and to create a common narrative (particularly in times of turmoil) that persists now, even 
as former students recall their experiences in the college and on the playing fields.  
1940 was an important turning point in the University’s history. It clearly marked 
the beginning of the domination of the Muslim League in the affections of the university 
students (though there is evidence of it even earlier, in 1940, the majority of students 
were drawn into sympathy with the League’s explicit demand for Pakistan). It is perhaps 
not surprising to detect a sense of caution in the discussions about the university’s esprit 
de corps. New political rifts were emerging, and certainly later in the decade, those 
tensions were expressed in physical conflict. The piece on physical culture concluded,  
wherever an Aligarh team goes in a friendly match or tournament or meet, its sportsmanship and 
good behaviour in victory or defeat is appreciated and praised. This distinction is the result of its 
carefully planned and worked residential system which trains them in the highest standard of 
conduct and behaviour, which is the hall-mark of Aligarh.101 
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As they discussed their experiences, these narrators were keenly aware of the place that 
sports held in the Aligarh narrative. “We were interested in the responsibilities of Aligarh 
so much that when our teams used to visit other cities, no college teacher was with them, 
the captain was the sole authority. He used to conduct all about sixteen or seventeen 
persons, conduct the tour and bring them. That was the training given to us. And that 
lasts.”102 This culture of discipline extended beyond individual ambition or individual 
sporting events. Rather, the discipline and respect that was cultivated there allowed 
students to see the team as a microcosm of other social organizations in their community 
and themselves as its representatives. As David Lelyveld writes, “to excel as an 
individual was also to serve the purposes of the team, the college, and the Muslims of 
India.”103 Thus, the stakes were high, and the student leaders knew it. 
These narrators clearly connected their experiences with team sports to their 
participation in other kinds of activities. As the 1940s advanced, both the environment of 
the Union and that of the playing fields became important sites of interaction with the 
politics of the Muslim League and occasionally other parties. A boy’s association with 
those institutions would have elevated him to a position of prestige, but the physical 
fields themselves also provided a site of contact with the visiting dignitaries guiding the 
students in their political pursuits. Zakir Ali Khan remembers meeting both Nehru and 
Jinnah on the hockey ground, and having photographs taken with them there.104 Some 
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stories about sports during the 1940s are woven together with stories about narrators’ 
involvement in the Muslim League’s Pakistan movement and their mobilization during 
the Second World War. Wajahat Husain recalled how being a member of the riding 
school enabled him to meet and interact with political leaders when they visited the 
university. 
Those of us who were proficient were taken in the riding squad and we had the uniform like a 
cavalry regiment.  [It was] a beautiful uniform which I was told was donated by [His Royal 
Highness] the Nizam of Hyderabad, and whenever these eminent persons used to visit Aligarh the 
riding squad used to provide the escort and the students would ride on either side of the carriage 
like you do in the British Household Brigade and so on. So by virtue of that I used to meet these 
people from the railway station onwards and then be with them until they left the campus.105 
 
During Jinnah’s famous visit to Aligarh in November 1942, Wajahat, as part of the riding 
squad sent to receive Jinnah at the station, remembered “we brought him in the carriage, 
which normally was two- horse driven. The students removed the horses and we dragged 
the carriage a few miles up to the University.”106 It is interesting to note here, that as a 
member of the riding squad, Wajahat rode alongside the procession; he did not physically 
lift the cart and drag it up the hill. But, in the retelling, he included himself in the group 
of boys who did, thus insinuating himself among the group of boys who supported Jinnah 
with this physical display of affection and deference. 
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These extra-curricular activities facilitated the formation of the biradari that was 
mutually supportive. The culture of sport and brotherhood empowered young men to be 
agents of their own destiny; it encouraged self-reliance and ambition. Zakir Ali Khan’s 
testimony above asserts that the real education was not linguistic, scientific or 
mathematical, not, in fact, in the subjects that Sir Sayyid worked so hard to get 
established there. Rather, the real education was in leadership, in sport, in competition, 
and in training. Abdul Rashid Khan, a student at Aligarh in the late 1940s, linked 
character training, sports, and the military when he told me, “the main objective was to 
bring up a nation well-equipped in every respect. Mentally, culturally, everything. There 
it was not just an institution to give degrees. There was a riding school also. They had the 
military training also… there, character-building was the most emphasized of all.”107 As 
aspects of “character training” these values prepared men for many futures outside of the 
protected environment of the university, but there was an especially close connection 
between this personal training and military training.  
In addition to the deliberate invention of Aligarh’s priorities in the early years of 
the university, that served to feed a masculinized Muslim solidarity, during the 1940s two 
other major forces drew the attention of Aligarh students. World War II was raging in 
Europe and pro-independence nationalism was growing in influence, especially amongst 
Muslims. Both episodes had distinct effects on the university. In addition, the values of 
the university, as an outpost of ashraf culture, were reflected in these movements, making 
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Aligarh students prime targets for recruitment. The university deliberately prepared 
students for both.  
 
WORLD WAR II 
During World War II, Muslim League supporters sought to differentiate 
themselves from the “Quit India” Movement by participating in the war effort. Congress 
leaders had resigned their positions in legislative assemblies throughout the country in a 
non-cooperation protest against the British government’s decision to declare war without 
consulting Indian leaders. Muslim League politicians did not resign. While Congress 
leaders languished in jail the League used the war years to build stronger relationships 
with the ruling British that bolstered their influence in the negotiations for independence 
after the war. General Wajahat remembers Jinnah’s speech during his 1942 visit in which 
he praised the students for staying aloof during the Quit India unrest in August, when 
many students in other universities got involved.108 Wajahat remembers that Jinnah urged 
the students to complete their studies in preparation for leadership in Pakistan.  
He came in and he addressed the students and he told them, “You are the leaders of tomorrow on 
whom I am banking when Pakistan is formed. I don’t want you to waste your time and take part in 
these demonstrations and be jailed and waste your time. I want you to concentrate on your studies 
and get ready to play your part when Pakistan is formed.”109 
 
Muslim support of the British war effort both demonstrated the loyalty of the Muslim 
community to the British in a time of need, and further differentiated the agenda of the 
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Muslim League from that of the Indian National Congress’ Quit India Movement.110 The 
restraint of Aligarh students was noted also by the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Chancellor 
of the University, who wrote to the Vice Chancellor, Ziauddin Ahmad, in order to 
commend the students and to inform them that their abstention from the Quit India unrest 
had been noted even by the Viceroy who “appreciated” their “good conduct and 
behavior.” The Nizam used the opportunity to remind the students of Aligarh that 
“perseverance and manly character are the chief necessary factors to combat the evil 
forces that are unfortunately rampant in the country; so it is all the more necessary that 
we should overcome them by our sagacity and prudence at all costs.”111 Within the 
University, however, the students’ behavior was cast less as result of pro-British, than as 
pro-Muslim League sentiment. As the Vice-President of the Aligarh Union suggested, as 
he introduced Jinnah to the students packed into Strachey Hall during Jinnah’s visit, “we 
obeyed and carried out to the very letter the mandate of the Working Committee [of the 
All India Muslim League] by continuing our peaceful academic life and refusing to be 
drawn into the suicidal and destructive activities of the Congress.”112 Even as he 
cautioned the students against getting mixed up with the Congress-led Quit India 
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Movement, Jinnah thanked the students for raising funds for the League, and aggressively 
urged them to “work, work and work and organize the Muslim League.”113 
In addition to the League work and their studies, Aligarh students were 
encouraged to demonstrate their support for the British effort by pursuing military 
training. By volunteering for the military, Muslim Leaguers and Aligarh students could 
engage in “useful” support and cast themselves as “martial” in contrast to the ostensibly 
non-violent ethos of the Hindu-led Congress. Aligarh Muslim University took up the 
mantle of the masculine imperative to defend the homeland by recruiting students for the 
armed forces.114 During the war, Aligarh students were expected to participate in a 
compulsory “drill” that took place three periods a week in the morning.115 The drill was 
considered the preliminary step in acquainting students with the discipline and training of 
modern warfare and was the foundational institution for what Ziauddin hoped would 
become Aligarh’s Military College. 
Sir Ziauddin Ahmad was instrumental in expanding the university’s facilities for 
war preparation.116 As early as 1937, he began to generate support and funding for a 
Military College at Aligarh University. In 1937 Khan Bahadur Abdul Hamid Khan 
appealed to the Nizam of Hyderabad for a grant to provide military training for Muslims. 
                                                
113 Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Muslim India Speaks: Speech Delivered by Quaid-E-Azam Mr. M.A. Jinnah 
President of the All-India Muslim League at a Meeting Held under the Auspices of the Muslim University 
Union. November 2, 1942. Ibid., F 237/ 21 (1-25). PNA. 
114 Paul Deslandes notes that, similarly, Oxbridge colleges had been emptied of undergraduates during 
World War I. Clubs and the Union ceased to function, and, in the absence of undergraduates, the “‘real 
Oxford’ became only a memory.” Deslandes, Oxbridge Men, 24. 
115 Nizami, History of the Aligarh Muslim University (1920- 1945), 219. 
116 Ibid., 217. 
 121 
He mobilized the familiar narrative of decline to convince Muslim leaders to support the 
training so that the “military spirit” might be planted in the Muslim community enabling 
them to defend against the nefarious designs of their “countrymen” who sought to give 
“practical shape to their secret designs and make the Muslim life unbearable.” He 
therefore urged leaders “In the name of Islam… to come to the rescue of their community 
which has lost its vitality and is fast going down into the depths of degredation [sic].”117 
Abdul Hamid Khan’s strategy represents a deployment of the original declensionist 
narrative of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. By presenting the Muslim polity as threatened, as 
undefended, his appeal sought to mobilize support for rejuvenation. On March 28, 
Ziauddin Ahmad presented his “Draft Scheme for a Military College at Aligarh” to the 
Muslim University Court. However, it was not until 1942 that the university received a 
grant from the Government of the United Provinces to establish a Department of Military 
Training.118 
Despite the difficulty in generating support for a full-fledged Military College, the 
University Training Corps (it became the University Officers’ Training Corps U.O.T.C. 
in 1942)119 flourished in Aligarh and was the first place many students received training. 
Masood ul Hasan recalled, “it used to be the feeder for the higher ranks of the army.”120 It 
was from the ranks of the UTC that Pakistan’s future Army Commander-in-Chief, Ayub 
Khan, was recruited. As a result of the complaint that Indians were not fairly represented 
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among the officers in the army, a recruiter gathered the students in Strachey Hall to look 
for “suitable officer-material.” Ayub Khan recalled in his memoir, “This was in early 
1926 and I was a member of the University Training Corps. General Skeen asked me 
‘Would you like to go into the army?’ I said, ‘Of course I would like to go into the army.’ 
He asked me why, and when I explained… he advised me to submit my application.”121 
Later, the Principal of the Intermediate College of Aligarh, the English Major Dann 
offered to coach him for the Sandhurst examination, and he was selected in June 1926.122 
Aligarh was an ideal site for officer recruitment, many students came from families with 
long-standing martial traditions, and the Aligarh boys were already accustomed to a 
disciplined lifestyle.  
The emphasis on the martial tradition persisted throughout the peace between the 
wars and when World War II began, it became an important political tool as well. In 1939 
the Aligarh Magazine reported that as proof of Aligarh’s loyalty to the British 
establishment, a tradition founded by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, “a large number of the 
UTC [University Training Corps] members are voluntarily offering to fight on the side of 
Britain.”123 Throughout the war, the UTC continued to grow, though it became 
increasingly difficult to finance. From 1941 to 1942, the corps doubled in size, but 
shortage of funds meant a shortage of equipment and frequent staff changes. Still, the 
Aligarh Gazette proclaimed that “a high level of efficiency and enthusiasm has been 
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maintained, and a considerable number of cadet members have joined the fighting 
forces.”124 
Whereas the day-to-day maintenance of discipline may have been the preserve of 
students, training for the military was managed by teachers and military officers. The 
university supported special training for some members of the staff in the hope that they 
might be able to “impart Military training to students on modern lines.”125 Some 
university officials even held “honorary rank” in the army, including Colonel Haider, the 
head of the Department of Chemistry and the Vice Chancellor Sir Ziauddin Ahmad who 
was granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant Colonel in 1942.126 By the middle of the 
war, Aligarh had become a site of official recruiting for the military.  
In 1942, while recruiting for Emergency Commissions, the Commissioner of 
Bareilly Division, Mr. Nethersole, wrote that he found Aligarh students highly qualified 
for the commissions, as they were “alert, full of enthusiasm and generally of a very good 
type.”127 Nethersole’s “good type” tellingly links the mental and the physical to praise the 
qualifications of Aligarh boys. The university provided “special facilities” to prepare 
students for these Emergency Commissions during the war, including the fact that the 
selection committee’s work was completed on site. “Students with sound physique and 
inclination for military service” were invited to take advantage of the unique training 
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opportunity available at Aligarh and to “help in maintaining the traditional share of the 
Muslims in the defence of the country.”128 By March 1942, approximately 80 students 
had received such commissions for the Navy, Air Force and Land Force.129 The 
following year, the Gazette reported that upwards of 500 students from Aligarh had 
received Emergency Commissions.130  
In June 1942, the Gazette reported that Ziauddin had convinced the government 
of India to support a War Technician’s Class, for which the university provided a special 
barracks and selection committee.131 The War Technician’s Class prepared young men 
for work in munitions factories and had the capacity to train up to three hundred students 
in each class.132 To encourage Muslim students to join the training course, the course was 
free, paid for by scholarships. It was advertised to students as good preparation for 
earning a livelihood during the war and more importantly for contributing to “the 
Mussalamans’ share in the industrial progress of India.”133 
During Jinnah’s 1942 visit, the students of Aligarh treated him to a military 
parade in which “different companies of students in military uniform marched past the 
base where he stood taking the salute to the accompaniment of military band. The leader 
of each company carried the Muslim League Flag which was also hoisted at the Cricket 
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Pavilion.”134 Wajahat described the interest of the University in recruiting capable 
Muslim students to serve:  
The war was on, [so] the University was running a special drive to give basic training to the 
students to prepare for joining the armed forces… Aligarh Muslim University was well ahead in 
sending boys to join the armed forces with the idea of the university’s policy of sending as many 
Muslim officers as possible so that they could participate in the armed forces and later on be 
senior officers.135 
  
Volunteering in the war was a way for Muslims to rededicate their support to the British 
cause. However, the war experience highlighted the ambiguity of the Muslim position. 
General Wajahat had the feeling that Indian soldiers fighting in Europe were treated as 
“cannon fodder.”136 While none of the narrators who contributed here had personal 
stories of discrimination on the battlefield, General Ghulam Umar did speak of the farce 
of the selection board. He said the applicants were asked trivial questions, and enrolled 
even if they revealed no desire to become career officers, perhaps supporting a theory of 
their “dispensibility.”137  
Although volunteering was the best way for Muslims to declare their loyalty and 
separation from the non-violent, “effeminate” tactics of the Congress, their masculinity 
was received as incomplete in the British system. In 2005 General Wajahat told me, “Let 
us say, if a brigade is attacking North Africa, or Italy or anywhere, then the first front 
units, those two units used to be Indian units and in the rear the reserves used to be the 
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British units.”138 The British were all too grateful for the Indian troops, but could not see 
them as equals. British and Indian soldiers did not eat together, did not share living 
quarters. The separation between British and Indians was similar to the separation 
between officers and enlisted men, enshrined in an unassailable hierarchy that placed 
white above brown. Ayub Khan writes in his memoir that during his tenure at Sandhurst 
“the British did not practice the colour bar in a blatant manner, as in some countries, but 
they were no less colour conscious. In those days anyone coming from a subject race was 
regarded as an inferior human being and this I found terribly galling.”139 Though, he 
wrote, there was the camaraderie of common purpose, “there was never any close 
understanding.”140  
The absence of a close understanding between the British and Indians had become 
the core principle of the resistance to British imperialism. Indians advocated for 
independence, for full representation and for an end to the British economic and political 
domination of Indian society. Aligarh boys had long struggled with their relationship to 
the British, but during the 1940s, under the guidance of the Muslim League and M.A. 
Jinnah, they had been persuaded to exercise forbearance, to avoid the tactics of the 
Congress, to organize and prepare for leadership on a day when the Muslims would rule 
their own state. Throughout the early 1940s, Jinnah and other League leaders had urged 
the students to focus on their studies, but as the Pakistan movement gathered momentum, 
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Jinnah began to shift his focus not only to generating popular support for the movement, 
but to preparing for its future. 
Jinnah and the Muslim League were inspired by Sir Sayyid’s nationalist 
philosophy and incorporated its values. However, as the movement developed and the 
establishment of Pakistan began to seem more and more likely, Jinnah began to shift his 
priorities in his speeches to students. Recognizing that social and economic diversity 
would be necessary to sustain the new state, he told students that the Muslim community 
had concentrated its energies on seeking employment in the Imperial Civil Service, a key 
goal of Sir Sayyid’s organization, and it had neglected the “commercial aspect” of the 
nation, to its detriment.141  
We have merely been producing B.A.s and M.A.s who look for a Government job carrying a 
salary of Rs. 50 or Rs. 60. This is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. I say to you and to all our 
leaders that we must now take immediate steps to train our youth in a manner that they may be 
diverted to other useful channels, where they have better prospects; but the channels will also have 
to be created… You must have your own commerce and your own industry in which you will be 
able to give employment not only to thousands of workers and labourers, but also to the educated 
youth, who will have infinitely better prospects and will be in a position to do better work in these 
lines than Government service.142 
 
He repeatedly urged students, in speeches throughout the subcontinent, to aspire to 
careers above the “mere clerkships” that had been allowed to them under the British, and 
to pursue vocational training in bookkeeping, banking and typing.143 These were careers 
traditionally dominated by Hindus. Jinnah went so far as to suggest that students “must 
look to the example of the Hindu community” which had been more flexible in its 
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pursuance of social and political opportunities.144 The principles of the ashraf, he 
implied, could not sustain an entire society. Aligarh University had been instrumental in 
providing some of this technical training during the war, and Jinnah hoped that this trend 
would continue. He began to transform Sir Sayyid’s narrative into one more productive 
for political organizing. As the next chapter will show, it was Jinnah’s re-imagined 
version of Sir Sayyid’s nationalist philosophy that ultimately created the enthusiasm for 
the Pakistan demand.  
 As the British extended their power in India, Sir Sayyid tried to align Muslims 
with their strategy, to draw Muslim leaders closer to their agenda. He embarked on a 
mission to develop an Aligarh masculinity, one that sought to be broadly inclusive, but 
ultimately succeeded in excluding those who were unlike him, who came from different 
family backgrounds, regions, or priorities. The culture of discipline enforced through the 
residential system, the sporting environment, and the Union became the core of a 
“character building” program that excluded women and non-Muslims in particular.145 It 
facilitated a narrow view of the Indian Muslim qaum that became even more significant 
when Muslim League leaders came to incorporate Aligarh boys in their political activism. 
When former students look back on this period, when they speak about non-political 
experiences, there is a broad consensus on the “atmosphere” of the University. Boys 
were, largely, boys. They lived, learned and played together in a perhaps not-too-
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detrimental culture of gentle teasing and ultimately deep support. By the 1940s, however, 
this culture experienced cataclysmic change as the priorities of the institution and its 
founder were re-imagined in service of a new political mission. 
Within two years of war’s end, India and Pakistan were independent. Aligarh 
men, including Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan led the nation to 
independence, supported by the students of Aligarh, the group that Jinnah had called “the 
arsenal of Muslim India.”146 Aligarh men were drawn into the movement for 
independence easily. They had been preparing throughout the war to leave the university 
and to take part in the world of men, as trained technicians, pilots, or officers. Many of 
their colleagues had already gone. The war’s end left a void for the expression of this 
enthusiasm, and the political organizers of the Muslim League were ready to harness it. 
Throughout the 1940s the League had held political sway on the campus, dominating the 
university’s publications, the Union and the sympathies of the administration and many 
of the teachers. In 1945-46 provincial elections were to be held, Aligarh boys threw 
themselves into League election work and set out across India to convince Muslims that a 
vote for the League was a vote for Pakistan. 
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Chapter 3 
Self-Realization and the Nation: Aligarh Student Activism 
 
The students of the Aligarh University are frequently invoked as the foot soldiers 
of Pakistan and their electioneering work recognized as the difference-maker in the 1945 
and 1946 provincial elections when the pro-Pakistan Muslim League won the majority of 
Muslim seats.1 The Muslim University Muslim League, under the guidance of Aligarh 
graduate and lawyer Manzar-i-Alam Ansari, was particularly active in recruiting, 
training, equipping and dispatching students into the hinterlands of UP, Punjab, the 
Northwest Frontier Province, Assam and Sindh to support Muslim League candidates. 
The elections are sometimes called “a referendum on Pakistan” (not to be confused with 
the actual referenda that took place in Bengal and the Northwest Frontier Provinces2) and 
secured sufficient support for the Muslim League agenda to convince the British that the 
Muslim League held a majority of Muslim support. 
In one of Indian historian Mushirul Hasan’s most famous pieces on Aligarh, the 
image of Aligarh student election-workers sets the scene for his examination of the 
university during the Muslim League period.3 Hasan’s work has done much to advance 
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our understanding of the involvement of Aligarh students in the Pakistan demand, as has 
the work of Sarfaraz Husain Mirza, a Pakistani scholar who has collated and published 
much of the correspondence between Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, and 
student groups throughout British India. However, neither scholar has undertaken a 
complete study of the role and experience of students during this period. The only 
monograph on the students’ movement, written by Mukhtar Zaman, is fairly 
comprehensive, based on personal experience, interviews, memories and preserved 
documents. All three authors invoke student activity in the context of telling a story about 
Muslim nationalism that places the state at the center of the story. Thus, Muslim 
nationalism takes on comprehensive significance as a story about state making—the 
creation of both India and Pakistan—and the place of Muslims in general and Aligarh 
Muslims in particular in both states. Hasan is concerned to protect the reputation of his 
alma mater from the stain of separatist Muslim nationalism, Zaman exalts the students’ 
central role in a teleological story of Pakistan, and Mirza has been instrumental in 
centering Aligarh in Pakistan’s state narrative as the beating heart of the Pakistan 
demand.  
This chapter argues that only by de-linking Aligarh students’ activism in the 
1930s and 40s from its outcome—the creation of Pakistan—can we clearly see their 
motives and the impact of state narratives on their memories. This allows us to place the 
Pakistan demand in a continuum of political action at the University beginning in its 
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earliest days and to recognize in it the central priority of Muslim uplift as a separate 
objective from that of independent statehood. For the student activists, particularly those 
at Aligarh, their concern was for the community, its integrity, safety and advancement.  
This was not simply a selfless and idyllic concern. Aligarh boys fully expected that they 
would be the leaders of this community. Their own welfare was tied to that of the 
community’s fortunes. Only by examining the movement historically can we see through 
the stigma of Aligarh’s exceptionalism and understand how its history has been co-opted 
by multiple state stories in ways that obscure many of the movement’s priorities. This 
strategy clarifies the experience of students who had to navigate the shifting politics of 
the institution that was not only their school, but also their home.  I will examine the 
changing environment at Aligarh in the late 1930s, and particularly the environment 
during the period when the Indian National Congress governed in provinvial ministries.  
This was a difficult period for Muslims who perceived their status to be compromised 
and deliberately undermined by Congress workers’ actions.  The Muslim League, intent 
to rejuvenate support for Muslim nationalism after the return of Mohammad Ali Jinnah to 
Indian politics, exploited the tension between Hindus and Muslims and specifically 
targeted the Muslim students.4  
Whereas in the late 1930s, Jinnah mobilized student support by appealing to the 
idea that Muslims were a Minority community that required concessions and safeguards 
in a democratic state, his speeches to student groups reflect over time the transformation 
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in his mind from conceiving of the Muslims as a Minority to insisting they be recognized 
as a Nation.  This is the critical transformation of the Pakistan movement, and sits at the 
heart of one of the great debates in the historiography of the Pakistan Movement, namely, 
was the Pakistan demand understood to be territorial? It is not my intention to reargue 
this point here; I believe there is sufficient evidence to make clear that the demand for 
Pakistan was always territorial. In an address to the Punjab Muslim Students’ Federation 
in March 1941, Jinnah unambiguously declared, “We are a nation and a nation must have 
a territory,” a nation “must have a territorial state and that is what you want to get.”5  
However, there is ample evidence to suggest that the question of completely separate 
statehood remained unresolved until very late in the negotiations for Pakistan.6   
There was already a precedent for semi-autonomous statehood with which the 
students of Aligarh were intimately familiar.  In addition to the support of local 
landholders and nawabs,7 the leaders of the Aligarh University and of the Hyderabad 
State had been serving in one another’s institutions since Aligarh’s foundation; the Nizam 
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of Hyderabad was the Chancellor of the University,8 the Nawab of Rampur its Pro-
Chancellor and a significant financial patron;9 and Nawab Ali Hasan Khan of Bhopal 
“was a great admirer of Sir Sayed and… helped Aligarh college with money and 
support.”10 The Nawab of Chatttari, a local zamindar (landlord) and Aligarh patron, was 
the Prime Minister of Hyderabad State from 1941-1943 and again in 1947; he also served 
as Chancellor of Osmania University in Hyderabad. It was not inconceivable that a 
Muslim state could exist within a larger Indian polity, and Aligarh’s links to Hyderabad, 
Rampur, Bhopal and other Muslim princely states proved it. There is no conflict between 
a Pakistan demand that is both territorial and part of India; the power of the Pakistan 
demand was that it meant different things to different people.11 What emerges from this 
examination, however, is the sense that Aligarh students saw in the Pakistan demand the 
familiar terms of the Aligarh movement, that Pakistan was for them not merely a territory 
where Muslims occupied the majority, but a way of being that elevated the priorities of 
their founder to the highest position. Pakistan, for them, meant empowerment through 
solidarity, and they were willing to do anything to get it.  
 An examination of Aligarh’s past reveals that political ideas gained currency there 
during periods of difficulty, when the students perceived an external threat to their very 
existence. It was on this ground that Sir Sayyid first argued for the institution. He 
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invoked fears of Muslim decline in the wake of the 1857 Mutiny, arguing that Muslims’ 
failure to take advantage of English education would render them helpless in a state 
dominated by the British. Lack of education, and especially English education, would 
exclude them from consideration for many lucrative posts, commerce and social 
interactions with “European fellow subjects.”12 It became clear by the time of Sir 
Sayyid’s death, however, that his loyalist views were not wholeheartedly shared by all 
Aligarians, or even by all of the founders of the Aligarh Movement. 13 Rather, it was 
discontent with the behavior of Sir Sayyid’s beloved British staff that aroused the anti-
British sympathies among the students.14  
The first British Principal of Aligarh, Theodore Beck, is widely recognized to 
have been a devotee of the Aligarh project who, in the eyes of Shaukat Ali behaved with 
“easy familiarity toward Indians”15 and frequently interacted with the students, even in 
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games.16 Beck, however, barely outlived Sir Sayyid himself, and his successors had been 
deeply influenced by the culture of formal imperialism that was codified in the wake of 
the 1857 rebellion and that cast the British in a distinctly separate social category than 
their subjects.  
Theodore Morison, for example, embraced a “stiff” policy towards the students, 
maintained a boundary between himself and their problems, and refused to meet them at 
his bungalow.17 The growing tension between University Trustees, current students, and 
the English staff, echoed growing anti-British sentiment in India and internationally. In 
an unpublished pamphlet, Hameed-ud-Din Khan, who arrived at the MAO College in 
1909, remembered his disappointment at discovering that the English staff were not as 
friendly or “intimate with the students” as he had expected from hearing tales of Beck.  
Rather, he “gradually realized that the general atmosphere [in Aligarh] was definitely 
anti-British… I cannot say how far we were influenced by the political tempo, steadily 
rising in the country, but we had sufficient sources of irritation of our own.”18 The scene 
he describes in this pamphlet is one that is motivated by its internal characteristics. That 
is, when the nationalist leaders, including Mohandas K. Gandhi and Aligarh Old Boys 
Mohamad and Shaukat Ali, urged Aligarh students to join the non-cooperation movement 
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against British financing of institutions (educational and otherwise), they were inclined to 
participate as much because of its global implications as its local ones.19 In the words of 
S.M. Tonki, a second generation Aligarh student who was drawn into the nationalist 
movement (and defected to the Jamia Millia Islamia), “The struggle continued between 
the self-respecting trustees and the all powerful principal till 1919, when the last of them, 
Mr. Towle, resigned with the European staff following him en bloc.”20  The internal 
tension created by discontent with the attitude of British staff was linked with the broader 
movement to resist British imperialism and coincided with more explicit political 
agitation on the campus surrounding the negotiations for the establishment of a Muslim 
University.  
The campaign for the Muslim University was a cause dear to the hearts of all 
associated with Aligarh, but the visions for the form and leadership of the institution 
varied widely. As Lelyveld and Minault have shown, the campaign itself became the 
battleground for factional rivalries; the divide between anti-imperialist nationalists and 
pro-British loyalists was a particularly acute fissure and the conflict with the English staff 
was by no means unique.  It was emblematic to the students, however, of their discontent 
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with imperialism, and “created a highly favorable atmosphere… for the reception of 
Mahatma Gandhi’s non-cooperation Movement,” and may ultimately be seen as the one 
that drove them to action.21 Whereas loyalist Muslims sought comfort in the traditions 
that linked the university to British patronage, nationalist Muslims looked outward from 
the university into the broader world of India and the Empire. Led by a prominent group 
of Old Boys who sought to carry Sir Sayyid’s torch but had come to see the loyalist 
aspirations of their alma mater as regressive and anti-national, the students fell into 
sympathy with the pro-Turkish Khilafat Movement and anti-imperialist forces of 
nationalism. When the debate over the conversion of MAO to AMU was taking place, in 
the context of the lead-up to the First World War, this faction—led by the Ali Brothers—
wanted to keep control of AMU out of the hands of government and firmly in the hands 
of Muslims. They looked to the example of the Deoband Madrasa’s insistence on 
eschewing government grants.22 A confluence of national and international events in 
1919 and 1920 resulted in an agreement between the Congress, the League, and the 
Khilafat “in favour of noncooperation” which put Aligarh, as a government-supported 
institution, under the spotlight.23 Aligarh was on its way to becoming a University, but an 
effort that started out as progressive took shelter in the conservatism of British loyalism, 
looked to the government for its future stability and shied away from nationalist calls to 
abandon government funding. Aligarh’s dedication to the secular education of Indian 
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Muslims set it apart from other institutions initially, but the early twenthieth-century saw 
a rush of inaugurations of new universities including Osmania, Dhaka, Lucknow, and 
Agra.24  This proliferation threatened Aligarh’s singular impact and tempered its value. 
So despite the Ali Brothers resistance, in the face of so much competition, “the ambitions 
for Aligarh as a central institution in an independent, Muslim, all-India educational 
system,” characterized by affiliated junior institutions throughout the country, fell by the 
wayside.25 The Ali Brothers continued to resist government affiliation. In October 1920, 
Mohamad Ali convinced some of Aligarh’s students to walk out in protest, and founded 
the Jamia Millia Islamia, the “Muslim National University” in the Aligarh Mosque.26 
Other leaders, including the MAO Principal Ziauddin Ahmad, accepted a pared down 
University model, and moved for incorporation with government support. The 
incorporation of the Aligarh University by an Act of Parliament was accelerated in the 
face of the nationalist challenge presented by Mohamad Ali. Still the Jamia Millia 
Islamia, that “lusty child of non-cooperation,” overshadowed the founding of the Aligarh 
Muslim University on December 1, 1920.27 
The temporal and spatial coincidence of two new institutions of learning that laid 
claim to the same intellectual history but held sacred opposing philosophies links their 
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histories during this period inextricably. It ties Aligarh as an institution to trends in 
national politics, even if only by its resistance to them. It should be clear, however, that 
the leadership of both the conservative and the progressive factions of Aligarh Old Boys, 
Ziauddin Ahmed, the Principal of the MAO College and Mohamad Ali, famed Khilafat 
leader, were contemporaries at Aligarh. One thing that this reveals is the diversity of 
beliefs that emerged from that enclosed and protected environment.  Well-wishers of 
Aligarh University argue that Sir Sayyid’s Movement sought the “intellectual and 
cultural regeneration of Muslims” and that “the essence of the movement lay in its spirit 
of freedom of thought and expression, and in the urge to keep pace with changing times. 
It is for this reason that Aligarh produced figures of all political shades and hues.”28 This 
rosy assessment should not obscure the fact that the variety of political opinion that has 
emerged from Aligarh over the decades has contributed to deep and enduring conflicts of 
values and disputes over the direction that Indian Muslims should take. Aligarh Professor 
of Arabic Riazur Rahman Sherwani emphasized this point when I first interviewed him 
on the terrace of his home in Aligarh in 2008.  
But I want to tell you one thing, not only during this period, even from an earlier period when 
there was no Muslim League, even from that time, there has always been a section of teachers and 
students in this institution, when it was MAO College as well as when it became University, who 
thought on different lines from the administration of the university, or from the majority of the 
students… Through all the phases, there have been students here and teachers also, whose line of 
action was different from that of the majority.  I also belonged to that minority.29 
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The Muslim League Movement of the 1940s, like earlier periods, was shot 
through with interpersonal and political frictions, though they have largely been 
obscured by historical concentration on the outcomes of partition.  
Aligarh was, for several decades, a testing ground for ideas as students explored 
alternatives to the state in which they had been raised.30 The Khilafat Movement invoked 
a rhetoric of pan-Islamism that drew India’s Muslims into a broader field of resistance. 
As Gail Minault has argued, however, the purpose of this rhetoric was really to draw 
India’s Muslims together around a set of shared values, to develop a Muslim constituency 
in support of the anti-imperialist cause of Indian nationalists. These values found 
purchase among those associated with Aligarh because they were based on powerful 
symbols in the Muslim imagination: the Muslim caliphate and the foundational values of 
Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.  Minault’s study concludes, “Islam as a religion and social 
order contains within itself certain symbols and networks of influence which allow for 
the development of alternative structures of mobilization.”31 Students were drawn 
together in solidarity, rallied around an apparently foundational institution of their faith 
and the authority it still carried, and around the idea that by suppressing the differences 
between and amongst them, Muslims could provide a challenge to international 
imperialism, in service not only of their own community, but also of India.  
As the influence of the nationalist movement, grew, the younger generation of 
Aligarh students participated. The defining moment of the nationalist period at the 
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university has become the founding of the Jamia Millia Islamia, but as Minault and 
Lelyveld allude, the initial revolt of students that resulted in the founding of the 
institution did not have enough momentum to keep the institution alive.  It was not long 
before many students returned to the newly founded Aligarh Muslim University—in the 
interest of completing their education—but retained their nationalist sympathies.  
Many students abandoned the loyalism of their founding father in favor of participation 
in the larger world of politics. The Muslim League held its annual session in Aligarh in 
1925 and its president made a concerted effort to draw students to the League. However, 
Professor Mohammad Habib persuaded even more students to join the Congress which, 
in the aftermath of the English staff’s departure, dominated the Students’ Union.32 K.G. 
Saiyyadain, an Aligarh Old Boy and well-known Indian educationist, fondly remembered 
that “it was [in the Aligarh Union] that I participated in the great Jubilee debate in 1926 
when the students of the University endorsed with great acclaim, a policy of united 
nationalism.”33 The influence of the Muslim League at Aligarh has been overplayed in 
the public memory of the institution whereas the nationalist period is glossed over or 
merely used as a foil to expose the wrongs of the League. It is therefore significant to 
dwell on the nationalist period at the University, particularly the shift that occurred 
between the enthusiastic moment surrounding the founding of both the Jamia Millia 
Islamia and the Aligarh Muslim University and the wild popularity of the League fewer 
than twenty years later. 
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THE NATIONALIST PERIOD 
The nationalist sentiment is evident in student publications, including The Aligarh 
Magazine. In 1930, an appeal for donations to the Sahibzada [Aftab Ahmad Khan] 
Memorial Fund was couched in nationalist rhetoric. The appeal calls on donors to support 
Aligarh with funds because of its impeccable nationalist credentials.  The appeal argues 
that students from all provinces of India meet in Aligarh and  
on one side we are placing into the crucible the Hindus, the Musalmans, the Christians, the Sikhs 
and the Parsees of India and beating them all on the furnace of Aligarh to fashion out of this 
mixture a common substance purged of the alloy thereby creating the typical man—that future 
citizen of India on whom would rest the task of building the nation of this great land, and perhaps 
of the world as India promised to be the future leader of humanity.34 
  
The appeal heralded the universal Indian citizen, a composite of her many cultures that, 
once mixed, created a “typical man.” Aligarh was cast as a forge for creating this typical 
man: one who understood his fellow citizens, was sympathetic to their culture, but held 
dear the unity of the nation and would forego communal or sectarian allegiances to act in 
the best interest of India’s composite culture.35 
Throughout the 1930s the Congress spirit remained evident in the university 
publications, the Muslim University Gazette and the Aligarh Magazine, as writers 
frequently appealed for “understanding cordiality between Hindus and Muslims.”36  They 
reiterated Aligarh’s nationalist credentials by linking their interests with that of the nation 
emphasizing that the contribution Muslims broadly, and Aligarians in particular had 
made not only to Muslim educational and cultural advance, but to “the country in 
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general.”37 A distinct tension began to arise here between the interests of the University, 
that had gone to some lengths to isolate its wards from the world outside and the interests 
of the students who insisted that their contribution to that larger world be recognized. 
This was in part an effort to recover Muslim history from the damage done to it after 
1857 when Muslims were singled out as enemies of the state and thereafter seen as 
interlopers in Indian society, and it was in part an effort to earn recognition for their role 
in such nationalist agitations as non-cooperation—rejected outright in Banaras Hindu 
University—and the founding of the Jamia Millia Islamia.38  
In 1937 the Indian National Congress’ election success allowed them to form 
provincial ministries under the Government of Indian Act 1935.  This was a politically 
polarizing time, as Muslims came to grips with the reality of parliamentary democracy. In 
particular, although the League and Congress had worked together during the elections, 
generating nationalist enthusiasm, visible at Aligarh, once the ministry was seated, 
Congress declined to form alliances with the League. League partisans saw this as a 
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breach of faith and used it to fuel support for their political movement.39 It was during 
this period that students at AMU increasingly turned to the League for political 
expression, challenging the ethos of political passivity current at Aligarh since Sir 
Sayyid’s days. 40 
The May 5th issue of the Muslim University Gazette took up the issue of the 
university’s role in politics explicitly. Addressing the role of the university in the lives of 
students, the editorial evokes the separate nature of the university itself and the dangers 
of the temptations of the world outside.  While in the university—an enclosed space, 
apart from practical life and strictly bounded—students were being prepared for life 
outside, but they were not in it yet, and to become involved would mean a dangerous 
distraction from the priorities of the student.  Thus, the editorial reminds students that 
“the Muslim University allows fullest liberty to the students to discuss all social political 
and economic problems of the day and form into groups on that basis provided that the 
rules of discipline are scrupulously maintained and the strictly academic nature of these 
activities is not violated.”41 The May editorial further acknowledged that among the staff 
of the university there were a variety of views, but that all AMU staff “act as a body” to 
exert a wholesome influence on the students and to guide them in their studies and “they 
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are always anxious to see that the academic atmosphere of this institution is not disturbed 
by forces outside this sphere.”42 Two significant issues are raised in the closing lines of 
the story, one is the tension between education and politics and this will increase in 
significance throughout the next ten years, and the other is the idea that the forces of 
distraction and corruption come from outside the university.  The Muslim League activity 
indeed put both of these premises to the test. But first, we must understand how the 
university was drawn into the politics of the Muslim League to the extent that in late 
1938 The Pro-Vice Chancellor, A.B.A. Haleem went so far as to estimate that “about 
90% of the students of the University have strong Muslim League sympathies and it is no 
exaggeration to say that out of 114 members of the staff about 100 at least are Muslim 
Leaguers.”43 Whereas in 1937 nationalist sentiment was still strong, by 1942, when 
Congress announced the Quit India Resolution Irfan Habib recalls that “nothing stirred” 
in AMU. Congress had become so weak there in the wake of the Pakistan Resolution of 
1940 that he does not remember the Congress even holding any meetings or processions 
in support of Quit India.44 
 
FROM NATIONALISM TO THE TWO NATION THEORY 1937-1940 
As the Congress Ministry in UP took its seat in 1937 the Muslim University 
Gazette published a supportive piece welcoming the leadership of “Pandit Pant and his 
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co-workers, who are the right men in the right place, and who have been chosen by the 
people to govern in their name.” 45 The same piece criticized “minority Government” as 
antithetical to the spirit of democracy and therefore “unwholesome” and expressed trust 
in the motives of the Congress ministry to protect Muslim interests because Congress is 
“not a communal body and therefore it does not look at things from the communal point 
of view.” The editorial’s objective was to place the issue of Muslim education before the 
Congress Ministry in the context of the Karachi Resolution of Fundamental Rights that 
ensured free primary education.46  The author urged the new Congress ministry to 
recognize that “a backward Muslim Society is a drag on the general advancement of the 
nation” and thus to make provisions for safeguarding the interests of Muslims, 
particularly in regard to education, culture, language, and religion.  Ultimately, the author 
argued, consistent with the strategy that the paper had adopted during this period, the fate 
of Muslims was intimately tied up with the fate of the nation. It made no sense for the 
Congress ministry to abandon its Muslim constituents because although Muslims may 
have been “backward,” they were part of India, and their lot was India’s lot.   
Significantly here, the Muslims are cast as a Minority, deserving of safeguards. 
The concept of a “minority government” was rejected as undemocratic and the author 
urged the elected government to care for its minority.  The minority, however, was 
subject to the whims of this government, and there is a mild but implicit threat that just as 
Muslims who receive safeguards could help to ameliorate social ills, were the Muslims to 
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find themselves empty-handed, they could prove an equally disruptive force. The role of 
the minority here was not to govern, but to participate and to hold the government 
accountable.  According to the author’s understanding of the Karachi Resolution, 
Congress’ intentions were good, but the editorial served as a reminder that the previous 
government failed to address Muslim education, and the new government must.  
A distinct transformation had taken place in The Muslim University Gazette by the 
end of 1937 and an almost frantic anxiety pervades an article on “National Education” in 
the year’s last issue. Since August, the Gazette had been grappling with the ideas at the 
heart of Mahatma Gandhi’s educational scheme, primarily the emphasis on 
craft/industrial production.47 The Editor disagreed that education should be self-
supporting, rather he desired that the state direct more money and resources at 
education.48 But it was Pandit Madan Malaviya’s Convocation address at Allahabad 
University that betrayed how threatened Muslims at Aligarh felt about Gandhi’s Wardha 
Scheme of Education. The story heavily criticized Malaviya’s use of Sanskritized Hindi 
in front of an audience conversant in an Urdu-ized Hindustani.  According to this report, 
“when a gentleman tried to express his feelings of bewilderment, he was hooted down by 
the more vociferous section of the house, and no one questioned the despotic rule of the 
majority.”49 Only a few months after the magazine welcomed the Congress Ministries 
and expressed trust in their intentions to safeguard Muslim interests, this story cast 
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majority rule as “despotic.” It went on to attack Aryan Hindu claims of Indian nativity 
that would exclude Muslims and argued aggressively for an inclusive system that would 
recognize the Muslim contribution to the Indian nation. The Muslims may have been in 
the minority, this argument suggested, but they were not separate from the Indian nation. 
Part and parcel of this argument is the demand that Urdu be recognized as the national 
language. The piece concluded with a jab at the majority community—calling it 
communally minded—and beckoned a leader “of vision and imagination” who could 
transform the political environment.50 
Things were moving quickly now. December 1937 saw two meetings of the 
Muslim Students Federation, both held in Calcutta, one under the leadership of nationalist 
Humayun Kabir, and one under Mohammad Ali Jinnah.51 The All India Muslim 
Students’ Federation had been founded at Aligarh, despite significant resistance from the 
still nationalist Union.52 Remarkably, the speeches that each leader delivered in Calcutta 
appear to be in almost direct conversation; Kabir chastised Muslim leaders for relying on 
a narrative of weakness and decline that provided the necessity for political organization, 
Jinnah deployed just such a narrative even as he urged the students to organize. He said 
that he had “failed” with the Hindus and that “there is [now] no other course open to us 
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except to organize ourselves through separate organizations like the All-India Muslim 
Students Federation.”53 Kabir called students to the nationalist cause, urging them to “rise 
above their personal or their class interests and work for the emancipation of their 
motherland.54 It was a mistake he argued, to believe that Indians or Muslims or the youth 
were weak, but it was obvious that by combining forces they would undoubtedly be 
strong.  Jinnah argued that Muslims would no longer be “camp followers” and would 
never “be subdued or be camp followers or slaves or the subject race of  ‘Hindu Raj.’”55 
Citing the failure of the All India Students’ Federation--over whose meeting he had 
presided the previous year—to include Muslims among the executive leadership and its 
failure to facilitate communal unity, Jinnah urged the students to “organize for self-
defence and self-help.”56  The Muslim University Gazette for its part, avoided taking sides 
between the two new organizations, but did not miss the opportunity to criticize the press 
for failing to cover the meeting led by Mr. Jinnah. Their explanation for this oversight is 
that the press did not “attach much importance to the problems which immediately 
concern Muslims.”57 Thus while resisting the urge to take sides, the paper articulated a 
call for an Independent Muslim press, a move towards separate representation in the 
public sphere, a theme that would emerge again and again as the Muslim League sought 
to control its own propaganda/ narrative through the 1940s.   
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Beyond the University, in March 1937, Jawaharlal Nehru had issued a call to 
Congress to “make a special effort to enroll Muslim Congress members” and to engage 
them in practical politics while protecting the “religious, linguistic and cultural rights of 
minorities.”58 The Muslim Mass Contact Campaign was a reaction to Congress’ poor 
performance in Muslim areas in the 1936 elections, and endeavored to draw Muslims into 
Congress based on common economic concerns rather than on the basis of Congress 
sympathy for Muslims’ parochial issues, as it had in the Khilafat Movement.59 The 
MMCC targeted Aligarh and other cities in UP, and Mushirul Hasan reports, it “had a 
favorable impression” on students at AMU.60 But Congress activity galvanized the 
League, an organization then seeking purchase in the Muslim community. Congress 
action felt like an assault on its territory and the League redoubled its efforts to draw 
Muslims into the League. Some mystery remains about how the Muslim League so 
quickly turned about-face, from its poor showing in the elections to the large organization 
it would claim by late 1937.61 From the examination of The Muslim University Gazette 
above, however, it is clear that discontent grew quickly in 1937 both in the university and 
outside of it. 
Controversy erupted over the actions and agendas of the Congress Ministries from 
the singing of Bande Mataram to the failure of Congress Governments to protect 
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Muslims from harm during communal riots.62 Muslims felt threatened by the Mass 
Contacts Campaign that appeared to them to be an effort to drive a wedge between the 
Muslim masses and their traditional leadership, which had turned to the League in large 
numbers by the end of 1937.63 The Wardha educational scheme had further frightened 
Muslims—already conditioned to fear assaults on their traditional systems of learning—
with its apparent priority of teaching Hindu values, and even dancing (this came on top of 
the 1921 Vidya Mandir scheme, which sounded to Muslims as if schools would be turned 
into temples.)64 This close link between education and Muslim solidarity placed Aligarh 
at the heart of the tension. It was shortly before his address to the inaugural meeting of 
the All India Muslim Students Federation that Jinnah came to recognize the political 
value of Muslim anxiety, and realized that at the heart of the education-political nexus, 
Muslim students were critical to the success of the Muslim League’s rejuvenation in the 
face of the Congress threat.65  
Former student and retired Aligarh University Professor of English Masood ul-
Hasan, described the allure of the League; he remembered, “The Congress volunteers had 
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their Young Men’s Corps.  Even the Khaksars, they had theirs.  The ordinary young 
student, the ordinary young man, he was left out.” The League seemed to present an 
opportunity to fulfill the students’ desire for “self-manifestation.”66  
The publication in 1938 of the Pirpur Report put paid to Congress’ claims to 
communal fairness. Though many still suspect that the episodes it describes are at best 
exaggerated, at worst “imaginary,” the Pirpur report served to foment Muslim mistrust of 
the Congress Ministries.67 The Pirpur Report is a litany of Muslim grievances from 
Congress-governed provinces alleging all manner of violence and disregard on the part of 
regular citizens and the authorities that ultimately argues that communalism was driven 
by the majority community.68 The report reiterates the threat of the MMCC as a Congress 
tactic to destroy Muslim solidarity and to co-opt some symbols—the use of green in the 
tri-color Congress flag is called into question here—and failure to adopt others—Urdu is 
identified as a lingua franca developed by Muslims with the intent of adapting a common 
language but these efforts were destroyed by Hindu communalism to the detriment of 
Muslims.  Part III of the report is a detailed accounting of “Muslims’ Grievances” in the 
six Congress governed provinces: Bihar, UP, Orissa, CP, Madras and Bombay. As might 
be expected, the report was received with terrific anxiety, appearing, as it did, at a time 
when Muslims had already begun to turn their attention to the League and its mission. It 
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was the “widely publicized” Pirpur Report that finally turned the tide at Aligarh, and the 
League with its message of empowerment began formally to establish itself there.69 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah visited Aligarh University in March 1940 to make an 
important speech to the students just before he traveled to Lahore for the Muslim League 
session at the end of the month. During that visit, he spoke about the difference between 
Minority and Nation. This rhetorical shift laid the ground upon which Jinnah sought to 
build his arsenal.  The Muslim India of which Jinnah spoke in March was the same as the 
differentiated Nation that became the heart of the Pakistan Demand. Since the advent of 
separate electorates, he noted, most people assumed that the Muslims were a minority 
requiring safeguards and governmental or legislative protection of their rights. In fact, 
this was the rhetorical strategy Jinnah himself had used throughout the 1930s. Now, 
however, he argued that when “we used this term… what we meant was that the Muslims 
were a political entity and that must be preserved at all costs.”70 The difference here is 
between the helpless minority and the empowered political force. Jinnah had turned away 
from the earlier rhetoric of decline, so ably deployed by reforming Muslim leaders before 
him, most notably Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and turned a sense of exclusion into a call for 
action.  Whereas the concept of Minority had given Muslims a false sense of security, 
and Hindus a false sense of power, the concept of nationhood made possible a demand 
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for political equality. This demand for parity would guide the League through the next 
seven years.  
The All India Muslim League leaders, for their part, especially Jinnah and his 
right-hand man, the Aligarian Liaqat Ali Khan, repeatedly reminded AMU boys of their 
centrality to the League’s strength and Muslim life in general. Jinnah taught them that 
they represented India’s Muslims, and hence that India’s Muslims were like them, 
regardless of their regional or linguistic origin.  The Urdu-speaking elites subscribed 
wholeheartedly to the idea that Jinnah inherited from Sir Sayyid, that the Muslims were a 
united moral community— a nation— because when they looked at its values, they saw 
themselves reflected. Mohammad Ali Jinnah empowered the students with the words, 
“What Aligarh thinks today, Muslim India will think tomorrow.”71 This Muslim Nation, 
and its claims, welcomed at Aligarh just prior to the passing of the Lahore Resolution, 
became the object and the goal of the Muslim League demand for Pakistan.  For as in 
earlier attempts to mobilize the Muslims for change, Jinnah’s demand that the League 
exclusively represent the Nation, paradoxically, was based on his desire to create a 
Nation, a political force strong enough to command attention at the center.72 He missed 
no opportunity to convince the youth of this and to impress upon them the need to be 
self-reliant. “It was no use,” he said, “depending upon anybody. We must depend upon 
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ourselves. I am willing to be friendly with all but I depend upon my own inherent 
strength.”73  
In 1941, before the students of Punjab, he berated the Congress for not catching 
on to the new paradigm: “Hindu leadership is still harping on the same old story that we 
are a minority and that they are willing to give all the safeguards according to the 
principles laid down by the League of Nations.”74 Jinnah tried to draw the students away 
from a narrative of dependency, and into one of self-reliance. A critical part of this is an 
appeal for solidarity within and amongst Muslims themselves. Jinnah recognized, and it 
was clearly apparent to him in his political work in the provinces, that Muslims, though 
unified at least nominally by their shared faith, were divided by a variety of factional 
loyalties.  His claim to nationhood could never stand without at least apparent loyalty on 
the part of Muslims. And the students were key to this appeal: “Muslims must remain in 
complete unity and solidarity amongst yourselves. Nobody can help you if you quarrel 
among yourselves.”75 
 This narrative of solidarity resonated at Aligarh, an institution built on an ethos of 
unity, a place that even now jealously protects its legacy as a place free from communal 
or factional strife. This is, of course, a fiction of sorts, and while the Aligarh environment 
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may not have been dominated by communal strife, there remained a certain amount of 
factionalism in the student body. 
 
THE LEAGUE PERIOD AT ALIGARH, 1940-1947 
During the League period, other political groups continued, at least nominally, to 
function on the campus. In particular the leftists, led by Professor Mohammad Habib 
resisted the League monopoly.  One of them, Nasim Ansari, an Indian Muslim graduate 
describes a university where amongst the students were “representatives of every 
province in India and followers of every party” where “whether the differences between 
them were based upon class or upon theories, they were not concealed in any way.”76 
This assessment fits very neatly into the image of Aligarh as a diverse yet harmonious 
environment, but several narrators described surprising levels of political bullying and 
coercion aimed at drawing students into the Muslim League fold. Certainly the Congress 
and the leftists continued to operate on the campus, but it was at risk of attack by the 
League.  In an off-the-record exchange, one narrator described the arrival of several 
communist party activists near the English House hostel.  When the young students 
realized who the representatives were, they began shouting abuses and cat-calling. This 
narrator is not alone in remembering the exclusivity of League sympathizers. Former 
student and retired professor of Arabic, Riazur Rahman Sherwani recalled that  
During the earlier days, leaders of various parties used to visit the university.  Pandit Nehru was 
very popular among the new generation of that time.  And he visited the university in early 
1930s… Gandhiji also visited this university.  All those people used to come here.  But when 
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Muslim League had a sway, it had hold of the university, the leaders of other parties stopped 
coming here.  Not stopped, they were not allowed to come here.  Only leaders of the Muslim 
League, they used to visit the university and no leader of any other party could come here.77 
 
The Muslim League monopoly during this period extended to personal relations, and as 
Sherwani was a nationalist and Congress supporter even throughout this period, he told 
me, “My father was always anxious that I may not be harmed physically due to my 
views. Because the majority of the students were of a different point of view, so his main 
anxiety was my safety.”78 The League monopoly was perpetuated through all manner of 
persuasion, not all of them peaceful. They took over the Students’ Union and became 
“the arsenal of Muslim India” when they later fanned out across the country working for 
the Muslim League in the 1945-46 elections.79  
As a result of the Muslim League influence, the university continued to struggle 
with the relationship between the University and politics. Hameed-ud-din argued that the 
campus had always been immune to the “communal virus” because no matter what the 
political views of the college and university leadership “they never allowed the students 
to take any active part in politics and did not even lecture to them about Muslim’s fears 
and aspirations on account of which they were opposed to the Congress ideology.”80 
Time and again the Gazette harmonized on this point: students were in the university for 
training, not to get involved in political action.  The frequent reminders to students that 
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their job was to stay focused and to study, but not to agitate, betrays a potent anxiety over 
their potential. 
Vice Chancellor Ziauddin Ahmed had shown, throughout the terms of his 
leadership, that he opposed student involvement in politics. This was clearly on display in 
the dispute over non-cooperation in 1920 and as late as 1942, during the Congress Quit 
India Movement, when, although students in other universities, particularly Allahabad, 
Lucknow and Banaras, actively responded to the Quit India agitation, as Irfan Habib 
remembered, Aligarh remained quiet. Mukhtar Zaman, as a student of Allahabad 
University, clearly remembers seeing the Hindus students form a procession to protest the 
spontaneous arrest of the Congress Working Committee.81  Both at Allahabad, and at 
Aligarh, however, the Muslim students remained apart.  At Aligarh, the British credited 
the calm to the willingness of Ziauddin Ahmed to cooperate with the authorities.82 
Certainly, by 1942, the League had gained significant traction at the university and the 
discipline of the students may also be seen as a reluctance to associate themselves with 
Congress’ movement. Ziauddin appears actively to have encouraged their passivity. In a 
Central Assembly debate in 1942 he declared, “I very much deplore that some political 
organizations are using the students for political propaganda”83 and he went on to lament 
the collusion of teachers. While this could be a reference to League activity at Aligarh, 
considering the timing, it is far more likely to be a direct attack on student involvement in 
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the Quit India agitation. Jinnah praised the students’ restraint in a speech before the All-
India Muslim Students’ Federation at Jalandhar in November 1942, congratulating “the 
Muslims that they in a body, from one end of India to the other, had kept completely 
aloof from the mass civil disobedience.”84  
League leaders at once enjoined the students to join the League and work on 
behalf of its ideals and urged them to focus on their education, and not to be distracted by 
the temptations of national politics. It seems that the League saw the students as a volatile 
and potentially fickle constituency. In the early years of the All-India Muslim Students’ 
Federation, Jinnah and other Muslim politicians had urged the students to focus on their 
studies, to support their community, and prepare themselves for the “future 
responsibility” that would fall on their shoulders as leaders of the Muslim community.85 
Jinnah guided the students, through his appearances, at once encouraging them to prepare 
for their future role in Pakistan, and simultaneously cautioning them against being 
swayed by sloganeering and “catch words.”86 He retained their allegiance throughout this 
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period with his long-held promise that when “the time comes, and when you are ready, I 
will tell you what do to.”87 
 
ALIGARH AND THE 1945- 46 ELECTIONS 
Throughout the 1940s, the League developed its values among Aligarh students 
and elsewhere, but it was not until the occasion demanded, in the 1945-46 elections, that 
Jinnah moved to deploy his arsenal. In preparation for the 1945 elections Muslim League 
politicians impressed upon the students that the elections were “life or death” for the 
League and the Muslim Nation; the results of the elections would determine the viability 
and influence of the Muslim political community. 88  Jinnah urged students to do 
everything they could to support the League.  They participated in fundraising, 
propaganda and pamphlet distribution, voter canvassing, and the establishment of polling 
stations.89  “Even at the cost of one academic year,” Liaqat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s right-hand 
man told them, the time had come “in the life of the nation” that academic sacrifice was 
deemed appropriate to ensure the achievement of independence.90 For the first time 
Ziauddin Ahmad, the Vice Chancellor, facilitated groups of students leaving the 
university actively to campaign for the League—now supporting student involvement in 
the freedom movement activities that he had previously opposed. The League organized a 
special training camp at Aligarh Muslim University in October 1944 to educate student 
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activists about the specifics of the Pakistan Demand.  The agenda of the training course 
included lessons on Islamic history, Muslim League history and Pakistan, as well as 
lectures on the “Art of public speaking, and Manning [sic] the polling booths.”91  The 
students who participated in this course were then dispatched outside of Aligarh to work 
on behalf of the League.  Under the banner of the All-India Muslim League, the students 
executed Jinnah’s call to action.92 Students were indispensable to the League during this 
time, traveling the countryside spreading the message about Pakistan and garnering 
support.   
Liaqat Ali Khan, himself an Aligarian, was instrumental in organizing the 
students for election work. Brigadier Iqbal Shafi recalls that Liaqat personally 
interviewed the groups who wanted to go electioneering. Seeing the young Shafi, a boy 
of only about 15 years old, he asked,  
“Mian Sahibzada aap kya karengey? What the hell are you going to do?...Mian Sahibzada, aap 
kya karengey?”  
I said, “Sir, I recite the poems of Iqbal.”  
“Which poems do you recite?” I said, “Utho Meri Duniya [ke garibon ko jaga do]! (Rise and 
Arouse the poor of my world!)”  
So he said, Fine! Fine! Don’t waste my time.”…what he meant was, we were passed! You see, 
“Alright, you go.”93 
  
The League provided minimal financial support and sent this group to Punjab and the 
Northwest Frontier. The boys encountered resistance there as both provinces were 
officially opposed to the League.94 Still, Shafi argues, “That was the thing. Government 
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against you, but the masses with Quaid-e-Azam.  That was the atmosphere! We were in 
between.”95   
Several narrators reported that, while on these electioneering visits, they spoke to 
gatherings of people, particularly after the nighttime prayers.96 Abdul Rashid Khan, now 
teaching in Karachi’s Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology recalled “We 
went to towns and villages to convince the people to vote for Pakistan.  In those days we 
were very staunch supporters.”97 Their election work, in their minds, made a significant 
difference in the outcome of the elections, even in minority provinces, where Muslims 
were not expected to shift to Pakistan territory.  Nonetheless, recalled Khan—who 
worked in the Hindu state of Bagrampur in UP—“My feeling is that Pakistan could not 
be formed without their vote.  They voted 100% [for Pakistan].”  Mukhtar Zaman, 
himself a student activist, and author of an important monograph, Students’ Role in the 
Pakistan Movement, suggests that “The youthful zeal of the student workers created a 
good impression on the electorate… the students’ participation in the campaign improved 
the image of the Muslim League… and the words uttered by the students were heard with 
attention.”  The Aligarh boys, in particular, he writes “looked impressive” in their black 
sherwanis and Turkish caps and “left a mark on the imagination of the masses.” 98 Many 
of the Aligarh students who fought these elections were from minority provinces, though 
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it was not obvious that they would be required to shift to Pakistan to receive the benefits 
of autonomy. Jinnah aggressively propagated the idea that the Muslim minorities in India 
would be protected by the mere presence of a Muslim state- what has become known as 
the “Hostage Nation” theory. According to this idea, both minority Hindus in Pakistan 
and minority Muslims in India would be protected by their co-religionists across the 
border. As Abdul Rashid Khan put it, “that was the aim, that Pakistan will look after the 
interests of Muslims in the minority in India.”99 Ultimately, however, many of these 
families, including Aligarh students, did migrate to Pakistan during or shortly after the 
mass migrations of 1947 when Pakistan and India were permanently divided, creating a 
fissure between the Muslim communities on either side of the border.  
The involvement of Aligarh students in electioneering on behalf of the Muslim 
League has persisted as the most resilient image of Muslim student activism for Pakistan.  
Their enthusiasm, as seen from the Pakistani side of the border establishes their 
credentials as transparently nationalistic, and reinforces the idea that Aligarh students, as 
a whole, shared enthusiasm for Pakistan and its goals. In India, however, former students 
decry their involvement in the elections.  Whereas Pakistani students hail the willingness 
and enthusiasm of youth influential in the elections, Indian narrators spin the same events 
in the opposite direction. For many of the young men who supported the League and 
ultimately chose to migrate to Pakistan, the emergence of the League represented the 
fulfillment of a hitherto nascent desire for action; it was an exciting and inspiring time. 
Major General Ghulam Umar remembers meeting Jinnah in 1940, only a couple of weeks 
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before the famous Lahore League Meeting, when he spoke before the Muslim University 
Union: 
My association with Aligarh brought another very interesting change.  On the 8th of March, 1940, 
Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah—he was not yet Quaid-e-Azam—he visited Aligarh and I 
was a student there.  He addressed the students and during his address he used the word “Muslim 
India.”  One of the students got up and asked him, “Where is Muslim India?  There are some 
provinces where Muslims are in the majority, four or five provinces, but otherwise, Muslims are in 
Bengal, in Madras, everywhere.  What is this Muslim India?”  And [Jinnah] said, “There is not a 
corner of India from which a Muslim student is not present here.  This is Muslim India.”  In other 
words, that was his concept of Muslim community.100 
 
Jinnah’s words were so compelling to the young man that he held onto them verbatim for 
sixty years. Masood ul Hasan, one of a very few Indian narrators willing to speak in some 
detail about his experiences in Muslim League electioneering, began by noting that 
because Aligarh boys played an active role in electioneering “Aligarh had to pay heavily 
later on, we still have to pay for it.”101 He dismissed student electioneering activities as 
inconsequential, overblown in the memory and the result of youthful enthusiasm. In 
contrast to Ghulam Umar’s clear and glowing recollection of Quaid-e-Azam’s visits,  
Masood ul-Hasan recalled the efforts of League leaders to empower Aligarh boys with a 
bitterness bordering on hostility. Jinnah had adopted a phrase that has remained the most 
powerful marker of the intimacy between Aligarh and the Muslim League activism for 
Pakistan; on March 10, 1941, Jinnah cried, “Aligarh is the arsenal of Muslim India and 
you are its best soldiers.”102 Masood al-Hasan, remembering this, remarked, “Here is 
Jinnah Sahib, he coined that phrase ‘Arsenal.’ ‘My arsenal.’ ‘Arsenal.’  Anybody would 
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feel puffed up.  Okay.  We were nothing.”103 The League harnessed the enthusiasm of the 
young men and, in Masood ul-Hasan’s opinion, used them to accomplish its goals. He 
remembered with some regret and bitterness today that “Aligarh’s boys came in handy.  
Why?  Did they come in handy because they were committed to the cause?  I tell you!  
Not so.  I speak as an insider.  Not so.”104 Masood ul-Hasan was one of only a few 
narrators who chose to remain in India after 1947 who would specifically address his 
involvement with the Muslim League during his student days. However, these 
recollections are frequently tinged with anger and he reiterates that his enthusiasm for the 
League was childlike and ill-advised.  But he was among the many students who fortified 
the League organization in the late 1930s and early 1940s, at a time when many forces 
came together to galvanize Muslims in solidarity and action. 
 Professor of History in Delhi University, Mohammad Amin, resisted the 
argument that there was any coercion on the part of League sympathizers to draw in 
others. Rather, he told me, if you didn’t want to go electioneering for personal reasons, 
there was no pressure to do otherwise. You might decide, he told me, “If one is thinking, 
fifteen or twenty days, that would be a loss” then one might decide not to go.105 Amin 
makes an interesting point here, that draws us back into the debate on the fundamental 
conflict between education and politics, that this electioneering interfered with the 
academic agenda of the University. While at first, League leaders had encouraged 
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students to spread the League message during their vacations, ultimately, Liaqat Ali Khan 
urged them to give up even a whole academic year if necessary to fight for Pakistan. 
Iqbal Shafi, then only a student of the Intermediate, was unfazed by the affect on his 
academics.  In fact, he was looking forward to the further adventures he could have when 
it became clear that his attendance was too short for his year to count. And he 
remembered his disappointment when the Vice Chancellor, Ziauddin Ahmad, 
remembered as always an advocate for students, allowed the students to sit for their 
annual exams despite the ostensibly disqualifying poor attendance.106  
Many of the interviews I have conducted address this period, and there is a wealth 
of correspondence between League leaders and Aligarh leaders that reveals a much more 
complex and fractious relationship between the two institutions and can complicate our 
view of student activity.  This is valuable as a way of examining the power of state-
supported teleologies that, in Pakistan, cast Aligarh men as the quintessential Pakistanis, 
and in India cast them as perfidious.  The correspondence between League leadership at 
the center and at the university reveals a close intellectual relationship, but also some 
tensions financially and culturally. For all of the attention paid to the image of Aligarh 
students as the foot soldiers of the Pakistan Movement, an examination of the 
correspondence reveals surprising ambivalence. It seems that the glorified image is 
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largely retrospective and in fact, student activism was dominated by the same kinds of 
factional concerns that characterized all political activities at the institution. 
The history of political activity at Aligarh has shown that the students were 
always eager to distinguish themselves, to establish their political credentials, though the 
movements to which they were attracted changed with the times. The thread that runs 
through all three major political moments at Aligarh prior to 1947 is that of solidarity—
Muslims came together to support one another for the advancement of the community as 
a whole.  By separating the outcome of the Pakistan demand from the political 
mobilization that made it possible, we can see why the students were attracted to the 
League’s rhetoric. There is no suggestion here that the students would be required to 
migrate elsewhere to enjoy Pakistan’s fruits. Rather, the Pakistan Movement, driven by 
Muslims bound together by common interest, led by Aligarh students, would give 
“expression to the hidden feelings of Muslim nation.”107 In his speeches before the 
Aligarh Union, Jinnah frequently emphasized the rapid growth of the Muslim League 
since 1938. In November 1942, he told them that in 1939 the League had become big 
enough, influential enough, that it was no longer possible for the British to ignore it—but 
now, in 1942, the League was strong enough “to make as big a hell, if not bigger, as 
Congress can.”108 This is a significant declaration considering the impact of the League’s 
political losses in the 1937 election, and it primed the students to keep working for the 
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League; the outcome of political action was strength, and it was measurable, and it was 
growing. In case the students had not fully grasped the implication of the rhetorical shift 
from minority to nation, Jinnah clarified: “It is not a question of concession or 
compromise, protection or safeguards. It is a question of the inherent birthright of 
Mussalmans to self-determination as a national group inhabiting this sub-continent to 
establish their own states in those zones where they are in a majority.”109  
 
THE MUSLIM UNIVERSITY MUSLIM LEAGUE (MUML) 
It is quite clear from the correspondence in Pakistan’s Freedom Movement 
Archives that the University administration—from the Union to the teaching staff to the 
Vice Chancellor to the Pro Vice Chancellor—was not only sympathetic to the demands 
of the League but also complicit in its expansion at the university. Both A.B.A. Haleem, 
the Pro-Vice Chancellor (the academic head of the University) and Ziauddin Ahmad (the 
executive head) were actively corresponding with Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali 
Khan about League activities. Obaidur Rahman Khan Sherwani, Riazur Rahman 
Sherwani’s father was, at the time, honorary treasurer of the University and responsible 
for managing the funds that the Muslim League sent directly to the Muslim University 
Muslim League.  These funds were disbursed through Sherwani and the accounting was 
documented by the Chief Accountant of the University.110 
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The Muslim University Muslim League, which gained official recognition as a 
City League in 1945—and thus was officially affiliated to the Parliamentary Board—“in 
recognition of the services it [had] rendered ever since 1937” worked feverishly to 
organize students for election work in the closing quarter of 1945.  After the stellar 
showing of the League in the Central Assembly elections, Muslim University Muslim 
League president, Manzar-i-Alam began to organize for the Provincial Assembly 
elections. Having significantly depleted his own resources to dispatch students during the 
first round of electioneering—he spent up to Rs. 7000 of his own money in addition to 
the Rs. 1000 sent by the League Central Committee and Rs. 536/-4 sent personally by 
Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan in whose district many students canvassed—he now 
leveraged the official position of the MUML to appeal directly to Jinnah for funds.111 
There is a flurry of correspondence in late 1945 between Aligarh Leaguers and M.A. 
Jinnah as Jinnah himself tried, at this late stage, to begin to manage the League affairs at 
Aligarh from a distance. Jinnah first wrote to A.B.A. Haleem on the 23rd of November 
1945 requesting that he establish a committee, under his own direction, to manage the 
election work and deputing Jamiluddin Ahmad (who was deeply involved in League 
propaganda work) and Ishrat Ali Khan (then the student Vice President of the Union). 
Before Haleem could reply, Jamiluddin Ahmad and Manzar-i-Alam launched a 
propaganda campaign to highlight their own achievements and to marginalize the role 
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played by A.B.A. Haleem.112 This rift between the League leaders resulted in the division 
of League forces at Aligarh, and as Alam and Ahmad personally wrote to Jinnah with 
lists of the MUML’s accomplishments in the Central Assembly elections, they were also 
trying to undermine Haleem’s role. Their letters cite a variety of activities by large 
numbers of students: “500 student workers were sent by our university Muslim League 
for all the provinces but largely for UP”113; “700 selfless warriors” demonstrated the 
“untiring zeal of the Muslim youth”114; “600 students and 20 members of the teaching 
staff” were able to help the League in the Central Assembly elections.115 In addition, a 
number of students wrote directly to Jinnah touting the pure intentions of the MUML 
president, Manzar-i-Alam, and his selfless efforts to organize and fund election work. 
Alam and Ahmad used this evidence to ask for funds above and beyond the initial Rs. 
1000 that the Central Parliamentary Board had promised and finally delivered in 
November (after it had already been spent on training League workers).116 Jamiluddin 
Ahmad immediately resisted the appointment of A.B.A. Haleem as the chair of the 
election committee and recommended Manzar-i-Alam out of concern that the students 
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would undoubtedly reject any person who appeared to be usurping the power of the 
MUML.117  
The students, the foot soldiers of the League’s electioneering team, here become 
leverage in the aspirations of University officials for acquiring their own political power. 
The students were a potentially disruptive force as much as they were a potentially 
mobilizing one. The university officials understood the students’ disruptive power well, 
and Jinnah appears to have had his own anxieties about this, which might explain his 
unwillingness to involve them in the world of active politics in the first place. Now, 
however, confronted with the evidence, in the form of the MUML leadership’s 
representations as well as testimonials from Liaqat Ali Khan and others as to the value of 
their influence, Jinnah began to send larger sums of money to the University, and by 
extension to the League, to facilitate their participation.118  
Even as Jinnah authorized up to Rs. 30,000 for student League work, he cautioned 
his acolytes to work together. Their unity would be rewarded with his attention and 
support.119 Ahmad and Alam succeeded in officially displacing Haleem as the chairman 
of the Election Funds Committee, forming on December 11th a “responsible committee 
after full consultations with the Vice-Chancellor Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad and all others 
who are genuinely and actively interested in Muslim League work” led by Dr. M.B. 
                                                
117 Ahmad. Jamiluddin Ahmad to M.A. Jinnah: Provincial Election Work and Committee. SUH Vol 26/ 
132 Jamiluddin to Jinnah December 1, 1945 
118 Mohammad Ali Jinnah. M.A. Jinnah to Jamil-Ud-Din Ahmad: Need to Establish an Election 
Committee. December 5, 1945. Ibid., Vol. 26/ 133. PNA.  ———. M.A. Jinnah to Obaidur Rahman Khan 
Sherwani: Accounts of the Election Committee. January 21, 1946. SHC, Vol. 26/ 224. PNA.  
119 Mohammad Ali Jinnah. M.A. Jinnah to Jamil-Ud-Din Ahmad: Need to Establish an Election 
Committee. December 5, 1945. SHC, Vol. 26/ 133. PNA. 
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Mirza of the Department of Geography. Khan Bahadur Obaidur Rahman Khan Sherwani, 
Honorary Treasurer of the University was to serve as the manager of the funds Jinnah 
sent, and the remaining two committee members were Ahmad and Alam themselves.120 
Within ten days, Jinnah sent ten thousand rupees and ardently requested that Jamiluddin 
Ahmad, as convener of the committee, keep in close touch with him in regards to its use, 
this seemingly in addition to the accounting that Sherwani was to send. The committee 
leapt into action, immediately dispatching “225 students to Punjab, 25 students to 
N.W.F.P.,  22 students to Sind, 10 students to Assam, 7 students to Bengal, and nearly 75 
students to United Provinces and other provinces of India” despite the fact that the 
university had already closed for the winter break.121 By the 13th of January, 1946, less 
than one month after Jinnah sent the money, it was gone.122 
On January 19th, 1946, ABA Haleem’s contingent fired back. A fourth year 
bachelor’s student, a resident of Aftab Hostel, wrote to Jinnah to inform him that the real 
election committee led by A.B.A. Haleem and consisting of “responsible members of the 
staff aided by enthusiastic students” was carrying on League work and organizing the 
students for election work. In contrast, he argues, Ahmad, Alam, and Ahmad Wahab 
Khairi were doing nothing but “making propaganda on their ownselves [sic]” and using 
                                                
120 Jamil-ud-din Ahmad. Jamiluddin Ahmad to M.A. Jinnah: Election Work Committee Constituted. 
December 11, 1945. Ibid., Vol. 26/ 180-81. PNA. It was well-known that Ziauddin Ahmad and ABA 
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122 Jamil-ud-din Ahmad. Jamiluddin Ahmad to M.A. Jinnah: Proceedings of the Finance Committee. 
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the League for personal advancement but obstructing sincere League workers in the 
University area.123 The student thus appeals to Jinnah to unseat the current committee and 
to replace it with a committee led by Haleem. It is important to recognize that all of the 
officials on both committees were involved in League work, and many of them including 
M.A.H. Qadri (Haleem) and Jamiluddin Ahmad (Alam) were working to create and 
distribute League propaganda through official channels.  
Throughout this dispute, Jinnah played his cards close to his chest, repeatedly 
urging the complainants to work together for the good of the League. Jinnah was clearly 
concerned about how the money was being used, as he reiterated his concern that no one, 
apart from Sherwani himself, Jinnah’s old friend and trusted associate, should sign the 
checks or authorize dispersal of funds. But in the ensuing days, Sherwani was called 
away to his rural district of Habibganj (where he was also standing for election) to see to 
his daughter’s illness and his own campaign. During this period, Ahmad and Alam 
complained that they were having trouble funding League work, Alam advanced Rs. 
10,000 to departing League workers and the sum total of the last check that Jinnah sent, 
under those express instructions, was transferred to Manzar-i-Alam before Sherwani’s 
return from the countryside.124 
The entire affair came to a head over the allotment of the Aligarh legislative seat 
for the Provincial elections. The UP Muslim League Parliamentary Board allotted the 
                                                
123 Saiyed Mohammad Sarwar. Saiyed Mohammad Sarwar to M.A. Jinnah: Constitution of Election 
Committee. January 19, 1946. Ibid., Vol. 26/ 214- 15. PNA. 
124 Mohammad Obaidur Rahman Khan Sherwani. Obaidur Rahman Khan Sherwani to M.A. Jinnah: Report 
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seat to an Aligarh businessman (and League worker) in January 1946. However, most of 
the correspondence in protest of his appointment does not even refer to the nominated 
candidate. It is evident that the real power play—at least as it appeared to Aligarh-- was 
between A.B.A. Haleem, President of the UP Muslim Students Federation and Manzar-i-
Alam, President of the Muslim University Muslim League. Both Haleem’s and Alam’s 
partisans argued that the seat rightfully belonged to their leader. This is the first time that 
the realm of active politics acquired relevance in the workings of the League partisans at 
AMU. Until that point, the factional bickering had seemed to revolve around internal 
issues, and it now became clear that all of the League leaders, on both sides of the 
dispute, sought to leverage their involvement into greater political prestige in 
representing the new Pakistan. As before, Manzar-i-Alam’s student troops from the 
MUML rallied behind his cause, sending letters and telegrams to Nawabzada Liaqat Ali 
Khan, the Chairman of the MLPB, to beg him to reconsider appointing Alam in 
recognition of his electioneering work.125 They accuse Haleem’s partisans of divisive 
behavior—particularly unseemly in Aligarh—and of nationalist, or sometimes 
Communist sympathies, sometimes using identical verbiage, including grammatical 
errors.126 Both leaders had turned their supporters into campaigners for their own political 
ends.  
                                                
125 Various. Letters and Telegrams in Support of Manzar-i-Alam from Halls of Residence, Aligarh 
University. 
126 Fasih-uddin Ansari. Fasih-Uddin Ansari to Liaqat Ali Khan: Letter in Support of Manzar-i-Alam. 
January 25, 1946. Ibid., Vol. 238/ 33. PNA. A. Ghaffar and Wazir Ahmad Hussain. A. Ghaffar and Wazir 
Ahmad Hussain to Liaqat Ali Khan: Letter in Support of Manzar-i-Alam. January 25, 1946. FMA, Vol. 
238/ 40. PNA. Two letters, written on January 25, 1946 refer to the efforts of Haleem partisans to disrupt 
the functioning of the League and “emphatically depricate [sic] their attempts at misrepresentation.” Both 
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It was here that the League edifice at Aligarh began to crumble. It may have been 
the fulfillment of Aligarh’s anxiety about the infiltration of active politics into the 
academic environment, or perhaps it was just the outcome of unbridled youthful 
enthusiasm. The significance of all this bickering lies in the role of the students, long-
held to have been the “arsenal” of the League elections. The disciplinary scenario was 
complicated by the empowerment of the students as political agents, and in 1946, their 
behavior began to get out of hand. By mid 1946, that arsenal turned mercenary and 
Jinnah’s fears came true. Ziauddin, who, as far back as 1920 had been ambivalent about 
student political activity, now again withdrew his support.  He called a closed door staff 
meeting and “said that it was time that there was a shift in Aligarh’s political role. 
Aligarh had to remain in the Indian Union and had to adjust and adapt itself to the 
situation. Political realism demanded that Aligarh [withdraw] itself from the political 
forefront.”127  
Practically, Ziauddin’s shift in approach manifested in several ways, the best 
known is that he withdrew from publication an issue of the student Aligarh Magazine 
over the charge that it contained an inflammatory, anti-Hindu article on the aftermath of 
the Bihar riots.128 In addition, Ghayurul Islam, Honorary Secretary of the Muslim 
University Union, complained to Jinnah that Ziauddin Ahmad had threatened to dissolve 
                                                                                                                                            
letters go on to reiterate the support of the MUML for the MLPB, their obedience to its authority and 
commitment to the cause of Pakistan. 
127 Nizami, History of the Aligarh Muslim University (1920- 1945), 224. 
128 Ghayurul Islam. Ghayurul Islam to M.A. Jinnah: Resignation of Ziauddin Ahmad. N.D. SHC, Vol. 51/ 
34-36. PNA, Habib, "Personal Interview with Amber Abbas."  
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the League organization.129 When Ziauddin realized that Aligarh would not be in 
Pakistan he finally withdrew his support for student political activity.  It was not long 
since he had defended students against any charges of indiscipline,130 and permitted 
students who had been gone electioneering to sit for annual exams; trying to reign them 
back in and refocus their attention to the educational task at hand. Ultimately, it seems, it 
was Ziauddin’s discomfort with his own decision that probably led to this reversal.  
When in 1946 he tried to temper separatist League enthusiasm he became the subject of a 
student agitation. As Masood ul Hasan remembered, students organized a “demonstration 
in front of the VC’s office.  Schoolboys on their way to Minto Circle also joined the 
procession and they marched to the office.  Offensive slogans were raised, glass-panes 
smashed, and the VC was forced to tender his resignation.  It was unbelievable that a 
popular VC like Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad could be treated by the students so 
disgracefully.”131 After a long struggle between the changing political worlds inside and 
outside the university, the educationist in Ziauddin won out; the students, energized and 
politicized, ousted him; discipline broke down completely. Ziauddin, drawn in by the 
promises of Pakistan that sounded so consistent with the cause to which he had devoted 
his life assisted in creating a body of students with such a sense of entitlement that when 
the fruit of their efforts took on a concrete form, he shied away and they drove him from 
his position as their leader.  
                                                
129 Islam. Ghayurul Islam to M.A. Jinnah: Resignation of Ziauddin Ahmad. 
130 Ziauddin Ahmad, "The Report of the Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University for the Calendar 
Year 1945: Read at the Convocation Held on the 1st December, 1945," (Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim 
University Press, 1945), 5. 
131 Emphasis in original. Hasan, "Glimpses of the Forties," 67. 
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 In a letter to Jinnah in January 1947, Ziauddin conceded, “On account of the 
impossible demands of the students and absence of support from the staff, I did not like 
to continue.” The choice of the next Vice Chancellor, Ziauddin says, was in Jinnah’s own 
hands.132 In February 1947, as a result of the anxiety about Ziauddin’s possible return, 
“the students,” wrote then Honorary Secretary of the Muslim League Abdullah Ghani 
“are in a ferment. They are bent upon setting their own house in order.”133 This letter, for 
all its fiery rhetoric, has a sense of resolution to it.  Jinnah should know that the students 
were now settling down; the convocation came off peacefully (Ziauddin did not attend); 
the students had “diverted” their minds to their studies; and everyone was satisfied with 
the acting Vice Chancellor, Obaidur Rahman Sherwani, ostensibly a League man.134 
For all of the political maneuvering taking place during this period, one thing is 
clear: the students were mobilized by the same concerns that had always inspired students 
at Aligarh—a narrative of solidarity and uplift—and their cohesion was destroyed by the 
same nepotistic and factional forces that had always left Aligarh’s movements in 
shambles. The League period at Aligarh was not an anomaly. It was theoretically and 
emotionally consistent with Aligarh’s past political movements. It is only in how this 
event is remembered that it is set apart. 
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The students understood Pakistan to mean Muslim India, and very early on, 
Jinnah had told them that they represented Muslim India. There was no question of 
territoriality.135 In 1945, a letter from a student residing in Aligarh cites his address as 
Aligarh, Pakistan.136 This is not because he expected Pakistan to incorporate the city, as 
has been sometimes suggested—one explanation for the devotion of UP Muslims to 
Pakistan is the argument that they truly believed there would be a corridor connecting 
East and West Pakistan that would pass through their region137—rather it reflects the 
intimate connection between Aligarh’s priorities and the way the students understood the 
priorities of Pakistan.  
This chapter has argued that the two national narratives that unproblematically 
incorporate the narratives of Aligarh’s Muslim League period to serve a particular 
national agenda have both deliberately overlooked the actual content of political ferment 
at the University during the 1940s. The students were mobilized by the terms of the 
demand for Pakistan, drawn to the empowering ideal of representing themselves as a 
Nation to be reckoned with, rather than as a Minority to be protected. This critical shift in 
the Muslim League rhetoric drew the students in, even before the formal passing of the 
Lahore Resolution in 1940. They were spurred toward this choice by the criticisms of the 
Congress Ministries in the late 1930s that made it appear that Hindus were abusing 
Muslims in every corner of India. The election campaign, organized through the 
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University appeared to be the modern way of responding to this oppression, and the 
students enthusiastically traveled, sometimes very far afield, to educate Muslims in towns 
and villages about the new force to be reckoned with. When they returned, utterly 
distracted from their studies, they did their best to maintain the momentum of 
electioneering in an environment overflowing with youthful energy. Their leadership 
took advantage of this energy and deployed the students to advocate for their own 
political aspirations. Having built themselves a constituency, they now appealed to it for 
support.   
Aligarh in 1946 was tumultuous and roiled. When the university administration 
began to withdraw its support for the Muslim League’s political agenda, the students, 
aware of their own persuasive powers, mounted a revolt. Pakistan, for them, was very 
real, even if they didn’t understand it to mean that they would have to move to a specific 
territory. Pakistan, for them, was an obligation to educate and uplift other Muslims, to 
draw in and protect their own and to attain a measure of political power and influence. 
Ziauddin’s ambivalence to this agenda, and his ultimate refusal to condone the rhetoric of 
hatred that came with it, marked the high point of unrest. Having exhausted their 
energies, the students got back to preparing themselves for Pakistan.  Even Jinnah rarely 
visited during 1945 and 1946. He had been so active there in the early part of the decade, 
inspiring the students to work for Pakistan, and once they were consolidated, he left them 
to work under the leadership of their own; once they had proven their worth in the 
Central Assembly elections of 1945 he funded them for the Provincial election work. But 
Jinnah had stepped into a nest of irascible bees, and though he always sought to calm the 
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tensions and controversies at Aligarh, it undoubtedly caused him some anxiety to see how 
unpredictable his arsenal could be. 
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Chapter 4 
Partition in Aligarh 
“[Many] of us are inclined to give up Aligarh rather than the dreams they had dreamt 
there.” –Mohamad Ali Jauhar1 
 
To understand the trauma of partition in Aligarh University requires an 
interpretive shift away from a narrative that suggests that violence “was” partition, and 
towards one that can incorporate unique and multiple experiences of disruption. This 
requires an examination of the particular meaning of trauma in life stories told by those 
who may not have experienced partition’s violence along the disturbed borders in Punjab. 
By expanding the contours of partition history, different understandings of trauma 
emerge. It becomes possible to see how people’s place in history has irrevocably shifted, 
how space is tightly linked to trauma and how recovery can illuminate trauma in 
particular life stories. In Aligarh, as my examination of partition narratives will make 
clear, trauma is intimately connected to questions of space and the university’s ability to 
expand its disciplinary regime into spaces beyond its boundary walls. While the 
university’s boundaries defined its unique territory, within which boys were conditioned 
into men, the university also exerted power beyond its boundaries that furnished its 
charges with a sense of belonging and importance that they carried with them when they 
stepped outside the institution’s walls. It was the disruption of this power that traumatized 
Aligarh’s students, and left them feeling exposed in post-independence India.  
                                                
1 Mohamad Ali to Mahmudabad, 6 April 1917, Mohamad Ali Papers, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. 
Cited in Minault and Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920," 264. 
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A significant new force was introduced in Aligarh during partition, one that was 
conspicuous in its absence before. For the first time, Aligarh students felt afraid, because 
as Ahmad Saeed remembered, “In ’47… these communal riots [were] all around us. We 
used to read it in newspapers. Naturally we were scared. And we were in the center of it. 
All around there were people belonging to the other community. So we were scared! And 
there were threats also. At least we felt so, I don’ t know how real they were. So, 
naturally there were threats.”2 In 1947, the sense of isolation and safety so integral to the 
university’s identity was disrupted.3 Saeed describes a situation in which Aligarh appears 
surrounded, overwhelmed by forces of disruption all around. Aligarh, in his explanation, 
was “in the center,” of all animosity directed towards Muslims. By mere virtue of their 
faith and heritage, and allegiance to the institution, the students were “naturally” 
threatened and thus came to fear the world around them. After partition in India, Muslims 
officially became “the minority community” in India and the sense of commonality 
among Muslims that leaders like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and later Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah sought to cultivate set Muslims apart as the subjects of suspicion. Even Ahmad 
Saeed, whose father was a nationalist and who claimed to have no sympathy with the 
League or its agenda, described the threats to Muslims as “natural.” This turn of phrase 
indicates the depth of the anxiety in Muslim communities during and after the 1947 
partition. The choice to remain in independent India, and the belief that Muslims could be 
fully engaged citizens, seems to contradict his straightforward recognition of threats to 
                                                
2 Saeed, "Ahmad Saeed: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 10, 2009," 64. 
3 Violette Graff, "Aligarh's Long Quest for 'Minority' Status: A.M.U. (Amendment) Act, 1981," Economic 
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Muslim security. Saeed recognizes Muslim vulnerability as an inevitability even as he 
believes that hard work would propel Muslims to greater heights of success. The slippage 
between these illuminates the tension embodied in Muslim citizenship in India and how 
intimately it was linked to the events of the 1940s. 
 Those narrators who remained in India describe the disruptions to their lives by 
speaking primarily in terms of how this new paradigm of distrust affected their 
relationship to space. Thus, spaces that previously seemed safe, protected, were no longer 
accessible. In their narratives, even the city of Delhi which, during the Muslim League 
period had seemed to be an extension of the Aligarh campus, seems to shift location. The 
sites of violence former students refer to, that were now sites of terror, were previously 
places where their safety was ensured by the marks of their belonging to Aligarh. 
Formerly familiar spaces now terrified the students, and their fear is the surest mark that 
partition’s disruptions exerted power there. This fear had a significant impact on life in 
the university and as narrators remember these events, it is clear that their fear was a 
result of the disruption of their understanding of their place in society, and the inability of 
Aligarh University to extend a carapace of protection over them both within and beyond 
its borders. Aligarh University itself had a special prestige and this is what generated the 
widespread sympathy for its students before partition; disruption to the moral order that 
supported this sense of prestige, that offered Aligarh’s students a special way of 
belonging in India is the source of their trauma.4  
                                                
4 Arthur Neal has argued that trauma is constituted in the disruption of “the institutional underpinnings of 
the social order.” Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory, xi. 
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This chapter examines the former students’ partition narratives closely, and shows 
the influence of these disruptions to everyday life, to the moral order of the Aligarh 
University. I explore the experiences of Aligarh students during and immediately after 
partition: how they interpreted the changes taking place, and the effects those changes 
would have on their own lives. Taking their unique perspective into account, this chapter 
explores the disruption of Aligarh’s isolation and what it meant to the students to be 
thrust into the heart of partition’s disruptions. Efforts to preserve moral continuity 
emerge, too, and many former students make an effort to minimize the effects of 
partition’s disruptions over the long term. These are ironic stories: Indian narrators, many 
of whom have remained close to the university, tell stories of disruption and 
discontinuity, whereas Pakistani narrators emphasize continuity, even as they are 
physically dislocated from the university they remember. These narratives begin to show 
these slippages in perception and reveal the effort narrators must exert to normalize their 
stories to state narratives that define the roles of different groups (Muslims, Aligarians, 
Pakistanis, Indians).  
 Aligarh University was never attacked during the violence of partition.5 Despite 
the absence of violence, this chapter explores the role of fear in rearranging the 
relationship between Aligarh students and the world around them. Through an 
examination of partition and post-partition experiences, this chapter argues that the 
outcomes of partition for many of the individuals interviewed here are still palpably felt 
                                                
5 There were no attacks on AMU during 1947 and 1948, though there were riots and communal 
disturbances in Aligarh City. There had been violence between city dwellers and students in 1946 and there 
were a number of riots in the 1950s. Brass, Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence. Pars Ram, "A Unesco 
Study of Social Tensions in Aligarh, 1950-1951," ed. Gardner Murphy (Ahmedabad: UNESCO, 1955). 
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today. The violence that altered the Aligarh boys’ view of the world was not “to be 
measured by external acts of murder, loot or abduction” but the “state where a sense of 
fear is generated and perpetrated in such a way as to make it systemic, pervasive and 
inevitable.”6 This was a new paradigm, one governed by “the fear of not belonging” in a 
place where one had always belonged before. Indeed, as Salman Khurshid has suggested, 
for those whose choice was “to stay at home” it has become difficult or impossible to 
“speak of the trauma, the injury or the insult.”7 In 1947 these anxieties about belonging 
were fresh, utterly unresolved, and marked a rupture with the period before; the fear was 
new and resilient.  
 Since the founding of the institution, Aligarh students were recognized as boys of 
good breeding who were engaged in a project of character building alongside their 
education. The uniform of the black sherwani marked them when they ventured outside 
the university’s bounds: to the cinema, on the train to their homes, and in the annual 
Aligarh exhibition. Aligarh boys’ prestige was evidenced by their smart uniform and 
backed by the history of the institution, and the fact that many of India’s Muslim leaders 
(including some leaders in the Indian National Congress) had passed through its gates. 
During and after 1947, however, the sherwani exposed the boys to the stigma of being 
associated with the institution that had “caused” the partition of the country. Not only 
were Muslims now seen as the Other of the Indian national, but Aligarh in particular was 
held responsible for Muslim League successes in the elections prior to independence. 
                                                
6 Guha Thakurta, "Uprooted and Divided." 
7 Salman Khurshid, At Home in India: A Restatement of Indian Muslims (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House Pvt Ltd, 1986). 
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Ahmad Saeed’s explanation implies that this suspicion was predictable because 
“Everybody knew the background of the University and what it did during the League 
days and how the entire student community and most of the staff of the university were 
working for the Muslim League and all that. [Aligarians] were not expecting that they 
would be allowed to flourish during those days.”8 Still, this new kind of exposure bred 
fear, both on the campus and among the students when they passed outside of the 
university’s protective environs. 
Thus, during the early years of independence, many narrators speak of efforts to 
conceal their identities, to disavow their Muslimness and their link to Aligarh in order to 
protect themselves. In instances of Hindu-Muslim violence, which, as Paul Brass has 
shown, were particularly frequent and acute in Aligarh in the years after 1947, Aligarh 
students feared that they would be held responsible for the wrongs of Muslims, though 
they were individually (largely) innocent. Muslim loyalty to the Indian state was 
immediately disputed, and it was not unusual for Muslims to be told “Man, if you people 
are going, then you all go! It shouldn’t be that some [Muslims] are here and some are 
there.”9  But Aligarh and Muslims remain in India, albeit in a perpetually vexed state.  
Though Aligarians had always considered themselves apart from society, 
distinguished by their way of dress and comportment, it was born of a sense of social 
                                                
8 Saeed, "Ahmad Saeed: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 10, 2009." 
9 Moinuddin Khan, "Moinuddin Khan: Interview with Sara Ansari, Citizens Archive of Pakistan"," 
(Karachi: October 16, (2008?)). My translation from Urdu. Wazir Khan, "Captain Wazir Khan: Interview 
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superiority, not anxiety.10 Isolation was maintained by the near constant efforts of the 
university’s proctors, its administration and alumni who repeatedly reminded students of 
the significance of the residential system in developing men of character. Its isolation was 
self-imposed, but as the cultivation of a masculine identity became increasingly 
associated with a politically active one, the boundaries of the university became more 
porous. The Vice Chancellor and university administration cultivated links with the 
Muslim League, allowed and even encouraged student participation in political activities, 
and ultimately facilitated the shift in the university’s identity from a culturally Muslim 
one, to a politically Muslim one. One outcome of this shift after 1947 was that the self-
imposed isolation of the institution was now girded by a sense of exclusion and suspicion 
of disloyalty that firmed up the institution’s boundaries and set it apart from the town and 
society more broadly. 
The story of partition at Aligarh is the story of this increasing isolation and how 
the students and the university more broadly coped with it, and how they now seek to 
minimize the effects of this disruption and to prove the importance of Aligarh in a 
narrative of India’s composite culture.  
 
PARTITION IN ALIGARH 
The partition plan had been announced by Viceroy Mountbatten and grudgingly 
accepted by both League and Congress leadership on June 3, 1947, a mere ten weeks 
before British power would officially be transferred on August 15, 1947. The actual 
                                                
10 Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation. 
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border award was not made public until August 17. There had been unrest in Calcutta in 
1946 and in Punjab in the early part of 1947, but the wanton violence of partition did not 
begin in earnest until the major migrations began in mid-August. As millions of refugees 
criss-crossed Punjab in the stultifying heat of that August, violence erupted in both urban 
and rural areas. The division between Aligarh and the rest of India became more stark as 
the identity politics that drove partition became more Manichean.  
Students began arriving in Aligarh in July to begin the 1947-48 academic year,11 
before the violence in Punjab made it clear that the two new states of India and Pakistan 
would be separated by a formal international boundary, and Pakistan would not function 
as a semi-autonomous Muslim region with a porous frontier (or no border at all) that 
many expected. Whether these students came from “Pakistan areas” or from other parts 
of India, the partition violence trapped them in their university. One narrator from U.P. 
told me,  
I wrote to my father. ‘Please call me back. I am being frightened over here.’ He said, ‘Why? You 
are a coward, boy? No! Be there in the hostel. What happens to the other students will happen to 
you also! And I think nothing will happen.’ … Nothing has happened. It was correct, but I was a 
lad and so much frightened with my other students. They were from far distance so could not go 
there easily but I can go to Kanpur very easily. But he refused me… He said what happens to 
others, it will happen to you also!12 
 
He found encouragement in his father’s instructions, but he was undoubtedly frightened 
by being forced to stay. It was not, however, until the early 1950s that Aligarh became 
                                                
11 Notes from the Executive Council Meeting of December 11, 1947 show that the opening of the 
University was delayed until September 15, 1947 (it normally opened earlier) due to the unrest. I am 
thankful to Naved Masood for sharing this source with me.  
12 KPS, ”KPS (Anonymized): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 8, 2009." Hasan, "Masood Ul 
Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 1, 2009." Khan, "Zakir Ali Khan: Personal Interview 
with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006." 
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one of the most riot-prone towns in India.13 Prior to this, and especially during 1947, 
Aligarh boys describe the waning influence of their university as a protective force. This 
waning influence created a persistent anxiety and efforts to take its defense into their own 
hands: sometimes arming themselves with the bamboo staves that held up their mosquito 
nets, sometimes patrolling the boundaries of the campus, alert to the possibility that their 
security could be breached and freshly conscious of their exposure as a Muslim 
institution surrounded by a Hindu majority.14 
 The University’s protective capacity was upheld by the Proctorial system of 
discipline run by University staff assisted by students; its purview extended into the 
annual Aligarh Exhibition, the Railway Station and Aligarh’s cinema halls. Students were 
required to adhere to the disciplinary norms of the university even in these places, and 
wardrobe or behavioral violations were punishable by fines. During 1946 and after, 
however, this sytem broke down, and it is through this collapse that students narrate tales 
of their fear. 
 As the previous chapter has made clear, 1945-1946 was a time of mounting 
student strength at Aligarh.  The Vice Chancellor’s anxiety about this was also growing 
and he repeatedly made attempts—rather ineffectually—to reel the students in, before he 
was ultimately ousted.15 Despite his ouster, Vice Chancellor Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad is 
                                                
13 Brass, Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, 37. 
14 Ibid. 
15 In his annual address in 1945 he complained, “All sorts of men, Hindu or Muslim, not connected with 
the University in any way, including even middle-aged men, have been treated by the railway staff as 
University students and all their misdeeds have been attributed to indiscipline in the University… To fortify 
ourselves against irresponsible criticism we have introduced the system of identity cards. We are tightening 
the system of permits, and are adopting other administrative measures for the still better supervision of our 
 191 
well-remembered by former students on all sides of partition’s borders as one who was 
sympathetic to the needs and desires of the students, this perhaps being one of the reasons 
the students gathered so much power in such a short time; Irfan Habib said that Ziauddin 
“was very afraid of taking action against hooligans” even if this meant manipulating the 
rules in their favor. 
 In 1946, there is one important episode, silenced in most stories about this period 
in Aligarh, that heralds the collapse of the discipline at AMU that had been so 
meticulously upheld throughout the 1920s, ‘30s and early ‘40s. This episode reveals the 
destruction of the boundary between the City of Aligarh and the University through an 
act of student indiscipline and efforts of the University administration. Though the 
original episode was a show of student strength, it created an opportunity for retributive 
violence on the part of city dwellers that established the precedent for fear of attack in 
1947. As much as political opinions and allegiances in Aligarh had always been 
determined by local concerns, so too, we see here that the fear of violence emanated from 
a disruption to the local environment. 
 
POLICING THE BOUNDARIES 
 In several stories about partition in Aligarh, the students established their 
allegiance to the institution by describing their efforts to protect it. They patrolled its 
                                                                                                                                            
students.” Ziauddin makes the move to fortify discipline seemingly out of disbelief that Aligarh boys could 
actually be responsible for the acts of indiscipline of which they were accused. His permit system was not 
to help in identification of undisciplined Aligarh boys, but rather an effort to prove that those who were 
behaving badly were not Aligarh boys at all. Ahmad, "The Report of the Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim 
University for the Calendar Year 1945: Read at the Convocation Held on the 1st December, 1945." 
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boundaries, they kept watch from the rooftops, they rallied to defend the campus against 
potential attackers, “wielding—many of them even trembling with fear—the sticks of the 
mosquito nets.”16 There is a pervasive sense in the memories of these narrators that 
Aligarh was surrounded by hostile communities. Mohiuddin Khan, now settled in 
Bangladesh, told me that the “atmosphere was also tense. Sometimes we used to feel that 
maybe we may be attacked by Hindu majority people around… at night we used to 
remain very careful.”17 There is a persistent narrative of threat here, but some students 
remember responding with a show of strength, as when Zakir Ali Khan told me, “We 
used to guard the university.  We used to travel in trucks and whatever transport all 
around the university periphery.  We spent the nights together guarding the university.”18 
The students were determined to protect their own safety within the boundaries of the 
university against any threat of outside attack from what Zakir Ali Khan called “mobs,”19 
and they never refer to engaging the outside authorities to maintain peace. Since 
Aligarh’s earliest days, and in the memories of many of these narrators, the university’s 
independence from the civil authorities was a source of pride. Zakir Ali Khan told me 
                                                
16 Hasan, "Glimpses of the Forties," 66. 
17 Khan, "Mohiuddin Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 28, 2010." 
18 ———, "Zakir Ali Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006." An appendix to a 
meeting of the Academic Council in April 1946 resolves that two lorries will be made available and “one 
jeep can be made available with sufficient petrol for night duty.” It must be noted that this was the first 
meeting of the Academic Council following the conflagration in the grain market covered below. Sh. Abdul 
(Proctor) Rashid, "Appendix F (Ref. No. A.C. Res. No. 3, Dated 13th April, 1946): A Meeting of the 
Committee Appointed by the Academic Council to Devise Means for Patrolling the University at Night," in 
Minutes of An Ordinary Meeting of the Academic Council (Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University, April 13, 
1946). 
19 Khan, "Zakir Ali Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006." Nizami, History of the 
Aligarh Muslim University (1920- 1945), 219. 
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that there was no need for police intervention in Aligarh’s conflicts because its own 
system operated so well. 
However, in reflecting on the events of 1947, several narrators refer to the 
deployment of a military regiment around Aligarh during the disruptions.20 In 
Mohiuddin’s memory, “the government protected [the university] with Tribal People 
Regiment, Gurkha Regiment or something, they were guarding the University.”21 Khan’s 
pride in the memory of Aligarh’s independent disciplinary regime contrasts with the 
sense of security Mohiuddin describes as a result of the presence of a Gurkha Regiment 
on the boundary of the University. This shift marks an almost imperceptible silence in the 
story about partition at Aligarh that appears in the vast majority of narratives. That 
Aligarh would relinquish control over its policing to the Indian military shows that 
something significant had changed in its relation to the world around it. While at first 
glance this may appear to be the result of the scale of the threat, I believe it actually 
marks a shift in Aligarh’s relationship to the town as a result of the disciplinary breaches 
that were allowed during the Muslim League period. 
In the spring of 1946, as the students returned from electioneering, there was an 
attack on a local market that shows that while there was no precedent for a Hindu attack 
on the University that would justify deploying troops to protect it, there was a precedent 
from 1946 of Aligarh students threatening the residents of the city, in response to which 
                                                
20 Naved Masood argues that this deployment was the United Provinces Armed Constabulary. Personal 
Communication with Naved Masood who says this “on the twin authority of late Mr. Merajuddin Ahmad 
who was the Commandant of the troops (moved from Agra); and a very respectable lawyer of Aligarh, 
Maulvi Fazlur Rahman (also long deceased).” February 12, 2012. 
21 Khan, "Mohiuddin Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 28, 2010." 
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the government deployed a company of military-police, not to protect the students from 
the city-dwellers, but to protect the city-dwellers from the students.  
As Irfan Habib recounted the event to me, “In 1946, Aligarh students, in a large 
mob, went to the grain market of U.P. and burnt it. And five villagers were burned to 
death.”22 Iqtidar Alam Khan told me that this was the first episode of violence that 
“disturbed” him, and ultimately led him to leave the University and to pursue his 
Intermediate education elsewhere. His memories of it are not vivid, because he was a 
boy, and “living inside the university,” however, he does “remember that some persons 
who were serving the students living with us in the hostel used to pretend they were 
participating in the events. I don’t know how far it is true.  To the extent that sometimes I 
used to feel very afraid.”23 Khan’s memory that the hostel staff bragged about being 
involved with the burning of the grain market in the town indicates that Muslims were in 
a position of power in this riot. Despite the power of Muslims in this conflict, the riot left 
the students feeling vulnerable, and it is this sense of vulnerability that persisted in their 
outlook throughout the years of partitioning. The 1946 episode itself and its aftermath 
reveal how great a threat an organized Muslim community—represented by the Muslim 
League and its attachment to Aligarh University—presented in Aligarh in the lead-up to 
the 1947 partition. How then does it become the source for a narrative of fear and 
anxiety?  
                                                
22 Habib, "Irfan Habib: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 28, 2009." Pars Ram, in his UNESCO 
funded study of Aligarh’s riots, describes the location as a “Cotton and gur market.” Ram, "Unesco Study 
of Social Tensions," 172. 
23 Khan, "Professor Iqtidar Alam Khan (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 31, 2009." 
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 Paul Brass has reported on this incident in his research into communal violence in 
Aligarh, and he dates it precisely to March 29, 1946. The conflict appears to have been 
“an altercation between AMU students and the proprietor of a Hindu cloth shop, in which 
students beat up the shopkeeper.”24 This incident sparked a riot, the burning down of the 
grain market and the deaths of four individuals.25 The British governor26 blamed student 
indiscipline for the riot and noted that the “Hindus in the town always live in a kind of 
half panic” under the threat of the sometimes unruly students.27 To mitigate student 
threat, the government created a Riot Scheme for the posting of a military-police 
company at several points along the railway line “through which the students are likely to 
enter the city.”28 The University responded to the incident by increasing its defensive 
power, particularly along the boundaries. Without calling in the services of police or 
military, the university increased the number of chowkidars (watchmen) and armed them 
with sticks. Further, faculty and staff were enlisted to help in “patrolling the area with 
guns and being present in batches of 2 every night.”29 It is telling that the university’s 
stance was defensive. It responded to the presence of a threat (albeit a retributive one), 
                                                
24 Brass, Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, 71-72. 
25 Irfan Habib cited five deaths in our conversation. 
26 The British Government was ruling U.P. under Section 93, but preparing to hand governance over to the 
Congress who had won a majority in the most recent elections. Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant and his 
Ministry were sworn in on April 1 in Lucknow. "Late News," The Times of India April 2, 1946. 
27 United Provinces, Governor's Report, April 1, 1946. Cited in Brass, Production of Hindu-Muslim 
Violence, 72. 
28 Home (Police) Box 378 File # 5004/1046 (Aligarh--Riot Scheme). Cited in Ibid., 71. 
29 Rashid, "Appendix F (Ref. No. A.C. Res. No. 3, Dated 13th April, 1946): A Meeting of the Committee 
Appointed by the Academic Council to Devise Means for Patrolling the University at Night." 
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and in the meeting of the Academic Council during which these protective resolutions 
passed, there was no discussion of sanctioning the student culprits.30 
 The British governor was concerned that the local authorities were ineffective at 
controlling the students and that the incoming Congress administration would respond 
vindictively to the event. The incoming Congress Chief Minister, Govind Ballabh Pant, 
according both to Brass and to Irfan Habib, did favor taking legal action against the 
students. Brass credits a dispute with the British Governor, Francis Wylie, with 
forestalling this response, but Habib credits his father, Mohammad Habib, who, at the 
behest of AMU Vice Chancellor Dr. Sir Ziauddin, convinced Pandit Pant to use restraint 
in his punishment of the students.  
So actually, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai was Home Minister and he issued a statement that there will be 
prosecutions and imprisonments. You can’t kill people. So Dr. Sir Ziauddin, Vice Chancellor 
came to our house… My father was enraged at this [and argued] “They must be punished!” And 
Ziauddin said, “You know, Habib Sahib, it’s useless talking to Kidwai Sahib. Talk to Pantji. He 
was your leader in the Swaraj Party.  We are prepared to do everything they tell us.  But 
prosecutions? What will happen?” So my father went to Pant, went to Lucknow, and he told us 
later that Pantji was very annoyed. Very annoyed. [Pant] said, “Rafi Sahib is right, we shall have 
prosecutions and we have witnesses. They shall go to prison!” And they had put military police, 
not in the university, but at the clocktower. And all the students, the moment they saw the military 
police at clocktower, totally there was demoralization in the university. Silence. My father said, 
“Alright, I’ll tell [Ziauddin].” But as he reached the door, Pant said, “Habib, come back. After all, 
they are our children. We don’t want to see them in prison. So tell Ziauddin it should not happen. 
But I’ll tell Rafi Sahib to tell the police to withdraw the cases.” So that’s 1946.31 
 
These explanations radically alter the narrative of perceived threat in Aligarh. For one 
thing, they show that Aligarh students had the capacity to threaten other Aligarh 
                                                
30 The Hindustan Times of June 9 1946, several months after the incident, reported that the Vice 
Chancellor had agreed to pay “compensation to damage done to Hindu property” but that his estimate was 
too low to cover all of it. Further, he also “gave assurance that in future the university will make genuine 
efforts to restore good relations between the students and the Hindu population of Aligarh. The town will 
be made out of bounds to students till good relations are restored.” "University's Compensation 
Offer for Aligarh Riot Damage." The Hindustan Times June 9, 1946, 3.  
31 Habib, "Irfan Habib: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 28, 2009." 
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residents, despite the geographic boundary of the railway tracks that separated the two 
communities. For another, they do show the power of the university to affect policy, and 
they show Ziauddin’s approach to student discipline—even more than his concern with 
disciplining the students, he was concerned with protecting them from a threatening 
outside world, even at the expense of punishment. Though all of the details of this 
experience show that Aligarh boys were in a position of power throughout the episode, 
perpetrating violence and getting away with it, still Aligarh boys emphatically repeated 
their fear that Hindu mobs would cross the kat pulla, the wooden bridge that separated 
the university from the city. It is important to remember that no Hindu group had yet 
done so (and did not do so in 1947); rather, the Muslim students frequently crossed over 
into the town; in this episode, the outcome catastrophic. 
 This episode demonstrates why, despite the distance from the disturbed border 
areas in 1947, Aligarh students did feel so afraid. Their own actions left people dead in 
1946, and though there was no retribution then, legal or otherwise, the possibility that the 
mostly Hindu residents of the town would exact revenge was again aroused during the 
communal disturbances of 1947. Masood ul Hasan has written specifically about the 
students’ anxiety during this period, though he omits the role of the students in provoking 
the anger of Aligarh’s Hindu residents:  
In 1946 when communal riots had broken out on a large scale in the country, one evening a 
rumour got round that the University was to be attacked that night.  Some night patrolman got 
panicky, and the University siren was sounded as a warning.  But the students took it as a 
challenge, and rushed out of the hostels, wielding—many of them even trembling with fear—the 
sticks of the mosquito nets.  Some of the more prudent strategists were even said to have chosen 
the ground under the dining-tables as a more advantageous field of operations.  The Proctor had a 
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hard time of it, and it was with considerable difficulty that he could send the boys back to their 
hostels.32 
  
Hasan’s explanation characterizes the university as the victim of undifferentiated 
communal hatred, but he also shows students ready to respond with a show of force. The 
students rose up to defend their institution against “challenge,” (he does not classify the 
potential attack as retributive) though the show of strength and the fear of victimization 
are closely linked. In fact, many of them simply ran to hide! This explanation, and its 
silences, clearly shows the difficulties the university faced in 1946 and 47. The students’ 
power had outgrown the university’s capacity to manage it. And as a result, they had 
provoked a potential response much too large for the university to defend against.  
 Irfan Habib remembered that during the 1946 deployment the students were 
“chastened” by the presence of the troops, indicating the power of external authority to 
modify their behavior in a way that internal discipline had been unable or unwilling to do. 
Thus the presence of the authorities at the clocktower in 1946 would have been an 
unambiguous signal that if Aligarh’s students were to continue causing trouble in the city 
and with local residents, its traditional sovereignty would be subject to challenge from the 
authorities. However, in the memories of these narrators, the official presence of troops 
near the campus was now received not as threatening but as protective, comforting. This 
turn towards finding comfort in state protection during times of disruption is a marker of 
a more significant “Nationalist Turn” that began in Aligarh during this period. It is this 
nationalist orientation that provides the context for the memories of those Aligarians who 
                                                
32 Hasan, "Glimpses of the Forties," 66. 
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remained in India throughout the disruptions documented here. Still, it is interlinked with 
the disruption that Aligarians experienced during this period, one that they experienced in 
very local and personal ways. 
 As former students remember this period, the events of 1946 have collapsed into 
the events of 1947 so that it appears that the police posted near and around the campus 
were protective forces deployed to keep the precious university safe from external 
attack.33 This perspective confirms the notion that the government was concerned with 
protecting the institution itself and, by implication, India’s Muslims. This effort to read-
back nationalist solidarity and allegiance to the Indian state onto the period of partition in 
Aligarh is part and parcel of the effort of Aligarh Muslims to outgrow the suspicions 
about their loyalty. It has changed people’s memories, making it possible for them, in 
some cases, to deny allegiance to the Muslim League, to mask their desire to migrate to 
Pakistan, to conceal student violence against one another and against non-Muslims, and 
ultimately to seek to overwrite the League period at the University by suggesting that it 
was little more than an anomaly.34 
                                                
33 It is worth remembering that the university was closed until September 15, 1947, though many students 
had already arrived there as early as July. The opening was delayed due to unrest in the country. 
34 Mushirul Hasan is perhaps the most prominent scholar to take this approach. His articles on Aligarh 
during the 1940s have supported the idea that nationalism at Aligarh was more-or-less continuous and that 
the Pakistan period was an aberration that should be forgotten. In fact, this strategy, as I have shown, has 
altered the memory of the relationship between the city and the town and fortified the notion that Aligarh 
students were perpetually threatened by their city neighbors. It obscures the actions of Aligarh students that 
might have earned the ire of the non-Muslims living nearby. Hasan, "Negotiating with Its Past and Present: 
The Changing Profile of the Aligarh Muslim University." 
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 Nonetheless, the fear and anxiety that former students report from this period is 
real, “systemic, pervasive and inevitable.”35 Their concern was that the boundary walls of 
the institution might be breached, that non-Muslims would cross the wooden bridge, enter 
the university and attack the students. With the passage of time, most have neglected to 
remember that the attack they feared may have been retributive—rooted in the local 
conflict between Aligarh University and the town—and not, as they remember it, an 
unprovoked attack on a helpless minority.  
 There is a significant difference in the tone of narratives here, too, that helps to 
illuminate the power that national narratives exert on memory. Perhaps the most dramatic 
contrast appears in examining statements from Pakistani Engineer Zakir Ali Khan, and 
Aligarh University Retired Professor of English, Masood ul Hasan (cited above). The 
experiences of these two men, even during their time as Aligarh students, was 
dramatically different. Khan was an avid sportsman, captain of the university hockey 
team, and he had access to the privileges of that position. Hasan, on the other hand, was 
studious and unathletic. His allegiance to the Muslim League ideology of Pakistan is now 
a source of regret, whereas it was the core of Khan’s identity. During the uncertainty of 
1946- 1947 and partition at Aligarh, both men were present on the campus. Khan 
remembers his experiences through a distinctly “League” lens: 
When we were in Aligarh there were nights when the university was being attacked by the villages 
in which Hindus were living all around Aligarh.  The Hindu mobs, it was a very rabid-type of 
organization of Hindus.  They were in mobs, [organizing] attacks on the university by villagers.  
We used to guard the university.  We used to travel in trucks and whatever transport all around the 
university periphery.  We spent the nights together guarding the university.36   
                                                
35 Guha Thakurta, "Uprooted and Divided." 
36 Khan, "Zakir Ali Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006." 
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Khan remembers two significant aspects of this experience. First, the threat to Muslims 
from Hindus was so real, that he remembers the campus actually “being attacked” by 
Hindu mobs. Second, he and his compatriots adopted a position of strength with regard to 
this threat. They did not cower under tables or hide inside the hostel. They traveled the 
university periphery to guard the university from attack.  
 The contrast between these two explanations is worth considering, for Khan’s 
narrative contains a key factual inconsistency. Aligarh was not attacked during the 1947 
partition, though several narrators described the threat to the university in 1946 and fear 
of attack in 1947, and one described the university’s protective stance after the partition 
when refugees began to enter Aligarh—telling me, “we were asked to safeguard our 
university in the night and we put a searchlight on the roof of V.M. Hall and we did duty 
up there… At night, we watched so that there should not be any attack.”37 Zakir Ali 
Khan’s description of patrolling the university is, at its heart, a narrative of triumph. He 
and his fellow students faced the threat of attack with strength, and he has imagined an 
actual attack to prove that they were successful. This narrative sits easily with the Muslim 
League narrative of Muslim vulnerability in India, but it is fortified by the idea that 
Muslims could wield power, as they would in Pakistan.  
Hasan’s explanation (cited above) however, reveals the fact that the Muslim 
students felt vulnerable, more consistent with Aligarh’s post-1947 stance, when the 
narrative of Muslim empowerment had worn away and Aligarh once again seemed a 
                                                
37 KPS, "KPS (Anonymized): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 8, 2009." 
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Muslim outpost in the hinterlands. Hasan’s perspective represents an Indian nationalist 
disavowal of Aligarh’s 1940s devotion to the Muslim League—a group seen as 
“separatist” in India. This disavowal seemed necessary to protect his own integrity and 
the integrity of the institution as loyal subjects of the Indian State. Even as he revealed 
these experiences to me, Hasan betrayed his anxiety: “I don’t usually speak of them for 
the fear—or I shouldn’t say fear—that I might be misunderstood.  And my credentials 
may be unnecessarily questioned even at this stage.”38 Hasan’s anxiety that his former 
attachment to the Muslim League, if publicly known, might impugn his credentials 
reveals a key anxiety lurking beneath the protest that the Indian government has always 
taken care of the Aligarh University. It seems that, just as Aligarh’s protective power 
collapsed in 1947, the Indian government cannot protect Muslims from suspicion of their 
loyalty to the very state that demands it. 
 
OTHER SITES OF DISRUPTION 
The disruption to the sense of security that Aligarh provided was key to the sense 
of trauma at Aligarh during partition. However, it was not only within the hallowed walls 
of the university that the university’s reputation exerted its power over the boys’ behavior 
and public opinion. Narrators’ descriptions of three other sites demonstrate well the sense 
of disruption and its role in reconfiguring the boundaries of belonging. 
The picture halls of Aligarh had been a favorite stomping ground of Aligarh 
students and many narrators told me of the special seat kept aside in Aligarh’s cinema 
                                                
38 Hasan, "Masood Ul Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 1, 2009." 
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halls for the Proctorial Monitor. Majid Ali Siddiqi established the scene for me: “In the 
picture house, also, I must tell you. There was a Proctor Seat. A Proctor Seat in the 
back—there were two picture houses, there weren’t so many—in the Proctor Seat [the 
Monitor] used to sit free. That boy, he used to sit in the Proctor Seat and watch all the 
Aligarh boys in the cinema house, [to make sure] they are not doing any mischief.”39 This 
description reveals a scene in which Aligarh boys’ presence in the cinema was permitted 
only under the watchful eye of the Monitor; the cinema hall became a sort of extension of 
the residential system. This system was designed to control the behavior of the students, 
to ensure they maintained the upright “character” expected of Aligarh boys.  
However, in 1949 when Iftikhar Alam Khan arrived at Aligarh, as a student of the 
Minto Circle preparatory school, he described (in a mix of Urdu and English) a very 
different scene.  
To go a film you had to have at least eight or ten boys together [and] because there would be the 
bigger boys included, you could get permission from the Warden.  I never went.  Because I knew 
that in the film houses there were stabbings and people were killed.  I feel that in all of those 
years, there is a cinema hall, Tasveer Mahal, which was very close to the university and I used to 
go to that one.  But I was most afraid of Royal because I knew that a lot of people were killed there 
in ’47… I believe that in the two or three years I was there, only once I would have gone and in 
that because lots of students were going to see this film together, some famous film and everyone 
was going.  But I was so scared.40 
 
The sense of disruption he felt in going to the cinema halls immediately after 1947 
contrasts sharply with the scene Siddiqi described and points to a significant disruption in 
                                                
39 Though this narrator described the scene in 1952, it reflects the earlier calm of the pre-partition period. It 
also shows that order was restored in the disciplinary environment by the early 1950s. Siddiqi, "Majid Ali 
Siddiqi: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 2, 2009." Majid Ali Siddiqi was born in 1935 in 
Gorakhpur, India. He arrived at Aligarh in 1952 and completed his B.Sc. in Civil Engineering in 1956. His 
first job was in the Uttar Pradesh Irrigation Department as a Civil Engineer and still works after a long 
career with Jayaprakash Associates; he is now Director, JP Karsham Hydro, Corporation, Ltd. See also 
Hasan, "Masood Ul Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 1, 2009." 
40 Khan, "Professor Iftikhar Alam Khan (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 6, 2009." 
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the moral order of the university, and its place in the town during the disruptions 
surrounding partition.41 He felt safe only in that cinema hall that was closest to the 
university; the farther the boys moved from the university, Aligarh’s power both to 
monitor and to protect them decreased. No longer did association with Aligarh represent 
prestige, as it had before, it represented vulnerability as the uniform marked the boys as 
“other” and the university’s powers of influence were restricted. The Aligarh uniform of 
a black sherwani, white pajamas, shoes and socks had marked Aligarh boys outside of the 
confines of the university and Aligarh town.42 Repeatedly narrators emphasized the 
influence of the uniform, “That was the recognition of Aligarh.  Looking from every 
angle you can see that he is from Aligarh.”43 After 1947, this exposure left them feeling 
vulnerable to anti-Muslim violence. 
 The narrators’ memories of this period reveal a shift in the undertanding about 
Aligarh’s “place in the world” spatially and in terms of its influence. The Railway Station 
was another site under the disciplinary purview of the Proctorial Monitor. Like the 
cinemas, the railway station functioned as a sort of extended part of the campu and 
Aligarh boys were highly visible there. It was also, of course, the gateway to Aligarh, a 
site through which almost all students had to pass as they moved between university and 
sometimes distant homes. Masood ul Hasan remembered, “Senior Proctor Monitor[s]… 
                                                
41 I have no specific evidence on whether people were killed in Aligarh’s cinema houses in 1947. However, 
the impact of this knowledge/rumor affected Khan’s behavior, and left him fearful for his safety. This 
anxiety is what is at stake here, more than the facts of the violence in the city. In fact, he revealed, referring 
to the anxious days after 1947, “That fear is still with me.” 
42 "The Aligarh Muslim University Act (Act Xl of 1920)," (Aligarh: Muslim University Press, 1920/ 1948). 
43 Khan, "Zakir Ali Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006." 
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would display badges. And they were specially prominent at the railway station where 
every arriving and departing train was attended upon by them.”44 
 Prior to 1947, the Aligarh students frequently traveled by train without actually 
purchasing tickets. Many narrators referred to this “Aligarh tradition” arguing that 
between Aligarh and Delhi, a distance of fewer than 100 miles, Aligarh students were not 
expected to purchase a ticket. Iqbal Shafi argued that it was a question of dignity: 
It was below our dignity, of Aligarh students, below our dignity to buy a railway ticket to go Delhi 
or Agra. It was our railway. And all these railway officials knew that these are Aligarh University 
students, they’ll never buy tickets so nobody bothered. 
 
AA: What do you mean it was “below your dignity?” What does that mean? 
 
BIS: Why should we buy tickets? We are going to Delhi and coming back! You know, Aligarh 
was like this hub and one side was Delhi and the other side was Bareilly and the third side was 
Agra. Agra, about forty miles, Bareilly about sixty miles, and Delhi about ninety miles. This was a 
free-for-all, and nobody bought the tickets. Why should we buy tickets? We are going to Delhi, 
Aligarh and you know, Bareilly. Anyhow, so that was the tradition.45 
 
Shafi’s declaration that it was “our railway” is related to the sense that Aligarh, Delhi, 
Bareilly and Agra were Muslim centers, from which many Aligarh students and 
professors hailed. The direct rail connection between the four cities lent weight to the 
idea that the connection between them was more than just spatial. Shafi, here, 
incorporates the whole region around Aligarh into its sphere of influence. Aligarh 
students, he felt, were entitled to move freely in this area without fear of legal challenge. 
Although he seems to recognize that the privilege of Aligarh students to travel these 
distances without a ticket was not strictly speaking legal, it was certainly tolerated, 
largely because of the respect and influence that Aligarh commanded in the region. 
                                                
44 Hasan, "Masood Ul Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 1, 2009." 
45 Shafi, "Brigadier Iqbal Shafi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 9, 2010." 
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 During the 1945-46 elections, Aligarh students placed additional pressure on this 
system at a time when communal tensions were mounting all over the country, and in 
Aligarh itself. Students frequently traveled to Delhi for League meetings and to meet (or 
to try to meet) with Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Whereas many students may not have been 
able to afford a ticket, this system made it possible for them to leave Aligarh in the 
afternoon for a meeting after the evening prayers, and to return the following day for free.  
Habibur Rahman exclaimed, “We had to go. Regularly we had to go!”46 It is clear from 
other sources that in 1945 and 1946, as Aligarh students were unleashed for election 
work, that this sense of entitlement, combined with the meager financial support the 
League provided for their endeavors, created tension between the railway staff, the 
university, other citizens, and even other Muslims. Even the All India Muslim Students 
Federation sought to censure the system and to challenge the sense of entitlement of 
Aligarh students. During its Seventh Annual Session, in 1945, the AIMSF passed a 
resolution arguing that the good name of university was being tarnished by  
the irresponsible and undignified behaviour of those students who travel without ticket and steal 
eatible [sic] of the poor passengers. This so-called ‘tradition’ and ‘Activity’ [sic] of Aligarh boys 
has been too much degenerated and criminal habits are fast developing through them among a 
section of Aligarh students. Scenes of roudism [sic] and mal treatment [sic] have become things of 
daily occurrence. This session of the All-India Muslim Students Federation strongly condemns 
the above mentioned tradition and activity of the Aligarh students and recommends to the self 
respecting [sic] and dignified section of the Aligarh Students to create a strong public opinion 
against them.47 
 
                                                
46 Rahman, "Habib Ur Rahman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas February 20, 2010." 
47 M.A. Bari. Resolutions for 7th Annual Session of the All India Muslim Students' Federation. March 
1945. FMA, F 961/ 17- 21. PNA. 
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Despite Shafi’s claim that the purchasing of the ticket was “below the dignity” of Aligarh 
students, here other students appealed to whatever remains of Aligarh students’ “dignity” 
to end the system as it was causing a problem for the reputation of Muslims.  
 The League was complicit with this system as it sent Aligarh boys out into the 
countryside for election work. Iqbal Shafi remembered that as Liaqat Ali Khan gave his 
group their instructions, he also provided a small amount of support for their travel. 
There was a munshi sitting with his black tin box. So [Liaqat Ali Khan] says, ‘There are seven of 
you, okay. Munshiji, give them two tickets, from Delhi to Jalandhar.’ Do you know what that 
means? In seven people, give them money for two tickets. There were a lot of things understood, 
or taken for granted. There was no explanation. The ticket would be of third class… And why 
two? And from Delhi to Jalandhar. Why? Because he knew that from Aligarh to Delhi they will all 
go free. From Aligarh to Delhi they would all go free and from Delhi to Jalandhar, among seven 
people, two tickets are enough. That’s enough. Don’t buy seven tickets. So that was the thing that 
was understood. And we took it for granted. ‘Okay, fine, you got the money for two tickets, and 
now you go.’48 
 
Thus, even as the Muslim Students’ Federation, who also supported the Muslim League 
demand for Pakistan, attempted to reel in Aligarh students, to encourage them to follow 
the letter of the law, the League itself was dispatching them into the countryside with 
meager provisions and an expectation that their status as Aligarians would secure them 
special privileges on the trains.  
 After 1947, however, trains became a site of spectral violence, and one of the key 
sites of catastrophic partition violence. The sense of entitlement that students felt with 
regard to the trains in the years before 1947 helps to expose why the trains became such a 
specific site of trauma for them after that date. The earlier system had allowed and even 
encouraged Aligarh students to flaunt their identity and relationship with the institution, 
as Pakistani Captain Wazir Khan put it, the sherwani was “like the license to travel, even 
                                                
48 Shafi, "Brigadier Iqbal Shafi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 9, 2010." 
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without ticket.”49 The distinctive uniform that Aligarh boys wore set them apart for the 
privilege of ticket-less travel. However, during partition, as much of the scholarship on 
violence has shown, “thousands and thousands and thousands [were killed]--those who 
could travel by train, all the trains were attacked and the people were butchered they will 
not spare anybody.”50 Aligarh students were not immune to the fear of violence in the 
trains after 1947, and their position was made more precarious by their distinct identity 
and sense of privilege. 
 In fact, after 1947 many students speak of efforts to hide their identity in trains 
and stations. Normally, they adopted one of two strategies (or a combination of both): 
they modified the markers of their appearance, or found company and a sense of security 
among other Muslims. Mohammad Amin said that he was advised to “to carry a book or 
something like that. And in the book, write the name Mahavir Prasad or Raghav Lal or 
something or the other.”51 During the violence of partition, Muslims could often only be 
distinguished by the fact of their circumcision, and so Muslims made efforts to mask their 
Muslim identity with more easily accessible markers. They shed the sherwani, and here 
Amin suggests that he attempted to impersonate a Hindu student by writing a marked 
Hindu name in his book when he traveled by train. The arbitrary value of a name written 
in a book as a way of establishing identity suggests that even indelible physical 
characteristics (evidence of circumcision) could be considered equally arbitrary, 
                                                
49 Khan, "Captain Wazir Khan: Interview with Unam Muneer, Citizens Archive of Pakistan." 
50 Ibid. 
51 Amin, "Professor Mohammad Amin: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas November 5, 2009." 
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distinguishing only between aggressor and victim.52 These efforts to conceal identity 
reveal a powerful anxiety and fear of violence. Aligarh boys for generations had flaunted 
their identity by proudly wearing their school uniform outside the university. During the 
election campaign of 1945-46, the sherwani was a mark of Aligarh’s expanding 
influence.53 Now, however, their identity had become a liability. 
 Iftikhar Alam Khan, whose narrative more than any other reveals the depth of 
anxiety that fear caused the students, told me that he could not travel in the direction of 
Delhi after the riots of 1947. Though his father lived there, he only felt safe traveling in 
the direction away from Delhi, away from the specter of violence. Still, as he traveled, he 
sought the company of other Muslims and sought to hide his identity. Remarkably, he 
found an ally in the man who ran the toddy shop in the Hathras Railway Station. In 
Hathras,54 nearly 35 kilometers from Aligarh’s protective reaches, Khan feared for his 
safety because he knew that in this direction, away from Delhi and Aligarh, there would 
be “no Muslim.”  
So outside the Hathras station there was a store selling sharab. Sharab you know? Country-made 
liquor.  A lot of people used to come to drink liquor over there. The bartender, the worker, he was 
called ‘Pandit’, he used to have a (ponytail). But he was a Muslim. I knew that. He was from my 
village. He had changed his name and all that, and because he had to live there, in the liquor shop. 
If he wasn’t a pandit, his caste was very low, then people wouldn’t drink.  And if he was a Muslim 
they would kill him, so having become a pandit he stayed there. I was knowing this. I reached 
there at night, and had to wait three hours [for my connection]. I used to go out, near this liquor 
                                                
52 Saadat Hasan Manto’s Short Story, “A Terrible Mistake” encapsulates this arbtitrariness. In its entirety: 
“Piercing through his stomach, the knife slid down to his groin, in the process cutting his pajama cord in 
two and exposing his genitals. ‘A terrible mistake!’ the assassin gasped.” Jai Ratan, ed., The Best of Manto: 
A Collection of His Short Stories (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt., Ltd., 1989). 
53 Hasan, "Nationalist and Separatist Trends." 
54 Mohammad Amin described the influence of Aligarh on Hathras, “It is a fact that if the meeting was 
called in the [Aligarh] Union, and the bell rang here, shops in Hathras used to get closed. Aligarh mein ho 
raha hain, Aligarh mein ho raha hain. (Something is happening in Aligarh, something is happening in 
Aligarh).” Amin, "Professor Mohammad Amin: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas November 5, 2009." 
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store and look to see if this man was there or not. He used to see me and give me a signal [of 
recognition] I used to say something. Then I would sit near to him. Until the train would come 
after three hours.  He used to come and ask after me ‘How are you doing?’ ‘Yes, I’m well.’55 
 
After departing from Hathras in the direction of his hometown—Qaimganj in District 
Farrukhabad—Khan began to feel more comfortable. For after three or four stations, 
people began to recognize him as the son of a powerful family. Then, he said, “I was in 
my own territory.  But what was really bad was that I couldn’t go towards Delhi.” The 
trauma of partition seems to have ruptured the intimacy of connection between Aligarh 
and Delhi that brought Delhi into Aligarh’s sphere of influence,56 that made Delhi a 
“Muslim” site. Though Khan did not arrive in Aligarh until 1949, and then as a young 
child, he seemed aware of the consequences of the rupture in the intimate relationship 
between Aligarh and Delhi that other narrators described in the period before 1947. The 
pride in a shared Muslim identity seems to have drawn the two cities together in the 
earlier period, but now failed to provide any protection.  
 To combat the fear of being isolated as a target for violence, many other students, 
too, reported that during their journeys, in order to find the kind of strength in community 
that Aligarh symbolized, they sought out other Muslims for company and more 
importantly, security. Iftikhar Alam Khan described this above, when a man, only 
nominally Muslim—known as “Pandit” and selling country-made liquor—provided 
enough of a veil of familiarity to make Khan feel safe. Another narrator, Masood ul 
                                                
55 Khan, "Professor Iftikhar Alam Khan (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 6, 2009." 
56 Or perhaps the other way around. Political power emanated from Delhi, it was there that the students 
traveled to seek guidance from Jinnah. However, the League’s power was legitimated for the students by its 
presence on the campus at Aligarh. Prior to 1947, Aligarh’s reputation “authorized” student travel to Delhi, 
but after 1947 this reciprocal relationship was disrupted. 
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Hasan, reported finding comfort sitting next to a Muslim convict on the train! Questions 
of dignity here seem to be tested by questions of safety, and one effect of the exposure of 
Muslims after 1947 was to reify their identity as “Muslims.” Masood ul Hasan described 
his journey to his home in Bhopal in January 1948. Though the Railway system had 
established “minority compartments” after the “great killings”57 of 1946 and 1947, 
Hasan, empowered in his identity as an Aligarian, chose not to ride in the minority 
compartment, as a “little assertion of self-confidence.” He told me, “in those days I was 
religiously clad in a sherwani.”58 In other words, as he embarked in Aligarh, he was 
dramatically marked out as a Muslim and an Aligarian. Though he did not choose the 
minority compartment, he settled in near another Muslim, a “hefty prisoner” who was an 
“Afghan” and traveling with several constables. Hasan shared his breakfast with the 
prisoner. But at the next station, the prisoner and his constables disembarked, and Hasan 
eventually shifted to the minority compartment.  
 Zakir Ali Khan, who earlier tried to demonstrate the reality of the threat to 
Muslim security presented by the Hindu villages surrounding Aligarh by showing how 
Aligarh boys protected their campus in a show of strength, told a story about train travel 
that does more to betray his own fear for his safety.  
Once when I was traveling, in my compartment, Hindus sighted two Muslims sitting there and 
they pointed and said, “He is a Muslim,” and they tried to tease him.  They threw his luggage 
                                                
57 “Great Killing” is the phrase used to describe the rioting that spread from Calcutta to Bihar and Noakhali 
in August 1946 in the wake of the Muslim League’s “Day of Deliverance.” Hasan uses the term here to 
account for both the rioting of 1946 and 1947; it also shows the continuity he sees between these two 
events. Hasan, "Masood Ul Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 20, 2009." 
58 Ibid. 
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outside the train with the result that when the first station came the poor fellow got out of the train.  
I sat quiet there, and they never thought that I am also a Muslim.59 
 
Whereas Khan’s earlier story sought to portray his strength as a member of the Aligarh 
community, dedicated to its welfare, when outside that community, his position was 
severely compromised. When he was alone, not only did he conceal his own identity, but 
he failed to act in defense of another Muslim who was being mistreated. We see here how 
empowering the sense of community at Aligarh could be and how isolated Aligarh boys 
felt in the face of actual threat when they were out on their own.60  
 Like many stories told by former Aligarh students about the period immediately 
after partition, none of these young men became the victim of anti-Muslim violence. Still, 
there is trauma evident here. One effect of the sense of isolation of Aligarh from the rest 
of India prior to 1947 was that it created a sphere of influence around the university that 
created a protective boundary between them and the world outside. 1947 caused a re-
centering of Aligarh as its students were held in large part responsible for the outcomes 
of partition.61 The disruption of that boundary left the students, as Muslims, feeling 
exposed to danger. The anxiety that the former students betray here comes when they 
                                                
59 Khan, "Zakir Ali Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006." 
60 As late as the1990s, when a Ph.D. student at Aligarh University, Professor Akhtaruzzaman of Dhaka 
University felt that when a Muslim went to AMU he seemed to have “received more power” but when he 
went “outside” he was again “ordinary.” Mohammad Akhtaruzzaman, "Mohammad Akhtaruzzaman: 
Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 10, 2010," (Dhaka: March 10, 2010). 
61 In 2010 I presented a paper at the Annual Madison South Asia Conference “The Ex-centricity of the 
Aligarh Muslim University” in which I argued that after 1947, Aligarh’s place in Indian society shifted, so 
that it functions as both a center and a margin simultaneously. The insistence of Aligarh’s well-wishers that 
it remains a critical site of Muslim opinion endangers it in the public sphere where for many others, 
including politicians, Aligarh is little more than a distracting irritation despite attempts to “nationalize” it 
after 1947. The title of the paper derives from this conflict and refers to Aligarh’s “former” place as a 
center of Muslim politics, and its position “outside” the center of Indian life. Aligarh stands out as a 
powerful symbol of the contested citizenship of Muslims in India. AMU represents both a place where 
Muslims can safely express themselves educationally and culturally, and a place where they are isolated 
from Indian society and politics. 
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ventured beyond the protective boundaries of Aligarh, and it is worth remembering that 
many of these narrators have remained close to the institution from that point forward. 
The narrators who betray the sense of having been traumatized were not those who 
moved away from the institution—even into places that were “disrupted,” like New 
Delhi, but those who remained intimately attached to Aligarh and all that it symbolized.  
Another aspect that appears significant here is Aligarh’s proximity to Delhi and 
other Muslim centers. Before 1947, students had used the trains and railway lines to mark 
out the boundaries of the territory they considered “theirs”—by imagining a network of 
cities, connected by railways through which they could freely and safely move. During 
the disruptions, narrators describe their relationship to the university and the university’s 
relationship to the world that surrounded it, Aligarh’s geographic location seems to shift. 
Zakir Ali Khan described Aligarh’s proximity to Delhi as a significant marker of the 
university’s importance; Asloob Ahmad Ansari (India) described Delhi as “not very far 
off”; several students, including Habibur Rahman (Bangladesh), Ghulam Umar and Iqbal 
Shafi (Pakistan) describe Delhi’s centrality in the Muslim League organizational 
structure, again emphasizing Aligarh’s proximity to it. Delhi’s closeness to Aligarh 
during the Muslim League period was clearly enhanced by ideological connection, but 
after 1947, several narrators identified Delhi as a source of disruption. It was as a result 
of refugees coming from the direction of Delhi and Dehra Dun, that KPS (Anonymized) 
describes setting up a searchlight on the roof of V.M. Hall and how the students took 
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turns keeping watch.62 Asloob Ahmad Ansari told me that while Aligarh was “immune” 
from communal disturbance, riots were happening “round about Aligarh and Delhi.”63 
Delhi was the place, he told me, where people were “victimized.” Iftikhar Ahmad Khan’s 
testimony that he could not even travel in the direction of Delhi is perhaps the most 
powerful indictment of the earlier link between the two cities. And it is not difficult to see 
here that Delhi’s vulnerability to such unbridled violence challenged the notion that it 
exerted a protective shield over Aligarh.  
 For Aligarh boys during this period, their fear and anxiety arose from a serious 
disruption of the sources of authority that had previously served to protect them. The 
meaning of the spaces in which they had learned to feel safe, and to build solidarity—
from the local sites of gathering in Aligarh, cafes and cinemas; to the railway station, 
their link between home and university; and the very geography of their institution in 
India—now changed irrevocably. When external authority deteriorated, the safest place 
appeared to be in Aligarh itself. While they feared attack on the university, no one 
actually crossed the boundary into the university, and whether they defended it with 
trembling hands or with shows of strength, the university itself represented a powerful 
continuity in the midst of traumatic disruption all around. 
 
                                                
62 KPS, "KPS (Anonymized): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 8, 2009." 
63 Ansari, "Asloob Ahmad Ansari: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas July 5, 2008." 
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ESTABLISHING CONTINUITY 
Among those narrators who remained in India, the university remains a powerful 
site of continuity with their pre-partition lives, though their narratives betray the effort 
required to establish continuity between the institution and the Indian narrative of 
citizenship. To clarify, even as they reveal the trauma of disruption during the partition 
and the anxiety of being singled out as Muslims, they declare the importance of Aligarh 
as an exemplary site of India’s composite culture, and credit her nationalist leaders with 
“saving” the institution. The tension evident in these complex narratives should not 
suggest that there is a problem of “loyalty” among Aligarh Muslims, but that in their 
effort to establish their position as unproblematic Indian citizens they have had to 
reimagine Aligarh’s place in Indian history, excising the problematic “League” phase and 
minimizing their attachment to the League’s ideals. Thus, many of these narrators both 
emphasize continuity at the university and mark the post-independence period by 
enthusiastic declarations of allegiance to the nationalist agenda, and in particular its 
leaders. Narrators seek to establish continuity in two ways: first, they minimize the 
disruptiveness of partition with regard to the normal functioning of the university; 
second, they focus attention on Zakir Husain, the first significant post-partition Vice 
Chancellor as an Aligarh “insider” who “saved” the institution. 
 By minimizing the disruptiveness of the partition, and even the impact of the out-
migration of students and faculty to Pakistan, narrators suggest that for all of the 
League’s self-importance during the period of its dominance the institution, it did not 
have the power permanently to disable the educational institution. The focus on Zakir 
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Husain establishes continuity with the pre-Muslim League nationalist period; when Zakir 
Husain took over in 1948, though it marked a shift from League allegiance, it 
rehabilitated the university’s earlier nationalist identity. Therefore, narrators excise the 
League period as an anomaly and focus their attention on getting back to business after 
the disruptions of 1947.64 Those who were not League partisans during the 1940s have a 
comparatively easier time of thinking through partition in this way, but those who felt 
sympathy with the Muslim League agenda now attempt to cover their tracks with 
expressions of regret and even guilt. For both groups, there is evidence that Muslim 
identity remains in conflict with Indian nationalist identity, and in the latter case, there is 
a sense that in the wake of partition Aligarh Muslims felt responsible for the deeds of 
fellow Muslims and Aligarians, and responsible to the larger body of the Indian citizenry. 
 Riazur Rahman Sherwani, whose family were large landholders in Aligarh, and 
who is now a retired professor of  Arabic told me that “so as far as the working of the 
university was concerned, it was not affected by [partition].  The doors of the university 
always remained open for the non-Muslims as well, even during the time when that 
movement [the Muslim League movement for Pakistan] was in its full force.”65 This 
statement sets the stage for establishing the continuity of Aligarh’s nationalist orientation. 
Sherwani never supported the League agenda for Pakistan, though his father was the 
university’s treasurer and managed the League’s funds for student electioneering. 
                                                
64 This effort was evident when I was conducting field research in Aligarh. As I explained my intention to 
study the 1930s and 40s at Aligarh many people directed me to literature on “The Aligarh Movement,” the 
educational movement led by Sir Sayyid in the nineteenth century that ultimately led to the founding of the 
institution. This period is highly glorified in the Aligarh narrative whereas study of the 1940s is absent. 
Many people in Aligarh were highly resistant to my efforts to study this period. 
65 Sherwani, "Riazur Rahman Sherwani: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas, July 6, 2008." 
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Sherwani defends the university’s nationalist credentials both by arguing that the League 
influence was not powerful enough to displace Aligarh’s agenda of inclusion, and that the 
division of the country had not had a marked effect on the functioning of the institution.66 
Irfan Habib, too, emphasized continuity in the academic realm when he suggested that 
“one of the strengths of the institution we didn’t notice, that admissions were on time, 
classes were held, a teacher disappears [and] was replaced immediately by another 
teacher.”67 Habib’s emphasis on continuity goes so far as to suggest that students “didn’t 
notice” any disruption as a result of partition.  
 Whereas in their descriptions of life in Aligarh prior to partition, academic life 
occupies an inferior role relative to social and residential life, here narrators begin to 
emphasize the continuity of academics. Thus, by directing attention away from the 
disruption to residential life—exemplified by the emptying of the Aligarh hostels after a 
period of severe overcrowding—these narrators are able to suggest that very little 
changed on the campus. Ather Siddiqi, who arrived at Aligarh in the immediate aftermath 
of the partition migrations, was highly cognizant of the effect of the disruptions. Earlier 
in the year when he applied for admission, the hostels were too crowded and he was not 
given a place in the university.68 After partition, however, “students left en masse. From 
six-seven thousand—that was a big number in those days!—[the student body] was 
                                                
66 The minutes of the Executive Council Meeting of December 11, 1947 reflect that the university opened 
later than usual, on September 15, 1947.  
67 Habib, "Irfan Habib: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 28, 2009." 
68 Nawab Ismail Khan. Application for Additional Grants-in-Aid Submitted to the Government of India by 
the Vice-Chancellor Aligarh Muslim University. 1948. Aligarh: Maulana Azad Library. 
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reduced to two thousand.  There was no difficulty in getting a room in the hostel.”69 
Despite his awareness of the significance of this disruption, Siddiqi also seeks to establish 
continuity with life before partition—though he was not present in Aligarh. Nonetheless, 
he argued, “Life continued and new teachers were appointed and our studies resumed.” 
Siddiqi implicates himself in the events of partition at the university.70 Siddiqi’s narrative 
suggests that partition’s impact at Aligarh defined everything that followed there—his 
story suggests that all the disruptive forces disappeared in 1947—and life carried on 
peacefully after that. 
 However, narrators frequently described the empty hostels, and indeed between 
the 1946 and 1947-8 school years, the student population of the Aligarh University and 
its allied institutions, including the Muslim University High School, and the Minto Circle 
School, fell from 6061 to 4613.71 The annual Vice Chancellor’s Report notes that many 
teachers and students had been “lost” as they could not join “through lack of 
communications” during the disruptions of 1947. In the Engineering College “the number 
of students returning for the Session 1947-48 was about 50 per cent of normal” and the 
number of undergraduates in the Faculty of Science dropped by about forty percent.72  
                                                
69 Siddiqi, "Professor Ather Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 11, 2009." 
70 Siddiqi actually told me he was in Aligarh during partition, but when I pressed him for details, he noted 
that he had been there earlier in the year to apply for admission and returned to matriculate in the fall. Ibid. 
KPS also told me, “These people who claim to be true Aligarians they joined Aligarh after post-
independence era. So they are unable to locate what happened during that critical moments when Aligarh 
was on the major hit list.” KPS, "KPS (Anonymized): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 8, 
2009." 
71 Mohammad Obaidur Rahman Khan Sherwani, "Report of the Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim 
University for the Calendar Year 1946: Read at the Convocation Held on the 16th February, 1947," 
(Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1947). 
72 Khan, "Annual Report of the Vice-Chancellor Aligarh Muslim University for the Calendar Year 1947: 
Read at the Convocation Held on 24th January, 1948." The Annual Report from 1945 noted that “the centre 
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 Mohiuddin Khan, now settled in Bangladesh, told me that the remaining students 
felt this “loss of students” because “the whole university campus became very quiet!”73 
Mohiuddin, however, advances an explanation for this loss that is common to many of 
the Indian narrators but not well- supported by the available evidence. He told me that 
before 1947 “the students used to come from Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, and 
also Southern India; they did not come [back].”74 His explanation for the changes that 
took place at Aligarh during the 1947 partition was that those students from “Pakistan 
areas” did not return to the university, undermining the idea that North Indian Muslims 
who supported Pakistan migrated to Pakistan alone or with their families. Many narrators, 
including Irfan Habib, Ather Siddiqi, Saghir Ahmad Rizvi and KPS (Anonymized) 
argued that the depletion of Aligarh University’s population came primarily from the fact 
that no students from “partition provinces turned up at Aligarh” in 1947 and even that 
students from Hyderabad were airlifted out of Aligarh during the disruptions.75 
 This is a common thread among Indian Muslims at Aligarh, and this argument 
suggests an effort to read back Pakistan’s geographic identity onto her ideological one. 
However, it is not supported by available evidence. Support for the Pakistan movement 
was centered in the United Provinces (later Uttar Pradesh), and it was from these 
provinces that its leadership was primarily drawn. In addition, since its earliest days, 
                                                                                                                                            
of gravity of the University has shifted from Arts to Science, and the Strachey Hall now no longer occupies 
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Aligarh University had attracted the majority of its students from these regions in North 
India.76 While it had always had some students from other regions, they were in the 
minority.  The explanation that only students from “Pakistan areas” ultimately settled 
there, however, serves Aligarh’s post-partition identity as an unproblematically loyalist 
institution by “showing” two equally important features about Aligarh’s student body. 
First, it seeks to prove that all those students who had been affiliated with the Muslim 
League’s demand for Pakistan were originally from those areas that were to become 
Pakistan—Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sindh, Balochistan, Kashmir and 
Bengal—thus, that they were drawn to its narrative because they would be affected by it, 
not (as the evidence shows) because they had experienced or feared discrimination from 
Congress or Hindus more generally.77 Second, it seeks to show that all those students 
who supported the League’s demand were purged by partition; they did not remain in 
Aligarh, and therefore, no disloyal elements remained in the student body.  
 That so many narrators supported this explanation suggests the importance of 
establishing Aligarh’s nationalist credentials. However, it is not born out by the facts. It is 
well established that the bulk of Aligarh’s students came from the United Provinces, 
Bihar and other neighboring areas. It was also these areas where the Muslim League was 
best established and drew much of its support. Although students from the “Pakistan 
Areas” did not return to the university, the majority of students who did not return were 
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North Indians. Despite an absence of evidence for the suggestion that the only reason 
Aligarh’s population was so severely depleted was because the students largely came 
from “Pakistan areas” this argument persisted, at least anecdotally, as a major feature of 
the Aligarh explanation of partition. 
 It is not difficult to understand why this narrative has become so well established 
in Aligarh. The loyalty of Aligarh students was questioned both locally, as Hindus urged 
them to join their fellow Muslims in Pakistan, and by government as Sardar Patel 
cautioned that Muslims would have to “prove” their loyalty. Still, evidence shows that 
Aligarh remained in transition at least until the early 1950s (when there were severe 
communal riots in Aligarh) and perhaps until as late at 1965 (when India and Pakistan 
fought an all-out war). Zakir Ali Khan, now settled in Pakistan, remained at Aligarh until 
1951, and earlier described the efforts of the State of Pakistan to recruit engineers from 
Aligarh’s Engineering College—one of the few in India, and the only one that admitted 
large numbers of Indian students.78 Ather Siddiqi reported that Pakistan continued to 
draw students from Aligarh for many years after the 1947 partition: “Everybody at that 
time thought that he should get a degree and go to Pakistan so for the first maybe ten, 
fifteen, twenty years, maybe, this went on.  Aligarh Muslim University was producing 
graduates but they were all going to Pakistan because there was great demand.  For 
engineers and civil services bureaucracy, et cetera.”79 Pakistan represented a powerful 
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opportunity to Aligarh graduates, and especially engineers. Thus despite the insistence 
that the migrations of partition stripped Aligarh only of those students who remained 
home in “Pakistan Areas,” the facts show that migration continued throughout the 1950s 
and early 1960s,80 and even Aligarians recognize this trend. Irfan Habib reported that 
Muslims finally stopped going to Pakistan “after 1960 with the [establishment of] public 
sector engineering services [in India].  They got higher pay here, why should they go?”81 
This acknowledgement of the continuing migration from Aligarh even after partition puts 
up an explicit challenge to the notion that Pakistan created very little disruption in 
Aligarh.82  
 In addition, at least anecdotally, almost every narrator I spoke to in India told me 
that at least some of their family members had settled in Pakistan. Whereas they were 
reluctant to admit any personal attraction to migrating, almost all came from divided 
families. In Pakistan by contrast, nearly all narrators indicated to me that their entire 
families had migrated along with them, that they had left few relations in India, and those 
who were left behind had become estranged over time. This tension shows that Pakistan 
plays a much larger role in the Aligarian Indian imagination than the other way around, 
betraying an incomplete resolution of the partition experience at the university. 
Nonetheless, the efforts to preserve continuity, to minimize disruption, and to show that 
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loyalty to Pakistan was geographic, and not ideological, further suggest the complexity of 
the League period and partition in Aligarh University. 
 Many narrators point to the arrival of Zakir Husain as Vice Chancellor in 1948 as 
a critical moment in the university’s nationalist transformation. In 1948, in the wake of 
the terrible communal disruptions of 1946 and ‘47, Aligarh deliberately re-oriented its 
allegiance and turned to face the secular Congress government. In addition to being 
comforted by the deployment of protective forces, it looked to the government for 
financial and moral support, and the government gave of it. Zakir Husain’s appointment 
is remembered as the most important tool in establishing the institution’s nationalist 
credibility. Unlike Ziauddin, Obaidur Rahman Khan Sherwani, or Nawab Ismail Khan 
who all served as Vice Chancellors during this tumultuous period and were partisans of 
the Muslim League, Zakir Husain’s nationalist credentials were unsullied. He had 
abandoned Aligarh in 1920 during the non-cooperation agitation and been a founder of 
the Jamia Millia Islamia. He remained loyal to that institution throughout the 
independence period and was closely associated with Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana 
Abul Kalam Azad. Husain was appointed Vice Chancellor of Aligarh University by 
Jawaharlal Nehru, and he served from 1948-1956 before moving back into a more active 
political life. These were critical years, and Zakir Husain’s connections within the 
Congress government undoubtedly drew in support for the institution. It was under his 
guidance that the government increased the grants to the university,83 and though he is 
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not remembered for large amounts of infrastructural development as Ziauddin had been, 
he ensured the university’s survival during a period of uncertainty. 
The students remember his influence with a tremendous sense of gratitude. As 
Ahmad Saeed described him, Zakir Husain “was a sort of a ‘screen’ which almost saved 
the University from adverse days that it was expecting to see after partition.”84 
Mohammad Amin reiterated that “it was primarily Nehru and his choice of sending Zakir 
Husain Sahib as Vice Chancellor that saved Aligarh University. Otherwise, for all 
purposes, it would have disappeared.”85 Nehru and Husain both came to the aid of the 
university during its time of need, facilitated a shift in the institution’s orientation and 
became a protective “screen” for it. The language of screening engages the notion of the 
university’s boundaries. The students imagine Zakir Husain and the nationalists as a 
boundary both protecting them from and connecting them to the non-Muslim world 
surrounding them. Thus, even as Nehru emphasized the shared environment of secular 
India, the boundaries remain critically important for Muslim engagement. Saeed sees 
Husain as an agent of the central government’s benevolence, and above all, he credits the 
government for protecting the university.  
 
SLIPPAGES OF MEMORY 
Despite the enthusiastic support for the nationalist reformation in the memory of 
India’s Aligarians, I was surprised to hear a repeated slippage in their explanations of 
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their post-1947 experience.  Many narrators expressed a sense of guilt as they reflected 
on their experiences during and after 1947. Iftikhar Alam Khan, for instance, explained 
his fear and anxiety by clarifying: “my problem was that I was also feeling guilty.” 86  
The guilt that Iftikhar Alam Khan and others have described is a surprising continuity 
from the pre-partition political environment at Aligarh and in the United Provinces more 
broadly.  It points to an incomplete imagining of a post-partition Indian Muslim identity, 
and though these narrators have repeatedly denounced the Muslim League and those who 
migrated to Pakistan, it creates a link between these narrators, who chose to stay in India, 
and those who chose to go.  The guilt that remained with these narrators reveals a sense 
of solidarity that they felt with other Muslims during the heady period of Muslim unity 
and the heyday of the Two Nation Theory, even if, as in the case of the Alam brothers, 
they were not Muslim League sympathizers.  In addition, it reveals the expansiveness of 
the question of Muslim belonging, embodied in the guilt of Muslim Indian citizens who 
feel responsible for what Gandhi called “the vivisection” of India.  
 The sense of guilt has morphed into fury over a serious betrayal of the ideals of 
solidarity that had been fostered at Aligarh.  The students together fought to achieve 
Pakistan, but then the few who chose to stay were betrayed and abandoned by the many 
who left, and left a gaping hole in Aligarh.87 Ather Siddiqi identified that “guilty 
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conscience” was the reason that his brother, who had been a Muslim League supporter, 
chose to migrate to Pakistan.  Though Siddiqi is a vocal supporter of the Indian secular 
state, he told me, “I also wanted to go!  But my father would not allow me to go.  He was 
a government servant and he didn’t want his second son--only two sons--to go.  He 
forbade me to go.  So I didn’t know what to do.  So I worked for a year but I wanted to 
do higher studies so I returned to Aligarh and I worked so hard.”88  At the time, he was 
too young to make the decision on his own, and his father was not keen to leave because 
he was only three years away from retirement (Siddiqi’s father finally did migrate to 
Pakistan in 1965).  But Siddiqi describes a turnaround in his sentiment that he portrays as 
an experience of “coming to his senses.”  He told me, “Our sentiments and emotions 
were pro-Muslim League-y but when rational thinking increased…I realized that Pakistan 
was the wrong thing.”89 Professor Siddiqi is not alone in claiming that support of 
Pakistan was irrational or senseless.  Several narrators describe this sensation, 
compounded by youth.  An exchange I had with professor of history Iqtidar Alam Khan, 
now well-known as a Leftist, displays this very well: 
Iqtidar Alam Khan: What happened was that, this idea that there should be a Pakistan that 
would be good for Muslims and it would guarantee a good future for Muslims, that idea 
was all around.  And perhaps I was also influenced by that because I remember that once 
or twice there was a procession taken out from the hostel, I don’t know why and how, but 
I was also a member of that procession!  And fifty or sixty boys they were just raising 
slogans “Pakistan Zindabad!” Going round the university campus.  For nothing!  I don’t 
know why, who took out that procession!  So this kind of atmosphere was there, and I 
was also influenced by that. 
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AA:  Did you have an idea about what that meant—“Pakistan Zindabad?” What did 
Pakistan mean to you?  Do you remember that? 
 
Iqtidar Alam Khan: Yes!  Something where the Muslims would be in a state and the 
Muslims would be in a dominant position, they wouldn’t be oppressed.  Really I was not 
a very, very thinking person.  I was not able to analyze.  I didn’t have any idea of the 
institutions that were being created.  But general frenzy was there and I was a part of that 
frenzy.90  
 
Masood ul Hasan echoes this sentiment, when he suggests that “Maybe I am trying to 
rationalize or justify something.  Maybe it is a mature man in me who is speaking now,” 
and that mature man has since realized that “No doubt the very demand for the partition 
of the country was not a very sane and wise call.”91  The Indian narrators, even those who 
had been sometimes involved in the Muslim League campaigns remember their 
experiences as though they had been duped.  Their activities were driven by a desire to fit 
in, to be involved, to be a part of something bigger than themselves. By 1947, however, 
the power of Aligarh’s brotherhood had become too large to control. The fear generated 
by the threat of communal violence during this period had a chastening effect and 
fostered a nationalist turn that most of the remaining students embraced. 
 
TELLING MOMENT: JANUARY 30, 1948 
Those Aligarians who chose to remain in India have been confronted with 
difficult questions about belonging. The collective identity that developed at Aligarh was 
focused on the shared interests of the Muslim elite, and the environment at the university 
during the 1940s showed the community’s mounting strength. However, many narrators 
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described their experience on the day of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, and the 
ways in which this event served to confirm the difference that would mark their future in 
India after 1947. Mohammad Amin suggested that this event “tells you the most” about 
partition’s disruptions. Whereas Aligarians felt targeted and afraid during the events of 
1947, the assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi, and the possibility that a Muslim might 
have been responsible, awakened Muslim terror, no matter where Aligarians found 
themselves that day. In a unique example of parallelism, many of the narrators with 
whom I spoke about their experiences on January 30, 1948, described being in trains or 
train stations, much like their experiences of the 1947 partition are told through stories 
about trains. Regardless of where they found themselves, however, they all describe their 
apprehension on hearing of the assassination, and fear that the assassin was a Muslim.  
 In every interview I conducted, when I asked about the assassination of Gandhi, 
the response was the same: Muslims feared that the assassin had been one of their 
community and this was accompanied by the certainty that if it had been, the 
consequences for Muslims would be terrible.92  Similarly, they all credit Nehru and Patel 
with making the identity of the assassin, Nathuram Godse, a Hindu fundamentalist 
associated with the RSS, known as quickly as possible.  Then, the community heaved a 
collective “sigh of relief.”93 For many Aligarians, the comfort of learning the assassin’s 
identity followed a tense period of anxiety over the possibility of a Muslim assassin.  
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The narrators’ attachment to the role of Congress leaders in “saving” Muslims by quickly 
making the assassin’s identity known reflects the shift in the attitude of Aligarh students, 
from feeling threatened by the Congress government, to feeling that it was only a 
Congress government who could protect Muslims.  
 Masood ul Hasan was traveling by train from Aligarh to Bhopal on January 30, 
1948; I have earlier shown that even before he learned of the assassination, he had chosen 
not to sit in the minority compartment, but to find another Muslim on the train for safety 
and comfort. The Muslim he found was a convict, traveling with two constables. Hasan 
befriended him, and shared his rations. But at the next station, in Agra, two things 
happened. First, the prisoner and his constables disembarked; second, Hasan noticed an 
“uncanny silence” on the platform. He heard some one say that Gandhi had been killed, 
and he was instantly struck by the thought that it must have been a Muslim who was 
responsible. His response, he said, was that “I lost nerve, and I also shifted to the 
minority compartment.”94 Whereas at the beginning of his journey, Hasan had exerted his 
self-confidence by sitting in the general compartment, the anxiety created by the 
assassination marked him out negatively as Muslim, and he feared sitting amongst his 
fellow Indians, lest he should become the target of their grief, or worse, rage. 
 S.M. Mehdi95 then a Communist activist in Bombay, was preparing to board a 
train at Victoria Terminus in Bombay, when he heard the news of Gandhi’s assassination. 
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His fear for his own safety precluded his ability to grieve for the slain leader. When I 
asked him how he felt about the death of the great leader, he responded with surprise,  
Emotionally, about Gandhi I thought, I mean, we thought less, I suppose, than ourselves. What is 
going to happen to us? Presuming some one is going to stab us, kill us. Who has killed? The whole 
thing was, who can it be? And it always came down, it must be a Muslim, it might be a Muslim, it 
must be a Muslim, it might be a Muslim, that’s all. It must be a Muslim.96 
  
And though Mehdi describes himself as a person who did not believe in communal 
division, in essential differences between Hindus and Muslims, who associated with a 
mixed group of Leftists, Socialists and Communists who had disavowed these labels, he 
said, “as we heard this news that a fanatic Hindu has killed Gandhi… I mean, just 
imagine!  We, who did not believe in this nonsense of Hindus and Muslims, when we 
heard that a Hindu had killed Gandhi, we felt relieved, that at least a Muslim has not 
killed Gandhi.”97 A lone potentially Muslim assassin became a metonym for the whole 
community and for a few tense hours, S.M. Mehdi’s identity was reduced to only one 
aspect: his Muslimness. He, who put no stock in communal identity politics, found 
himself comforted by the knowledge that the assassin had been from the majority 
community. This episode betrays a serious disruption in the social fabric of Mehdi’s 
chosen community. Though he normally would not identify as a Muslim first—preferring 
the less parochial veil of his political identity—the communalization of Indian life 
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created by the partition determined his reaction to the tragedy of Gandhi’s assassination 
and he knew it would similarly determine the reaction of others towards him.98  
 In other places, too, the possibility of a Muslim assassin kept Muslims off the 
streets in fear of reprisal.  The small group of Hindu conspirators responsible for 
Gandhi’s death did not occupy the same metonymic space, for their disloyalty was 
transparently exceptional. Rather than being identified as a Hindu conspirator, Gandhi’s 
assassin was identified as a member of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and any 
retributive actions were directed at that small, right wing political party. Two narrators 
describe anti-RSS sentiment in the wake of the assassination. Irfan Habib recalled that as 
Aligarh students marched towards the city, “There were communists also demanding 
execution of RSS leaders. ‘Hindu Sabha, nehin!’ (No to the Hindu Party!) “RSS and 
Hindu Sabha, Phansi Do! Phansi Do!’ (Catch the RSS! Hang the Hindu Party!) I forget 
the title, the slogans.”99 And Iqtidar Alam Khan recalled that RSS members were targeted 
and offices attacked in “a nationalist frenzy in which everyone was hating RSS like 
anything.”100 These memories are the exceptions, in that most narrators do not associate 
the aftermath of Gandhi’s assassination with anti-RSS violence; they clearly remember 
the threat of anti-Muslim violence, for as Irfan Habib remarked, “Of course, Hindus are 
not marked out.” The politics of partition essentialized identities and at Aligarh this 
process was magnified by the symbolic separation that already existed between the 
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university and the town. The procession that Professor Mohammad Habib led towards the 
town was intended as a show of solidarity, or possibly a show of force, once Muslim 
innocence had been established. Habib’s memory of anti-RSS slogans raised at this event 
is particularly telling. It was a rare opportunity for Muslims to demonstrate their loyalty 
by critiquing the exclusionary politics of the RSS, an anti-Muslim organization.  
 In the aftermath of the assassination, the 1948 issue of the Aligarh Magazine 
opened with a photo of Mohandas K. Gandhi in his funeral shroud. The still face of 
India’s fallen leader appearing there marks a significant shift in the university’s outlook, 
the composition of the editorial board of the Magazine and an explicit sign that the events 
of 1947 and ’48 had exerted their power on Aligarh’s environment, despite its distance 
from the newly drawn borders. A panegyric essay “In Memoriam” served as a memorial 
to the life of Mahatma Gandhi and as a call Aligarh’s students to “pledge ourselves anew 
to uphold steadfastly, by exercising a strenuous moral discipline and working incessantly 
for a just social and economic order, the ideals of universal human brotherhood and peace 
for which he lived so single-mindedly and laid down his life so heroically.”101 Whereas 
throughout the 1940s, both the Aligarh Magazine and the Aligarh University Gazette 
treated Gandhi as the representative of a Hindu parochial movement that threatened 
Muslims, his appearance in the Magazine as a national hero and a friend to the Muslims 
signals a re-orientation of Aligarh’s outlook in an effort to fit into the secular Indian state.  
 This issue of the Aligarh Magazine is a particularly clear and poignant example of 
the shifts in outlook and orientation that were taking place in Aligarh in 1948 as it sought 
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to establish itself as a nationalist institution and to excise the history of Muslim League 
domination there since 1940.102 In a coincidence of timing and publishing, the issue also 
contains a much less prominent lament on the death of Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad, the 
former Vice Chancellor of the institution, who passed away in London in December 
1947. Ziauddin had been one of the Pakistan partisans who facilitated the Muslim 
League’s political organizing on the campus. When, however, it became manifest to him 
that Pakistan would be a separate state, of which Aligarh would not be a part, he 
withdrew institutional support for the movement, leading the students to forcibly oust 
him from his position of leadership. The transition that is marked in the Magazine 
between the League period and a new nationalist period is well captured by the laments 
for both Gandhi and Ziauddin.  
 The nationalist perspective is buttressed, in the same issue, by the publication of 
the 1948 Aligarh Convocation speech delivered by Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru only six days before Gandhi’s death. Nehru’s speech addresses the challenge that 
AMU faced as a result of its recent political orientation, but he magnanimously invited 
the university and its students to find solidarity of feeling with other Indians even as he 
reminded them that  
all of us have to be clear about our basic allegiance to certain ideas. Do we believe in a national 
state which includes people of all religions and shades of opinion and is essentially secular as a 
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state, or do we believe in the religious theocratic conception of a state which considers people of 
other faiths as something beyond the pole? [sic; read: pale].103 
  
Thus even as Nehru made a point to make Aligarh students feel welcome as Indian 
citizens, he acknowledged the pull of Pakistan. Pakistan’s allure continued to affect the 
students for many years (some say until 1965) but officially, the institution began its 
about-face in 1948, and by 1949, when the arrival of Zakir Husain as Vice Chancellor 
was announced in the Aligarh Magazine, its official transformation was complete.104 For 
the students, however, January 1948 provided a terrifying reminder of what was at stake 
as they took on the responsibilities of citizenship.105 
 Gandhi’s assassination is tied to partition in that it forced Muslims to recognize 
the precariousness of their position in independent India. Whereas S.M. Mehdi described 
the anxiety caused by the reduction of his identity to his “Muslimness” for a few tense 
hours, partition reduced the identity of Muslims to their “Muslimness” for decades, and 
Aligarh Muslims were among the most easily identifiable.106 It is this kind of disruption, 
the disruption in the continuity of people’s sense of identity, that has frequently been 
overlooked in studies of partition. Mehdi was not a victim of violence, but his worldview, 
and his ability to move freely were severely disrupted by partition’s outcomes.  
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 Ather Siddiqi suggested that time would heal the wounds partition opened, but he 
referred to two other instances when Muslims felt especially threatened, merely for being 
Muslims and as an entire community: in the aftermath of the assassinations of both 
Mahatma Gandhi and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.  It is quite telling that it was the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 that drew scholars’ attention to partition and its 
violence, as they sought to understand how deeply the communal division reached in 
India after 1947.107 The assassination of Indira Gandhi exposed links between the past 
and the present that spurred scholars to explore 1947 in new ways, but these narratives 
point to the continuity between 1947 and later instances when minority communities felt 
essentialized. For Muslims, these might include the Babri Masjid demolition in 1992, the 
2002 Gujarat pogroms, and the spate of bombings of Muslim targets for which Muslims 
were held responsible (Samjhota Express, Mecca Masjid, etc.). The periodic repetition of 
events like this, that point to the discomfort of Muslim citizenship in India, establish a 
long thread of continuity that shows the importance of partition’s disruptions beyond the 
border areas.  
 Those Muslims in India who describe their fear repeatedly enact the role of the 
threatened minority, the very identity that Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League 
demand for Pakistan sought to displace with the language of the Muslim Nation. As I 
argue in the next chapters, it is impossible and unwise to ignore the outcomes of partition 
when considering the experience of South Asian Muslims after 1947, for the partition of 
                                                
107 Butalia, The Other Side of Silence, Menon and Bhasin, Borders and Boundaries, Pandey, Remembering 
Partition. 
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India was a paradoxical outcome of the Pakistan movement that reduced the power of the 
Muslim minority in India precipitously, rather than fortifying the solidarity that gave the 
movement its power. 
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Chapter 5 
The Muslim Question After Partition in India 
 
On January 15, 2011 India’s Tehelka Magazine published an article on several 
rounds of bombings that had targeted Muslims from 2006 to 2008. These blasts had 
earned notoriety in India and many Muslims, members of “radical organizations” were 
rounded up and charged with committing the crimes.1 Ashish Khetan argues in Tehelka 
that “since the first horrific blasts in Mumbai in 1992, there has been an automatic and 
damaging perception amongst most Indians that there is a Muslim hand behind every 
terror blast” and that this bias has been shared by the security forces who were quick to 
look for Muslim rather than actual perpetrators. Khetan’s article, “In the Words of a 
Zealot…” builds the case against this assumption. As he points out, over the last several 
years, further investigations have begun to break down the artifice of this discriminatory 
assumption, and have revealed radical Hindutva activists hiding behind it. Based on the 
leaked confession of Swami Aseemanand, the article illuminates the real culprits behind 
these infamous blasts, and suspicion now falls on activists throughout the RSS hierarchy, 
right to its highest ranks. Swami Aseemanand admitted to helping to conceive of the 
blasts and to identify targets though the blasts themselves were organized and executed 
                                                
1 Perhaps the most egregious example of this was the “Batla House Encounter” in which students from 
Jamia Millia Islamia were picked up on suspicion of having exploded bombs in crowded sections of New 
Delhi in September 2008. 
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by others. Significantly, Aseemanand also identified other potential targets, including the 
Aligarh Muslim University.2 
 Aseemanand’s confession sparked enough concern at Aligarh that it prompted a 
request for additional security,3 perhaps a reasonable request considering the fact that 
most of the other targets had already been hit: Malegaon, Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad), the 
Ajmer Dargah.4 While certainly the actions of a right-wing religious zealot should not be 
taken as the perspective of the majority, Aseemanand’s confession raises a significant 
concern relevant to this study. All of the targets were selected to injure Muslims and two 
of the targets: Hyderabad and the Aligarh University, were selected because of their 
perceived connections to Pakistan. The persistence of suspicion of the motives of 
Muslims broadly and Aligarians specifically is remarkable when since 1947 Muslim 
intellectuals have worked tirelessly to undo this perception. I have tried to show why I 
believe that this assumption of disloyalty was founded on faulty assumptions about the 
motives of Aligarh’s students with regard to their participation in the Pakistan movement. 
But the larger question relevant to independent India persists here, as Gyan Pandey so 
aptly put it, “Can a Muslim Be an Indian?”5 This question has vexed the issue of 
citizenship for Muslims in the ostensibly secular Indian state. Pandey has shown that the 
creation of Pakistan, which may have appeared as a solution to the Muslim Question by 
                                                
2 Ashish Khetan, "In the Words of a Zealot," Tehelka December 15, 2010. 
3 Lalmani Verma, "After Aseemanand's Confession, A.M.U. Wants More Security," Indian Express 
January 12, 2011. 
4 At a time of external threat, it should be noted here, the Aligarh Vice Chancellor turned immediately to 
the civil authorities for protection.  
5 Gyanendra Pandey, "Can a Muslim Be an Indian?," Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 4 
(October 1999). 
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granting political autonomy to Muslim constituencies in fact, because of the rigidity of 
the final territorial solution, confirmed political “difference” and fixed the notion of the 
“Muslim minority” even in “districts, cities, or towns where they were in a numerical 
majority.”6  The friability of this notion has had a profound impact on the status of the 
Indian Muslims today whose loyalty is now not questioned by the Queen—as in Hunter’s 
earlier query Are they Bound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen?—but by fellow 
citizens of a secular and independent India.7   
The history of the association of Indian Muslims—and in this case, particularly 
those attached to the Aligarh Muslim University—with the demand for Pakistan has 
permanently obscured their loyalty to the Indian state. The removal of so many Muslims 
to Pakistan created a whole new set of Muslim problems or Muslim questions.8  My 
research examines some of those questions by moving beyond the immediate territorial 
reality of independent India to look also at the subject of Muslims in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, where Muslims hold the power of the majority, but where they remain 
nonetheless plagued by questions about citizenship and belonging within the confines of 
the post-partition state. India provides an explosive example of the challenges of 
integration, and Aligarh University stands out as a powerful symbol of them, but 
Pakistan, too, continues to struggle with the insufficiency of its national narrative to 
create space for the many diverse ethnic, linguistic and regional groups that live within its 
                                                
6 Ibid.: 610. 
7 Najeeb Jung, "Why Should a Muslim Have to Wear His Nationalism on His Sleeve?," The Times of India 
February 20, 2010. 
8 Tan and Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, 8. 
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borders. The independence of Bangladesh exemplifies this struggle and I will examine 
the way that my Bengali informants makes sense of the transitions and challenges they 
faced during their drive for freedom.  
 It is worth noting, with regard to the Indian case, that, in recent years, the Indian 
reaction to Hindu- Muslim communal tension has undergone a significant transformation. 
Suspicions over the loyalty of Aligarh University have left it in shadow since partition 
when the university was cast as a partisan for a separatist demand for Pakistan, a weapons 
manufacturer or a factory for engineers destined for the neighboring state.9 However, 
since the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the ten years of periodic riots that 
overwhelmingly targeted Muslims, the Indian public has in large measure come to 
recognize the threat under which Muslims live in daily life. The explosions of hatred 
typified by the violence surrounding the Babri Masjid destruction, and the Gujarat 
pogroms of 2002, embarrassed and shocked many Indians who, by and large, take the 
question of secularism very seriously. Still, as scholar Omar Khalidi has shown, “in every 
riot since independence, no matter when or where, or how the riots take place, no matter 
who starts the riots, in the end the victims are mainly Muslims, whether in numbers of 
people killed, wounded or arrested.”10 As the tale of Swami Aseemanand shows, 
                                                
9 Omar Khalidi reports that Vallabhbhai Patel labeled Maulana Azad’s Education Ministry, staffed by 
Muslims including K.G. Saiyidain, as a “miniature Pakistan.” Khalidi, Muslims in Indian Economy, 39. 
Hasan, "Masood Ul Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 1, 2009.", Khan, "Zakir Ali Khan: 
Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 10, 2006." Hamid, "Sayyid Hamid: Personal Interview with 
Amber Abbas October 29, 2009." Sayyid Hamid was born in Faizabad near Lucknow in 1920. He attended 
Aligarh University 1937 to 1942, as a student, and later joined the Indian Administrative Service in 1943. 
In 1980 he was appointed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to serve as Vice Chancellor of AMU where he 
remained until 1985. He is currently Chancellor of Jamia Hamdard University in New Delhi. 
10 Khalidi, Indian Muslims since Independence, 17. 
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Muslims are vulnerable not only as the targets in riots and pogroms, but are seen 
simultaneously as potential, even likely, perpetrators of violence. This suspicion remains 
directly linked to the suspect loyalty of Muslims of which Pakistan serves as a constant 
reminder.11 
 This dissertation has argued for a reevaluation of the politics and experiences of 
partition so as to challenge the hegemony of state narratives of origin and belonging. I 
have argued that the specter of Pakistan, and the persistent awareness of the outcome of 
the freedom movement and demand for Pakistan, has obscured our ability to examine the 
many meanings of the movements themselves. After partition, the lens of nationalism has 
deepened many of the pre-partition conflicts. The identity politics that contributed to the 
polarizing of Hindus and Muslims continue to be relevant today. The independence of 
Pakistan has raised “Muslim Questions” all over South Asia relating not only to Muslim 
belonging in non-Muslim majority states like India, but also about how comfortably 
Muslims might live alongside one another and non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh.  
This chapter and the next will examine the challenges of belonging in British 
India’s successor states to show the influence of state narratives on perceptions about 
belonging. The narratives of the nationalist movements in India—whether the “composite 
culture” narrative of Congress or the Two Nation Theory of the Muslim League—sought 
to create a broadly homogenous identity within the state they demanded from the British. 
While the “composite culture” narrative appears broadly inclusive, it is an assimilationist 
                                                
11 Patel, "For a United India." 
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narrative that ultimately obscures and devalues difference. The Two Nation Theory, on 
the other hand, while it posited a fundamental difference between Hindus and Muslims, 
suggested that all Muslims were united by their common faith and similarly obscured the 
diversity of India’s Muslim communities in favor of an elite, faith driven narrative of 
solidarity. In the face of these state narratives that manipulate the identities of citizens 
with their obscurantist tendencies, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have witnessed ethnic 
or linguistic supremacy movements by the Majority that target the Minorit(ies). These 
reactionary movements seek to shore up majority identity against that of the minority, as 
Gyan Pandey has exposed in his 1999 essay.12  
In the face of both the influence of state narratives, and the backlash of ethnic or 
linguistic supremacist movements, my objective here is to examine the experiences of 
Aligarians and other citizens of all the post-partition states. Here, Aligarians are 
representative of the larger Muslim minority in India. For though they are set arpart by 
class and education, the perception that the institution is somehow linked inexorably to 
Pakistan has mitigated the differences of class and means that Aligarh Muslims both 
identify and are identified as part of an embattled minority. In the Muslim minority states, 
Aligarians are tied to assimilationist narratives that have the potential to oppress other 
minorities. Therefore, their position can be seen as both exceptional and unexceptional. 
How can we understand their attachment to certain state narratives, or narratives that 
resist the state’s definition of the citizen? Aligarians have been involved in large and 
small ways in the establishment of all three states, and their experiences and perspectives 
                                                
12 Pandey, "Can a Muslim Be an Indian?." 
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cast some light on these contestations over belonging. They take on different positions 
depending on their vantage point, and each individual’s experience of partition and 
independence inevitably shapes his experience. These chapters examine the interplay 
between Aligarians’ engagement with the politics of independence for India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, the influence of state narratives and homogenizing narratives of belonging. 
There is not one story here, there are many stories of discrimination, assimilation, 
acceptance, resistance and cooperation that illuminate partition’s multiple realities. The 
disputes over identity and belonging that made partition seem necessary created a 
complex web of identities that Aligarians and South Asians more broadly continue to 
negotiate.  
It is important to realize that as partition slips further into the past, it continues to 
have a transformative effect on the way people perceive themselves as citizens of states. 
The renegotiations over political space that are taking place in all three countries are the 
evidence of partition’s continuing influence. It would be folly to try to isolate 
contemporary politics of hatred from the narratives of inclusion and exclusion that 
predominated during the movements for Indian independence and Pakistan when 
narratives of unity were constructed to politicize loosely linked groups in pursuit of a 
particular agenda. Likewise, regional and ethnic identities can still be mobilized in order 
to secure political space in the face of the homogenizing narrative of the state. Narratives 
that proclaim a space of unity for those with shared characteristics (as distinct from 
priorities): ethnic, religious, linguistic or national are mirrored by narratives of exclusion 
 244 
that define who cannot be included. These narratives are interwoven parts of the larger 
fabric of South Asian identity. To understand them, we must see how they are connected.  
 
Subaltern Historian Gyanendra Pandey has shown the importance of these 
narratives in the construction of national identities in India in his article “Can a Muslim 
Be an Indian?”13  He argues that the construction of the mainstream and the minority are 
fundamental characteristics of defining the nation. The consequences of this process 
permanently complicate the position of Indian Muslims; the state cannot see them merely 
as citizens, but always as “Muslim” citizens.  This is a holdover from the nationalist 
period when all Muslims were marked by their membership in a minority religious 
category, whether they were political or not.  Nationalist Muslims supported Congress 
and its composite nationalism- but their designation as such implicitly marked other 
Muslims as “not” nationalist, and thus subject to suspicion.  Implied in the placement of 
that qualifier is the idea that Muslims can never be truly loyal, because their history is not 
rooted in Indian soil—this differentiates them from other minorities including Sikhs and 
Jains—and therefore Muslims cannot be considered “natural” citizens.14  In his 
examination of the “foreignness” of Islam within the Indian nationalist narrative, Pandey 
builds on Partha Chatterjee’s argument in The Nation and Its Fragments that the 
construction of the Indian nation has reified a “singular” history for India: the history of 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.: 621. Vazira Zamindar’s The Long Partition reveals the particular vulnerability of Muslims in the 
post-partition state. Whereas Jews who migrated to Israel in the early 1950s were allowed to return to India, 
Muslims who migrated to Pakistan around the same time but sought to return were denied re-rentry. 
Zamindar, The Long Partition. Irfan Habib, too, noted that “Hindus are not marked out.” Habib, "Irfan 
Habib: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 28, 2009." 
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Hindu civilization.15  Hindus, unlike Muslims, are not constituents of the nation; they are 
the nation.16 The centering of Hindus as the heart of the Indian nation positions all 
minorities as exceptions, and the Muslims are additionally problematic because of their 
own claim to exceptionalism, negatively represented by the Pakistan demand.  
 
THE MUSLIM CASE IN INDIA 
Recent examinations have shown the results of Muslim marginalization in terms 
of poverty, employment and other human development indices. The 2006 Sachar 
Committee Report provides the most current evidence showing that Muslims throughout 
the social hierarchy in India lag in a variety of Human Development Indices.17 They are 
less educated, less wealthy, and less secure than others in similar positions. In some 
cases, this was true before partition though revisionist history has, to some extent, 
disproven the assumption, originally fronted by Sir Sayyid, that Muslims were backward 
relative to Hindus, particularly in education.18 The Hunter Report, published in 1871, 
stimulated this assumption because Hunter, though his research had only covered some 
portions of Bengal, was less than clear about the implications of his study for Indian 
Muslims overall.  
Hunter’s report provided an “objective” foundation for a “narrative of decline” 
that guided Muslim reformist thinking through the late nineteenth-century and beyond, 
                                                
15 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Princeton Studies 
in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
16 Pandey, "Can a Muslim Be an Indian?," 624. 
17 Sachar, "The Sachar Committee Report," 2. 
18 Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism. Sachar, "The Sachar Committee Report." Khalidi, Indian 
Muslims since Independence. 
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exemplified by the educational philosophy of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. While more 
recent research has argued against the factual veracity of Hunter’s argument, it remained 
broadly persuasive amongst educated Muslims as an impetus for educational reform and 
helped to generate support for the Aligarh Movement. Paul Brass argues that though the 
statistics Hunter deployed did indicate a measure of Muslim deprivation in Bengal, it is 
the irony of the Muslim nationalist movement that educational reform was mobilized 
intensely in the United Provinces, where the conditions that Hunter describes were 
largely inapplicable.19 Brass draws attention to two contradictory arguments used by the 
Muslim League in service of national mobilization: a) that Muslims were backward and 
b) that Muslims had a historical link to power and prestige that qualified them for 
disproportionate representation in positions of power.20 I argue that the complementarity 
of these two arguments gave them power. In combination, these two powerful myths: of 
deprivation and decline as the result of alienation from power, became the basis of a 
Muslim awakening that mobilized “Muslim national will for a competitive coexistence in 
the future.”21 It established a precedent for Muslim power and facilitated a desire to 
recover it. This desire, I have argued, lies at the heart of the Pakistan movement. 
Omar Khalidi argues that “Muslims had generally caught up with other groups in 
education in most provinces of the country by the 1940s.”22 The Sachar Committee 
Report confirms that at the time of independence the gap in graduation rates between 
                                                
19 Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, 121. 
20 Ibid., 170. 
21 Khalidi, Indian Muslims since Independence, 108. 
22 Ibid. 
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Muslims and All Others was relatively low. However, since that time, and especially 
since 1970, the gap has widened markedly and unemployment among Muslim graduates 
is higher than that of any other group.23 It is a tremendous irony of partition that the myth 
of decline that Brass criticizes became reality after 1947. The post-independence reports 
on Muslim achievement that incorporate recommendations for reform by the government, 
reveal that Muslims lag in achievement, and that other marginal groups, including Dalits, 
have reached higher levels of achievement, despite starting from a lower position.  
The “perception of decline” that emerged in the wake of the 1857 uprising, fueled 
by W.W. Hunter’s murky theorizing, and picked up by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan with 
dramatic results, became, in the years after partition, an actual fact of “relative 
deprivation.”24 The Sachar Committee Report lays bare the suspicions and obstacles in 
the way of Muslim success. Underlying communal tensions have created an environment 
where Muslims are seen as likely perpetrators in a variety of violent or illegal acts from 
petty crime to terrorism and whereas they are underrepresented in the professions, they 
are overrepresented relative to their population in jails.25 Though a variety of reports have 
been commissioned by the government to examine the problem of Muslim achievement, 
few have had any impact on government policy and many have barely seen the light of 
day.26 As a rule, the government has largely ignored the recommendations of these 
                                                
23 Sachar, "The Sachar Committee Report," 67. Employment Statistics, 74. 
24 Ibid., 84. 
25 17.6% of convicted prison inmates are Muslim according to the 2008 National Crime Records Bureau 
Report. The ten year average is 17.53%. "Prison Statistics India 2008," (New Delhi: National Crime 
Records Bureau, 2008). 
26 Khalidi critiques the government’s transparency when he shows that since 1996 annual reports of the 
National Minorities Commission have not been made publicly available. He attributes this to the fact that 
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various committees, and official efforts to improve the conditions of Muslims have not 
led to measurable improvement. In the halls of parliament, Muslims become material 
during campaigns when candidates seek their support as a voting bank.  Separate 
electorates were established in 1909 and indicated a shift towards a measure of Muslim 
sovereignty in voting. However, as a result of the perception that separate representation 
was intimately linked to the separatist politics that resulted in partition, separate 
electorates were abolished in India in 1949. 27 Still, this has not prevented politicians 
from recruiting Muslims en masse based on (later forgotten) appeals to their needs. 
Muslims are, in effect, treated electorally as a special constituency defined by shared 
interests, but separate from other groups that might have broadly similar needs. 
Omar Khailidi has shown—in two books that focus on the experience of Indian 
Muslims after independence, and one that specifically treats the role of security forces in 
the management of ethnic violence—that the position of Muslims is closely linked to the 
migrations of partition and their symbolic value in the context of Indian and Pakistani 
statehood. This is important for a variety of reasons. First, it is significant with relation to 
how Muslims see themselves, particularly in those areas from which there was a high 
                                                                                                                                            
the reports must be presented in the Lok Sabha alongside an Action Taken Report. He also reveals that 
other government-sponsored reports have languished for years (like the Gopal Singh Panel Report 
commissioned in 1983 that was not presented in parliament until 1990) before being presented in 
parliament. Khalidi, Muslims in Indian Economy, 5-6. 
27 Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 109. See pages 108-122 for Wilkinson’s discussion of the abolition of 
Muslim electorates, against the veto of the few remaining Muslim League politicians. Begum Aizaz Rasul, 
apparently at the urging of Congress’ Maulana Azad, Sardar Patel and K.M. Munshi, spoke only hesitantly 
in favor of the abolition with the logic that as “an integral part of the Indian nation” (121) Muslims should 
participate in the general electorate. For an assessment of Congress’ failure to fulfill commitments to 
Aligarh see also "A Wasted Generation at Aligarh" in Khurshid, At Home in India: A Restatement of Indian 
Muslims, 57-65. 
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level of migration including UP, Bihar, West Bengal and Central India.28 Second, the 
migrations of partition served to remake local environments, to expose the raw wires of 
communal sensitivity and to provide the current running through them. The changes 
wrought by partition continue to influence day-to-day relations between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in mixed neighborhoods and have shaped perceptions about Indian identity 
in both communities. As Omar Khalidi has shown, riots tend to occur in neighborhoods 
where Hindus and Muslim live alongside one another, and tend to be marked by anxiety 
over Muslim economic advance.29 This outcome reveals a persistent tension about 
belonging that reminds Muslims that their place in society is bounded, conditioned by 
Hindu tolerance (or lack therof).  
Paul Brass has examined the continuity between partition’s migrations and the 
production of contemporary anti-Muslim violence; his research shows that the legacies of 
partition are significant for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  For example, in some cities 
in Uttar Pradesh he reports, (and I can attest from my own experience), Muslim localities 
are called “Pakistan” despite the choice of the residents not to migrate. These “mini-
Pakistans,” found in otherwise non-Muslim cities and towns, including Aligarh, serve to 
remind Hindus of the potentially traitorous population in their midst, and are used to 
justify violence against Muslims.30 Whereas it is necessary to separate the outcome of 
Pakistan from our study of pre-partition politics, it is impossible to separate it from any 
examination of Muslims post- partition. As Pandey and others have shown, partition 
                                                
28 Khalidi, Indian Muslims since Independence, 114. 
29 Ibid., 21-23. 
30 Brass, Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, 36-37.  
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remade the nation in such a way that Muslims were pushed to the margins. The question 
of how they function there is the subject of this investigation.  
In Muslim localities and communities, Muslims’ sense of their own identity, as 
well as in many cases their actual social status, is bound up with the actions of those 
Muslims who departed. This perception is exemplified by the oft-heard argument that 
Muslims occupy a lower social status because all of the educated Muslims left for 
Pakistan.31 Even after the 1947 partition, the employment opportunities in Pakistan 
continued to exert a powerful pull in Aligarh, especially for engineers. Khalidi shows, 
further, that UP and Bihar—two states heavily represented among the student body in 
Aligarh—remain the most educationally “sluggish” states in India six decades after 
partition.   
The real effect of partition’s migrations in terms of local environments in this 
case, was the “loss of leadership.” Another Muslim commentator, Salman Khurshid,32 
observes the effects of partition’s brain drain in “the seemingly inexplicable poverty of 
social and political leadership.”33 The issue of loss of leadership is especially important 
with relation to political power. Partition’s migrations reduced the voting bloc of 
Muslims from approximately 25% of the population to more like 10%.34 This represents 
                                                
31 Habib, "Irfan Habib: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 28, 2009.", Siddiqi, "Professor Ather 
Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 11, 2009." 
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33 Khurshid, At Home in India: A Restatement of Indian Muslims, 21. 
34 In 1961, well after the major Partition-linked migration had ended, India's Muslim population was 
enumerated at 47 million, about 10% of the total population of 439 million. Sachar, "The Sachar 
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clearly a far less powerful bloc overall, and has created a sense of powerlessness within 
the Muslim community combined with a terrible resentment for those Pakistanis that one 
Muslim in Aligarh called “cheaters” who betrayed their Indian brethren.35  
The narrators at the heart of my study in India, have, overall, an ambivalent 
relationship to the question of the position of Muslim Indians.  Their first point of 
reference is the university itself. For example, their assessment of the university’s plight 
after partition is mired in a perception of decline. First and foremost, Aligarians of an 
older generation complain about the decline in status of Aligarh students. This is not 
expressed as a communal or sectarian concern—rather, it is the decline in the status of the 
Muslim students themselves that these narrators find troubling. “Previously,” a number of 
narrators suggested to me, “Only boys from good families were admitted. Now, the son 
of every shopkeeper and pan-wallah can come to Aligarh.” This complaint is of course 
linked to the migration of so many of those “good families” from the hinterlands of UP to 
the ostensible homeland of Pakistan.36 There is a palpable sense of loss in this community 
for the cultural elite, the educated class who departed. While few of these narrators would 
concede a desire to migrate themselves, and have, as such, aggressively embraced the 
identity of Indian citizenship, even looking across the border with frustration and often 
pity, they also attribute some of the difficulties that Indian Muslims have faced to the 
                                                                                                                                            
Committee Report," 28. The most recent census data, from 2001, places the Indian Muslim Minority at 
approximately 13.4% of the population. http://www.censusindia.gov.in 
35 This assessment came from an informal exchange with an Aligarh graduate who has family in Pakistan. 
36 This argument, too, complicates the perception (outlined in the previous chapter) that only students from 
“Pakistan areas” remained in Pakistan, and that no one from Uttar Pradesh “migrated” there. 
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departure of their co-religionists.37 Though many of the narrators with whom I spoke 
come from divided families, meaning that they have relatives in Pakistan, they compare 
their own experience and achievement to that of their family and friends on the other 
side.  
In fact, this tendency exists on both sides of the border, further reinforcing the 
idea that the self is defined, at least in part, by difference. Relative to non-Muslims, 
Indian Muslims may have a qualitatively different experience, lagging behind in 
observable indices.  Though my informants largely come from the upper and middle 
classes, they consider themselves to be exceptional and speak of the larger Muslim public 
when they speak of decline. However, in comparison to Pakistani Muslims, Indian 
Muslims consider themselves better off or are aggressively critical of those in the 
neighboring country, and with the intention of proving their success, sometimes use the 
examples of the exceptional to define the rule.  
Consider, for example, Zakiya Siddiqi’s critique of her husband’s family in 
Pakistan, who she considered to be unnecessarily materialistic, “I used to go there my 
mother-in-law used to say, ‘Put on some jewelry,’ and this and that. And people would 
recognize me, ‘Oh! She has come from India!  Look at that.  Poor India!’” 38 While at 
                                                
37 Ather Siddiqi told me that his parents took his sister to Pakistan in 1965 because it was too difficult to 
find a good “match” for their daughter in India as so many of the “good families” had migrated to Pakistan. 
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38 Zakiya Siddiqi, "Professor Zakiya Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas December 9, 
2009," (Aligarh: December 9, 2009). In a written memoir, Hayatullah Ansari, a former resident of Aftab 
Hostel in the late 1930s remembered his friend Akhtar Raepuri, a Communist who “later changed his road. 
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first glance, this may seem an innocuous difference in preference, Siddiqi uses it to show 
the fundamental corruption of society in Pakistan. Whereas, she indicates, modesty and 
simplicity are considered to be the values of Aligarh, or even Indian Muslims, Pakistan’s 
culture is showy, shallow and materialistic. This is not fundamentally attached to any 
concept of place in her mind. Rather, she clarified, that those in Pakistan have undergone 
a substantive change. “Even those people who migrated from India to Pakistan, their 
value system has changed.”39 Many Indian Muslims deride Pakistani migrants as 
“opportunists” and this critique is at the heart of the perception that their values have 
changed. In this conception, Indian Muslims have made the best with the resources 
available to them, their quietism is a virtue. 
Masood ul Hasan similarly links the presence of Pakistan with a betrayal of 
Aligarh’s values. Speaking of Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, an Aligarh Old Boy, Muslim 
League leader, and author of a comprehensive biography Pathway to Pakistan, Hasan 
calls him a “mean-minded man.” Hasan describes Khaliquzzaman’s abrupt departure for 
Pakistan as “stabbing us in the back!”40 Hasan acknowledges that Khaliquzzaman had 
been “our” leader, by which he means not only the Muslim League’s leader, but 
Aligarh’s own leader. Whereas Hasan refuses to criticize Jinnah, a League man but 
ostensibly an Aligarh outsider,41 his continued anger at Khaliquzzaman seems rooted in 
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different.” Hayatullah Ansari, "Mera Aftab Hall," The Aftab The Aftab Memoirs Special (1976). 
39 Siddiqi, "Professor Zakiya Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas December 9, 2009." 
40 Hasan, "Masood Ul Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 1, 2009." 
41 Only to narrators in India. Pakistani narrators make an effort to portray him as an “insider,” emphasizing 
his many visits to Aligarh during the 1940s. In a 2006 interview General Ghulam Umar intimated a direct 
link between Aligarh and Jinnah by placing Mohammad Ali Jauhar and the Khilafat Movement leadership 
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the same kind of betrayal of values that Zakiya Siddiqi describes above. Departure for 
Pakistan appears then not just as the pursuance of choice, or self-fulfilment, or even the 
culmination of the League’s avowed policy, it is a personal and particular betrayal of 
Aligarh’s values that reveals the corruption of Pakistan’s partisans and separates Pakistan 
in its reality from India. This is, at worst, a betrayal of the Pakistan ideal that the students 
had pursued aggressively during the 1940s. They had worked to build and sustain an idea 
of Muslim solidarity, based on the values they had learned at Aligarh, and to spread this 
idea throughout the hinterlands. The creation of Pakistan as a separate and sovereign 
state, however, appears to them as a betrayal of this ideal. Rather than serving to unite 
India’s Muslims, Pakistan has permanently divided them. 
Aamir Mufti has examined the question of values, and their influence on Muslim 
political acceptibility in an important 1995 article “Secularism and Minority: Elements of 
a Critique” in which he argues that those Nationalist Muslim Leaders who, like Maulana 
Kalam Azad fortified the Indian National Congress’ claim to inclusivity, represented 
“traditional” culture.42 This link to traditional culture reinforced the perception of 
Muslims as “non-modern” and provided a necessary contrast with the modernity of the 
Hindu nation thereby reinforcing the boundaries of that nation. While Nationalist Muslim 
leaders existed and remain, they always represent the minority, the part and not the 
                                                                                                                                            
between them. Jinnah neither attended Aligarh Muslim University nor supported the Khilafat Movement. 
However, General Umar easily incorporated him into Aligarh’s narrative by identifying him as the heir to 
the legacy of Muslim reform in the period after 1857. The link was further solidified by Jinnah’s 
commitment to the university and his belief that the young men educated there would go on to be leaders in 
Pakistan. Umar, "Major General Ghulam Umar (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas August 8, 
2006." See also Abbas, "Thinking through Partition: Finishing the Narrative (Unpublished Master's 
Thesis)." 
42 Aamir Mufti, "Secularism and Minority: Elements of a Critique," Social Text 45 (Winter 1995): 84. 
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whole. As Mufti articulates, “The minority is cast as a segment only, and becomes an 
undifferentiated staging ground for the traditional, the premodern, the underdeveloped, 
the archaic.”43 Mufti’s argument is useful, despite the attachment of Aligarh to its own 
“modernity.” Irfan Habib confirmed this when he spoke to me about the difference 
between Congress Muslims and Muslim League Muslims. In his estimation,  
most nationalist Muslims were religious—Hakim [Ajmal Khan]…Dr. [M.A.] Ansari. Here was 
also Tasadduq Sherwani. They were all religious… Muslim Leaguers were not religious to this 
degree. Jinnah was not; he couldn’t pray. They were mostly modern with a large proportion of 
people who were landlords. On the women’s question they were iffy, but they had on their 
Working Committee women who didn’t observe purdah. Jinnah’s sister didn’t observe purdah. 
Begum Aizaz Rasool didn’t. So on these issues, purdah and so on, they were fairly modern…They 
were in this sense “modern communalists” rather than religious jihadis.44 
  
Habib draws out a number of significant points here- perhaps most important is the 
identity he creates between the “Aligarh” identity of modernist Muslims and the 
“League” identity. Contrary to perceptions that the Pakistan Demand was driven by 
religious zeal, he shows that the Aligarh Muslims were largely ambivalent about the 
nature of their Muslim identity, preferring its cultural associations to the trappings of 
faith. Most of the former students who spoke with me described the fact that although 
there were expectations of religious observance, those students who performed them with 
sincere belief were in the minority. A shared religious identity was the baseline common 
attribute at Aligarh but few students expressed a sense of having been guided by 
questions of faith. 
Whereas Congress Muslims, as Mufti argues, held fast to notions of “traditional” 
Muslim identity, marked by religious observance, Aligarh Muslims were engaged in a 
                                                
43 Ibid.: 85. 
44 Habib, "Irfan Habib: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 28, 2009." 
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process of mixing Western and traditional values. Although many non-Muslim 
Congressites had been raised in this tradition, including Gandhi and Nehru, the party had 
begun to differentiate itself from “British” values and identity markers in the 1920s. 
Attachment to these markers, then, became associated with British loyalism, 
unacceptable in the context of the Congress demand for independence.45  
Within the context of India’s Muslims, the Aligarh University has represented a 
progressive strain since its inception. Even Habib’s description of his own father shows 
how identity at Aligarh was far from static. He said, “My father was a curious man: a 
devout believer in God, and his Prophet, even more devoted than Prophet to Gandhiji, 
and very well read in Marxism.” 46 However, in the context of the trajectory of the Indian 
state and the non-Muslim public, Aligarh appeared non-modern: ambivalently anti-
imperialist and archaically communal.  
The question of “communal identity” within Aligarh, however, as I have shown 
earlier is key to the institution’s own identity—that is, it defines itself by the absence of 
communalism within the university. Thus Aligarians in India critique the communal 
identity of Pakistan and express pity for the experience of Muslims there. Saeeda Kidwai, 
the first female student to attend the Aligarh Muslim University for post-graduate classes 
in Geography lamented (in Urdu) the situation in Pakistan.  
                                                
45 Partha Chatterjee’s discussion also points out the Indian National Congress appropriation of “traditional” 
cultural features from Hindu/Indian society that were seen as anti-colonial. He argues that it is in the “so-
called ‘spiritual’ domain” that “nationalism launches its most powerful, creative, and historically 
significant project: to fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western. If the nation is 
an imagined community, then this is where it is brought into being. In this, its true and essential domain, 
the nation is already sovereign, even when the state is in the hands of the colonial power.” Chatterjee, The 
Nation and Its Fragments, 6. 
46 Habib, "Irfan Habib: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 28, 2009." 
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What happens in Pakistan is such a terrible thing that Muslims are killing Muslims and destroying 
mosques. It is such a shameful thing. Here, if a Hindu kills, what is the complaint of the Muslim? 
Those people should complain because brother is killing brother. And in mosques!...On Fridays 
when more people come to the mosque. Boys also come, the younger generation also comes. Old 
people also come. If in Hindustan a mosque is destroyed look what a ruckus it creates!47 
  
Kidwai is referring here to the destruction of the Babri Mosque in 1992, and the massive 
impact that episode had on communal relations in India. She contrasts this with the 
complacency she perceives in Pakistan and her disbelief that Muslim vs. Muslim violence 
is even possible there. What surprises here is the notion that Hindu-Muslim conflict 
draws Muslims together in solidarity, and others, too, speak out against the injustice of 
these attacks. In Pakistan, however, the violence is “unnatural,” it contravenes the logic 
of the state and the identity politics that brought it into being by associating allegiance to 
Islam and allegiance to the state. This situation is perplexing to Indian Muslims, and 
exemplifies the fundamental difference they see between their experience and the 
experience of Pakistanis. Although the place of Muslims in Indian society is sometimes 
uncertain, the bonds of solidarity that connect Muslims to one another in India remain 
strong.  
The Indian government reports commissioned to examine Muslim status confirm 
the suspicion of Muslim backwardness and communal attitudes, and the exceptions to the 
rule, India’s Muslim Presidents (Zakir Husain, Fakhruddin Ahmad, APJ Abdul Kalam) 
and Vice Presidents (Justice Mohammad Hidayatullah, Mohammad Hamid Ansari) serve 
to confirm India’s modernist commitment to secularism. That many of the Nationalist 
Muslims were educated at Aligarh, including Zakir Husain, the very picture of the 
                                                
47 Translated from Urdu by author. Kidwai, "Mrs. Saeeda Kidwai: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas: 
June 17, 2009." 
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modernist Muslim with his miniature beard and dapper attire, escapes the notice of those 
who would cast Indian Muslims as backward while using the success of a handful of 
Nationalist Muslims to prove India’s secular outlook. Observant or secular, traditional or 
modern, Indian Muslims are implicated in the nationalist project; the question arises in 
Mufti’s examination, “If ‘Muslim outright,’ then how can he be an Indian in the modern 
sense?” But the question of secularism seems overdetermined with regard to the Indian 
state, and untrustworthy in the case of Muslims. Thus though Salman Haider,48 Indian 
Foreign Secretary 1995-1997, selected “none” in the religion column on his Indian 
Foreign Service application, he continues to be seen as India’s first Muslim Foreign 
Secretary.49  
Another narrator, whose identity I have chosen to protect because his deliberate 
efforts to mask his past as a Muslim League activist while a student at Aligarh University 
reveals a real anxiety that this past might affect his reputation today, told me, in a 
moment of frankness, “Of course we are Muslims first, and Indians later… We are 
Muslims because we ARE Muslims and we are Indians because we live in India.  So our 
loyalty is there, but our faith is obviously centered in Islam.” His anxiety about his past is 
unsurprising considering this statement.50 This hints at the great fear of Indian 
nationalism, that Muslims see their Indian nationality as incidental, whereas their Muslim 
identity is primordial. Given the choice between defending the state and defending the 
                                                
48 Salman Haider is the grandson of Sheikh Abdullah, the founder of the Aligarh Women’s College. His 
father, Colonel Haider was an important influence on many young men at Aligarh during the 1940s, 
including Wajahat Husain, whose memories are included in this study.  
49 Khalidi, Muslims in Indian Economy, 48. 
50 Masood ul Hasan expressed a similar anxiety, cited in the previous chapter. 
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faith, which would they choose? This narrator flatly denied his involvement in Muslim 
League causes, but he told me, “I was regarded as a very good debater in the Student’s 
Union here.” As my research progressed, it became clear that during his tenure as a 
student (1940-1946), only those students who supported the League were given space to 
speak in the Union. Additional evidence confirmed my suspicions, including an article in 
the Aligarh Gazette that identified him as an enthusiastic League member. His persistent 
attitude that his attachment to his faith comes before his attachment to India suggests that 
he has never given up on the goal of Muslim solidarity. Perhaps it is his proximity to 
Aligarh, the theoretical hub of Indian Muslim solidarity, that has allowed him to hold fast 
to its promises, despite the fracturing presence of Pakistan. 
Indian Muslims, contrary to the outsider’s criticism of their non-nativity, become 
in this assessment, the preservers of truly Muslim, or truly “good” values and they link 
these directly to the Indian environment. While Muslims lament the departure of so many 
“good” families, leading to overall decline in Indian Muslim society, at the same time, 
those families who left are no longer “good” having been corrupted by their migration. 
Though from the same family, Zakiya Siddiqi determines that her in-laws have 
undergone a “change” which alienates them from herself. Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, an 
Aligarh insider and leader, betrayed those values when he abruptly left for Pakistan in 
November 1947, despite being the leader of the League in the Indian Parliament. Masood 
ul Hasan sought to reveal Khaliquzzaman’s inauthenticity or intrinsic “meanness” when 
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he raised the conditions of his departure in 1947. Pakistan represents “corruption” and 
“opportunism,” values he implied are not native in Aligarh.51 
Reversing the gaze, when Zakiya Siddiqi’s experience is viewed from the 
Pakistan side, her disinterest in showy jewelry or wealth appears as an indication of 
India’s poverty. In the hands of her in-laws, what she calls modesty appears to them as 
poverty, and serves to justify their migration choice. Major General Wajahat Husain, in 
considering the question of Indian Muslims, argued that the Muslims’ pre-partition fears 
about being excluded in the services have since come to pass in India. The “main point of 
discontentment” for Muslims in India, he told me, was the perception that “they would 
not get the same treatment that the British gave” once India became independent. And, he 
went on, “This is precisely what is happening now. There are more Muslims left in India 
than there are in Pakistan, but the conditions in which they are living, and the way they 
are treated and the unfairness that is meted out is what we expected would happen.”52 
Thus, the creation of Pakistan is justified by the fulfillment of Muslim anxieties about 
exclusion. This argument is troubling in its teleology, and it further deepens the sense of 
difference between Indian and Pakistani Muslims. There is a common argument for Indo-
Pak peace that argues that “Pakistanis and Indians are brothers” or sometimes “the same 
people” but these perspectives, touted by Muslims with a shared geographic, historical 
                                                
51 Certainly the available evidence belies this, as we have seen in earlier chapters. Aligarh’s environment 
was always riven with factionalism and opportunism. Sir Sayyid’s very goals in founding the institution 
were that Muslim boys should be well-educated and prepared to take advantage of the opportunities 
available to them. Hasan, "Masood Ul Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 1, 2009." 
52 Husain, "Major General Wajahat Husain (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas July 11, 2006." 
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and institutional heritage, suggest that the boundary that divided India and Pakistan also 
created a boundary between people. 
 
THE PRESENCE OF PAKISTAN 
The source of these anxieties can be understood on both sides of the border. 
While I have argued that support for the Pakistan movement did not necessarily imply a 
desire for independent statehood, and that we should avoid viewing pre-1947 sentiments 
and perspectives through the lens of Pakistan, the situation is drastically changed with 
regard to events and experiences involving Muslims throughout the subcontinent after 
1947. Now, I argue, it is critical to consider the influence of the reality of Pakistan—no 
longer an ethos, a theory, a persuasive and perhaps multiply (but not insufficiently53) 
imagined idea—for the presence of Pakistan exerts influence on the experiences of 
Muslims throughout the region. As Saeed Naqvi suggests,  “divergence of views on 
Partition conditioned differing attitudes towards Pakistan and consequently towards 
Indian Muslims.”54 Partition is a distorting lens through which Pakistani and Indian 
Muslims examine one another and through which they are viewed by others. Pakistan 
created expectations on all sides of the borders and it is the fulfillment or disappointment 
of these that conditions the perspectives recounted here. 
                                                
53 Salman Rushdie, Shame (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1983), Oldenburg, ""A Place Insufficiently 
Imagined:" Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971." See also Venkat’s Dhulipala’s forthcoming 
book Creating a New Medina. 
54 Naqvi, Reflections of an Indian Muslim, 14-15. 
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Masood ul Hasan pushed this point further for me, “What soured our relations? 
The bloodshed.”55 The bloodshed of partition made indelible the line that separated the 
two states. This line seemed arbitrary to many, and came with an expectation of 
permeability. It was never imagined as a permanent definition of identity but as one that 
would become “blurred”56 with time. Instead it was reified by partition violence.57 It now 
put a boundary not only between Muslim and non-Muslim Indians, but between Muslims 
in India and Pakistan. Pakistanis—almost by necessity—look back at India triumphant, 
taking solace in the perceived disadvantage of Indian Muslims, and the constant threat of 
violence under which they are believed to live. By contrast, Indian Muslims criticize the 
opportunism of those who migrated, those “cheaters,” and see the present political unrest-
- “Muslims killing Muslims!” while non-Muslims study peacefully in AMU58—as the 
vindication of their choice to stay in India. Saeed Naqvi’s argument to this end is based 
on the premise that the Muslim who remained in India was “less ambivalent than the 
majority community in his opposition to the two-nation theory” and therefore “a shared 
hatred for Pakistan became the acid test for loyalty.”59 While Naqvi is adamant on this 
point for the period after 1947, I again think it important not to read it back. While 
Aligarh narrators may have been reluctant to discuss their involvement with or support 
                                                
55 Hasan, "Masood Ul Hasan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 1, 2009." 
56 Naqvi, Reflections of an Indian Muslim, 41. Siddiqi, "Professor Ather Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview 
with Amber Abbas May 11, 2009." 
57 Zamindar, The Long Partition. 
58 Siddiqi, "Professor Zakiya Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas December 9, 2009." 
59 Naqvi, Reflections of an Indian Muslim, 17. KPS also expressed anxiety on this point when he argued 
that “EVERY Muslim is a nationalist” by which he means, that the Muslims who remain in India are there 
by choice, despite the presence of Pakistan and must be considered loyal Indians. KPS, "KPS 
(Anonymized): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 8, 2009." 
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for the League’s objectives in the shadow of partition, there is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that many of them shared its priorities, as I have defined them in an earlier 
chapter, and even participated in League activities before partition. Further, Naqvi’s 
protestations over Indian Muslim hatred for Pakistan perhaps resonate only with the 
converted and seem unlikely to convince others who still harbor suspicions over Muslim 
loyalty. The presence of urban “mini-Pakistans,” and the persistent accusations of Indian 
Muslim support for the Pakistani national cricket team represent large and small ways of 
questioning Muslim loyalty in everyday life.60 
Indian Muslims recognize that the burden of tolerance is on the Hindu majority. 
The fragile peace in Muslim communities is dependent upon Hindu forbearance. Ather 
Siddiqi, Zakiya Siddiqi’s husband, who was a student at Aligarh in the 1940s, and taught 
in AMU for most of his career, laid this argument out most clearly. At the outset of our 
recorded interview, which was the second of our conversations, he told me, “So I want to 
prove this that India, as a nation, has limitless tolerance and resilience, persecution as a 
concept does not exist.”61 The very presence of Muslims in India today, Siddiqi argued, is 
evidence of Hindu tolerance, “they could have chucked us out” during partition, he told 
me. Rather, they “allow” Muslims “use” of the country. Siddiqi laid the blame for 
partition squarely at the feet of Muslims.62 He did not conflate the Muslims with the 
                                                
60 Naqvi, Reflections of an Indian Muslim, 55- 59.  
61 Siddiqi, "Professor Ather Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 11, 2009." KPS, 
"KPS (Anonymized): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas October 8, 2009." 
62 At one point, he told me, “Hindus will say this, that Muslims divided it. There were other reasons, but 
still.” While he also blames Muslims, he recognizes the complexity of the identity politics, and 
acknowledges that the Hindu-Muslim relationship after 1947 has been dominated by this complaint and the 
suspicion it provokes. 
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Muslim League, or attribute the creation of Pakistan to League politics. Rather, he argued 
that Muslims, as a people, bear the responsibility for partitioning India. His is a broad 
indictment that grows from a sense that “Muslims cannot live together.”63 This inability, 
as Siddiqi sees it, to live together, to live without conflict is a foil to India’s self-evident 
history of tolerance-- “Can you name a time when India has invaded any other 
country?”64 This history of tolerance, Siddiqi argued, is evident in every day life when 
the early morning call to prayer is broadcast over loudspeakers. The fact that Hindus do 
not interfere with this loud, public reminder of Muslim presence, is a testament, he 
argued, to the depth of “Hindu” commitment to secular inclusion. 
This story about Hindu tolerance, however, quickly becomes one about access to 
power. Even riots, including the riots in 1951 in Aligarh, Siddiqi said, had little to do 
with communal feelings, but were motivated by political ones. Whether it was the riots in 
1947 that drove his parents and him out of Saharanpur (some of his siblings had already 
left for Pakistan), or the later riots in Aligarh, he conceded that “Only Hindus could start 
that, the riots” because Muslims felt very guilty, and were “subdued.” Consistent with 
Omar Khalidi’s argument, Siddiqi said, Muslims cannot and do not start riots, “because 
their numbers are small, and they have to live in this country and they can get a guilty 
conscience if they do.”65 As Siddiqi navigates the tricky territory of his post 1947 
experiences, ensconced in the safe and tolerant environs of Aligarh’s civil lines, he is 
                                                
63 Siddiqi, "Professor Ather Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 11, 2009." 
64 The factual point not withstanding, Siddiqi imagines an Indian state determined to protect the rights of 
minorities. Ibid.  
65 Ibid. 
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patently aware of Muslim vulnerability. It is guilt that prevents any Muslim uprising, 
guilt for their role—even their implied role—in the creation of Pakistan. Muslims, he told 
me, still “suffer from this.”  
 
THE CASE OF THE BABRI MASJID VERDICT 
More recent events in India, surrounding the late 2010 release of the Allahabad 
High Court’s verdict on the Babri Masjid demolition, show that Muslims are painfully 
aware that peace is maintained not by the good behavior of their community but at the 
whim of the non-Muslim community. The verdict was to determine how the contested 
land on which the Babri Masjid had been situated would be allotted to those claiming 
sovereignty over it. The Mosque was destroyed in 1992 as a result of the claim that the 
site was the birthplace of Lord Ram, the Ramjanmabhoomi. During the many years that 
have passed since the destruction of the mosque, the catastrophic rioting that followed all 
over India, and the periodic eruption of related violence, including the 2002 Gujarat 
pogroms, India’s non-Muslim public has come a great distance in recognizing the 
fragility of the communal peace that generally prevails in their country. Muslim 
apprehension in the days leading up to the verdict revealed their awareness of the 
possibility of violence in its wake.  
On September 19, 2010 in anticipation of the announcement of the verdict, the 
Vice Chancellor of Aligarh University issued “an appeal to staff and students” to 
“maintain equanimity, and desist from any form of reaction that would destroy trust 
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between the communities.”66 In addition, alumni of the Aligarh university engaged in a 
lively discussion over one of several AMU listservs about how to deal with the pending 
verdict, including suggestions to turn the disputed site over to the UN as a World 
Heritage Site, or to give the “Babri Masjid to our Hindu brethren to facilitate the 
construction of a Grand Temple so as to pay respect to their faith (Astha), leaving only a 
small piece of land away from Garbha grah to construct a small replica of the Babri 
Masjid.”67 When these perspectives encountered the fiery resistance of those who felt 
Muslims must defend their claim, alumnus Islam Habib Khan replied, “Thousands of 
people and mostly Muslims have been killed at the time of the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid. I do not wish to visualise the reaction if a verdict is made specially in favour of 
Muslims. There will be another round of massacres. Personally, I do not think it will be 
worth it and then what would have we achieved?”68 The Vice Chancellor and many of 
those who advocated that Muslims make clear that they would accept the verdict, no 
matter its outcome, raised the issue of “Aligarh’s tradition of communal harmony” to 
justify their willingness to forego contesting the verdict. The threat of violence by the 
majority was palpable, and the prevailing atmosphere on Aligarh’s campus was described 
as “an uneasy calm” as the date for the release of the verdict approached.69 
                                                
66 Rahat Abrar, "Appeal to Staff and Students for Communal Harmony," (Public Relations Office, Aligarh 
Muslim University, September 19, 2010). 
67 Anwar Khursheed, "Past Tense-Future Perfect: Appeal for Forgiveness and Reconcilation," 
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2010). Comments used with permission. 
68 Islam Habib Khan, (YahooGroups: VoiceofAligs Listserv, September 26, 2010). Comments used with 
permission. 
69 "Aligarh Breathes Easy after Two Days of Anxiety," The Asian Age Online October 1, 2010. 
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There was also a contingent of voices among former Aligarians arguing for 
Muslim solidarity in the face of Hindu tyranny, suggesting that Muslims must defend 
their claim to the territory.  These voices mark the boundaries of an important rift within 
the Aligarh community. Some voices, particularly those who lived through the Indian 
partition, advocate docility and the benefits of communal harmony. Other voices, many 
coming from those who grew up in independent India, advocate for a more aggressively 
represented Muslim identity, particularly in the face of the perceived non-Muslim threat. 
Both groups however, recognize the threat to Muslim sovereignty in independent India. 
The value of protecting the Muslim community is common to both strategic responses. 
Some contributors to the AMUNetwork Listserv suggested that the destruction of the 
Babri Masjid was not an isolated event, but part of a larger plan to marginalize Muslims 
more fully. They argued that if Muslims relinquished their claim to the Babri Masjid, the 
Hindus would build a grand temple there and go on to police Muslim boundaries more 
closely. The anxiety that they expressed over a domino-effect on Muslim marginalization 
echoes some of the points that Ather Siddiqi outlined above. The concern to hold fast to 
“Muslim” territory is a way of marking Muslims’ legitimate presence in Indian public 
space. The anxiety of this scenario is that the construction of a grand Ram temple in 
Ayodhya would mark the symbolic foundation of an anti-Muslim Hindu state.70  
Whereas older generations are plagued by the knowledge that demands for this 
kind of sovereignty over Indian space have dire consequences, including the violence that 
                                                
70 Wajahat A. Khan Yousef Zai, (YahooGroups: VoiceofAligs Listserv, September 27, 2010). Comments 
used with permission.  
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characterized the Indian partition, the Babri Masjid destruction in 1992 and the Gujurat 
pograms of 2002, the younger generations feel so circumscribed by the boundaries of 
their public personae, that they feel it necessary to aggressively defend themselves 
against encroachment on these boundaries. The continuity with earlier periods of pro-
Muslim activism is clearly visible here. Famously, during the mosque destruction in 
1992, Hindu nationalists raised the slogan “Babar kisantan jao Pakistan! (Children of 
Babur, go to Pakistan!)” This chant linked the entirety of Muslim civilization in the 
Indian subcontinent to the young state of Pakistan and reflected the deep-seated distrust 
of Muslim loyalty.71 In the face of the perceived threat to Muslim autonomy, Aligarh 
students and young alumni have moved to resist it. But a senior Aligarian, Islam Habib 
Khan (Engineering 1951) tried to temper the enthusiasm for a vigorous response with his 
experience,  
If I know anything about human behaviour the reaction of the other party to the court case will be 
immediate and severe. Their agenda… will become firmer and not softer and you will always be 
in a state of clash rather than working towards a reconciliation. Wisdom tells us that the playing 
ground should be made softer rather than harder as the issues are many and difficult to negotiate.72 
  
As one who arrived in Aligarh in the wake of partition, at a time when its student body 
was much depleted by partition’s migrations, and as one who likely experienced the 
tensions in Aligarh surrounding the 1951 riots, Islam Habib Khan recommends 
compromise, accommodation. Muslims will not be responsible for violence, he argues, 
they will be its victims. 
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72 Islam Habib Khan, (YahooGroups: VoiceofAligs Listserv, September 27, 2010). Comments used with 
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The verdict in the Babri Masjid case was finally released on September 30, 2010. 
The controversial verdict divided the disputed territory into three parcels, awarding two 
of them to two Hindu claimants, and one to the Sunni Waqf Board, the caretaker of the 
site prior to the mosque’s destruction. There was discontent on many sides as a result of 
this “three-way partition” but it was generally hailed as one that would make an “attempt 
at resolution.” 73 Many editorials contextualized the verdict by hailing it as an expression 
of “India’s culture of religious pluralism;”74 as evidence that “The Allahabad High Court 
itself seems to have vaguely recognised the imperative of communal harmony;”75 and as 
“a compromise calculated to hold the religious peace.”76 The widespread Muslim 
discontent with the outcome of the verdict, which seemed to take into account matters of 
faith in addition to legal claims, settled down into a feeling of “sullen resignation to the 
inevitable.”77 As the Sunni Waqf Board vowed to appeal the decision to India’s Supreme 
Court, and while Muslims expressed their disappointment to one another, no one took to 
the streets. This is a measure of India’s secularism. One Indian Muslim commented to the 
Pakistani newspaper Dawn, “At least this is not the kind of a verdict that can justify any 
Muslim outrage… They’ll settle for this deal.”78 Indian Muslims, as Ather Siddiqi also 
indicates, have settled for a place in Indian society entirely their own, but monitored and 
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circumscribed by the non-Muslim public surrounding them. Undoubtedly there are 
alliances great and small, friends, neighbors and colleagues from both communities who 
recognize and even share the anxieties of Indian Muslims. Hindu and Muslim groups 
both had called for patience and restraint surrounding the Ayodhya verdict. It is telling, 
however, that the expectation of violence after the verdict was so widely anticipated that 
its absence became the heart of the story.79  
Despite the complication of occasional communal violence, Ather Siddiqi and 
others maintain that Muslims do not face institutionalized discrimination. 
Constitutionally, of course, discrimination in employment is disallowed. However, the 
stories of discrimination, or perceived discrimination abound. Many narrators discount 
their importance, or challenge the basis for a discrimination claim. Ahmad Saeed argued, 
for instance, that Muslims, even when offered special consideration, failed to submit their 
applications or to compete for positions.80 Still, one narrator told me, off the record, that 
in his job he overheard remarks by senior managers at his government job reluctant to 
give him a special project on the grounds that he was a “karela”—literally a bitter 
gourd—used here to mean inept, and troublesome: a Muslim. In the lower echelons of the 
labor economy, Ather Siddiqi argues, Muslims are a critical link in the interdependence 
of the labor economy, dominated by Muslims, and the industrial economy dominated by 
Hindus. The Hindus, he says, are “the providers;” any disruption in production results in 
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a disruption in sales which would hurt the industrialists and money-lenders. Therefore, 
they avoid it. Omar Khalidi, however, in his study Indian Muslims Since Independence, 
argues otherwise. Riots occur more frequently in “locations where the economic 
condition of the Muslims was seen as improving.”81 Thus the tenuous balance that 
Siddiqi describes seems to hold up as long as Hindu “providers” and money-lenders 
maintain economic superiority; a challenge to this status quo has the potential to invite 
violent retribution. 
Despite this, Ather Siddiqi argues that Muslim success is evidence of the “large-
heartedness of the majority community.”82 To prove this point on Hindu magnanimity, 
Siddiqi offers the example of his daughter, Taad, who, with her husband Adil, started a 
successful commercial bread bakery in New Delhi. Harvest Gold Foods India Pvt. grew 
65-70 percent during its first four years, and by 2001 was selling nearly Rs. 40 crore, 
seven years after investing Rs. 1 crore (ten million) as startup cost.83 Siddiqi used his 
daughter’s success in business as evidence that Muslims do not face discrimination in 
employment, though he earlier had indicated to me that Muslims tended to occupy the 
labor, rather than the creative or entrepreneurial classes. It remains a matter of pride for 
him that Indian Muslims have the capacity to succeed in independent India, and without 
the taint of corruption and greed that overshadows his perception of Pakistan where 
“there is a lot of corruption and the rich are super rich and want to get richer. Means are 
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not important for them.  They have no interest in nation-building or country-building or 
anything else.  They are only interested in how can I get rich quickly by selling drugs, by 
smuggling, by doing this or by doing that.”84 Siddiqi’s daughter demonstrates that 
opportunity is available for Muslims who are educated and willing to work hard, but she 
also represents an exception to the rules Khalidi outlines in his analysis of communal 
tension. Siddiqi, and other Aligarh Muslims turn to the exceptions to define the rules. 
Both Zakiya and Ather Siddiqi suggest that the wealth in Pakistan is corrupt, 
deviant, and inconsistent with the values of India broadly, Indian Muslims more 
particularly, and Aligarh Muslims above all. They portray Muslim wealth in India as a 
marker of equal opportunity, and a sign of a tolerant and open society whereas in 
Pakistan, they represent wealth as ill-gotten. The Siddiqis’ perspective could probably be 
read in a number of different ways. What stands out to me is their bitterness towards 
Pakistan and everyone in it, to some extent including Ather Siddiqi’s own family.  
Siddiqi’s anxiety about Pakistan has roots in his own disappointed aspirations to 
go to Pakistan. As a young man, looking up to his elder brothers, Muslim League 
sympathizers who migrated to Pakistan, Ather Siddiqi had his dreams thwarted as he 
remained subject to his father’s authority.85 Having abided by his father’s injunction that 
he was too young to migrate to Pakistan, Siddiqi consistently refused later to migrate, 
even when his parents migrated in 1965. In December 1971, he traveled to Pakistan for 
his niece’s wedding, and was caught when India began bombing Karachi. As he tried to 
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flee back to India, his plane was turned around mid-air and he returned to his sister’s 
home to find her and his mother, on their prayer rugs. “They were praying that our boy 
will get far away from us.  What a paradox is that that the mother and sister would say, 
‘You go!’”86 The paradox of this moment encapsulates the tension he feels about his own 
family’s relationship to Pakistan. Pakistan, for him, presents a problematic: the dream it 
represented, which he also held, has now complicated his existence in India, left him 
plagued by guilt, separated him from his own family, and forced him to place all hope for 
success in the lap of his daughter and the continued forbearance of Hindu society. These 
are complicated emotions, born of complicated experience. Partition no longer seems 
straightforward, momentary. Rather, it has taken nearly 60 years for Siddiqi to process 
his own choices and those of the people he loves. His daughter now holds the hope for 
the future, the evidence of the secular dream in India, while Pakistan lies corrupt and 
ruined, a dream deferred. 
 
REDEMPTION 
Reflecting on the historiography and narratives of partition, Mushirul Hasan says 
he realized that the “preoccupation with pain and sorrow that resulted from partition has 
doubtlessly limited our understanding of many other crucial areas, including the political 
and civic fault-lines of religion, gender, caste and class that still run through our lives.”87 
Even as we recognize, over a long period of time, the continuities present in partition 
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narratives, it is critical to recognize that all of the narrators whose stories are collected 
here have succeeded in finding some kind of redemption from the terrors of 
displacement, alienation and exclusion that characterized the early years after 1947. The 
efforts that narrators make to form continuous narratives across the rupture of partition 
can be measured by their ability to incorporate it, “come to terms with it” by recognizing 
its “present-tense-ness.”88 This present-tense-ness emerged in every interview I 
conducted; as an interviewer I tried to be perpetually cognizant of the influence of the 
present. But it also became clear that the ability to engage with partition experience in the 
present-tense depended on a sense of redemption from the past. Many narrators in India 
referred to a sense of “guilt” for the outcomes of partition, but they also identified the 
individual or experience that freed them from this guilt’s crippling effect. 
Many Aligarians highlight the role of Zakir Husain in “saving” the university 
from certain demise after 1947 that would have resulted from the “natural” alienation that 
followed partition as a result of Aligarh’s controversial attachment to the demand for 
Pakistan. Husain’s power as a redemptive force was incorporated into other testaments of 
allegiance to the nationalist leadership as well. Iftikhar Alam Khan, retired professor of 
Museology at Aligarh and former director of Sir Syed Academy, spoke most explicitly 
about the impact of fear on his experience at AMU. Immediately after describing his fear 
of train travel and the threat of communal violence he told me (in a mix of English and 
Urdu): 
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Here in Aligarh, Zakir Sahib brought the changes… Rather I will say Zakir Sahib also because of 
Nehru and Maulana Azad.  For Nehru I had unlimited—that is also because of this fear complex 
and guilty complex—I believed that Nehru was the only one who could save us.  Without limit.  He 
started that All India Youth Festival in 1954 probably.  For this 150 universities were called… 
every university had started cultural activities. Here also there were cultural activities.  And [the] 
first participation of Aligarh University’s contingent was in 1956, I think.  The drama team that 
we sent, I was the hero in that drama.89 
 
His emphasis on the influence of Zakir Husain is common to many of the narratives. 
However, Iftikhar Alam Khan aligns himself more clearly with Prime Minister Nehru, the 
convocation speaker in Aligarh in 1948 at the moment when the University made a 
deliberate about-face towards nationalist ideology. Khan’s attachment to Nehru comes 
largely from his support of youth (Iftikhar Alam Khan is one of the youngest informants, 
arriving at AMU’s Minto Circle School 1949) and cultural activities. Also, Khan 
connects his attachment to Nehru with his “fear complex and guilty complex,” 
subscribing to the nationalist ideology that the only way to overcome these anxieties was 
to participate fully in the secular endeavor “where there is equality of opportunity for all 
and where many variegated streams of thought and culture meet together to form a 
mighty river of progress and advancement for her people.”90 The Youth Festivals that 
Nehru organized brought together young people from many different regions, religions, 
and backgrounds from 150 different institutions. This microcosm of the secular, national 
state of which Nehru spoke in his convocation address in Aligarh appealed to Khan and 
though he told me “that fear is still with me” Nehru’s deliberate efforts to bring people 
together made it possible for him to come to terms with the fear, and to move forward. 
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 As Iftikhar Alam Khan found redemption in nationalism, his brother Iqtidar and 
their comrade Irfan Habib, found redemption in the ideology of Communism. (Iftikhar 
Alam Khan described himself as a sort of incomplete Communist, who always 
maintained some allegiance to the establishment, for protection.) During the League 
period at Aligarh, the leftist Students’ Federation provided an alternative ideological 
space. During the League period and immediately after partition, the leftist and 
Communist students were marginalized at the university; League documents, especially 
A.B.A. Haleem’s letters to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, show a terrific anxiety about their 
influence despite that fact that the Communist Party officially supported Pakistan during 
this period.91 
 Iftikhar Alam Khan remembered the anti-Communist sentiment on the campus, 
that resulted in leftist students being “beaten up” in the Union and that “til 1952, there 
was a practice in the University that every year, before the Union elections took place, 
they would take out a procession.  An Anti-Communist Procession.  “Stalin, Hai Hai!” 
(laughing)  “Lamazhab log, hai Hai!” (Irreligious people! Oh!)” Very strong Anti-
Communist sentiment was there in the University.”92 After partition, however, the 
Communist influence grew on the campus. Irfan Habib remembered that in 1951 and 
1953 the Students’ Federation actually won the Union elections. While conflicting 
ideologies divided the institution for many years in a dispute between “Fundamentalists” 
and “Progressives”—Mohammad Amin told me that “Aligarh became a center also of the 
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liberal school which helped in the understanding of Medieval India. Except when, later 
on, it goes up completely Red… and [became] ideologically tainted”93—it  represented 
one change from the pre-1947 period that validated the perspectives of those who had not 
subscribed to Muslim League ideology.  
Iqtidar Alam Khan had briefly participated with the pro-Pakistan movement, and 
was a devout Muslim—“from  roughly ’44 onwards up till about ’50, I was an intensely 
religious person… [but I shouldn’t] use this word ‘intensely religious’ because I didn’t 
know anything about religion.  I was a believing person.  That’s all.”94—but in retrospect 
he sees these allegiances as being largely naïve. Similarly, when he discovered his 
attraction to Communism, he said, “I was still having those religious attitudes which I 
had earlier...  I started attending those Students’ Federation meetings; there I met 
Professor Irfan Habib also… he had his own commitment to Marxism.  He was a much 
more educated person than myself at that time also.”95 Though Iqitidar Alam (like his 
brother) remembers his commitment as poorly informed, in 1951, in protest of a visit by 
then U.P Governor Pandit Govind Vallabh Pant, he was arrested.96 During his two 
months in Aligarh and Agra prisons, he was converted to Communism. Many Communist 
activists were in jail—this was in the wake of the “Ranadive Period”97 when the party 
actively encouraged revolution and the central government cracked down on their 
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activities—and the jail was an incubator for young activists.  Iqtidar Alam told me that 
unlike his earlier commitments which had been born of circumstance, his experience in 
the jail drew him closer to the ideology. As he described the experience to me, “I became 
a Communist party member inside jail.  When I was in Agra prison, they used to hold 
their meetings, cell meetings.  I said, ‘Why are you keeping me out?  I came to jail 
because of you and now I am quite convinced.  Everything is acceptable to me.  So make 
me a member.’”98 Once he became a member and fully separated himself from the 
challenging politics of the League period, Khan found absolution for his “guilty 
conscience” and naïve (if short-lived) commitments to religious devotion and Pakistan. 
Both Iqtidar Alam Khan and Irfan Habib have maintained their involvement with the 
Communist Party. 
Some narrators find redemption in the vindication of the ideology to which they 
had subscribed throughout. In India, this stance is best exemplified by Riazur Rahman 
Sherwani, the son of Muslim Leaguer Obaidur Rahman Khan Sherwani, and who defied 
his family and maintained an allegiance to Congress nationalism throughout the League 
period at Aligarh. In 2008 he told me, “I did not agree with the ideology of the Muslim 
League.  I was against the partition of the country.  I thought that partition was harmful to 
the country as well as to the Muslims because country, if it was divided, it will lose its 
power, it will lose its resources.”99 Sherwani suggests that he had predicted the decline of 
Muslims in independent India, and though he defends their position—in part by 
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suggesting that the implication that they were responsible for dividing the country is a 
fallacy—he is vindicated by having, from the outset, maintained his allegiance to 
Congress and its ideals, despite its unpopularity in AMU. Pakistanis, similarly, engage a 
narrative of justification for their adherence to Muslim League ideology. This narrative is 
based on the presence of Muslim suffering. The suffering of Indian Muslims before and 
after partition justifies the creation of Pakistan despite the suffering of Muslims during 
partition. Indeed, many narrators deployed ideas about the suffering of Muslims in India 
to suggest that even today, the legitimacy of Pakistan is self-evident.  
The East Bengali narrators, who fully subscribed to the Pakistan ideal based on 
their experience (or the perception) of discrimination by Hindus found a home in Aligarh 
prior to 1947. Yet, this home was never free of discrimination or a taint of exclusion. In 
matters of food and language especially, Bengalis felt “other” at Aligarh despite the 
powerful connection provided by the Islamic idiom. As Mohiuddin Khan put it, “We 
have always a difference, because we were non-Urdu-speaking people… So this 
difference was there between the students.”100  These students supported the 
independence movement fully, Habibur Rahman even argued that the Bengali students 
were especially “shrewd,” but they were disillusioned by their experience in Pakistan. 
None imagined breaking away from Pakistan, but as the movement for Bangladesh 
gathered momentum, they supported it. The rupture in continuity between East and West 
Pakistan left these individuals holding fast to an idea that no longer seemed relevant. 
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Their attachment to the liberation of Bangladesh provided a redeeming narrative, a re-
establishment of the boundaries of belonging. 
 
This chapter has shown the persistence of the suspicion of Muslim loyalty that has 
affected Muslims in India and Aligarians specifically. Since 1948, however, the 
institution itself has deliberately allied with the secular nationalist stream in Indian 
politics and, in fact, Muslim intellectuals have worked to prove that those Muslims who 
remained in India have chosen the rights and responsibilities of Indian citizenship. The 
assumption of disloyalty, in any case, was founded on faulty assumptions about the 
motives of Aligarh’s students during the Pakistan movement and distrust of its 
relationship with Pakistan after 1947. The question of belonging therefore continues to 
vex the issue of citizenship for Muslims and leaves them exposed to violence. The 
creation and ongoing presence of Pakistan, as Pandey writes, confirmed political 
“difference,” thus fixing the notion of the “Muslim minority”101 in India. 
Indian Muslim narrators who participated here have confronted the notion of 
minority by seeking redemption in other sources of legitimacy, other ideologies, 
acceptable individuals or narratives of tolerance that serve as a protective boundary 
around the community. When Aligarh the institution lost its power to endow its boys with 
the prestige of belonging, narrators have invested in other protective institutions.  
Many of the narrators who remained in India, who may have had some attachment 
to the League prior to 1947, point to the current devastation in Pakistan to justify their 
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satisfaction in their choice to remain Indians. This suggests that they see their own 
experience in the context of partition. Further, it pushes us to examine the situation in 
Pakistan, to test the promises that the League made, and that many of Aligarh’s former 
students pursued. Critically, we must include in this study an examination of East 
Pakistan and the independence of Bangladesh. The conflict that emerged between West 
and East Pakistan represents the critical challenge to the Two Nation Theory upon the 
strength of which the creation of Pakistan was justified. It seems insufficient to accept the 
theoretical challenge without an understanding of the human experience of this challenge, 
particularly since it is driven by many critical claims to an alternative nationalism, one 
that was rejected by the West Pakistan government. How did this challenge affect 
people’s perception of Pakistan, its role, and theirs? How do those Aligarians who fought 
for Pakistan experience it now? 
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Chapter 6 
The Muslim Question After Partition: Pakistan and Bangladesh 
 
For Muslims throughout British India, partition represented a profound national 
trauma, an extraordinary disruption of “the institutional underpinnings of the social 
order.”1 This institutional disruption “was not just an event but a trigger for a series of 
reverberations, the tremors of which can still be felt in the region.”2 In the midst of this 
institutional disruption, however, individuals have had to find ways of carrying on, to 
make a place for themselves under drastically changed circumstances. As they have 
sought to understand their present, they engage in a process of reinterpreting their pasts to 
create a sense of continuity.   
For instance, despite the shared heritage of the narrators included in this study, 
their identities are often formed in opposition. In Pakistan today, India is the spectral 
Other, the site of oppression of Muslims even as it is also the home of many Muslim 
religious and cultural sites. Though the idea of Pakistan that captured the imaginations of 
Aligarh students during the 1940s did not anticipate the severing of ties between India 
and Pakistan, rather foreseeing a Muslim polity within India, 1947 saw the establishment 
of state borders and the foundation of oppositional narratives between the two states. 
Pakistanis buttress their state’s accomplishments by describing the extent of Pakistan’s 
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disadvantage relative to India in 1947, when Pakistan lacked much infrastructure for 
government or industry.3 The oppositional aspect of this narrative is part of the triumphal 
story of the establishment of the nation-state as the culmination of the Pakistan 
movement, but does not fully occlude awareness of the state’s failures and the ongoing 
challenges it must confront. For the group of Pakistani narrators who shared their stories 
with me, recounting their personal relationship to Muslim nationalism meant developing 
a narrative in which they could emphasize their connection to institutions in India, insofar 
as those institutions incubated the Muslim nationalism that triumphed in Pakistan.  This 
link to the sites of Muslim nationalism’s origins distinguishes these stories from others 
that might be told about the significance of Pakistan.4 It also provides a link between the 
stories told by former Aligarians in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Both groups have used 
national narratives to redefine their memories of partition in officially acceptable ways, 
but by localizing their memories in the institution of the Aligarh Muslim University, they 
have not fully allowed those national narratives to redefine their own stories. 
These narrators’ stories show how memories serve as a link between the past and 
the present to create a continuous narrative through Partition, that joins the intellectual 
and cultural history of Muslims in India with the nation-state of Pakistan. These 
narrators, all men old enough to remember the events of 1947,5 are Aligarh educated 
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professionals.  They migrated to Pakistan in the wake of the partition and have built their 
lives there.  They are representative of that class of Muslims that Sir Sayyid sought to 
reach; their fathers were, overwhelmingly, employed as servants to the Raj and many of 
those fathers were also graduates of Aligarh who had been raised on Sir Sayyid’s British 
loyalism and spirit of Muslim revival.  
With independence, the Muslim identity touted by the Muslim League ceased to 
be a minority category in the territories of Pakistan even as it defined a permanent 
minority in India. In the decades since, Sunni Islam has emerged as the dominant 
orthodoxy in Pakistan through the systematic marginalization of other groups including 
Ahmedis, Shias, Sufis and Bengalis. Similar forces of nation-making are at work in all of 
the post-partition states that sometimes challenge and sometimes reify the narratives of 
belonging that defined their boundaries. 
 
ALIGARH AND PAKISTAN 
From its inception, the educational institution at Aligarh had provided 
opportunities primarily for the Urdu-speaking elite of North India. All were welcome 
there, however, and it did attract well-off Muslim students from throughout the 
subcontinent. In fact, as several Bengali narrators told me, they became aware of Aligarh 
because they knew that several local, respected lawyers were its products. However, as 
Benedict Anderson’s work on “imagined” national communities has shown, language is a 
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powerful organizational tool for the community, and is particularly powerful amongst the 
educated elite.6  Language provides an important site for national solidarity among the 
bourgeoisie, in this case, the North Indian ashraf. The Pakistan demand was deeply 
rooted in the priorities of the North Indian service elite, that particular class who had the 
most to lose by the establishment of Indian democracy.  
 
Taking Sir Sayyid’s passion for the perpetuation of the Urdu language as a 
starting point, his rhetoric of an all-India Muslim identity is easily unraveled. The 
national identity of which Aligarh University has been so famously construed to be the 
home, was rooted explicitly in the values of a narrow segment of Muslim society: the 
Urdu-speaking, educated or landed class. Many of the narrators who contributed here 
belong to that class, and those from Bengal shared in its cultural similarities, but were 
distinguished by their lack of knowledge of Urdu.  
When Jinnah spoke of the two “nations” of India having different languages, he 
referred to the Hindi-Urdu controversy that erupted in the late nineteenth-century when 
Urdu’s status began to decline and Hindi gained currency as a lingua franca. Hindi was 
given equal status with Urdu as an official language of UP in 1900, only two years after 
Sir Sayyid’s death. In addition to creating an intimate link between the Muslim demand 
for political autonomy and the language of Urdu, the tension over the relationship 
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between language and power accentuated the growing animosity between Muslim and 
Hindu political organizations.  
After the founding of Pakistan, however, a new language conflict emerged. In 
1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah traveled to Pakistan’s East Wing and gave a speech in 
Dhaka University in which he proclaimed that “the State Language of Pakistan is going 
to be Urdu and no other language.”7 This attachment to Urdu, despite the fact that 52 
percent of Pakistan’s population spoke Bengali, and far fewer than half were Urdu 
speakers, betrays an attachment to the values of the ashraf that could no longer be made 
broadly applicable as it had been in the enclosed environment of the university. Aligarh’s 
narrative was assimilationist and it obscured the individual priorities of different groups.  
During the 1940s, when these values were reappropriated by the Pakistan 
movement, Aligarh boys took their role as Jinnah’s  “arsenal of Muslim India” seriously 
and now in Pakistan, speak passionately about the solidarity of Muslims, the inevitability 
of the partition and the establishment of the Pakistani state.  Allegiance to Aligarh has 
facilitated a powerful collective identity and source of memory for those now displaced 
from it in Pakistan. Maurice Halbwachs, in his work On Collective Memory describes 
how our memories help us to perpetuate identity.8  The Pakistani narrators’ identity is 
based on their centrality in a teleological narrative of statehood.  Yet, the Bengali 
narrators present a challenge to that teleology, revealing different memories both of 
Aligarh and of their time as Pakistanis.   
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 When speaking of Aligarh, many narrators describe a utopian world in which 
there was no sectarian or communal strife. Aligarh was concerned with taking in boys 
from many backgrounds, but the “Aligarh product” adhered to certain ideals of 
comportment and behavior. 
Even as these narrators hearken back to the utopian vision of unity, their 
memories of their experiences at Aligarh betray the seeds of the tension. Bengali 
narrators remember a fundamental sense of not fully belonging amongst the largely Urdu-
speaking Aligarh students. Habibur Rahman emphasized that, at Aligarh “they don’t 
believe in parochialism as well as localism.  They would make it an international attitude, 
international brotherhood.”9 However, every Bengali narrator described building 
friendships in Aligarh primarily with other Bengali students, as Salahuddin Chowdhury 
said, “when I went there, I was received by some people from Bangladesh and given a 
room.”10 His sense of belonging at Aligarh was determined by the initial support he 
found among those who also “belonged” to his region.11 Habibur Rahman belonged to the 
student group known as the “Eastern Association” that included students from Bengal 
and Assam.12 Other narrators noted that “we were more friendly with the Southern Indian 
students and to some extent with Pathan students,” in other words, with other non-Urdu 
speakers. This statement highlights the fault-lines that emerged in the Aligarh student 
body that other former students have described in largely homogenizing ways—
                                                
9 Rahman, "Habib Ur Rahman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas February 20, 2010." 
10 Chowdhury, "Salahuddin Chowdhury: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas April 10, 2010." 
11 Bangladesh, of course, did not exist then, so Chowdhury’s statement betrays an explicit “reading back” 
of national history. It makes sense that he would associate the solidarity of Bengalis at Aligarh with 
Bangladesh, especially if he had felt most at home among other Bengalis in Aligarh itself. Ibid. 
12 Rahman, "Habib Ur Rahman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas February 20, 2010." 
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emphasizing the invisibility of difference, or the university’s efforts to create an 
“international brotherhood.” As innocuous as it may seem at the university, the fault lines 
of language and region proved to be fundamental to the sense of difference between East 
and West Pakistan that became controversial shortly after partition and that led to 
violence as early as 1952. 
While few of the Bangladeshi narrators would explicitly admit that they “did not 
belong” they indicated a sense of alienation and recounted the methods they employed to 
build community, even if on the fringes of the Aligarh mainstream. Where many students 
describe the “café culture” of students gathering for cheap snacks and long conversations 
in the cafés of Shamshad Market or even right on the campus, Mohiuddin described the 
effort to find a familiar culinary experience there. “Of course, we used go to the cafes. 
You see, in Bangladesh, we get shingara, we call it shingara—it is vegetable inside and 
it is rolled in a triangular shape. So somehow we used to get in Aligarh namakpara and 
potato chip, so we mixed together that and said, ‘This is the taste of our shingara.’”13 
This episode illustrates the effort that Bengali students had to exert to fit into Aligarh’s 
largely North Indian brotherhood. There is a sense that, more than other students, these 
students sought ways to retain their own culture, while engaging with that of Aligarh’s.  
In discussions about food the sense of displacement from home is most acute. 
Every narrator described the difficulty of eating a North Indian bread-heavy diet when 
they were accustomed to rice and fish. As minor as this may sound, the difficulty of 
feeding his family motivated Akhtaruzzaman to suggest his wife return to Dhaka early, 
                                                
13 Khan, "Mohiuddin Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 28, 2010." 
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before he finished his degree.14 And during the 1940s, several students described 
enlisting the hostel servants and their wives in preparing dishes that might convey a 
familiar taste, though of course, “on Monday noon, the hostels served a little biryani, so 
that was one of our very fond item, at least it is rice!”15 Thus, while Aligarh was an 
environment that welcomed India’s diversity—as Jinnah had said, “This is Muslim 
India!”—it was not always a natural fit.  
Though tolerance was an ideal of the student body, the memories of Pakistani 
narrators collapse difference. This triumphal narrative that denies any heterogeneity 
within the Muslim community is an essential component of their sense of citizenship.  In 
this conception: Muslims were oppressed, Muslims unified and resisted injustice by 
mobilizing the progressive values of the Muslim elite and established a state in which 
those values could be safe and where their status would not be threatened.  That the 
Pakistani state has not fulfilled its role in this image causes some anxiety for the Pakistani 
narrators, but this anxiety was acute for those from Bengal.  
All agree that the problem with the Pakistani state was that it had rejected the 
values on which Muslim identity in Aligarh was based. However, the critique of the state, 
as might be expected, varies in each of Pakistan’s former wings. During the period of 
reform and regeneration from 1857- 1947, when the leaders of the Muslim community 
sought to unify it in opposition to British and Hindu domination, the needs and values of 
the elite were broadly interpreted and portrayed as the values of the community as a 
                                                
14 Akhtaruzzaman, "Mohammad Akhtaruzzaman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 10, 2010." 
15 Khan, "Mohiuddin Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 28, 2010." 
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whole. Within the religiously defined nation-state, however, communities cohered around 
different issues, those that were overwritten by the demand for statehood: class, sect, 
provincial and linguistic identity.  The institutions that were established to service North 
India’s Urdu-speaking elite, even those— like Urdu— that have survived in some form 
the disruption of Partition, proved manifestly insufficient to serve this ultimately diverse 
community.   
In Pakistan, former Aligarians like General Wajahat, lament these emerging 
fractures. 
I am a firm believer that it is the commitment to the country that is the main thing.  Everything 
else is secondary.  That is our main problem right now.  It wasn’t, in our first few years after 
formation of Pakistan.  The spirit of Pakistan at the time of its establishment was quite different 
from what it is now.  At that time we were only concerned with doing our best, hard work, get 
down to building the country, establishing the country, and getting the country moving forward.  
We were not concerned with anything else.  It’s only afterwards when these feelings of 
provincialism or ethnicity started entering.  That has eaten up the country and has done a lot of 
damage, it is doing a lot of damage.  That is our major problem.16 
 
Aligarians in Pakistan do not recognize more localized identity markers and insist on 
setting themselves up as the standard of Muslim identity that developed in a 
straightforward and uncomplicated way at Aligarh and led to the establishment of the 
Pakistani state. In other words, the image of Muslim identity that survives in their 
collective memory, one that collapses difference, is constantly in conflict with the reality 
of Pakistani identity, which is much more aggressively diverse.  
For the Bangladeshi narrators, the Pakistani state’s unwillingness or inability to 
recognize and accommodate this diversity is at the heart of their grievance. In reflecting 
on the outcomes of the 1947 partition and their own later involvement in the movement 
                                                
16 Wajahat Husain, "Major General Wajahat Husain (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 
29, 2005," (Lahore: June 29, 2005). 
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for the independence of Bangladesh, several of these narrators demonstrate that they, too, 
believed in an ideal of unity. They emphasized their support for an idea of Federation, 
with a particular emphasis on the Pakistan Resolution of 1940. The Pakistan Resolution 
was originally fronted by Bengali Muslim League leader, Fazlul Haq, known as Sher-e-
Bangla, or the Lion of Bengal, at the 1940 League session in Lahore.17 It called for the 
grouping of “the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority” into zones “to 
constitute ‘Independent States.’” As Rounaq Jahan has noted, many Bengali Muslim 
League leaders emphasized the plural “states” though it was later amended to resolve the 
ambiguity of the plural.18 When Bangladeshi narrators evoked the Resolution, they 
referred to this verbiage as the impulse to federation. This insistence on a return to the 
origins of the idea of Pakistan, with an emphasis on the possibility for federation is 
unique among the narratives I collected. These narrators, despite having twice fought for 
independence, continue to believe that the best outcome for the subcontinent in 1947, 
1971 and today would be a collection of federated states rather than independent ones.  
                                                
17 M.A. Rashid described the 1938 League session when Fazlul Haq was given this nickname. “He spoke 
in his speech ‘If Hindus did something wrong with the Muslims of UP we will take revenge in Bengal 
where we have the same average of Hindus and Muslims as in UP. Muslims are here in majority, and 
Hindus were in majority in Lucknow.’ On that point, the public of Lucknow uttered, ‘Sher-e-Bengal 
Zindabad! (Long Live the Lion of Bengal!) Sher-e-Bengal Zindabad!’ on this point. Since then, he became 
Sher-e-Bangla. And he is here also famous in this name, Sher-e-Bangla, Sher-e-Bangla. People know him 
as Sher-e-Bangla not as AK Fazlul Haq.” Mohammad Abdul Rashid, "M.A. Rashid: Personal Interview 
with Amber Abbas March 29, 2010," (Dhaka: March 29, 2010). M.A. Rashid hails from Lucknow in North 
India; he was norn in 1921. After passing of Aligarh in 1943, he settled in Calcutta, having taken a job with 
M.M. Ispahani, Ltd. He fled to Dhaka in East Pakistan in 1950 during communal riots in Calcutta. In the 
early 1950s he started his own business trading in jute. In 1954 he joined the East Pakistan Stock 
Exchange. Today he remains a Director of the Stock Exchange and lives in Dhaka. 
18 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 
22. 
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Some narrators maintain some allegiance to the solutions posed by the 1946 
Cabinet Mission plan, in which the British Government suggested a confederation of 
groups that would unite Muslim states in the West and Muslim states in the East. Hindu 
states would form a third group. In Pakistan, the Cabinet Mission plan, and Jinnah’s 
initial acceptance of it, is used as a critical component in the narrative that “blames” 
Nehru and Patel, and by extension, the Indian National Congress, for the outcomes of the 
partition.19 As Wajahat Husain put it,  
There is no doubt about it, and now more than ever it has come out quite clearly that the 
responsibility for Partition lays upon Mr. Nehru and Mr. Patel. On the Congress… Responsibility 
for the Partition—undoubtedly Pakistan was the main slogan and we wanted it—but the Muslim 
League had accepted the Cabinet Plan, and [was] going along and everybody thought it would 
work out alright. It was the Congress.  Having agreed, they went back on their word and then there 
was no other alternative.20 
  
There is a pervasive slippage here between the narrative of triumph, of “liberation,” and 
the narrative of the oppressed minority that demands state protection and 
accommodation. This slippage illuminates a theme that has run throughout this argument, 
that if partition was initially designed as an answer to the “Muslim Question” it did little 
to “solve” it, but rather spawned a variety of persistent Muslim and minority questions 
                                                
19 Several narrators, on all sides of the borders, were sympathetic to the Cabinet Mission plan and blamed 
Congress intransigence for its failure. IQ (Anonymized) argued “I think there was a glimpse of lightning 
when the Cabinet Mission was brought in… And Quaid-e-Azam almost agreed to it. Ke ‘Okay, where the 
Muslims are in the majority we’ll form the government, where the Hindus are in the majority, they will 
form the government. There will be a few subjects which will be centered for both. So Quaid-e-Azam 
almost agreed… But the Congress they did not agree. Because they wanted to have overall supremacy. See 
that is where, that was a glimpse of where things could have settled down, and been sorted out.” IQ, "IQ 
(Anonymized): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 26, 2010," (Karachi: May 26, 2010). Major 
General Ghulam Umar (Ret’d) said, “Up til 1946 this Mr. Jinnah was trying to find some understanding and 
when that understanding was no more possible, then it became obvious that you have to part company and 
that was how Pakistan came into being.” Umar, "Major General Ghulam Umar (Ret'd): Personal Interview 
with Amber Abbas August 8, 2006." Javid Iqbal, son of renown poet Mohammad Iqbal added, “Jinnah 
agreed with the Cabinet Mission plan… Jinnah conceded. But Nehru under the influence of Patel refused to 
accept it. So actually Pakistan was created by the Congress. By the Hindu obstinacy!” Iqbal, "Justice Javid 
Iqbal: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 13, 2006." 
20 Husain, "Major General Wajahat Husain (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 13, 2005." 
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that continue to find expression as evidence of the ongoing nature of India’s partition. 
Despite the powerful rhetoric of liberation that the state of Bangladesh employs to 
describe its separation from West Pakistan, in the minds of those Aligarians who fought 
for the independence of Pakistan first, complete “liberation” may not have been the ideal 
outcome. Rather, reconciliation with the original idea of Pakistan, as expressed in the 
Lahore Resolution, and as embodied in their work as students for Pakistan, remains a 
powerful counterbalance to the standard narrative of “liberation” from West Pakistan. 
The Bangladeshis here use the Lahore Resolution and the Cabinet Mission Plan as 
components in a developing narrative in favor of federation. Habibur Rahman, 
(describing cooperation between Pakistan and Iran over oil resources), used the phrase, 
“mutual cooperation is necessary,”21 which, in the context of Pakistani relations between 
1947-1971, sums up the Bangladeshi reaction. It is the absence of a spirit of cooperation 
in the West Pakistan- East Pakistan relationship that troubles these narrators. Since 1940 
they had invested their emotions in an expectation of federation that was further 
encouraged by the near-acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan in 1946. In committing to 
Pakistan in 1947, they expected a federal system, one where some portfolios would be 
controlled at the center, but as Habibur Rahman described, “If there is a confederation, 
yes, obviously the federal government can restrict many things, but there is still some 
social development.  Local development.”22  
                                                
21 Rahman, "Habib Ur Rahman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas February 20, 2010." 
22 Ibid. 
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Even the Awami League and its leader, Mujibur Rahman, professed an allegiance 
to the terms of the Pakistan Resolution in Rahman’s 1966 “Six Points Programme.” The 
first point demanded that “The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan 
in its true sense on the basis of 1940 Lahore Resolution, and parliamentary form of 
government with supremacy of legislature elected on the basis of universal adult 
franchise.”23 That the Lahore Resolution makes an appearance both in Sheikh Mujib’s 
Six Points and in the memories of those who supported both Pakistan and Bangladesh 
suggests an important continuity between the 1947 partition and 1971. This coincidence 
conveys a sense of authenticity that several of these narrators have sought to project: that 
Bengalis were the true Pakistanis, that they remained true to the founder’s ideals, ideals 
that were corrupted in Pakistan. Without federation, and without even a sense of 
equanimity with the Pakistani system, in the absence of concerted “local development” 
these narrators turned away from Pakistan, disappointed. 
What becomes clear here is that both Bangladeshi and Pakistani narrators look to 
the origins of the Pakistan Movement for a sense of clarity about the meaning of 
Pakistan, but they have derived different meanings from its rhetoric. Both groups 
emphasize a kind of unity, but the Pakistanis suggest a homogenized unity, one that 
obscures the unique differences between individuals; the Bangladeshi narrators tout a 
vision of unity that recognizes difference and creates space for it, even while 
acknowledging a broader unity that could draw states together based on shared priorities. 
                                                
23 "Six-Point Programme of Sheikh Mujib Ur Rahman," in Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of 
Bangladesh. 
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Both of these visions for South Asia are rooted in notions of solidarity, the kind that were 
fostered at Aligarh University, but they also reflect the variety of experience that students 
lived there. Bengali students found commonality among the students whose language or 
dress or region of origin placed them outside of the mainstream. The students who 
represented the Urdu-speaking majority, however, subscribed to an identity that created 
little space for recognizing these other groups, assuming rather, that by their presence at 
Aligarh, they would be assimilated into an already familiar mold. These differences in 
outlook that emerge from different sides of the borders shed light on the problems of 
belonging in Pakistan, and also how deeply rooted these narrators’ experience was in 
those years when they were fighting together for freedom. 
 
THE CASE OF PAKISTAN 
Dedicated observers of the scene in Pakistan have been aware of the problem of 
sectarianism and discrimination against minorities for some time and have recognized the 
challenges minorities face in finding space within a hegemonic and homogenizing 
Muslim national identity. In the months before the partition, anxiety developed about the 
place of minorities in both the Indian and Pakistani states. Jinnah addressed this concern 
repeatedly with assurances that minorities would be fully privileged citizens of the 
Pakistani state with full religious freedom.24 His most famous declaration came in his 
                                                
24 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, "Sacred Duty of Muslims to Protect Minorities," in Quaid-I-Azam Muhammad 
Ali Jinnah (Speeches, Statements, Writings, Letters, Etc.), ed. Muhammad Haneef Shahid (Lahore: Sang-e-
Meel Publications, 1976), 53. See also ———, "Protection for Minorities in Pakistan," in Quaid-I-Azam 
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August 11, 1947 speech to Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly. He addressed the nation 
with the immortal, and oft-cited words “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, 
you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of 
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed…” Despite these, Pakistan’s 
minorities have faced an uphill battle for inclusion.  
In 2010-11, in addition, even casual observers of international affairs have been 
drawn into the story of Pakistan’s minorities by highly publicized cases involving the 
Blasphemy Laws.25 The assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer by one of his 
own security personnel in early 2011 because he stood up for the abolition of blasphemy 
laws that disproportionately target minorities, especially Christians, brought the issue of 
Pakistan’s non-Muslim minorities to the fore in a complex and quickly changing political 
and religious conflict.26 These events signal a shoring up of majority identity—
increasingly defined as Sunni Muslim—against any others who might make a claim to 
legitimate belonging. Despite Jinnah’s promises of inclusivity, Pakistan’s minorities are 
well aware of the history of this challenge, even if the rest of world has been ignorant of 
                                                                                                                                            
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Speeches, Statements, Writings, Letters, Etc.), ed. Muhammad Haneef Shahid 
(Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1976), 84. 
25 Jane Perlez, "Pakistani Sentenced to Death May Get a Pardon," The New York Times November 22, 
2010. Dean Nelson, "Blog Shahbaz Bhatti Killing: What Hope Now for Pakistan's Christians?," The 
Telegraph March 2, 2011. Though the Blasphemy Laws have been on the books since the British period, 
Zia ul-Haq was responsible for refining the language and increasing the penalties. The penalty for defaming 
the Prophet is death. Theodore Gabriel, "The Blasphemy Law and Its Impact on the Christian Community," 
in Christian Citizens in an Islamic State: The Pakistan Experience (Aldershot, England: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 2007), 60. 
26 Salman Masood and Carlotta Gill, "Killing of Governor Deepens Crisis in Pakistan," The New York 
Times January 4, 2011. Ed Husain, "Explaining the Salman Taseer Murder," in Expert Brief (Council on 
Foreign Relations, January 7, 2011). 
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it, content to believe the official myth of Pakistani identity: that it is all Muslim.27 The 
ostensibly “Muslim” identity of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been accepted as 
homogenous and undifferentiated. While scholars have worked to expose the diversity of 
the Muslim population of Pakistan and India, this image has not been resilient in the 
public sphere, particularly in the United States where the notion of Muslim “diversity” is 
poorly understood.28  
As they speak about their own position, minorities frequently refer to the plight of 
other minority communities, sometimes expressing solidarity with them, and refer to the 
fact that Pakistan’s minorities anticipated the protection of the majority Muslims by 
virtue of the fact that Indian Muslims had an experience of minority identity in India, and 
would therefore be sympathetic. However, as research on trauma has shown, and I think 
the case of partition exemplifies well, one of the effects of trauma is “you can’t then see 
what you are capable of doing. You are always repeating a situation in which you are 
threatened and potentially destroyed.”29 The process of identity formation that pits 
majority identity against minority threat is visible in all three post-partition South Asian 
states. The repetition of the trauma of threat is exemplified by repeated attempts to define 
                                                
27 Rob Crilly, "Pakistan's Religious Divide on Display," The Telegraph January 9, 2011. 
28 Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). ———, ed., Islam in South Asia in Practice (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009). Jalal, Self and Sovereignty. Many more works by Richard Eaton, Akbar Hyder, 
Simony Digby, Peter Hardy, David Gilmartin, Annemarie Schimmel, etc. focusing on Sufis, Shi’as and 
others might be included here.  
29 Jacqueline Rose, "Nation as Trauma, Zionism as Question: Jacqueline Rose Interviewed," ed. Rosemary 
Bechler (OpenDemocracy.net August 17, 2005). Rose is responding to the tension between the state of 
Israel and the potential threat of the Palestinians. She argues that Israel no longer has any concrete 
justification for feeling threatened as it possesses one of the most powerful militaries worldwide. Still, 
trauma is the foundation of its national identity and must be repeatedly enacted to fortify that identity. 
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the boundaries of the majority by pushing the minorities outside of it. The critique of 
Pakistani Muslim treatment of minorities that suggests that “the Muslims would 
remember the problems faced as a minority and would not perpetuate the same fate for 
other minorities” is confronted by the reality that “it turned out to be the opposite.”30 The 
repetition of trauma, suggests Jacqueline Rose in the context of Israel, is the result of the 
“distressing overlap between the need to feel safe as a nation and the need to believe in 
yourself”31 and is the “the most historically attested response to trauma.”32 Thus, despite 
the good intentions of the founders of both India and Pakistan: Jinnah’s protestations of 
the intimacy in relationship between minorities and the state in Pakistan, and Nehru’s 
determination that the essential quality of the Indian state was its composite identity in 
which distinctions between majority and minority communities had no meaning in the 
eyes of the state, a variety of other identities have become important in India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh. These identity politics, worked out in an environment of mutual 
potential threat, sometimes called the “hostage nation theory” did little to create an 
environment of equal opportunity for minorities in either Pakistan or India. The 
persistence of identitarian politicking that marks citizens in relationship to one another 
rather than by their relationship to the state has challenged the founding narratives of all 
three post- partition states.  
Perhaps the most potent case of religious discrimination against citizens who fell 
                                                
30 Interview with Cecil Chaudhry, Rawalpindi, in Salim, ed., Reconstructing History: Memories, Migrants, 
and Minorities, 162. 
31 Rose, "Nation as Trauma, Zionism as Question: Jacqueline Rose Interviewed." 
32 Jacqueline Rose, "Response to Edward Said," in Freud and the Non-European (London; New York: 
Verso in Association with the Freud Museum, 2003), 77. 
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outside the fold of the mainstream Sunni Muslim identity in Pakistan is the case of the 
Ahmadis. Whereas the fundamental rights of non-Muslims in Pakistan have been 
protected under the law, the Ahmadis have been singled out for a legal classification as 
“non-Muslim” though they believe themselves to be Muslims. The “alleged doctrinal 
deviancy”33 of the Ahmadi has resulted in ongoing persecution in Pakistan including 
periodic attacks on their “places of worship” and leadership. The roots of the conflict 
between the Ahmadi and those who consider them apostates dates to before the founding 
of Pakistan, but became a tool for the Pakistani state under successive leaders to curry 
favor among Pakistan’s conservative ulama, especially during periods when democratic 
forces had been compromised. In May 2010 two Ahmadi sites were simultaneously 
attacked in Lahore, part of a Sunni supremacist campaign of violence against those 
groups, including Shia, Sufis, and Christians, seen to be outside the Sunni fold. These 
sites were deliberately targeted as sites of plural or heterodox practice—so critical to the 
identity of Islam in South Asia—and these attacks represent a concerted effort to 
eliminate or discipline that plurality.34 
 The Ahmadi movement emerged during the same period as the reformist Aligarh 
and Deoband movements35 and employed similar strategies—the establishment of 
educational institutions—to facilitate outreach and to spread its reformist message. 
Unlike Aligarh or Deoband however, the Ahmadi movement was largely rural and its 
                                                
33 Simon Ross Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at: History, Belief, Practice (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), 228. 
34 "International Religious Freedom Report- Pakistan," ed. Department of State (Washington, D.C.: July- 
December 2010), 2. 
35 Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India. 
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adherents came from the middle and lower classes, and the movement particularly 
focused on “missionary outreach to non-Muslims.”36 In its early years, the movement had 
much in common with other reformist movements, but after its leader Ghulam Ahmad 
claimed to be receiving revelations and began making prophecies, the Ahmadis 
increasingly became isolated and reviled by these other movements. The critical conflict 
between Sunni leadership and the Ahmadis is the question of Ghulam Ahmad’s claim to 
prophethood. After the creation of Pakistan, the Ahmadis were singled out as a threat to 
mainstream Islam—the threat of Hindus having largely been eliminated by partition’s 
migrations. During the 1950s they became the victims of violent attacks from the 
Anjuman-i-Ahrar-i-Islam a group with whom the Ahmadi had been in conflict since 
before Pakistan’s creation.37 Maulana Maududi, the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami 
emerged as a particularly virulent opponent of the Ahmadi and he demanded that the 
Ahmadis be declared “non-Muslims.”38 
 In 1974, the National Assembly passed a resolution that was signed into law by 
then Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, vindicating Maududi’s request and declaring 
Ahmadis a “non-Muslim minority.” Though they are permitted to practice their religion, 
the law prevents them claiming to be Muslims. Ordinance XX passed by General Zia ul-
Haq, as a part of his efforts to generate support among Pakistan’s ulama added two 
sections to the Pakistan Penal Code directed specifically against Ahmadis. These 
restrictions facilitated more persecution of Ahmadis including prohibition on the use of 
                                                
36 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective (New Delhi: Manohar, 1974), 12. 
37 Ibid., 164-85. 
38 S. Abul A'la Maududi, The Qadiani Problem (Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, 1979 [1953]). 
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the Muslim call to prayer, the recitation of the kalima, or declaration of faith, and the 
right to call their “places of worship” mosques. Ahmadis are threatened under Pakistan’s 
harsh Blashphemy Laws, restricted under the Electoral code from voting “as Muslims,” 
and all Pakistanis must sign a pro forma declaring that they consider Ahmadis to be non-
Muslims in order to obtain an identity card or passport. The institutionalization of this 
discrimination has marginalized Ahmadis and legitimized the accusation of apostasy 
constitutionally by enshrining the belief in the finality of the Prophet Mohammad as a 
criterion to claiming the Muslim and even the Pakistani identity. As a result, attacks on 
Ahmadis have largely gone un-prosecuted even as their rights as citizens and human 
beings have been compromised repeatedly through violence.39  
 In Maududi’s writings, particularly The Qadiani Problem, the “threat” of the 
Ahmadis becomes clear. For Maududi, it is not just their recognition of a new prophet 
that sets Ahmadis on a collision course with Sunni Islam. Rather it is his perception that 
Ahmadis see believers in the finality of Mohammad’s prophecy as non-believers. “The 
inevitable implication of a claim to prophethood is that anyone who does not accept him 
as such automatically becomes a KAFIR (infidel) [sic]; as a matter of fact the Qadianis 
did exactly that and openly declared through their writings and speeches that those who 
do not believe in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad are Kafirs [sic].”40 While 
Maududi recognized the presence of other sects of Islam, he claimed that they isolate 
                                                
39 Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at: History, Belief, Practice, 232- 33. 
40 Maududi, The Qadiani Problem, 6. 
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themselves “like small rocks scattered on the borderline”41 whereas Ahmadis “penetrate 
into the Muslim Society posing as Muslims… [and] carry on proselytizing propaganda in 
an aggressive manner.”42 It is this missionary zeal which appears particularly problematic 
because it puts the Sunni mainstream at risk of conversion. Maududi’s logic is circular, 
but was clearly persuasive, as the cry of “Islam in danger” had served to mobilize the 
Muslim constituency against outsiders in the past. The call to protect Islam from 
imposters serves to center a particular identity against plurality. The legal restrictions 
placed on Ahmadis in particular have facilitated the idea that the state supports a certain 
version of Islam, under which all heterdox practices including Sufism and Shiism are 
vulnerable. 
 Ahmadis are not alone among persecuted minorities in Pakistan. However, they 
have been particularly targeted by the government and singled out for institutionalized 
discrimination as the mainstream has sought to protect its boundaries against the threat of 
blasphemy and apostasy. The most significant crisis of nationalism in Pakistan, however, 
emerged as a result of the tensions between the Pakistan’s two wings.  
 The independence of Bangladesh proved a fundamental challenge to the Two 
Nation Theory betrayed by the total lack of sympathy for the rights of East Pakistan, and 
it serves to expose a deeper racialized tension and a difficult history of communalized 
politics that challenged the ostensible brotherhood of Muslims on which Pakistan was 
created. It is worth examining this further, as the Bengali challenge was only one of many 
                                                
41 Ibid., 17. 
42 Ibid., 18. 
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that exposed the weakness of the Two Nation Theory as a founding narrative for 
independent statehood. The attitudes that resulted in the “loss of East Pakistan” continued 
to divide the country and undermine the Two Nation Theory, betraying insurmountable 
differences within the communities of Muslims that had joined together to form Pakistan 
itself. The degradation of the foundational narrative of Pakistani national identity is a 
perpetual source of regret and anxiety among these many informants. Pakistan no longer 
embodies for them the priorities of unity and solidarity to which they subscribed as 
student Muslim League workers. On the contrary, Pakistan today is divided, Muslim 
against Muslim, and the few minorities that have survived the increasingly puritanizing 
environment have become the subjects of a campaign of violence supported explicitly 
and implicitly by the government of Pakistan.  
 Once charged with unifying its people, today Pakistan’s government has become 
an instrument of oppression, isolating and persecuting minorities, much to the chagrin of 
many who think of themselves as Pakistan’s founders. These self-proclaimed “founders,” 
former students of Aligarh University who were active in the demand for Pakistan, 
however, disdain just as equally the rise of regional, ethnic and linguistic nationalisms 
that they see as a challenge to the unmarked Muslim Pakistani identity. And the 
minorities are blamed for its disintegration. This lament for Pakistan is perhaps best 
summarized in the words of former Aligarh student Abdul Rashid Khan. “Think of those 
times in 1944. The aim was… to build up culture for the Muslims. Now [in Pakistan] we 
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are not Muslims, we are Sindhis, we are Punjabis, we are all that… the nation-building 
spirit has gone.”43 
 
ALIGARH AND BANGLADESH 
In Bangladesh, the six narrators I was able to locate with the assistance of the 
Bangladesh chapter of the Aligarh Muslim University Old Boys Association offered 
some of the most surprising commentary on partition experience. All but one of these 
narrators had been in Aligarh between 1942 and 1949 and active in the Muslim League 
demand for Pakistan to some degree. They describe an institution whose reputation had 
spread far and wide, that had provided Muslim lawyers throughout India, and that was 
widely recognized for its academic achievement and the prestige that its graduates 
carried. For two of the narrators, coming from Sylhet, Aligarh represented their only 
option for an education in Engineering, as there were few seats available for minorities in 
Bengal. The final informant, Professor Akhtaruzzaman of Dhaka University, was a 
student in AMU during the 1990s as he completed his Ph.D. Though he is much younger 
(born in 1961) his story touches on similar themes as those from the earlier period, 
revealing continuity over a long period.  
The institution that the Bengalis describe is substantively similar to the one 
described by others during the 1940s. These narrators, too, tout the importance and 
uniqueness of the university’s disciplinary system, and how this system lent credibility to 
Aligarh’s reputation. Habibur Rahman emphasized the university’s independence from 
                                                
43 Khan, "Abdul Rashid Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas." 
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the government; whereas in other universities, like the Jamia Millia Islamia, the 
Chancellor was appointed by the government, in Aligarh there was “no Chancellor from 
Government.  The Nawab of Hyderabad was the Chancellor.  It was completely 
independent.”44 These narrators also describe the influence of the Muslim League, though 
they tend to reveal more ambivalence in their allegiance to its ideology. Salahuddin 
Chowdhury, for instance, described himself as basically non-political, but when I asked 
about Pakistan, he conceded, that the idea of Pakistan was “more or less not 
controversial” and that he was “not [a] very active member. But supporter. I had to 
support this, but not as an active member.”45 His comments reveal the pressure that 
Aligarh students were under to conform to the League agenda. Both Mohiuddin Khan and 
his childhood friend Waheeduddin Chowdhury, who shared a room in AMU, shared the 
Leftist inclinations of the Students’ Federation, and even attended a rally in Delhi in 
1947.46 Despite these political differences, none betray their faith in the mission of the 
university. The university, especially during times of disruption provided safe haven. 
These students traveled a great distance to attend AMU, they had no option of returning 
home during periods of unrest. Therefore, for them, the university’s protective capacity 
was particularly significant.  
                                                
44 Rahman, "Habib Ur Rahman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas February 20, 2010." 
45 Chowdhury, "Salahuddin Chowdhury: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas April 10, 2010." 
46 An article on the session in The Student notes that “in the procession were a large contingent of Muslim 
students—many of them were from Aligarh in their black sherwanis and Jinnah caps. Together with the rest 
of the procession they joined their voices in the resounding slogans of: ‘Hindu-Muslim nahi larenge!’ 
‘Angrezo-per war karenge!’ (‘Hindus and Muslims will not fight each other!’ ‘Together we shall fight the 
British!’” "Forward to New Battles!: The A.I.S.F. Conference, Delhi," The Student: Journal of the All India 
Students Federation (January 1947). 
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These stories, however, when they focus on the events of partition, are 
substantively different from those I heard in India. Whereas Indian informants strove to 
minimize the sense of disruption in the Aligarh environment, these stories focus on 
disruption, both public and personal. Waheeduddin Choudhri recounted to me in a long, 
winding narrative, the difficulty he had in reaching Aligarh during the summer of 1946, 
when the city of Calcutta, through which he would have had to transit, was in the throes 
of a communal conflict known as the Great Calcutta Killings. After leaving his home in 
Sylhet—more specifically, Maulvi Bazaar, where he was in school—he headed for 
Calcutta, but  
I could not reach Calcutta. I was advised by somebody that ‘You don’t go to Calcutta.’ Calcutta 
was very much disturbed. ‘You go to Bardhaman, by Loop Line.’ From there, I took a train and 
somehow I reached Aligarh. Once I reached Aligarh, I was safe there. The university authorities 
had an arrangement in the railway station for the students who were going and reaching there. So 
ultimately, I reached Aligarh.47 
 
Throughout the interview I conducted with Choudhri, he repeated aspects of this story 
multiple times: “there is trouble in Calcutta;” “I went to Bardhaman;” “I just used to sit 
down, in khaki dress;” “it was a very disturbing time.” He links the disturbances in the 
country very tightly to his own experience of a disrupted and dangerous train journey. He 
realized, traveling in the train, that his only hope for safety was to change his plans, keep 
a low profile (khaki dress) and not to draw attention to himself (by sitting still). 
Throughout the interview, this is the only reference he makes to unrest in the country, 
and it is metonymically represented by his own disrupted train ride. Like others, however, 
                                                
47 Engineer Waheeduddin Choudhri, "Waheeduddin Choudhri: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas 
April 6, 2010," (Dhaka, Bangladesh: April 6, 2010). 
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he described the safety of Aligarh, the sense that once he arrived on the train platform, 
that he was safe.  
Like other Indian narrators, Waheedudin also described the presence of the army, 
dispatched by the government to protect the university. However, as before, the 
chronology is difficult to follow, incorporating experiences from 1946 and 1947 into a 
continuous chain. In the middle of describing his disrupted train journey in 1946, 
Waheeduddin began to describe the efforts of the government in 1947 to protect the 
university by dispatching first Nawab Ismail Khan, a Muslim leader, but close friend of 
the Nehru family, and, in 1948, Zakir Husain, to lead the institution. Although 
Waheeduddin and his friend Mohiuddin (who was present and participated in this 
interview) describe themselves as Leftists--supporters of Pakistan but more invested in 
Leftist ideology—here they, too, place their faith for the university’s survival in the 
Indian nationalist leadership.  
The values these students learned at Aligarh have indeed stayed with them, and 
Pakistan, despite its impossibility in reality, has persisted as a guiding idea—a federation 
of states, that is—that remains important to them. This is especially significant in light of 
the persecution that those who were seen to have allied with Pakistan during 1971 have 
faced in Bangladesh since liberation.48 These narrators have felt a connection to Pakistan, 
though, M.A. Rashid, the businessman, offered a critique of life in the Western state 
similar to that of Indian Muslims.  
                                                
48 Ari Bassin, "Justice or Charade in Dhaka?," International Justice Tribune, no. 123 (March 2, 2011). 
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Karachi was like machines, you see. People had no time for social jobs, you see. So I never like. I 
always liked Dhaka. People here, my neighbor here and there , any function they come. If there is 
any trouble, we help each other. They are very friendly and social. But Karachi people, no! 
Somebody stays in one building in some flat and down on the ground floor does not know who is 
staying. If somebody dies, they do not go for his burial. They were very business-type people.49 
 
In his critique of the values of Pakistan, we hear his lament about the absence of 
cooperation. Whereas these Bangladeshis still hold tight to the possibility of federation, 
of a system based on “mutual cooperation,” and helping one another, Pakistanis have 
changed. This change can be seen at the heart of the conflict between Pakistan’s two 
wings. 
 
THE CASE OF BANGLADESH 
In Bangladesh, it is perhaps not surprising that the 1947 partition does not serve 
as a central motif in the official national history. Rather, it is one of three partitions 
(1905, 1947, 1971), and seen as only a stepping stone on the way to full independence, 
achieved after the war with Pakistan in 1971. This variation marks an important 
difference with the national stories of both India and Pakistan in which, I am arguing, 
partition serves to reorient the experience of social and political relations.  
In Bangladesh, 1971 definitively serves this role, but the tensions born out of the 
making of the state of Pakistan in 1947 were the fuel for the conflict that resulted in the 
independence of Bangladesh, thus fortifying my suggestion that the 1947 partition was a 
lengthy and drawn out process, and did not end in 1947 or even 1948. The identity 
politics that determined the nature of the relationship between Pakistan’s East and West 
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wings were not only continuous in a longer view of Muslim nationalism before partition, 
linked to the basic political conflict between the Congress and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan as 
early as the late nineteenth-century.50 They persisted until the crisis became so acute that 
the East Pakistanis felt they could no longer remain part of Pakistan without recognition. 
The efforts of the Pakistani establishment to narrowly determine the boundaries of 
belonging, and the content of Pakistani identity, resulted in terrible violence perpetrated 
by the Pakistani government and military upon Pakistan’s Bengali majority and the 
severing of ties between the two wings.  
The narrators whose stories are collected here represent a small but unique group. 
I conducted several interviews with Bangladeshi men who were students at Aligarh 
University during the 1940s, and actively supported the Muslim League and worked for 
Pakistan. These narrators settled in East Pakistan, and remained there throughout the war 
that resulted in the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Because my collection is so 
limited, I have also analyzed interviews collected in Ahmad Salim’s 2009 oral history 
collection Reconstructing History: Memories, Migrants, and Minorities.51 The 
backgrounds of Salim’s narrators are more varied, and not always clear. In addition, I have 
used a few interviews with former Aligarians collected and preserved by the Citizens 
Archive of Pakistan, “a non profit organization dedicated to Cultural and Historic 
                                                
50 And later, the Muslim League, founded in 1906. Many early League leaders were connected to Sir 
Sayyid and the Aligarh Movement. 
51 Although these interviews provide a diversity of views, Salim provides little to no biographical 
information on the informants, which compromises their value as “life history” interviews, in my opinion. I 
have used several excerpts from these interviews below, but lack any contextualizing (age, profession, 
birthplace, etc.) information for each narrator’s comments. Salim, ed., Reconstructing History: Memories, 
Migrants, and Minorities. 
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Preservation… [that has] focused its attention on the tradition of oral story-telling in 
Pakistan, emphasizing the importance of such narratives in a dialogue on national 
identity.”52 Together, these sets of stories give us a complex picture of the human 
experience of the conflict between East and West Pakistan that resulted in the 
independence of Bangladesh. 
The historically rooted perceptions of difference that divided the North Indian 
Muslim from the Bengali Muslim through deeply rooted and gendered rhetoric, persisted 
from the mid-nineteenth-century into the mid-twentieth. Though they originated in 
colonial notions of “martial” and “effeminized” races, they lasted beyond the temporal 
boundaries of British domination.53 Although Bengali Muslims had been enthusiastic 
supporters of the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan, they were never allowed 
to become fully privileged citizens of an independent Pakistani state. The Government of 
Pakistan used a variety of tactics to prevent the assumption of the majority by the 52% of 
the population that was Bengali, going so far as first to re-draw the boundaries of the 
provinces—the “One Unit” scheme54—and then to dismiss the parliament after the 
electoral victory of the Bengali-led Awami League in 1970.  
Muslim League leaders, and later, West Pakistanis were willing to preach a 
message of unity as long as it fortified their own political power.  However, shortly after 
the creation of Pakistan, the East Pakistanis came to be seen as a liability.  They were 
                                                
52 "The Citizens Archive of Pakistan," http://www.citizensarchive.org/index.php. 
53 Sinha, Colonial Masculinity. Streets, Martial Races. 
54 The One Unit Scheme amalgamated all of the provinces of West Pakistan into one province thus nearly 
equalizing the percentage of the population in each state, creating a false sense of West Pakistani regional 
unity and providing a bulwark against the possibility of a Bengali representative majority in government.  
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spatially marginalized, and seen as weak and backward.  The perception of Bengali 
effeteness or weakness that had survived British colonialism was combined with the 
sense that East Pakistan was undeveloped, unable to be self sufficient, thus feeding the 
West Pakistani sense of superiority and paternalism.  As General Wajahat told me,   
At the time of Partition East Pakistan was in a very bad way, [it was] very backward.  By way of 
administration, there was no infrastructure and [it was] very poorly administered and of course, 
they had—except for jute—there were hardly any resources.  We did a lot for East Pakistan.  We 
established for East Pakistan one of the world’s best inland water transport systems for inland 
communications.  The Chittagong harbor, which was nothing, just a very small port really, at the 
time of Partition, was developed by us into a first class port and harbor.  Similarly, Dhaka, which 
was a very backward small town was developed into a modern town.  All the infrastructure, post 
and telegraph, railways, internal water communications—and the main thing was the development 
of the cantonment and the creation of the East Pakistan armed forces—was done entirely by the 
Federal Government at the expense of West Pakistan.55 
 
I quote this passage at length to demonstrate the masculinist rhetoric of the West 
Pakistanis (here, an Aligarian).  In this formulation, the East Pakistanis are characterized 
as weak and inept, utterly dependent on the goodwill and financial resources of the West.  
In addition, the services that General Wajahat so proudly claims credit for taking to the 
East are the very same ones that the British so proudly established in India during their 
rule.56  He explicitly associates development with colonial modernity and military 
infrastructure.  General Wajahat went on to claim that the East Pakistanis were ungrateful 
for the support of the West and accused the West of stealing revenue from jute exporting, 
which he claims “wasn’t very much.”  He delegitimizes the claims of the East Pakistanis 
                                                
55 Wajahat Husain, "Major General Wajahat Husain (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas July 8, 
2005," (Lahore: July 8, 2005). 
56 It is reasonable to characterize the relationship between West and East Pakistan, in fact as a “colonial” 
one, marked by the same exploitative commercial and political tactics of the recently deposed British 
Imperial regime. See also "Introduction" to Minault, Gender, Language, and Learning, 5. 
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and privileges the development of the military cantonment as the ultimate marker of West 
Pakistani generosity.   
Significantly, he speaks at length about the unsuitability of Bengalis for military 
service.  They had been underrepresented in the British Indian Army and had to be 
trained for the Pakistan Army, but, he suggested,  
initially we had problems with the East Pakistanis because of their physical—I wouldn’t say 
disability… but they were weaker, physically, than Pakistanis.  As a result of that, they did not 
conform to the physical standards required for the infantry or the armored corps.  Eventually, we 
lowered the physical standards for the East Pakistanis, so much so that the whole armored corps 
suffered on account of that, by lowering the physical standards.  When we got the first lot, I 
remember only three or four in my squadron.  They were clever, they were intelligent, they were 
better educated, they were more open-minded in many respects, than any West Pakistani Punjabi 
or Pathan soldier.  But, as far as their professional side was concerned they were very weak on the 
physical side.57 
 
Again Wajahat deploys colonial rhetoric to describe the Bengalis, as “weak” and “clever” 
and draws on the British theory of  “martial races” to identify strong Pakistani soldiers 
with Punjabis and Pathans.  He blames Bengalis for compromising the quality of the 
Pakistan Army, perhaps to account in part for the loss of the West Pakistan Army to the 
Bengalis in 1971. 58   
The lie of Bengali effeminacy was, of course, exposed by “the loss of East 
Pakistan,” an event still seen in Pakistan as purely the result of Indian intervention to the 
extent that, in Pakistan, the 1971 war is seen as a war with India rather than as a civil war 
waged by an alienated segment of Pakistani society. Dr. Tariq Rehman of Islamabad was 
a cadet in the Pakistan Military Academy in 1971. He told Ahmad Salim that the people 
of Pakistan have been “brainwashed” into believing that the war of 1971 was “an Indian 
                                                
57 Husain, "Major General Wajahat Husain (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas July 8, 2005." 
58 However, he primarily accounts for this failure of West Pakistani masculinity by blaming the conniving 
Indian forces who “infiltrated” the East Pakistani militias. Ibid. 
 313 
conspiracy or Bangladeshi deviance.”59 It is impossible to miss the sexualized rhetoric 
here, and it points to the importance of taking a long view of the tensions between East 
and West Pakistan that allows us to see the impact of long-established racist theories of 
Bengali inadequacy that posed a challenge to the myth of Punjabi masculinity and had 
very concrete consequences for national unity.  
Language has been elevated to the heart of the conflict between East and West 
Pakistan, and Jinnah’s 1948 speech designating Urdu as the national language as the 
critical moment marking West Pakistani intransigence, but if the conflict is to be seen in 
the context of a challenge to the Two Nation Theory, then we must confront the 
suspicions that Bengalis belonged to a different nation from the North India elite who 
determined the “Nation” in the first place. The inability of West Pakistan to transparently 
allow the Bengalis into the hallowed halls of the majority rests on more than a conflict 
over language (though we can see how the importance of a “national language” was 
deployed by Muslims earlier in their efforts to create a Muslim constituency) and is 
intimately linked to the earlier conflicts over race, caste, and class that provided the 
content for the initial drive to establish a differentiated Muslim constituency in North 
India. Bengalis could not be Pakistanis because they were seen as only nominally 
Muslim—mostly Hindu—and therefore, suspect.  
Ahmad Salim’s collection of oral histories includes an interview entitled 
“Treatment with Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan’s Family” in which the story of Dr. Norul 
                                                
59 Dr. Tariq Rehman, Islamabad in Salim, ed., Reconstructing History: Memories, Migrants, and 
Minorities, 72. 
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Huda of Dhaka University’s Department of Economics is retold by his brother-in-law. On 
the morning of March 26, 1971, the Pakistan army burst into Dr. Norul Huda’s home 
while he was reading the Quran. They “demanded to know his name and his religion, Dr. 
Huda told them his name and said, ‘I am a Bengali Muslim.’ The leader sarcastically 
remarked, ‘Can a Bengali be a Muslim?’” 60 This story, which I include here anecdotally, 
reveals the tensions between East Pakistanis and the West Pakistan Army. Included in the 
story is the charge that the Army leader took Dr. Norul Huda’s Quran and threw it on the 
floor. This narrative authorizes Dr. Norul Huda’s piety in two ways, he is characterized 
as a respected intellectual, though he had escaped the March 25 massacre of intellectuals 
and scholars, and as a devout, Quran-reading Muslim. It was as an act of defiance that he 
announced to the Pakistan Army leader “I am a Bengali Muslim” rather than simply 
stating his religion. As if in response to the question “What are you?” he states that he is 
a Bengali first, and a Muslim, an identity clearly abhorrent to the Pakistani establishment 
so intent on disciplining Bengalis into being Pakistanis. This defiance provoked a 
transgression by the Pakistani Army leader as he threw the sacred text to the ground. 
Even as the story establishes Dr. Norul Huda’s piety—it challenges the West Pakistani 
claim to a normative Muslim identity by describing the sacrilegious behavior of the 
Pakistani army officer. We learn nothing more of Dr. Norul Huda in this narrative, but it 
exposes a powerful moment of conflicting prejudices: the Pakistani Army is represented 
as hypermasculinized, anti-intellectual and blasphemous; the Bengali is represented as 
calm and collected, devout, and steadfastly loyal to his Bengali heritage.  
                                                
60 Ibid., 74. 
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Consider another story, from the pen of a Bangladeshi Hindu scholar whose father 
was killed by the Pakistan Army in 1971. Meghna Guha Thakurta’s father “met his death 
at the hands of the Pakistan Army in 1971 when he was accused of possessing an identity 
which he had always resisted, i.e. of being a Hindu. His professed identity of a humanist 
was not to be found anywhere in the vocabulary of Yahya Khan’s barbaric regime.”61 
Both the Hindu, definitively non-Pakistani, and the Bengali Muslim are challenged on the 
basis of their identities. In these cases, the Bengali cannot be a Muslim, and he cannot be 
not-Hindu.62 And in neither case, can he be treated as a fully privileged citizen of 
Pakistan, for the narrative of the state left little space for these identities. Many stories of 
this period reflect these kinds of conflicts, and from both of Pakistan’s wings. It seems 
that the forces of prejudice were as productive of the conflict between the two wings as 
any of the other, more easily identified conflicts over representation, language and 
economics. 
The Bangla Language Movement that fueled the desire for Bangladeshi 
independence captured the imaginations of millions of East Pakistanis, and combined 
with widespread perceptions of West Pakistani and particularly Punjabi oppression, 
served to draw in broad support for the resistance to West Pakistan. During this struggle, 
Urdu-speaking Muslims and non-ethnic Bengali East Pakistanis were opposed by ethnic 
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fact that he selected “none” in the Religion Section of his Foreign Service Application. In all of these cases 
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Bengalis demanding further recognition from the state of Pakistan.63 The graduates of 
Aligarh Muslim University with whom I spoke about their experiences during this 
difficult time were primarily Bengali-speaking, though several hail from Sylhet.64 Despite 
having attended Aligarh University and supported the demand for Pakistan, when their 
loyalty to Bengali identity came into conflict with loyalty to the Pakistani state, they 
placed their solidarity with the Bengali people and supported the demand for liberation.  
However, they protest the assertion that Sheikh Mujib’s desire was always for 
independence. Though the independence of Bangladesh was the result of armed struggle, 
and the Bengali people suffered extreme hardship, these narrators insist that their demand 
was first and foremost a demand for social justice. Although the Bengalis were not a 
numerical minority, they were treated as second-class citizens by West Pakistan, and 
particularly by Punjabis. Although these narrators fought for the independence of 
Pakistan, it was, in their minds, West Pakistan’s betrayal of the original dream of Muslim 
solidarity that led them to work for Bangladeshi independence.  
For the Bengali students at Aligarh, the allure of Pakistan was tied to their 
perceptions of the communal disharmony in their own home state. Habibur Rahman 
suggested that it was the history of Hindu oppression that drew him to League activity. 
As he told me, “the Hindus generally used to neglect the Muslims. And mostly in East 
                                                
63 Sarmila Bose’s 2011 book Dead Reckoning argues that more attention should be paid to the “civil war” 
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independent Bangladesh. Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War. 
64 Mohiuddin Khan of Dhaka told me “Sylheti is not a language, it is a dialect of Bengali. It is Bengali.” 
Khan, "Mohiuddin Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 28, 2010." 
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Pakistan.”65 He went on to explain the most significant aspect of the Bengali relationship 
to Pakistan, in his opinion, that “It was only in Bangladesh that all the MLAs were 
Muslims.” Rahman himself was very involved in student activism for Pakistan after 1944 
when he arrived at Aligarh. He even participated in training other students for election 
work. He credits the Bengali students with having been very influential in Pakistan work 
because they were “very intelligent” and “shrewd” and goes so far as to suggest that the 
Bengalis “made” Pakistan.66 His sentiments about Pakistan are similar to those of the 
non-Bengali students who were drawn in by the enthusiasm for Pakistan and Rahman 
characterizes the goal of their work as “the hope that there will be a change of the 
fortunes of people.”67 The hope that the Bengalis placed in Pakistan was the same as the 
hope the North Indian Urdu speakers did. Pakistan should empower the people, serve 
them, and bring them freedom from the oppressive Hindu majority. 
After the creation of Pakistan, however, Habibur Rahman said that it was not very 
long before he recognized that, “unfortunately, the army of West Pakistan, especially the 
Punjabis, were in control” of the implementation of the expected democracy. The 
fundamentally undemocratic imbalance of power represented by this outcome was deeply 
troubling to him, and to others who had fought for the independence of Muslims. He 
frequently reiterated to me that he was “very much in favor of the Pakistan Movement,” 
an active participant, and one who worked hard to learn about Pakistan and to participate 
                                                
65 He uses “East Pakistan” anachronistically here, referring to the period before 1947. Rahman, "Habib Ur 
Rahman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas February 20, 2010." 
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in activities to build support for Pakistan. It was only “when they started all these 
discriminations” that he felt there was nothing else he could do but join the Awami 
League opposition. Still, he insisted, “No one demanded complete separations.”68 Rather, 
East Pakistan, led by Mujibur Rahman, sought sovereignty over internal issues including 
Commerce, Industries, and currency, while granting Defence and Foreign Affairs 
portfolios to the center.  Sheikh Mujib’s Six Points were designed to restore the priorities 
of Pakistan’s original charter, The 1940 Lahore Resolution, to restore parliamentary 
democracy and to create a “Federation of Pakistan in its true sense.”69 The Pakistani 
government refused patently to accede to these demands and the conflict mounted. 
Contrary to Pakistani opinion, Habibur Rahman insisted, the movement for liberation was 
not made on “the insistence of India;” it was a demand for “self-existence!” This 
language aligns the demands of Bangladesh with the demands of Muslims during the 
Pakistan movement in the 1940s and especially with that of students seeking “self-
manifestation.”70  
 In fact, the extent to which the narratives of these two events, 1947’s partition and 
1971’s liberation, are made structurally similar is worthy of closer examination. Narrator 
Mohiuddin Khan, president of the Aligarh Old Boys’ Association, Dhaka 2009-2010, 
pointed out, that it was not Jinnah who rejected the Cabinet Mission plan, but that after 
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Congress rejected it, Jinnah was left with no choice but to push forward for Pakistan.71 
Similarly, Mohiuddin said it was “unfortunate” that East and West Pakistan parted. But 
he placed the burden on Pakistan’s unwillingness to treat East Pakistan with dignity. “If 
they only could have accommodated us, just a little bit.  It would have been different.  
We didn’t want separation.  Even Sheikh Mujib did not want separation throughout.”72 It 
was only upon Pakistan’s rejection of Sheikh Mujib’s Six Points that separation became 
inevitable. Mohiuddin, like Rahman, insisted that “we supported Pakistan. We fought for 
Pakistan” and this investment in Pakistan should have earned East Pakistanis the rights of 
full citizenship and participation in a democratic system. In the end, it was the 
unwillingness of the more powerful party to accommodate the weaker one that led to the 
separation. 
And as in the earlier Pakistan movement, it was the experience of oppression that 
drove these narrators into solidarity with their fellow countrymen and against the powers-
that-be. For these men, who had worked for Pakistan in the 1940s, the narrative was 
familiar, but the memory of Pakistani oppression remains fresh and painful. Mohiuddin 
described his initial attraction to Aligarh university as motivated by “this mood of Hindu-
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Muslim feelings [that] was on the forefront at that time to a large extent.”73 That the 
communal tension spurred his interest in Aligarh suggests that Mohiuddin sought an 
environment where he might be able to contest Hindu domination.  Even before he was 
admitted to Aligarh in 1946, he had been active in campaigning for the Muslim League 
candidates in Assam. He links his interest in League campaigning to the political 
situation in Assam, where he lived. He was influenced by the “atmosphere at that time, in 
the year 1946. Throughout India more of this communal politics was coming up and the 
British wanted to leave and the demand for Pakistan [was] growing. So, naturally,” he 
says, “we supported the Pakistan Movement at that time.”74 His attachment to Pakistan 
was “natural” considering the political situation at the time. Similarly, Mohiuddin 
describes his later opposition to the administration of West Pakistan as a “natural” result 
of the feeling of being “cheated some way or other by revenue.”  
East Pakistanis saw West Pakistan developing infrastructure at a faster rate, and 
felt that their province was being neglected.75 This complaint against the West is 
enshrined in three of Mujibur Rahman’s Six Points. The third point demands “effective 
constitutional provisions… to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan;” the 
fourth point addresses uneven distribution of tax revenue between the two wings, and the 
fifth point addresses the need to abolish customs duties on products produced in one 
                                                
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 An appraisal of Pakistan’s economic policy reveals that it was overly concerned with protecting industry 
at the expense of agricultural development. Since East Pakistan’s economy was driven by agricultural 
production, “a transfer of resources from agriculture to industry also implies a transfer from the East to the 
West Wing, since during the period under review more than 60 per cent of East Pakistan’s gross output 
originated in agriculture and about 40 per cent in West Pakistan.” Keith Griffin and Azizur Rahman Khan, 
eds., Growth and Inequality in Pakistan (London: Macmillan 1972), 29. 
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wing, and sold in the other.  The complaint about unfair distribution of revenue and 
uneven levying of taxes is a persistent one, and more than one narrator expressed it.76 
Mohiuddin noticed these disparities not long after partition and began “surreptitiously” 
(because he was a government employee) to attend “these meetings where Mr. Fazlul 
Huq was delivering his speech about his activities in the Assembly.”77 By the time of the 
language movement, he told me, “I was against remaining Pakistan.” It was West 
Pakistan’s inability to allow East Pakistan fully to participate in the representative 
democracy that hardened him to it, and he felt a tremendous sense of triumph upon the 
success of the Bangladesh liberation movement.  
Mohiuddin’s close friend, Engineer Waheeduddin Choudhri, shared his Leftist 
ideals, but in retrospect was less willing to concede his support for Pakistan. He 
suggested, rather, that Pakistan was not the fulfillment of his Leftist ideals; he sought a 
United India from the outset. At the time of partition, he said, “I could not say at that time 
I am a Pakistani or I am an Indian. Everything was in a fluid state. As I told you, we 
neither used to support Pakistan, nor used to support India. We were Leftists. In fact, we 
wanted to have a Leftist United India.”78 He clarified that what he hoped for was a United 
India and a democratic state. When I pressed him on support of Bangladesh, by asking 
“Did you support independence of Bangladesh?” he replied, correcting me, “Actually, we 
did not support Pakistan; so we neither wanted East Pakistan nor West Pakistan, but 
Bengal. We wanted another state.” Waheeduddin is attached to a concept of Bengal as a 
                                                
76 See also Rahman, "Habib Ur Rahman: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas February 20, 2010." 
77 Khan, "Mohiuddin Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 28, 2010." 
78 Choudhri, "Waheeduddin Choudhri: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas April 6, 2010." 
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whole, and as distinct from East Pakistan. While he would not commit to having earlier 
supported Pakistan or India, he now enthusiastically cast his support behind Bengal. 
Bengal, it appears, embodied the values for which he had been fighting all along.  
Cast in these ways, there is immediate continuity between the demand for 
Pakistan and the demand for Bangladeshi liberation. Waheeduddin’s anxiety about 
attaching himself to East Pakistan exposes the discomfort he had with what Pakistan 
represented. Undoubtedly, his memories are colored by his traumatic experiences with 
his family in Chittagong during the 1971 war, but his insistence that Pakistan was a 
misrepresentation of his ideals seems an important lens on the relationship between 1947 
and 1971. 1971 clarified questions of belonging for Bengali Muslims, even as it 
challenged the foundation of the identity of Pakistan. 
 
REFLECTING  
As the narrators whose stories are collected here reflect on these experiences, they 
betray the complexities of their memories and experiences through imperfect attempts to 
align their personal stories with the readily accessible official narratives. It is the 
imperfections in this process that remind us of the complexities of independence, 
partition and liberation in South Asia. Whether the questions are of belonging, triumph/ 
failure, inclusion/ exclusion or past/present/future, they reveal deeper processes of 
reconciliation that narrators have gone through in trying to establish their own identities 
as citizens of states and supporters of certain ideological movements. We have seen this 
earlier with the conflict between Pakistan’s triumphal narrative of its own creation 
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contrasted with a persistent effort by several narrators to place “the blame” for the 
creation of Pakistan on the shoulders of India’s leadership, especially Nehru and Patel. 
Mohiuddin Khan and Habibur Rahman replayed this process when they argued that 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not really seek independence from Pakistan, but was forced 
into it by West Pakistani intransigence. Unwittingly, they cast a shadow over the 
possibility that Bangladesh was the triumphant outcome of a War of Liberation by 
obscuring the motives of the leaders behind the conflict.  This section examines several 
points of slippage in the stories of narrators from all three collection projects: my own 
with Aligarh graduates, Ahmad Salim’s conducted in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and that 
of the Citizen’s Archive of Pakistan. They sit together here because they do not fit 
comfortably elsewhere, and I use them to expose some of the complications of 
remembering through the lens of the state and the nation. 
Several interviews with enlisted Pakistan Army men from Pind Dadan Khan 
appear in Ahmad Salim’s collection.79 These interviews reveal the firsthand perceptions 
of the men who fought for the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, and expose the lasting 
anxiety over the challenge the Bengalis presented to Pakistani identity. Without 
hesitation, these soldiers identify the Bengalis as traitors, and make the point that in East 
Bengal it was impossible to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims. As Laal Khan 
argued, “Mukti Bahini and India were involved in this conspiracy. Bengalis did not 
                                                
79 The village is located in the Jhelum District of Pakistan’s Punjab Province. 
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behave with us. Mukti Bahini consisted of both Hindus and Muslims of Bengal.”80 All of 
these narrators were made Prisoners of War, and their bitterness towards the Bengalis 
must be read in that context.  However, it reveals West Pakistani anxiety about the ability 
of Bengalis to fit into the Pakistani national identity. They are cast as indistinguishable 
from both Hindus and Indians, thus casting doubt on their very Pakistani-ness, an identity 
rooted in a different linguistic history and martial tradition. However, by the logic of the 
Two Nation Theory, this “Pakistani” identity should have been distinctly different from 
both Hindu and Indian identity. Ironically, perception that these boundaries were blurred 
in East Pakistan clarifies some of the terrific anger that remains in Pakistan about 
Bangladeshi independence. The 1971 war cannot be remembered as a Civil War because 
West Pakistan’s adversaries in East Pakistan were not real Pakistanis, they did not share 
those elements of identity—language, faith, history—so critical to the Two Nation 
Theory. Because of the role played by India, Pakistanis easily push the East Bengalis out 
of the shared identity of “Us”—Muslims, Pakistanis—and into that of “them”—Non-
Muslims, Indians; the war of 1971 becomes an international conflict as well as an 
interstate one. 
West Pakistanis who had some experience in East Pakistan see the situation more 
sympathetically. With regard to the relationship between East and West Pakistan, 
narrators on both sides of the borders see a parallel situation between the pre-partition 
environment, and the post-partition one. However, as Captain Wazir Hasan of Karachi 
                                                
80 Laal Khan, Pind Dadan Khan in Salim, ed., Reconstructing History: Memories, Migrants, and 
Minorities, 136. 
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pointed out in an interview with the Citizens Archive of Pakistan, the personnel had 
changed. He recounted his experiences in Chittagong in the 1950s, “When the West 
Pakistanis went there… we thought we were the rulers and they are the subjects. One of 
the supervisors—a Hindu—said, that ‘Before the British were ruling, and now you are 
ruling us. So what is the difference? Where is the independence?’”81 Considering the 
depth of the anxiety that persists in Pakistan today over “the loss of East Pakistan,” I was 
surprised to hear recognition of the Pakistan Army’s oppression and sympathy for the 
plight of East Pakistanis from several narrators who spoke with interviewers from the 
Citizens Archive of Pakistan. Narrator Moinuddin Khan, who lived in Dhaka, East 
Pakistan briefly in the 1950s, echoed Captain Hasan’s remarks when he suggested that 
West Pakistanis had been aware of the mistreatment of East Pakistanis. Moinuddin 
lamented, “West Pakistanis thought of themselves, having gone there, that ‘We are the 
Badshahs of this place.’ This [attitude] was there, and we saw it, we heard it, we 
tolerated it.”82 He went on to criticize the overreaction by the Pakistan Army to East 
Pakistani resistance.83 Moinuddin clarified his own position, saying that as an educated 
person, he never could understand the reason for enmity between the two peoples. 
Moinuddin’s comment here seems rooted in the complicated legacy of outward tolerance 
that was fostered at Aligarh and easily became synonymous with interethnic, 
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82 Moinuddin Khan, "Moinuddin Khan: Interview with Sara Ansari, Citizens Archive of Pakistan 
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interlinguistic Muslim solidarity, but also recognizes that the tension between the two 
wings was deeper than the agitations surrounding the Bangla language movement. After 
all, West Pakistani resistance to East Pakistani parity itself had deeper roots in a history 
of anti-Bengali feeling and the perception of fundamental difference between the peoples 
of the two wings.  
However, Moinuddin refers to Pakistan as a whole when he says, “The first time 
Pakistan had to suffer while it was made. The second time Pakistan suffered when East 
Pakistan separated.”84 Here again, the events of 1971 become equivalent to the events of 
1947 and both are cast as traumas to Pakistan. The violence of 1947 marked the troubled 
beginning to the fulfillment of the solidarity agenda that the students of Aligarh 
University had pursued, and 1971 can be seen as its collapse. This sense of a double 
trauma emerges in East Pakistan, too. Salena Hussain of Dhaka, who was a recent 
graduate in 1971 told Ahmad Salim, “We as a nation suffered twice; in 1947, when as 
Muslims we crossed the border from India and again in 1971 as Bengalis living in East 
Pakistan.”85 Whether speaking from the East Pakistani or West Pakistani sides of the 
border, it seems, 1971 and 1947 are too intimately connected to be considered separately.  
Salena Hussain draws attention to the trauma of “living in” East Pakistan during 1971.  
Whereas in 1947 the trauma was one of displacement, in 1971 the trauma was an 
everyday fear. For as Bangladeshi historian Meghna Guha Thakurta has suggested, 
“What is crucial to note is that violence also typifies a state where a sense of fear is 
                                                
84 Ibid. 
85 Salena Hussain, Dhaka in Salim, ed., Reconstructing History: Memories, Migrants, and Minorities, 130. 
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generated and perpetrated in such a way as to make it systemic, pervasive and 
inevitable.”86 Whereas 1947 introduced fear on the campus of Aligarh University, 1971 
brought fear, wholesale, to East Pakistan. Bangladeshi poet, Taslima Nasrin sums up the 
relationship of the two events in her poem “Denial”; she writes “That man who fought in 
71 and won/ That man who thrashed away the two-nation theory/ He can never accept 
defeat at the hands of 47.”87 In other words, “1971 challenged and rejected 1947.”88 But it 
is worth noting that 1971 became a necessity because of the ways in which 1947 remade 
the social and political environment of each of Pakistan’s wings. Further, there are 
distinct narrative parallels in the ways that both experiences are remembered and retold: 
like Indian Muslims, East Pakistanis were marginalized by a group with greater political 
power (if not numerical); East Pakistanis sought compromise with Sheikh Mujib’s Six 
Points, as the Muslim League did in the Cabinet Mission; the West Pakistanis, like the 
Indian National Congress, dismissed these efforts, shut down talks, and forced a 
catastrophically violent division that resulted in triumphant, though troubled, “liberation.”  
The independence of Bangladesh is widely believed to have presented the major 
substantive challenge to the “Two Nation Theory” that had become the basis of the 
demand for Pakistan. This is the suggestion that there were irreconcilable and 
fundamental differences between Muslims and Hindus that created an impossible 
situation for cohabitation. It was not possible for Hindus and Muslims to live together, 
                                                
86 Guha Thakurta, "Uprooted and Divided." 
87 Taslima Nasreen, "Poems on Partition," Ibid., no. 510 (2002). 
88 Cited in Jasodhara Bagchi and Subhoranjan Dasgupta, "The Problem," Ibid., no. 510 (February 2002).  
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or—despite a history to the contrary—peacefully to govern one another. This latter 
suggestion, of course, really only means that it would be impossible for Muslims to be 
governed by non-Muslims, as it was precisely the history of Muslim governance over 
non-Muslims that gave substance to the Muslim reformers’ aspirations to power. How 
persuasive was the Two Nation Theory in the minds of young Muslims who desired the 
fulfillment of Pakistan? Combined with their existing perceptions about the injustice of 
Hindu power—facilitated by Jinnah and the Muslim League in the late 1930s—the Two 
Nation Theory gave a name to their perception of difference from majority Hindus that 
had been quantified in census and political data since the late nineteenth-century.  
However, in many interviews, there is a persistent desire to recover Hindu-
Muslim amity. In India, this impulse finds a home in the Indian national story of 
“composite culture” that deploys evidence of hundreds of years of Hindu-Muslim 
cohabitation that is best articulated in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery of India. With 
reference to Bangladesh, Hindu-Muslim harmony is elevated as an indicator of difference 
between the cultures of East and West Pakistan. The Bengalis were early and ardent 
supporters of the Pakistan Movement, primarily because there was an already established 
struggle between Hindu landlords and Muslim farmers. The Pakistan demand politicized 
and communalized this struggle; young Muslims recognized its priorities and were drawn 
into its fold. However, when it became clear, particularly after 1952, that West Pakistani 
rule had displaced British and Hindu domination in East Bengal, the East Pakistanis made 
a similar push for parity under the law as the Muslim League had made in British India.  
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For many narrators, this challenge to Pakistan’s founding narrative is a bit sad, 
rather than triumphant. As Anwar Ahsan Siddiqui suggested in an interview collected in 
Karachi by Ahmad Salim, the independence of Bangladesh was “a tragic event and it tore 
the two-nation theory into pieces and along with it, the hearts of its people. The fact is 
that the two-nation theory forwarded in 1947 became the basis of Pakistan; suddenly no 
life was left in it. And Hindus did not do it; Muslims finished it by themselves.”89 Anwar 
Ahsan Siddiqui went on to say that “unity forged on the basis of religion, race or 
nationalism is a false unity” because the “real issues were economic” and created conflict 
between the interests of special groups, especially landlords, and the wider public.90 
Tahira Mazhar Ali of Lahore agreed that Pakistan was created for economic reasons, but 
she recognized in Bengali resistance an important opportunity to build solidarity with 
East Pakistan, rather than as an unpatriotic challenge to Pakistan’s very foundation.  
In the face of the oppression in East Pakistan she called a meeting of the 
Anjuman-e-Taraqqi Pasand Khawateen (Association of Progressive Women) to protest 
the army action. Her views were unpopular in Lahore at the time, she said, and “people 
spat on us and called us traitors. We were arrested and my house was ransacked.”91 When 
pressed by the authorities to apologize for her behavior she argued that it would be too 
shameful to acquiesce to the injustice of army action in East Pakistan. Narrator Sayeed 
Hasan Khan in Karachi felt it was a “tragedy” that resulted in the infertility and 
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91 Tahira Mazhar Ali, Lahore in Ibid., 68. 
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barrenness of contemporary Pakistan. Whereas Bengal and Sindh had “contributed the 
most in the creation of Pakistan,” the Bengalis were treated as “traitors.”92 Whether they 
see it as a betrayal or a failure, all recognize that the 1971 independence of Bangladesh 
was not in the original plan.  
In contrast to the sense among Pakistani narrators that leaving India represented 
no “loss,” the conflict with East Pakistan cannot be seen as anything but a loss. The “loss 
of East Pakistan” remains the most humiliating moment in Pakistan’s short history, 
almost totally excised from official memory.  It represents a fundamental failing of 
Pakistani masculinity, and cannot be easily incorporated into a narrative of national 
triumph.  
Whereas Bengalis today are triumphant, Pakistanis increasingly point out that 
Bangladesh is doing better than Pakistan, and this is used as evidence that the idea of 
Pakistan has been fully, and perhaps finally, degraded. As Mr. Salman Khaliq of Lahore, 
who was Senior Superintendent of Police in East Pakistan in 1971 wished, “I want to visit 
Bangladesh. I want to tell them that the Bengalis did not leave us. We left the Bengalis. 
We could have had a great country, instead now we have a terror ridden and a divided 
country.”93 As the Bangladeshis create an intimate link between the outcomes of 1947 
and 1971, drawing attention to the structural similarity, so too, Khaliq draws the outcome 
of 1971 onto the stage of the contemporary. The relevance of Pakistan’s founding 
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narrative provides a site for contestation not only over the meaning of the past, but 
perhaps most significantly, as a site for examining the present and even the future. 
This challenge to the founding narrative of Pakistan creates a complicated 
relationship to the past. Whereas many Pakistani narrators were deeply hesitant to 
confront the issue of “loss” with regard to India, they remain deeply injured by the “loss 
of East Pakistan.” It seems that when, as young men, the contributors to this project chose 
Pakistan, they chose the opportunity of fulfilling the promise of the Muslim solidarity 
agenda, and chose to leave behind the challenges of exclusion that they feared in an 
independent India, and as members of a permanent minority.  
Ironically, it was the establishment of a territorially defined nation-state, designed 
to ensure the political survival of the Muslim nation conceived of by Sir Sayyid that 
forced the profound disruption of Muslim institutions: educational, cultural, and 
religious.  In relocating the Aligarh community outside of the physical space in which its 
values were embodied, the “dense networks of interrelationships that defined the 
particularities of place”94 were dislocated and de-emphasized. With this in mind, the 
Aligarh Old Boys Associations of Pakistan and also of Bangladesh have made the 
(re)creation of such an institution their primary agenda.  
  
 All of these examples draw out the continuing relevance of the identity politics 
legitimized by the partition of India and their influence on formations of identity 
throughout the subcontinent. I have referred to these ongoing contestations as the 
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“partitioning” of the subcontinent, situations born of the original “Muslim Question” that 
not only was not solved by the 1947 Partition, but that, in fact, grew out of it. In order to 
understand the persistence of these questions about the relationship between identity and 
the state it is important to recognize the importance of partition’s influence on South 
Asian identity-making. In the case of Aligarh, the institution’s values, long hailed as 
progressive, have been deployed in the development of exclusionary narratives of 
belonging that both represented the necessity of an independent homeland, and then led 
to its demise. The logic of the Two Nation Theory that suggested a broad homogeneity 
among Muslims and fundamental difference from Hindus proved incapable of 
incorporating variations of practices among Muslims in diverse regions of the 
subcontinent. Similarly, despite the broad inclusivity of India’s “composite culture” 
narrative, Muslims present a persistent problem. That Muslims have been slower to 
develop than other minority groups is a self-fulfilling prophecy of the Muslim League 
argument of Muslim exclusion. Whereas Aligarh Muslims are in many cases best 
equipped to achieve success, they continue to identify with a narrative of Muslim 
marginalization in India.  Frequent episodes of communal unrest throughout India have 
meant that the tenuous status of Muslims—exemplified by their anxiety on the day of 
Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination—persists in some measure in daily life. Muslim loyalty 
continues to be suspect and Muslim success far from guaranteed. 
 The unsettled nature of these questions about belonging illuminate the need to 
expand our lens as we examine the outcomes of Partition/partitioning in the subcontinent. 
We cannot isolate the contemporary politics of hatred and exclusion currently being 
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played out in the subcontinent from the identity politics that created the conditions for the 
1947 partition. In all three post-partition states diverse groups compete for space and 
recognition; even as they do they develop exclusionary narratives that drive other groups 
out. The 1947 partition radically altered South Asian subjectivities, and its is aftermath 
life in South Asia has been characterized by a long series of “partitionings,” that demand 
further exploration. 
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Conclusion 
Aligarh University after 1947 
 
The Aligarh Muslim University, with its connections to both Pakistan and 
Bangladesh stands as a powerful symbol of the contested citizenship of Muslims in 
India.1 AMU represents both a place where Muslims can safely express themselves 
educationally and culturally, and a place where they are isolated from Indian society and 
politics. Its political history has vexed its position as the center of Muslim opinion and 
left it at the center of debates about Muslim loyalty. This complexity forms an important 
aspect of AMU’s legacy in South Asia, and provides a lens for examining the position of 
Indian Muslims. Aligarh is implicated in a complex matrix of historical, ahistorical, 
communal and secular forces in which it functions sometimes as a center and other times 
as a margin. My conclusions here examine some of the assumptions inherent in narratives 
that seek to railroad Aligarh’s legacy to one side or the other. 
The standard story about the Aligarh Muslim University, told by its advocates, 
places it as the center of education, organization and uplift for South Asia’s Muslims. 
This narrative, however, relies on a problematic, ahistorical elision that obscures the 
changes that have taken place there since the end of the nineteenth-century. Most 
discussions of the institution at Aligarh conflate the early period when Sir Sayyid and his 
cohorts operated the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College with the period after 1920 
                                                
1 Heads of state in all three countries, as well as other leaders, have passed through Aligarh University. For 
example, India: Zakir Husain (President), Hamid Ansari (Vice-President); Pakistan: Liaqat Ali Khan 
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(Governor General); Bangladesh: Muhammad Mansur Ali (Prime Minister), M.A.G. Osmani (Leader of 
Bangladeshi Liberation Forces);  
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when an Act of Parliament elevated the institution to become The Aligarh University.  
While this elision may seem harmless, it has very real historical consequences for our 
understanding of the role of Aligarh in Indian politics and whether it is seen as a center of 
Muslim education and culture—critical to Indian life and the maintenance of its values—
or as a center of Muslim life only—specifically of Muslim separatism—therefore 
marginal in independent India. The insistence of Aligarh’s well-wishers that it remains a 
critical site of Muslim opinion endangers it in the public sphere where for many others, 
including politicians, Aligarh is little more than a distracting irritation despite attempts to 
“nationalize” it after 1947. Aligarh’s legacy in India is viewed through its place as a 
former and potential center of Muslim politics, and its position outside the center of 
Indian life which has been facilitated both by the actions of Aligarh well-wishers and its 
critics.  
In the context of nineteenth-century India Sir Sayyid’s vision to bring modern 
education to the “backward” community of North Indian Muslims has been conceived as 
liberal.  His willingness to incorporate English and to look outside the traditionally 
narrow boundaries of Islamic education represented by the Deoband school were 
undoubtedly progressive, but in many ways, Aligarh’s political environment was defined 
by its conservatism.2 Sir Sayyid sought to preserve the influence of Muslims in India by 
nurturing an elite class qualified to take up government posts, and to represent Muslims 
in local government. His sights were set on the public services, and many of his wards 
                                                
2 I refer here to a Victorian conservatism: concern with proper upbringing, elegance and decorum that 
found sympathy with the traditional values of the Muslim elite. This conservatism was not necessarily 
religious. Though the university’s identity revolves around Muslim-ness, much evidence reveals that not 
only were students not driven by issues of faith and devotion, but they often interacted with their religion 
largely through its public rituals. In other words, it was less important to pray as a spiritual imperative than 
it was to be seen praying, as a disciplinary one. 
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went on to pursue careers there.3 Sir Sayyid and his compatriots argued for a separate 
examination for Muslims seeking positions in the services, and this movement led into a 
later demand for separate electorates.  Though he claimed his agenda to be purely 
educational, Sir Sayyid continually sought political protections for Muslims. He 
endeavored to carve out educational, political, and social space for them even as British 
fears over Muslim loyalty threatened to erode it away.  
Though Sir Sayyid died several years before the 1906 founding of the Muslim 
League in Dhaka, many of his collaborators in the Aligarh project were among its 
founding members. This created a tight link between the priorities of Muslim political 
organizing and the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College, later the Aligarh Muslim 
University. The tendency to examine the League, the institution at Aligarh and the 
Pakistan demand through the lens of the outcomes of 1947 has obscured the fact that the 
League was not always a separatist organization, and the University students and faculty 
were not always in solidarity with the League. As I have shown, it was not until the late 
1930s that students and faculty were drawn to the League’s agenda, having previously 
been largely in sympathy with the anti-imperialist motives of the Indian National 
Congress (even this nationalist sentiment marks a break with the British loyalism of Sir 
Sayyid). Aligarh’s priorities were always driven by the concerns of its local environment: 
anti-imperialism was driven by discontent with British staff, League sympathy was 
driven by the perception of Congress Ministry abuse of Muslims enshrined in the Pirpur 
Report, and the demand for Pakistan found support at Aligarh in the context of the 
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institution’s historical values of Muslim solidarity and support. To view Aligarh 
University through the static lens of 1947 is to freeze it in time, to disregard the 
environment of active debate and to imprison the institution’s future within the anxieties 
born of only one of its important political moments. 
In the memory of the larger Indian public, however, the significance of the events 
of 1947 overshadowed all of Aligarh’s earlier history except its first few years. And it is 
here that the elision of MAO and AMU takes on significant meaning. The legacy of the 
1940s and the participation of so many Aligarh students in the demand for Pakistan has 
permanently tainted the Aligarh Muslim University in the public eye as a hub of anti-
national activity, hidden its history of communal harmony and tolerance (even in 1947 
the Aligarh campus was quiet), and, oblivious to the conditions of its founding, linked it 
permanently to the specter of Muslim separatism. On the other hand, Aligarh insiders cast 
1947 as “exceptional” and seek to link AMU today to the values of its founder with his 
progressive educational agenda, to reach back to a more perfect time. As they try to 
establish their nationalist credentials they lionize Sir Sayyid as a representative of India’s 
“composite culture,” a great secularist who advocated peaceful co-existence of the two 
major communities. Both tendencies obscure the dynamic environment at Aligarh where 
opposing ideologies often emerged out of the same foundation.  It was not without 
contestation that supporters of The Muslim League, The Indian National Congress, and 
the Communist Party co-existed at Aligarh, but a failure to recognize the possibility does 
damage to the complexity of Aligarh’s legacy. 
The trends in Aligarh itself since Independence have perfectly established the 
tension between center and margin. Since 1947 it has been the explicit and determined 
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efforts of the central government to fund AMU that have kept it running, and attempted 
to save it from the stigma of its intimate association with the Muslim League demand for 
Pakistan. As Violette Graff observed, “Aligarh has become a key-symbol [sic] of the not 
altogether easy relationship which has developed between the Government of India and 
its secular policies on the one hand, and the Millat on the other hand.”4 The tensions at 
the heart of this relationship are those that complicate the position of Muslims throughout 
India. The government is responsible for ensuring the equitable treatment of Muslims, but 
it must always appease the sensibilities of the majority community. Disproportionate 
demands for recognition by Muslims raise anxieties over the potential for the 
development of a separate identity. Anxieties over Muslim power are linked immediately 
to the outcomes of partition and must be carefully handled.  
There is a contingent of alumni who continue to argue that Aligarh should be 
granted a special “Minority Character” enabling it to provide additional reservations for 
Muslim students. The outcome of the efforts in favor of the Minority Character would be 
to create—or to preserve—a realm created by and for Muslims, free of the meddling of 
outside forces. It would create “a protective nest”5 that some would say was Sir Sayyid’s 
intention when he founded the MAO College. 
The demand for “Minority Character” brings many of the tensions underlying 
Aligarh’s relationship to the Indian state and other communities to a head.6 Aligarh 
Muslim University is one of India’s twenty Central Universities, a designation that 
                                                
4 Graff, "Aligarh's Long Quest for 'Minority' Status: A.M.U. (Amendment) Act, 1981," 1771. 
5 Ibid., 1779. 
6 Violette Graff’s close study of the Demand for Minority Character exposes many of the issues at stake. 
My review here is deeply informed by her study and by that of Theodore Wright. See also Theodore P. 
Wright Jr., "Muslim Education in India at the Crossroads: The Case of Aligarh," Pacific Affairs 39, no. 1/2 
(Spring- Summer 1966). 
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indicates its incorporation by an Act of Parliament and marks it as a recipient of funding 
through the University Grants Commission.  Such central universities have a provision to 
“reserve” seats for students from certain low caste and tribal communities, who are 
assumed to come from a low Socio-Economic Status, and therefore deprived of many 
educational and employment opportunities.  In some cases, Muslims are included in the 
“Other Backward Castes” category, thus giving them an advantage in admissions.  
However, there is a large faction within the Aligarh Community that desires Aligarh to be 
kept apart, as an institution with “Minority Character,” and to be a special preserve of 
Muslims, with a 50% reservation for Muslims across the board.  Keeping in mind that a 
large percentage of Aligarh’s student body is comprised of “internal” candidates—those 
students who have attended an Aligarh University affiliated secondary institution like the 
City High School or Aligarh Women’s College—the vast majority of Aligarh students are 
Muslims.  The extension of the reservation implied by the push for “Minority Character” 
would go even further to exclude non-Muslims from the institution.   
This demand for separate consideration reinforces the anxieties about Aligarh’s 
relationship to the “separatist” Pakistan demand and draws Aligarh University into the 
public eye, where it comes under attack by those with a communal outlook.  As recently 
as August 7, 2010, IBN Live ran a story entitled “AMU Falsely Claiming to be a 
Minority Institution” that referred to the BJP allegation that Aligarh’s claims to Minority 
Status are precluded by its status as a Central University and its history of being 
incorporated by an act of Parliament—not by the actions of the Minority Community—
and that it is thus delinquent in fulfilling reservations for SC/ST/OBCs. Opponents of 
increasing reservations for Muslims, commonly known as “Minority Character,” say that 
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because AMU was founded by an act of Parliament, and not by a minority community 
itself, it is not eligible for additional reservations. Here we see the reduction of AMU’s 
significance to the bureaucratic instant of the university’s creation and the disavowal of 
Aligarh’s history beginning with the MAO College. 
As we have seen with the debates around the release of the Babri Masjid Verdict 
in late 2010, the Aligarh community itself is not unified in its perspective on the value of 
Minority Character. This conflict is linked to the tension between those Muslims who 
would seek to blend into India’s broader secular public by limiting the demands that they 
place as a community on the central government, and those who suggest that Muslims are 
already “marked” by virtue of their faith, and therefore deserve special protection and 
services from the government.  The tension here has been present in various guises since 
the earliest years of the MAO College’s existence when there was no consensus on the 
value of maintaining a close tie with the British government. Some Aligarh partisans 
admired the system of support developed in Deoband, where the institution was 
supported purely by donations from the Muslim community.7 The debates and 
disagreements over government loyalty came to a head during the demand for the 
Muslim University, and it was the incorporation of the University by an Act of 
Parliament during the height of the nationalist movement that remains at the heart of the 
current debate.8 Aligarh had long survived with some government support and some 
support from the community, but it had always remained apart from the world of India 
around it, an isolated environment whose residents developed familial bonds with one 
                                                
7 Minault and Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920." 
8 K.N. Wanchoo et al., "S. Azeez Basha and Anr Vs. Union of India on 20 October, 1967," (New Delhi: 
Union of India, October 20, 1967). 
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another, and a sense of difference with the worlds—defined by status, faith and region—
around them. 
As Professor Asloob Ahmad Ansari told me in the summer of 2008, Aligarh has 
always been somewhat isolated from other institutions in India.  The demand for 
“Minority Character” would deepen that difference, a move that is distasteful to many 
onlookers whose attitudes towards Aligarh have not softened much over time. In the final 
assessment, there are several aspects of its identity that keep Aligarh apart from the world 
outside. The relationship between Aligarh and the Indian state has deteriorated since the 
years immediately following partition when Zakir Husain brought his nationalist 
credentials to the institution and, with the government’s support, restored its academic 
standards.9 The persistence of anxieties surrounding the university’s very existence has 
resulted in its marginalization as a whole.  
Proponents of Minority Character defend it because they do not see any other 
institution making an effort for Muslims. This problem has persisted over a long period 
of time. Mohiuddin Khan of Dhaka credited his interest in Aligarh in 1946 in part to a 
recognition of the fact that because there were very few reserved seats, he “couldn’t get a 
seat” in Shibpur Engineering College by virtue of being both a Muslim and a Sylheti.10 
As Theodore Wright has noted, “admitting students and recruiting faculty for Aligarh 
strictly on ‘merit’ would mean swamping it with non-Muslims without any compensating 
                                                
9 Habib, "Irfan Habib: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas June 28, 2009.", Siddiqi, "Professor Ather 
Siddiqi (Ret'd): Personal Interview with Amber Abbas May 11, 2009." Graff, "Aligarh's Long Quest for 
'Minority' Status: A.M.U. (Amendment) Act, 1981," 1771.  
10 Khan was unable to get a seat reserved for Muslims or for Assamese or Sylhetis in Bengal Shibpur 
Engineering College. This, in part, he suggested, was because “[the seats] were limited and there was very 
hard competition… and there was again a difference between Assamese, Bengalis, Hindus and Muslims 
and all these combinations.” Unable to find a seat in an engineering college in Bengal that recognized 
either his ability or his religion or his region of origin, Mohiuddin set his sights on Aligarh, where he 
passed the competition and took his seat in 1946. Khan, "Mohiuddin Khan: Personal Interview with Amber 
Abbas March 28, 2010." 
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improvements in Muslim access to other institutions of higher education.”11 Aligarh has 
always seen its role as a unique one, designed to serve a particular class of Indians, but 
after partition, that agenda was called into question.  
Throughout the debates on Minority Character that have waxed and waned 
periodically over the last forty years, Aligarh’s situation has been uniquely problematic.  
Other institutions have been granted the privileges of Minority Character. Even the Jamia 
Millia Islamia, founded in part by Aligarh Old Boys, and led for many years by Zakir 
Husain, was awarded Minority Character in February 2011.12 The National Commission 
for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) deemed the Jamia’s appeal legitimate 
because “The Jamia Millia Islamia Act 1988, codified, declared, confirmed and 
encapsulated the continuous and preexisting factual and legal position of the Jamia by 
incorporating the existing institution formally under the Act as a central university…. 
Thus, the evidence on record clearly proves that since its inception, administration of the 
Jamia remained in the hands of Muslims.”13 The Commission clarified that Aligarh’s 
appeal, on the other hand, has repeatedly been denied in the wake of the Azeez Bhasha 
case in which the Supreme Court determined that “the MAO College had lost its identity 
by its conversion into the AMU, which was established by the AMU Act, 1920. In the 
instant case, the Jamia never lost its identity.”14 It is certainly worth considering the fact 
that the Jamia Millia Islamia, unlike the Aligarh Muslim University, has an unsullied 
nationalist pedigree, and though it has sometimes come under suspicion of harboring 
                                                
11 Wright Jr., "Muslim Education in India at the Crossroads: The Case of Aligarh," 61-62. 
12 Aarti Dhar, "Jamia Millia Islamia Declared Minority Institution," The Hindu- Online Edition February 
23, 2011. 
13 Justice M.S.A. Siddiqui, "Order in the Matters Of: Case No. 891 of 2006, Case No. 1824 of 2006, Case 
No. 1825 of 2006, ," ed. National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (New Delhi: February 
22, 2011), 52. 
14 Dhar, "Jamia Millia Islamia Declared Minority Institution." 
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extremists, has no material connection to the separatist politics of India’s partition or the 
taint of British loyalism. In the context of the Jamia’s demand for Minority Character, 
Aligarh alumni again began to consider options for pushing their own demand, and the 
tension was apparent between the quietists and those who would protest before the Indian 
parliament. 
AMU remains a powerful symbol of Muslim rejuvenation despite the fact that 
Muslims today face many of the same problems Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan sought to 
eliminate when he founded the institution in 1875, and despite the factions and 
differences of opinion and strategy that continue to hound its partisans. It follows that 
Muslims would seek to protect the institution which they believe was designed 
exclusively to serve their community.  But in a society increasingly focused on 
assimilation, where nationalism is the new loyalism, this demand smacks of much-
dreaded Muslim separatism.  The fears of both parties prey on the other, and Aligarh 
remains caught, no longer “the arsenal of Muslim India” and certainly not, as its well-
wisher Mushirul Hasan has argued, “the symbol of Indian secularism.”15 
 
LOOKING ACROSS THE PARTITION(S) 
In May 2010, I arrived in Pakistan for the final leg of my dissertation research. 
This visit included both plans to collect oral history interviews and archival materials. 
Unlike past years, I decided to focus my attention on Karachi, the city where most 
migrants from North India settled during and after 1947. Karachi, since the 1980s, has 
been a site of interethnic violence driven by regional rivalries and in 2010 and 2011 had 
                                                
15 Mushirul Hasan, "Introduction," in Knowledge, Power and Politics: Educational Institutions in India, 
ed. Mushirul Hasan (New Delhi: Roli Books, 1998), 15-16. 
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become the site of political violence (largely between the Pashto-led Awami National 
Party and the Urdu-led Muttahida Qaumi Movement—formerly the Mohajir Qaumi 
Mahaz) on a massive scale. As these ethno-political rivalries threaten the functioning of 
Pakistan’s commercial center and the comings and goings of average Pakistanis (markets 
and thoroughfares are frequently shut down during periods of unrest), ethnic identity 
politics are becoming even more deeply entrenched. I spoke with one of my cousins 
about this during my 2010 visit. His father has been a life-long PPP man—a civil 
servant—but in 2010, even as the PPP sat in power in Islamabad, I heard his youngest 
son making a distinction between Urdu speakers and non-Urdu speakers. When I asked 
him what he was getting at, he told me, “Amber, we are Urdu speakers, see, there is a war 
on, we have to take sides.” The distortion of Pakistani identity that this fragmentation 
represents was also troubling the narrators with whom I spoke during that visit. In 
Karachi more than elsewhere, the pervasive sense of uncertainty overshadowed any other 
conversation. For those who came to Pakistan to pursue an opportunity for a life without 
communal strife, the intra-Muslim, intra-Pakistani fighting seemed to threaten the entire 
project. The sense of disappointment that has colored all of my interviews in Pakistan 
now became the overarching theme. 
After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, I had noticed a 
significant change in the position of Pakistan’s mohajirs, those who migrated into 
Pakistan in 1947 (this appellation includes the offspring of migrants, now settled in 
Pakistan for multiple generations). In drawing rooms all over Lahore in the days that 
followed I witnessed an entrenchment of regional identity. Suddenly, I heard Punjabis 
conversing in their mother tongue to the exclusion of Urdu speakers in the room. As 
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violence erupted in Karachi (organized political violence) I heard mohajirs in Lahore 
express fear about “the breakup of the country.” What did they mean? The answer was 
usually the same: a beloved Sindhi politician was assassinated (likely) by the Punjab- 
dominated army. This would stir up regional sentiments. If Sindh were to break away, 
Balochistan would be quick to follow. The Northwest Frontier Province, only nominally 
under the jurisdiction of the central government had been infiltrated by Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban fighters (who came in droves after 2005) and instability in the rest of the country 
would further destabilize the government there. In the event, Punjab still controlled most 
of the water resources, but the power in Punjab lay with the feudal landlords who would 
likely tighten their grip on those resources. In short, it seemed, the mohajirs would be left 
with very little of the country. Those who believe themselves to be its “footsoldiers” who 
“sacrificed” for Pakistan, those who, since their student days, touted the narrative of a 
progressive, democratic state (even though this dream had long since atrophied), now 
were confronting the consequences of the inability of the Two Nation Theory to 
incorporate all of Pakistan’s multiple identities.  
It was a sense of betrayed history that motivated much of the critique of the 
Pakistani state that I heard in Pakistan. The anti-Punjabi bias was significant as narrators 
blamed Punjabi-style feudalism for hijacking the agenda of democracy. After all, 
narrators did not hesitate to remind me, Punjab did not support Pakistan until very late in 
the game. In fact, some argued, Pakistan should have been made in what is now UP and 
Bihar—where the support for the League’s agenda was strongest. As historian Ahmad 
Saeed told me in Lahore in 2006, “I am of the view that Pakistan should have been 
established in C.P. (Central Provinces) in U.P. (United Provinces) because those people 
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worked for Pakistan.  Those people suffered for Pakistan.  They could be more loyal than 
we people living in Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan.”16 Similarly, Aligarian 
Pakistanis lament the intrusion of identity politics into Pakistani life. For while the 
outcome of their “united Muslim” identity politics in India was a new country, the 
outcome of regional identity politics in Pakistan was the creation of Bangladesh—known 
in Pakistan as “the loss of Bangladesh”—and the division of the country. They 
desperately fear a repeat performance.  
 The overwhelming feeling that comes from this large collection of oral histories, 
especially in India and Pakistan, is one of anxiety over the position of Muslims and 
citizens in South Asia today. Surprisingly, in Bangladesh, the youngest of South Asia’s 
post-partition’s states, and her weakest in geo-political terms, this sense of anxiety was 
less pronounced. I was especially surprised not to hear any charged anti-Pakistan rhetoric 
(quite unlike my experience in Pakistan where I heard anti-Indian rhetoric), but rather a 
sense of disappointment at outcomes that had spiraled out of control. While these 
narrators described Pakistani oppression and injustice, especially between 1952 and 1970, 
they did not seem to harbor any lasting ill-will against Pakistanis as a whole.  
Rather, they have retained a sense of the legitimacy of the original idea, and a 
belief that, had it been implemented in the true spirit of Pakistan, as they understood it in 
Aligarh University, that much of the conflict the subcontinent has witnessed would have 
been avoided. These are utopian visions, remarkably persistent despite the 
disappointments of both Pakistan and Bangladesh that Mohiuddin described as he spoke 
about his feelings upon the 1971 independence of Bangladesh: “Triumph we felt. But 
                                                
16 Ahmad Saeed, "Professor Ahmad Saeed: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas July 20, 2006," (Lahore: 
July 20, 2006). 
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then, disappointment in the normal mismanagement of the government; these are the 
disappointments. But as against the Pakistan movement and all that, we felt that this 
independence—we were very happy.”17  
Each group of narrators has defined themselves against the others. They have 
negotiated national, individual and collective identities to reconcile conflicting histories 
into a coherent sense of belonging. This process has resulted in the re-writing of their 
pasts, their relations and their identities and created its own boundaries that incorporate 
the priorities of collective solidarity that they learned at Aligarh. As much as these 
narratives of belonging expose partition’s “multiple realities,” they also illuminate a 
shared yearning for unity. 
                                                
17 Khan, "Mohiuddin Khan: Personal Interview with Amber Abbas March 28, 2010." 
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Appendix 
Narrator Biographies and Interview Abstracts 
 
Interviewee: Mr. Ram Advani 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Ram Advani Bookseller, Hazrat Ganj, Lucknow, UP, India 
Date: April 4, 2009 
 
Biographical Notes: Ram Advani was born on October 21, 1921. He spent his childhood 
in Lahore, but attended Bishop Cotton School and Lucknow University. He fled Lahore 
in 1947, ultimately settling in Lucknow where he opened a bookshop of which he 
remains proprietor after more than 65 years. He is a friend to many academics and told 
me “A Bookshop brings people together- you meet so many people in a bookshop.” 
 
Abstract: Ram Advani begins by telling me about his experiences as a young bookseller 
in Lahore. He fled Lahore during the partition and went to Simla and then to Lucknow; 
he opened bookshops in both places. During World War II, however, he had been bursar 
at Bishop Cotton School. His uncle sold the bookshop in Lahore to Ferozesons 
booksellers, and the store stands today in the same location. He tells me about meeting 
the Ferozesons Booksellers at the Delhi Book Fair and reminisces about Lahore. He goes 
one to tell me more about the disturbances in Simla in 1947 and the challenges of 
opening the shop. He found Simla too sleepy, and therefore moved down to Lucknow to 
open a shop. He was set to open his shop on February 1, 1948 inside the Gandhi Ashram, 
but was derailed by Gandhi’s assassination on January 30. In the early 1950s, he shifted 
to his present location in the Mayfair Building. He briefly mentions his love of cricket 
and promises more stories on a later visit.  
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Interviewee: Qazi Moinuddin Ahmad 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Defense Housing Association, Lahore 
Date: May 16, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Qazi Moinuddin Ahmad was born in Sikandarabad, District 
Bulandshahr on January 6, 1929. He had four brothers and two sisters, most of whom 
remain in Pakistan. His father was Professsor Saeeduddin Ahmad and taught Geography 
in Punjab University. His mother, from Aligarh, died when he was quite young. Qazi 
Moinuddin studied in the Muslim University High School in Aligarh before shifting to 
Lahore. He worked for Pakistan and has received a “Gold Medal” from the Nazaria-i-
Pakistan Foundation for his work. He lives in Lahore.  
 
Abstract: Part 1: Qazi Moin begins by telling me about his family and his father, a 
geographer and member of the Boundary Commission.  He had taught in Aligarh 
University from 1934 until 1945 before migrating to “Pakistan” before partition. Qazi 
Moin spent most of his childhood in Aligarh and has been a Shell Pakistan dealer since 
1953. He tells me about his childhood and education in Aligarh. He also tells me about 
the atmosphere in Lahore before partition, when, in schools, there were more non-
Muslims than Muslims. He tells me about his work for the Pakistan movement from his 
days in the Baccha Muslim League (Children’s Muslim League) in Sikandarabad. He 
tells me about his academic accomplishments and his experience at FC College, as a 
Muslim Students’ Federation activist. Today he is known as a businessman and 
philanthropist. He had met Mohammad Ali Jinnah in Aligarh, when Jinnah died, Qazi 
Sahib was “disturbed” and worried about Pakistani leadership. He says, till now, Pakistan 
has had no such leader. Were he looking down, he would want to see rule of law, good 
governance, and economic development. Still, compared to Muslims in the “poor 
country” of India, Qazi Moin believes Pakistanis are advanced. Part 2: Qazi Moin shows 
me several photographs of himself, and his family and from his career in Pakistan. Mr. 
Naim tells about the criteria that Nazaria-i-Pakistan Foundation uses to award Gold 
Medals. Qazi Moin tells me about his wedding in Lahore. Mr. Naim gives his assessment 
of the current government, and says that Pakistan is still waiting for a leader. Qazi Moin 
tells me that he is a born social-worker. He feels little connection with Muslims 
worldwide, or other Muslim countries that do not cooperate with Pakistan. He says that 
Jinnah promoted hard work among the youth of Pakistan. He says that there was no loss 
in leaving India apart from the material, which was replaced in Pakistan. Mr. Naim notes 
that his family left everything in East Punjab and that many became the victims of 
corruption in the Settlement Dept who did not allot the appropriate value of property to 
many, including his father. He tells me that the most important things he learned in 
Aligarh were confidence and broad-mindedness. The three of us speak about the role of 
Islam in Pakistan. As we close, he misremembers Gandhi assassination, saying that he 
was a small child in India. [Gandhi was assassinated in 1948] 
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Interviewee: Shamim and Hamida Ahmad 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Aligarh, India 
Date: November 19, 2009 
 
Biographical Notes: Shamim and Hamida Ahmad are both professors in Aligarh 
University. Hamida Ahmad is a professor of Psychology. Shamim Ahmad, an 
engineering professor, served briefly as Vice Chancellor. They live in Aligarh. 
 
Abstract: Shamim Ahmad begins by telling me about the frequency of communal riots 
after partition which sent Muslims running for Pakistan. Aligarh became increasingly 
segregated into Hindu and Muslim areas. This all changed in 1971, Muslims realized they 
had to stay in India. He tells me about the history of the Muslim League activism to 
protect Muslim interests. Hamida Ahmad speaks about the state of Muslim education in 
India, and the detrimental impact of the fear of failure among Muslims. She advises that 
Muslims must work hard to achieve success. Both advocate for the expansion of 
secularism in India, for the benefit of Muslims. In particular Shamim Ahmad advocates 
for tolerance, and respect for other opinions.  Shamim Ahmad speaks about the 
hierarchies within Islam. We discuss communal rioting, and the separation between the 
City and the University. He says that the security forces have become communalized. He 
notes the link between the Muslim neighborhoods and the Aligarh University. Shamim 
Ahmad describes his family’s hardship during partition. Shamim Ahmad describes his 
family’s nationalist past—on his mother’s side, he is related to A.M. Khwaja, Gandhi’s 
close associate. He speaks of the impact of losing the family property. He argues that the 
university practically saved Muslim education. His father chose not to migrate to 
Pakistan because he had only minimal education and felt he would not be able to get 
decent work in Pakistan. Shamim Ahmad speaks of his involvement in the Congress 
party. Still, he says, he could understand why people migrated to Pakistan in 1947, but 
since then, he says, there is no reason. He notes how widespread the Aligarh diaspora is, 
worldwide. He speaks of learning elocution directly from Zakir Husain in the Students’ 
Union. He decries the influence of political parties in the university. He speaks about his 
tenure as Vice Chancellor and his belief that this figurehead must set an example of 
humility. He tells me about their charitable work.  
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Interviewee: Syed Mohammad Ahmad and Farrukh Jalali 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Old Boys Lodge, Aligarh 
Date: May 27, 2009 
 
Biographical Notes: Syed Mohamamd Ahmad (d. December 26, 2011) was a longtime 
Aligarh personality, having long served as the Assistant/ Acting Public Relations Officer. 
He retired in 1996. He originally hails from Hapur. His father was killed in a communal 
riot in 1952. Many called him “Chaccha” or Uncle. He completed his Ph.D. on M. 
Obaidullah Sindhi after retiring from the PRO office. After his retirement he continued to 
live in the Old Boys Lodge, with a view of the Aligarh mosque. 
 
Farrukh Jalali is a scholar of Aligarh history. He lives in Aligarh near Muzzammil 
Manzil.  
 
Abstract: Farrukh Jalali began speaking (in English) before I attached the microphone. As 
the recording begins, he was telling me about the early years of the Pakistan movement 
and the “role of Aligarh people.” The students were overwhelmingly Muslim League, a 
movement inspired by zamindars. There was another group that was not interested in 
these movements. Jalali mentions that it will be hard to find materials about the 1940s 
because much had been destroyed by Muslim League people after partition. Syed Ahmad 
weighs in (in Urdu) on the value of biography and autobiography. They refer to me 
several good resources on Aligarh History. Jalali tells me that his family was from 
Karachi. We speak about the vilification of Muslims in History, beginning with the 
British period. Both suggest a wide variety of materials on Aligarh. We discuss scholars 
that we both know, including my supervisor, Gail Minault. Jalali speaks to me about 
Nizamuddin Husain Nizami Badayuni (d. 1940) who started a weekly paper in 1903 that 
persisted until 1919. He also suggests Musalmanon ka Roshan Mustaqbil by Tufail 
Manglori. He refers to M.M. Bashir, a Pakistan worker from 1941-50s.1 Syed 
Mohammad Ahmad tells me about his family’s history. Jalali tells me that his family 
were early supporters of women’s education. We conclude by speaking about more 
sources for Aligarh history.  
                                                
1 M.M. Bashir was initially given the League ticket for the Assembly elections in 1946. 
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Interviewee: Dr. Rafique Ahmed 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Nazaria-e-Pakistan office, Lahore 
Date: August 5, 2006 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Rafique Ahmad was born on February 3, 1927 in Lahore. Both sides 
of his family hail from the old city of Lahore and he spend his childhood there. His 
father, Mohammad Siddique was a businessman. He owned the Punjab Stores provisions 
store in Tollington Market on the Mall in Lahore. The store served locals as well as 
foreigners and the military. Rafique Ahmed completed his M.A. in Islamia College in 
1948 and went abroad to complete his Ph.D. from Oxford University in 1956. He 
returned to Pakistan and began teaching in Punjab University. Eventually he became Vice 
Chancellor of Islamia University-Bahawalpur, where he established the campus. He 
helped to establish the Nazaria-e-Pakistan Foundation in 1999. He lives in Lahore. 
 
Abstract: Dr. Rafique begins by telling me about the nationalization of the colleges under 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s semi-socialist regime and how this led to decline in the educational 
standard in the institutions. He tells me about his father’s business concerns in Lahore 
and the establishment of Tollington Market.  He describes the tussle in his family over his 
decision to pursue his studies, rather than business, which he tempered by staying 
involved with the store even as he studied for his M.A. and pursued research in 
economics. He details his career path in Punjab University and other educational 
institutions in Pakistan. He speaks about the challenges associated with establishing the 
Nazaria-e-Pakistan foundation as an independent foundation, free of government 
meddling. He compares this experience to that of Pakistan Television where their speech 
is circumscribed by their relationship to the government. He describes at length his 
memories of the 1940 Muslim League meeting where the Pakistan Resolution passed, 
and other memories of the Pakistan movement and Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah. During the 1947 partition he, and other students, helped to manage the incoming 
refugees and he also describes the atmosphere in Lahore at that time, and the burning of 
Shahalmi Gate. He gives a long exposition of Muslim Nationalism, the origin of which he 
dates to Allama Iqbal’s 1930 speech. He also traces the development of the Two Nation 
Theory and the origins of Muslim separatism. He blames the policies of the British and 
Hindu discrimination for the creation of Pakistan, and says the best monument to the 
triumph of Pakistan would be good education. He adds that to some extent the visions of 
Jinnah and Iqbal have been fulfilled, through development of Muslims, but suggests that 
there will always be more to do. He describes the aims of the Nazaria-e-Pakistan 
foundation and the need of good leadership, like that of Jinnah, to keep Pakistan going in 
the right direction. 
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Interviewee: Professor Mohammad Akhtaruzzaman    
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Department of Islamic History and Culture, Dhaka University 
Date: March 10, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL 
*This interview was not recorded.  
 
Biographical Notes: Akhtaruzzaman was born in Borguna, in southern Bangladesh (then 
East Pakistan) in 1961. His father was a teacher who later became a politician, and his 
mother was a housewife, but had a primary education. He has two brothers and three 
sisters. Akhtaruzzaman completed his B.A. and M.A. in Dhaka University before he went 
to Aligarh Muslim University in 1995 to study Medieval History with Iqtidar Husain 
Siddiqi. He is currently Chair of the Department of History in Dhaka University.  
 
Abstract: Professor Akhtaruzzaman begins by speaking about his decision to go to 
Aligarh University to study Medieval Indian History because it had the best reputation. 
AMU is revered in Bangladesh and about 90% of the students are Muslims. He says that 
although there were non-Muslims at the University, they  “were not as happy.” He speaks 
briefly about the town-and-gown relationship and the tension over Aligarh students 
supporting the Pakistan cricket team against India. He speaks of many other regional and 
international groups at the University who struggled with its identity. He addresses 
language issues at Aligarh. He speaks about his own educational experience and why he 
prefers to live in Bangladesh. Then he speaks briefly about his memories of the struggle 
for the liberation of Bangladesh and finally about how the standards of education at 
Aligarh have declined precipitously. 
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Interviewee: Professor Mohammad Amin    
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Oxford Apartments, Patpar Ganj, New Delhi 
Date: November 5, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Professor Mohammad Amin was a student in Aligarh during the 
1940s but was not active in League election work. He later became a Professor in St. 
Stephen’s College of Delhi University where he taught for over forty years. He became a 
well-known medieval historian. He is also the father of Shahid Amin, a historian in Delhi 
University.  
 
Abstract: Professor Mohammad Amin begins by telling me about his early career at St. 
Stephen’s College in Delhi, where he was referred by Dr. Mohammad Habib. He speaks 
of the importance of History as a discipline, and the different approaches to writing 
history. He speaks about his early religious education and his father’s intellectual bent, 
unusual in the Police! He describes the Liberal History Department at Allahabad 
University and the “Red” History Department at Aligarh. Professor Amin tells me that he 
and his brother were the first in their family to attend AMU—his brother later shifted to 
Pakistan. He remembers the influence of the Muslim League during the 1940s and the 
students’ electoral activities. After independence, he said those who had associated with 
the Muslim League were made to “pay a price.” The Muslim League met very little 
opposition, but he also does not recall feeling coerced into Muslim League 
electioneering. He critiques the narrative of Muslim decline from a historian’s 
perspective, then, after a break, he returns to speaking about Aligarh. He describes a 
sense of euphoria in Aligarh, a feeling that the institution had a role in determining the 
destiny of the country. He describes the atmosphere at Aligarh in 1947, and the fear the 
students experienced. He makes a direct comparison to the assassination of Mahatma 
Gandhi to show the impact of violence on Muslims. He speaks of Gandhi’s influence in 
ending partition violence. He describes Zakir Husain’s influence at AMU. He goes on to 
describe his own transition to St. Stephen’s, where he taught for his entire career. He 
refers to provincialism at AMU, the role of Islam there and concludes by criticizing the 
anxiety about the singing of the Indian nationalist song Vande Mataram, arguing that 
“Iqbal’s Tarana is on par and sung more often because it is easier!” 
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Interviewee: Professor Asloob Ahmad Ansari 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: “Gulfishan” Aligarh 
Date: June 5, 2008 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Asloob Ahmad Ansari was born in Delhi in 1925. He passed his 
Matriculation from Government High School, Delhi in 1939. He joined Aligarh Muslim 
University in the Intermediate Class the same year. He completed his Intermediate in 
1941, went on to earn a First Class degree in his B.A. and B.Sc. Examinations in 1943 
and earned a University Gold Medal. He also won the Marris Prize for the best marks in 
English in both examinations. During his tenure as a student at AMU, he was an active 
speaker in the University Union and won several prizes for his writing and speaking both 
inside and outside the university. He lived in Aftab Hostel. In 1946 he completed his 
M.A. in English and was appointed lecturer in the Dept of English at AMU. In 1946 he 
left for Oxford, earning an Honors degree in English Language and Literature. After 
returning from Oxford he was appointed Reader and later Professor.  Professor Asloob 
Ahmad Ansari retired in 1987 and lives in Aligarh. 
 
Abstract: Professor Ansari began by telling me about his early education and arrival at 
AMU where he eventually became a professor.  His family is from Kashmiri Gate in 
Delhi, but most of his family was educated in Aligarh. He describes living in Aftab 
Hostel and participating in the Union where he was considered “a very good debater” 
though he doesn’t remember any specific details about the issues under debate.  He 
claims to have had no particular political allegiance during his student days, and 
remembers that Aligarh was peaceful during the partition days, which he attributes to its 
isolation and distance from New Delhi. Though he chose not to migrate, all of his 
siblings did go which created some disruption in the family relationships. He tells me that 
his two daughters also teach in the Aligarh University. He remembers the purdah 
(seclusion) arrangements when girls first started taking classes in the university, until 
partition when purdah ended. He describes his early Islamic education, and the orthodox 
atmosphere in his home as a child, and he still considers himself devout. He sees himself 
as a Muslim first, then an Indian, then as a Citizen of the World! He feels the most 
important thing about Aligarh “is to know what Sir Syed stood for” because he was “the 
greatest benefactor of Muslims.” 
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Interviewee: Wing Commander M.A. Baaquie  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Dhaka, Bangladesh   
Date: March 22 and April 7th, 2010  
 
Biographical Notes: M.A. Baaquie was born on Friday Dec. 28, 1917 in Fardabad, 
Pargana Bardakhat in Comilla. His father was Hazrat Shah Sufi Moulana Muhammad Ali 
Akbar and he was  educated in Islamic Theology and secured Title degree from Alia 
Madrassa. M.A. Baaquie attended Aligarh Muslim University before joining the Pakistan 
Air Force. 
 
Abstract March 22, 2010: Wing Commander Baaquie begins by telling me about his three 
children, and apologizes for his failures of memory. He speaks at length about his son 
Bilal’s educational experience and success. He describes his own experience getting out 
of his village to go outside for education in science. He was admitted to Dhaka College in 
Physics Honors. Later, he left for Aligarh University. He mentions the political 
environment in the country at the time, with two major parties. The Aligarh students were 
enthusiastic about the Muslim League, which they saw as the only organization 
representing Muslims. The League planned its meeting in Aligarh while he was there, in 
1941. Baaquie was discouraged by his mentor from attending the conference or getting 
involved in politics. After that, he was only indirectly involved in politics. In the Pakistan 
Air Force, he was the senior man from the East wing. He describes how he was 
implicated in the Agartala Conspiracy Case and his relationship with Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. During the war, he was called for military service and he was selected for the 
British Air Force. He served briefly in Burma. In 1947, he opted for Pakistan. He speaks 
about his experiences in the Air Force and his forced retirement. He says he suffered 
discrimination for being a Bengali, from “way back” in matters of seniority. He returned 
to East Pakistan/ Bangladesh as a civilian. He supported the liberation of Bangladesh and 
especially Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.  
 
Abstract April 7, 2010: This is my second interview with Wing Commander Baaquie. 
Part 1: I read his book British Bengal to Bangladesh and wanted to follow up on a few 
things. He begins by speaking about his father’s emphasis on education. His own goal 
was to get the best education he could get and remain to serve his country. He speaks of 
his dedication to his “soil” and fighting for East Pakistan and later Bangladesh. He speaks 
about the separation of Pakistan and Bangladesh and the legacy of the Muslim League. 
He describes his attachment to a brotherhood of Muslims and the fact that the “Hindu 
Indian Congress” was responsible for alienating Muslims and forcing the 1947 partition. 
He speaks of the importance of good leaders, not just Mohammad Ali Jinnah, but 
especially A.K. Fazlul Haq and Liaqat Ali Khan. Baaquie’s memory falters as he 
describes his experience at Aligarh, but he suggests that the value of the experience there 
was not educational. Rather it generated prestige for a group of students, especially sports 
captains, and that Bengalis were excluded from this. Part 2: Baaquie speaks about his 
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involvement in the freedom movement—this part is difficult to follow—and his 
relationship with fellow Aligarian M.A.G. Osmani. He concludes by describing his 
efforts to found the Retired Armed Forces Association. 
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Interviewee: Anonymized as CSI   
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Aligarh, India  
Date: June 16, 2009 
RELEASE:  REQUESTS ANONYMITY 
 
Biographical Notes: CSI was born in August 1923; his family were large landholders. He 
began his school in 1933 in the Minto Circle School. After completing his education he 
took over responsibility for the affairs of his family’s state until 1952 when large estates 
were abolished, though he still manages some orchard operations there. During his stay at 
the University he supported the Muslim League, and although his elder brother migrated 
to Pakistan, he did not follow. He had been in poor health and preferred to stay nearer to 
home. He has remained in his family home in Aligarh and is frequently invited to preside 
over occasions at the university.  
 
Abstract: CSI begins by telling me about his childhood and the lifestyle of a landowning 
family. Before the abolition of zamindari, he cared for the properties. Today, he still 
manages the orchards, though most of the property is gone.  He still feels wronged by the 
abolition, claiming that his family was not abusing the system, and they lost a lot. He 
speaks about his son’s accomplishments. He goes on to emphasize the character building 
agenda of Aligarh University. Still, he tells me stories about his mischevious behavior! 
He speaks about the highly honorable behavior of his tutors who refused to accept 
payment for supporting their students. Today, he says, tutors make a living from this 
extra help. He tells me about the decline of values in modern society. Though he was not 
a sportsman in Aligarh, he, like his father, is an avid hunter. He says that a consequence 
of partition for India was that the “Hindu-Muslim question came” after 1947. He tells me 
about his father. He speaks about the creation of Pakistan and the hardship for Indian 
Muslims. He tells me about his visit to Pakistan, where his daughter lives. We turn off the 
recording as he takes me to see the gallery of photographs from the 1940s hanging in his 
house.  
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Interviewee: Mahmood Ali Khan Chaudhry (d. May 29, 2011) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Lahore School of Economics, Lahore 
Date: July 4, 2005 and July 6, 2005  
 
Biographical Notes: M.A.K. Chaudhry was born in Wazirabad in 1923. He was the 
second youngest with six brothers and a sister. He spent his childhood in Wazirabad and 
Jullunder. He studied in Mofussil College in Ludhiana. He was commissioned in the 
British Indian Army in 1944. He served in Burma during World War II. His family, in 
India, was known for its support of Pakistan, and suffered somewhat for this. Thus, his 
whole family migrated to Pakistan. He was an important public figure in Pakistan. He 
served as Inspector General of Police in East Pakistan in the 1960s and Director General 
Federal Intelligence Agency and Interior Secretary in the 1970s. After being retired by 
General Zia, he took up a law practice in Lahore in the late 1970s and in the 1990s he 
became the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Lahore School of Economics. 
 
Abstract July 4, 2005: M.A.K. Chaudhry begins by telling me about his experiences 
during World War II in Burma as a Second Lieutenant and the challenge of adapting to 
the Army way! He describes his fear of Japanese atrocities—some thought they were 
cannibals—especially in Korea. In fact, they found the Japanese very docile, crushed by 
the famine and occupation. Chaudhry tells about the deception that he used to get back to 
New Delhi, by claiming he was carrying important dispatches. He describes his difficulty 
in migrating to Pakistan. He was aided by a Hindu officer whose father had been killed in 
Lahore, but upheld the British Indian Army standard of camaraderie. Initially, he says, 
those morals came into Pakistan, but have since declined markedly. He found his brother, 
a foreign service officer, posted in the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi. Though 
his brother wanted him to stay to help with refugees, they were living on meager rations 
and MAK said he’d rather go directly to Pakistan! He found his family in Lahore, they 
had come by train from Jullunder. He goes over some of the history of the Indian 
independence movement, beginning with “Quit India” and the subsequent closing of 
recruitment to the superior services by the British. All vacancies were then reserved for 
those who rendered war service, and it was under these auspices that Chaudhry joined the 
army, later joining the Civil Service. He speaks in “stray thoughts” about the standards 
Jinnah set in his leadership, but decries his expertise. He speaks about his own father, a 
businessman, who came from a Hindu background (four generations back, his family 
converted to Islam in Jaipur), and was settled in Jullunder. He describes his old home in 
Jullunder, and the challenges of surviving after his father’s death. As we close, he tells 
me about his posting in East Pakistan until 1953, during which time he became close to 
the Bengalis, speaking and writing their language. He describes them as “good 
Pakistanis.”  
 
Abstract July 6, 2005: M.A.K. Chaudhry tells me about his deployment in East Pakistan 
from 1948-1953 when he noticed that the Hindu population was uncomfortable. He 
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speaks about the historical system of land tenure that had hurt Muslims. He also notes 
some details about caste oppression there. Though Muslims were liberated by partition, 
the language problem persisted, because although Urdu was a universal language of 
Muslims, it was only minimally spoken in East Pakistan. Jinnah thought it was a 
“neutral” language, not belonging to any province, but this “irked” the Bengalis, 
provoking language riots. He reviews the history and major events in the conflict. He 
returns, then, to the 1940 Lahore Resolution and the mention of “states.” He also 
mentions the 1953 Lahore riots against Ahmadis/Qadianis. The army learned then, that 
the police were relatively docile, excepting the Border Police, who were heavily armed. 
In 1958 the Border Police were incorporated into the army, eliminating their threat to the 
army and fortifying the army’s power. However, he says, few resisted the 1958 martial 
law. He then tells me about 1971, when he was Inspector General of Police in the 
Northwest Frontier, but after the police “ran away” in East Pakistan, General Yahya 
asked him to go and raise a police force. He found only a few officers there and 
resistance from the mukti bahini. He speaks at some length about his experiences in East 
Pakistan and the challenges he faced there. M.A.K. Chaudhry was taken prisoner after the 
loss of the war, and he was held in India for two years. In his interrogation he was asked, 
“Why didn’t the Pakistan Army fight?” But he protested that he knew little about the 
army. He feared being taken to Delhi Fort where he “knew what happened” but he was 
saved by another officer’s declaration that Chaudhry was a “stubborn son-of-a-bitch” 
who wouldn’t talk no matter what! After 1971, he testified to the Prime Minister that 
Pakistan should recognize Bangladesh in order to mitigate Indian influence there. He tells 
me more about the police administration in Pakistan and the reforms under the Pervez 
Musharraf government, making the police more “people friendly.” He says the 
imposition of martial law in 1958 was the low point in his career. He speaks about his 
wife’s family and heritage in Punjab. He also speaks about his own family and early 
education. He speaks about the difference between the imperial police and the British 
police (in England). In England, they represented and defended the people, in India, they 
represented and defended the colonial power. This system, inherited by Pakistan, served 
the landed interests and not the people. As we close, he mentions that he prays regularly, 
but does not consider himself devout. His service, he says, is through promoting 
education, especially for those without resources. His priority is to inculcate a sense of 
fairness, and honesty and not bending before injustice. He praises his family for their 
unfailing support even in periods of difficulty and illness.  
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Interviewee: Saima Choudhri   
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Dhaka, Bangladesh 
Date: April 6th, 2010  
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Saima Choudhri is a female poet originally from Sylhet, where she 
was born in 1930. After fourth class she shifted to Calcutta. She completed her 
Intermediate degree before marrying Waheeduddin and he supported her as she 
completed more education later. She has published several books of poetry. She lives in 
Dhaka. 
 
Abstract: Saima Choudhri begins by describing her early education. She had some 
religious training as a child, guided by her mother who was semi-literate. Her mother was 
highly supportive of education, so much so that Saima continued her education even after 
her marriage.  She went to school to a Muslim girls school in Calcutta during Partition.  
She describes the disruptions of the 1946 riots. Her father was a Muslim League leader 
and after partition the family shifted to Dhaka where she completed her education in 
Eden College. Initially, she says, she supported Pakistan, but in reality it was not good for 
Bengalis. By the late 1960s she began to support Bangladeshi independence. 
Independence, she argues, gave her children space to express their talent. She concludes 
by speaking briefly the war and about her children. 
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Interviewee: Engineer Waheeduddin Choudhri 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Dhaka, Bangladesh 
Date: April 6, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes:  Waheeduddin Choudhri was born in Sylhet. He attended Aligarh 
University for engineering from 1946- 1949. He held Leftist sympathies and was active 
in the student movement. He settled in East Pakistan and became an engineer for the 
government. He later supported the movement for the independence of Bangladesh. 
 
Abstract: Waheedudding Choudhri speaks to me about his early education and attending 
Aligarh for Engineering. He describes the political atmosphere there, his leftist 
sympathies, and the fact that the Muslim League dominated the environment there. He 
speaks about the arrangements for girls in the university, though there were none in 
engineering at that time. They used to look for the girls in the annual exhibition! He 
details at length the troubling train journey from Sylhet to Aligarh during the 1946 
Calcutta riots. When he finally arrived in Aligarh he felt safe in the university. This story 
becomes a thread throughout the interview, and he focuses on the personal disruption 
caused by the riots. He describes the role of Aligarh’s leadership in stewarding the 
institution through partition, and the fluidity of his politics—though he was a leftist he 
supported a United India, but settled in (then) East Pakistan. He concludes by sharing his 
perception of the conflict between East and West Pakistan. The army was responsible for 
the tension, and even the murder of Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951—a moment he identifies as 
critical. The idea of Pakistan was good, but in its execution, it failed. 
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Interviewee: Salahuddin Chowdhury   
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Dhaka, Bangladesh 
Date: April 10, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Salahuddin Chowdhury was born in Sylhet in 1928 and was the 
youngest of six siblings. He passed his matriculation from Sylhet Government High 
School in 1943 and got his Intermediate degree from Sylhet College before setting out for 
Aligarh. In Aligarh he lived in Sir Syed Hall. He passed out of Aligarh in 1949. 
Chowdhury left for Scotland in 1949 to study jute technology at Dundee Technical 
College. When he returned to then East Pakistan in 1953 he worked four years in the 
Adamjee Jute Mill. Then, from there, he went to Bhawani Jute Mill. Since his retirement 
he has consulted for the World Bank. 
 
Abstract: Salahuddin Chouwdhury begins by telling me about his early childhood in 
Sylhet where his father was small zamindar. His wife’s father also had a tea garden, and 
she is his cousin. He goes on to speak about Aligarh University, how distant it was, and 
how it was difficult to adjust to the food. Luckily, there were other Bengali boys there 
who received him and helped him to get settled. He also remembers that at Aligarh, they 
were “very particular” about the prayer, and he served as a prayer monitor. He never 
experienced any discrimination in Aligarh, and he was a supporter of Muslim League 
politics, though he never participated in Union debates, he was attracted to the strong 
sense of community in the university. After finishing in Aligarh in 1949 he went on to 
Scotland to complete a degree in Jute Technology. He worked in this field in East 
Pakistan and Bangladesh for his entire career, passing up an opportunity to work abroad 
so that he could be closer to his family. He insists that prior to 1947 and prior to 1971 he 
was not involved in politics, but felt supportive of independence in both cases. He speaks 
briefly about his work with the World Bank and the careers of his children. 
 364 
Interviewee: Mrs. Fatima Minhaj Fari Rahman 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: G.O.R. #6 College Road, Lahore, Pakistan (2008) and Islamabad (2010) 
Date: January 4, 2008 and May 10, 2010 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Fatima Fari Rahman was born in Sheikupura in Punjab. After her 
father’s early death her family moved to their hometown of Aligarh where she grew up 
and completed her education in the Abdullah College and Aligarh Muslim University. 
She completed her M.Sc. in Chemistry in 1948. She taught for several years in the 
Women’s College and later completed her Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry at the University 
of London. She got married in 1961 and moved to Pakistan where her husband, a 
Pakistan Army Officer was stationed. She was the only female co-founder of the Sir Syed 
Memorial Society in Islamabad. 
 
Abstract January 4, 2008: Dr. Fatima Fari Rahman begins by speaking about her early 
childhood and the premature death of her father, after which she and her sisters moved 
back to Aligarh with their mother. She describes her post-secondary education in 
Chemistry, and then speaks about her travels all over India with her sister Tahira. They 
traveled by train. She describes the importance of Aligarh in her family, and its centrality 
in their lives, though she has returned only rarely since her mother’s death. For her, a 
teaching job in Aligarh just after graduating with her degree gave her a sense of having 
“arrived.” She speaks briefly about partition, her migration to Pakistan after marrying a 
Pakistani army officer, and the disturbances in Aligarh during partition. She tells me 
about the anxieties Muslims experienced when Gandhi was assassinated; traveling by 
train; the disruptions of partition and the atmosphere in Aligarh Women’s College. She 
speaks about the burqa the girls were required to wear. They still played sports: 
badminton and volleyball. All of her five sisters were highly educated at their mother’s 
urging. Since the founding of Pakistan, she says, things have changed for the better for 
women, but she laments the disunity; people thought that Pakistan would be a paradise.  
 
Abstract May 10, 2010: Dr. Rahman first describes the location of her home in Aligarh, 
and speaks about moving between the women’s college and men’s university during her 
post- graduate classes in chemistry. There were only two girls in her class. They were in 
the first batch of women in Aligarh. She had to wear the purdah at the university. The 
chairman of her department was a very liberal person and he used to tell her to go out 
without her burqa. Once she entered a government college, post-graduation, she did not 
wear the burqa. She started lecturing in 1956. As her family was from Aligarh, she lived 
in her house and not in the hostel. She describes her decision to pursue sciences. Then she 
speaks about her involvement in Muslim League activism, spurred by female League 
workers. The girls used to go into Aligarh city to speak with women about Pakistan. She 
speaks about traveling as a single woman and coming back from England to teach boys in 
Aligarh! She compares the position of Muslims in India and Pakistan, suggesting that 
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Muslims still face problems of acceptance in India. Then she speaks about partition’s 
disruptions, and traveling around the country for Science Congresses. We speak about 
Pakistan, Jinnah’s virtues and the challenges of leadership. Then she tells me about 
bringing her mother to Pakistan and surreptitiously changing her nationality when she 
had not wanted to leave her hometown, her motherland. For the last several minutes we 
chat about life in Aligarh, my stay and my family’s background and she gives me the 
contact information for many of her old friends and relatives in Pakistan and India. 
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Interviewee: Dr. Aijaz Fatima 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Ziauddin Hospital, North Nazimabad, Karachi 
Date: May 25, 2010 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Dr. Aijaz Fatima was born in New Delhi on December 31, 1927. Her 
mother died when she was two years old and she spent her childhood amongst various 
relatives in UP, before her father called her to Aligarh when she was twelve years old. 
She has two sisters and one brother, but they all grew up in different houses with 
different relatives. Her father, Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmad was Vice Chancellor of the 
Aligarh Muslim University. She sometimes attended classes at the Aligarh Women’s 
College, and completed her Intermediate from there before shifting to Lady Hardinge 
College in New Delhi from where she earned a Medical degree before shifting to 
Pakistan.  
 
Abstract: Dr. Fatima begins by describing her early life and education after the death of 
her mother. As a child she lived with relatives around the United Provinces. She then 
describes her return to Aligarh and her secondary education. She speaks about her 
father’s death in 1947 and his burial in Aligarh, in a place of pride next to Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan, the university’s founder. She describes her father’s approach to 
leadership—he maintained an open door policy—and as a hospital administrator she has 
tried to adopt the same policy.  She speaks about her father’s close relationship with 
Muslim League leaders, but then declines to speak about the idea of Pakistan. I asked her 
more about her education in Aligarh, and she describes the atmosphere of equality in the 
Aligarh Women’s College and the particular aspects of that environment. She speaks 
about shedding the burqa when she was a student in Lady Hardinge Medical College, and 
how important it is for her to “show your identity.” She describes her family as 
“conservative” and says they were practically all “forced” to shift to Pakistan in 1947. I 
raised the topic of Bangladesh and she asked me to turn off the recording again. She goes 
on to speak about her sister’s involvement in political activities, and the celebrations for 
independence. She speaks about her comfortable relationship with Hindus, but describes 
the devastation partition created in Delhi. We speak about leadership, her mentors, and 
the relationship between Pakistan and Bangladesh. We touch on gender in Aligarh and 
then continue talking about Dr. Fatima’s career.  She speaks about education for girls in 
India and the challenges they still face, especially in Pakistan. She argues that terrorism is 
the biggest challenge Pakistan currently faces.  She describes the hardships Muslims face 
in Pakistan.  We conclude by chatting about my research. 
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Interviewee: Professor Irfan Habib 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Center for Advanced Study, Dept of History, Aligarh 
Date: June 28, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Irfan Habib was born in Baroda in 1931 but grew up primarily in 
Aligarh where his father had been a professor since the mid 1920s. Habib began his 
education in Zahoor Ward and then onto Minto Circle and the Muslim University High 
School. His family was staunchly nationalist and close to both the Nehru Family and 
Mahatma Gandhi. He was a Leftist student leader at Aligarh and went on to become a 
professor of History there after completing his D.Phil at New College, Oxford. He is 
currently Professor Emeritus, having retired in 1991. Nearly every day Professor Irfan 
Habib returns to the History Department at AMU and continues to guide students and 
discuss politics with his old colleagues. 
 
Abstract: Irfan Habib begins by telling me about his parents and his early life and 
education in Aligarh. He emphasizes the “nationalist spirit” there. Under the Congress 
Ministry in UP the educational curriculum was brought into line with Gandhi’s Wardha 
scheme by K.G. Saiyidain and others, so he says he had a good, nationalist education. 
Even when the League held sway at Aligarh they were powerless to change this. He 
speaks of the disruptive tactics of the Khaksars; the growing tensions between Hindus 
and Muslims in the late 1930s and his father’s relationship with Jinnah. He notes that the 
Muslim League leaders were not overly devout, that Jinnah couldn’t even pray, whereas 
Muslim nationalists were known for their religious observance. The Muslim League, he 
says, were not “religious jihadis.” Still, he describes being bullied by them, and then his 
father sent him away to boarding school. He tells a story of his father bringing a 
prominent atheist to give a talk in AMU. He says he didn’t have a clear idea about 
Pakistan because he was only a boy. He remembers Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to their 
house one afternoon for lunch. He speaks of his father’s influence, especially with the 
League, though he did not support their politics. Rather, his father was a Marxist and a 
nationalist. He describes a riot involving Aligarh students in 1946. Irfan Habib 
remembers hearing Khaliquzzaman, his father’s cousin, suggest that Pakistan was no 
more than a bargaining chip in the independence negotiations. He speaks of the pain at 
his own brother’s departure for Pakistan in the 1960s. He tells me that Aligarh was only 
minimally disrupted during partition and credits Gandhi’s assassination with fueling the 
recovery and nationalist turn. He says most AMU students had their eyes on Pakistan 
until the mid- 1950s at least. He speaks of Aligarh traditions and how much has changed 
since 1947. He mentions Vice Chancellor Ziauddin and his role in facilitating Muslim 
League action at AMU. He concludes with memories of his friend Satya Bhushan. 
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Interviewee: Colonel Mohammed Hadique    
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Karachi, Pakistan  
Date: May 25th, 2010   
 
Biographical Notes: Mohammad Hadique was born in 1947 during the time of partition 
in Assam. Because his father, Mohmmad Siddiq, was in the Railways and he was posted 
there. A month after the partition took place they went to East Pakistan. He grew up in 
East Pakistan and graduated from Dhaka University in 1969. And then he joined the 
Pakistani army and relocated to West Pakistan. His father and his uncles were killed 
during the war in East Pakistan. His mother and sisters escaped and crossed over to India 
and went to Nepal. From Nepal they went to Karachi in West Pakistan. He has six sisters 
all of whom are very successful and educated. His mother was very adamant about 
education for her children. He started his education in Bengali medium then he went to an 
Urdu medium school where he took his Matric exam. 
 
Abstract: He briefly summarizes his family’s experience in East Pakistan and the death of 
many relatives after he joined the army in 1970 and went to West Pakistan. Even today, 
the family’s  property is held by the Bangladeshi government. He speaks about his 
parents, and his mother’s emphasis on education. Though his father did not know 
Bengali, his mother could understand, and much of Colobel Hadique’s early education 
was in Bengali medium. He describes the emergence of the Bengali/Urdu divide in the 
late 1960s. He believes Sheikh Mujib is a good orator, but a mediocre leader. He 
describes the exploitative attitudes of West Pakistanis towards East Pakistan and hurtful 
economic policies. He speaks about the responsibility for the civil war that led to 
Bangladeshi independence and blames Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for the conflict. He speaks 
about Bengalis and non-Bengalis in the army, and different customs. Pakistani Muslims, 
he says, are better off because they know that they are free. Indian Muslims live under 
threat, but Bengali Muslims have an advantage because of the unity of their culture and 
religion. Pakistan is too fragmented and has no unity. He speaks about these difficulties, 
and why they still won’t drive him to migrate out of the country. He speaks about his 
post-army career in oil and gas. He concludes by telling me about his hobbies, and 
speaking about the differences in character between East Pakistanis (humble, friendly 
caring) and West Pakistanis (the opposite). 
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Interviewee: Mrs. Zahra Haider   
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Lahore, Pakistan 
Date: June 28, 2005 
 
Biographical Notes:  Mrs. Zahra Haider was born in Dehra Dun. Her father’s name was 
Yaqoob Shah and her mother Zohra Shah. She was raised in Lahore by her Aunt because 
her mother was unwell.  Her father was the Auditor General of Pakistan. He was posted 
for two years in Washington as Pakistan’s representative to the World Bank, and took his 
family along with him. She married Khurshid Haider. General Haider died a few years 
before this interview. Currently she lives in Rawalpindi, Pakistan with her son Mohsin 
and his family. 
 
Abstract: Zahra Haider begins by speaking about her early childhood in Lahore and her 
mother’s illness. Her adopted mother was very fond of Jinnah and took her to listen to 
him. Zahra became aware of the movement for Pakistan as a young girl and felt that if 
Muslims had an independent country that it would be a bit better. She tells me that she 
was in Murree during August, but that when she returned to Lahore in September she 
found her college, Kinnaird College, closed and many of her friends planned to migrate. 
The Muslim girls who remained volunteered in the refugee hospitals instead of going to 
school. She describes the difficulties in early Pakistan, and the violence in the trains—her 
mother was briefly stopped in a train—and describes the migration story of her own 
family and her husband (who brought my father from Aligarh to Lahore). She speaks 
about students electioneering activities and processions in Lahore. She describes her 
experiences on hearing of the deaths of John F. Kennedy and Mohammad Ali Jinnah then 
she details meeting her husband and his career trajectory. She speaks about ethnicity and 
language and assimilation in Pakistan. She says that although he says her prayers 
regularly, she does not consider herself devout. Also, she tells me that while she 
considers herself Sunni (as do both of her daughters-in-law), her husband was Shia and 
so are her sons. She emphasizes the value of tolerance in their family so this never caused 
conflict. As we conclude she leaves a legacy for her grandchildren that they should be 
honest and honorable and love their country and put the country’s priorities above their 
own.  
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Interviewee: Sayyid Hamid  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location:  Talimabad, Delhi  
Date: October 29th, 2009  
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Sayyid Hamid was born in Faizabad near Lucknow in 1920. He did 
his early education in Western UP. His father, Sayyid Mehdi Hassan, was a police 
officer.  His mother was a housewife. He completed a B.A. in English Literature and 
M.A. in Persian from Aligarh University. He joined the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service in 
1943 and was later selected for the Indian Administrative Service. He was in the UP 
cadre. He is a former Vice Chancellor of Aligarh University. He was in Aligarh twice for 
two five-year terms. The first was from 1937 to 1942, as a student, and later as Vice 
Chancellor from 1980 to 1985. Currently he is Chancellor of Jamia Hamdard University 
in Delhi. He still goes to the office even though he is of retiring age.  
 
Abstract: Sayyid Hamid begins by telling me about joining the Indian Administrative 
Service in 1943 through competitive examination. He was posted to the United Provinces 
(now Uttar Pradesh). He later become Vice Chancellor of Aligarh University and noted 
that normally the administrative service officers were not supposed to head a university, 
but Aligarh’s tumultuous environment necessitated the posting of required service 
officers. Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister at that time and she sent him to head 
Aligarh. He tells me that he was not very politically involved as a young man (his 
memory is also fading). At Aligarh, he lived in Aftab Hall because of his academic 
achievements. He says that he had no interest in Pakistan, though one of his brothers 
decided to settle there. He has visited Pakistan a number of times, mostly in his official 
capacity, on trade delegations. He notes that Muslims remain impoverished and poorly 
educated in India and Aligarh suffers from the stigma of its association with Pakistan. He 
notes that there was always a nationalist contingent at Aligarh throughout the 1940s. In 
conclusion, he remembers the influence of his teachers at Aligarh and his gratitude to 
them. 
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Interviewee: Professor Masood ul Hasan 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Sir Syed Nagar, Aligarh 
Date: March 20, 2009 and May 1, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes:  Professor Masood ul Hasan was born in Moradabad in 1928. He 
completed high school from Hewat Muslim High School.  His father was an employee of 
the Municipal Board. He completed his F.A. (Intermediate) from Government Inter-
College, Moradabad. He studied in the Aligarh Muslim University from 1943 to 1947 
where he completed his B.A. and M.A. in English Literature.  He completed his Ph.D. in 
Liverpool while he was appointed as a Reader in the Department of English at AMU.  He 
retired from AMU in 1988 after serving as Professor of English, Chair of Department of 
English and Dean of the Faculty of Arts.  He also served as the Proctor of the University.  
He continues to live in Aligarh, in Sir Syed Nagar.  
 
Abstract March 20, 2009: Professor Hasan begins by describing his own educational 
experience at Aligarh University, which he joined in 1943. He describes Ziauddin 
Ahmad’s reputation for absentmindedness, and illustrates it with a couple of anecdotes. 
He goes on to speak about many of the professors and readers who were in AMU when 
he was a student, including their own academic pedigrees, and whether or not they 
migrated to Pakistan. He describes the influence of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the 
University Court, and the organization of academics. He also covers the University 
School and City High School, and the effect of the war on AMU and its faculty. He 
describes his early years in Moradabad. He speaks about his family and his own 
academic background, as he chose English as his degree and received some recognition 
for his analysis of John Donne’s imagery. He completed his Ph.D. from Liverpool. In 
conclusion he briefly speaks about his wife, and we make plans for a second interview. 
 
Abstract May 1, 2009: Professor Hasan begins speaking about Saeeda Apa, one of the 
first women to attend classes in the Aligarh Muslim University. He recommends some 
further reading for me and we speak briefly about sports at AMU and other resources for 
my research. He speaks about his experience living in Aftab Hostel, admissions, and 
details about the disciplinary environment. He speaks about the organization of food, 
cleaning, and other domestic necessities in the hostels. He never played sports in AMU, 
however, he was a side-backer and socialized in the cafes. He speaks about some of his 
old friends, and what the atmosphere was like in hostel and in classes and in the Union. 
He frequented the Union library, and was considered persuasive in English, so he 
supported various candidates. He begins to discuss at some length his involvement in 
Muslim League electioneering but gets very agitated when I ask follow-up questions. He 
describes this period in his life as having been governed by “youthful enthusiasm.” He 
then goes on to describe his experience on the day of Gandhi’s assassination and how 
frightened he was to be traveling, lest he be discovered as a Muslim.  
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Interviewee: Vice Admiral Iqtidar Husain 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Naval Housing Colony, Karachi 
Date: December 13, 2009 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Iqtidar Husain was born in Aligarh in July 1936. He was the twelfth 
or thirtheenth of his mother’s children, the last surviving, and therefore the youngest. (My 
grandmother was the oldest) His father was Iftikhar Husain and his uncle was Fasahat 
Husain. His mother’s family were landlords near Hapur. Iqtidar began his education at 
the Government School in Aligarh, a mixed educational environment. He migrated with 
his family to Pakistan in 1947, when he was only ten years old. His family settled in 
Lahore, and he had increased success in academics. He got a First Division in his Matric 
and tutored his younger cousins (including my father, who is his nephew) in math. After 
his twelfth grade he joined the Navy and was sent to England for training, where he 
married his Pakistani Christian wife. 
 
Abstract: Vice Admiral Husain began by telling me about his birth and early childhood 
and home in Madar Darwaza/ Tamboli Para, Aligarh, India. The street was later named 
after his grandfather, Amjad Ali, a lawyer. He describes the geography of the home and 
where different branches of the family lived. His father was fond of entertaining in his 
home in the evenings though he remained a “remote figure” to his children. He 
remembers how much fun he and his siblings and cousins had playing cricket and flying 
kites. Unlike his elder siblings, he was not sent to the Minto Circle School because his 
father felt that academics were underemphasized in favor of extra-curricular activities. He 
walked to school each day and remembers the trials of walking two miles loaded down 
by books until his brother learned to ride a bike. He remembers how the tensions and 
occasional violence grew between Muslims and Hindus in the 1940s. He describes his 
father’s representation to the Cabinet Mission. He describes his mother’s family near 
Hapur. He describes Aligarh’s culinary culture: kebabs, parathas, and sweets. He studied 
the Qur’an at home under the supervision of his mother and with the aid of a local 
maulvi. He also describes his father’s conversion and the mixed nature of his family—
both Sunni and Shia. His family observed the “occasions” of both sects, though as Hindu-
Muslim tensions increased, they were exacerbated by public celebrations.  Suspicion fell 
on Iqtidar’s father Iftikhar for being a leader of Muslims, and “pressure started building” 
and the family decided, led by the eldest brothers and cousins, to shift to Pakistan. Iqtidar 
describes the family’s migration in a military truck in October 1947 and the efforts of the 
neighbors to prevent them from leaving (or trying to go along!).  He describes his 
family’s effort to find a house in Lahore; they settled at 47 Jail Road without any beds or 
other furniture. He describes the money problems and the way the family worked 
together to get settled and regain a sense of normalcy. He describes his education in 
Lahore where he joined Government College, Lahore. After twelfth grade he joined the 
Navy. He concludes by describing my father’s departure for the United States in 1958.
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Interviewee: Colonel Nayyar Husain 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Lahore 
Date: May 16, 2009 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Nayyar Husain was born in Aligarh on January 16, 1936. His 
grandfather was Syed Tassaduq Husain, head of Intelligence in British India. His father 
was Syed Fasahat Husain, who studied in Aligarh Muslim University and was Captain of 
the Aligarh University Cricket Team. Nayyar Husain had ten brothers and sisters, most of 
whom were born in India. He did his early education in Aligarh before migrating to 
Pakistan in 1948. He was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in 1958, the same year that 
his father passed away. He married Roshan Abbas (my father’s elder sister) and had four 
children. He retired from the Army as a Colonel and went on to serve in Fauji Fertilizer 
before retiring in Lahore.  
 
Abstract: Colonel Husain began by speaking about his father’s experience at Aligarh 
University as a student and sportsman. He speaks about the popularity of cricket both in 
the university and outside. As a boy, he used to play on the lawn of his home in Aligarh, 
which he describes in detail. He moves on to describe his own childhood in Aligarh, 
attending City High School before shifting to Bulandshahr, Bihar and later migrating to 
Pakistan in 1948. He speaks about his awareness of the movement for Pakistan as a child, 
saying he “always knew” Aligarh would not be part of Pakistan. He describes Muslim 
alienation from power, Hindu discrimination and the role of Congress in creating the 
conditions for Pakistan. He describes his neighborhood as “mixed” and “congenial” 
except during riots. Still, he says that there was a lot of killing and Muslims were always 
vulnerable which is why his family left for Pakistan. He speaks about the importance of 
English under the British and the role of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan in supporting Muslim 
education. He describes his family’s experience of migration by plane from Aligarh with 
only a suitcase after many of his older relatives had already gone, especially those in the 
military. He is one of the few Pakistanis who describes the difficulty of finding work in 
Pakistan, and a sense of loss for connections left behind. He remembers Lahore when he 
first arrived and also his childhood home and memories of Aligarh.  He describes, at 
length, the sweets he remembers: gazak, shahi tukra, faluda, etc. He describes his 
experience as a cricketer, playing on the national team, and the decision to remain in the 
army instead of becoming a professional cricketer. He speaks about our common family 
(He is my father’s cousin and also the husband of my father’s elder sister). He mentions 
his childhood friend Niranjan Lal, and suggests that he would be a good connection in 
Aligarh, because he cannot recognize the pictures I have brought of his home there. He 
describes the property that he remembers, which has changed markedly now! He goes on 
to describe the disruptions of partition and the role of individuals in helping one another 
to get through it. He concludes by describing the friendly relations between his family 
and Hindus, free of bigotry. 
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Interviewee: Major General Wajahat Husain (Ret’d) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: 100 Park Lane, Lahore Cantonment, Pakistan 
Dates: 2005-2008 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Wajahat Husain was born in Aligarh where his family lived in the 
city on a road named after his grandfather. Wajahat did his early schooling in Minto 
Circle School and the Muslim University City High School before he began his 
university education at Aligarh Muslim University. He passed out from AMU in 1944 
and volunteered for the Air Training Corps’ in 1945. He was decommissioned at the end 
of the war and joined the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun. He passed out from 
there in 1946. Husain opted for Pakistan, but first served on the bilateral Punjab 
Boundary Force before settling in Pakistan and serving in Guides Cavalry. He also served 
as ADC to General Gracey, the second Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army He 
later served Pakistan as Ambassador to Greece and then Australia. He lives in Lahore. 
 
Abstract June 13, 2005: General Wajahat Husain begins by describing his early life in 
Aligarh, with his family.  He talks about his education in the Minto Circle School and 
Aligarh Muslim University.  While there, he was able to meet Mr. Mohammed Ali 
Jinnah, the founder and father of Pakistan, also known as Quaid-e-Azam, on number of 
occasions.  He recalls the political milieu in India at the time and how Pakistan came into 
being.  He talks about his decision to join the army and the major influences on that 
decision.  Finally, he discusses his decision to opt for Pakistan and briefly describes some 
of his experiences on the Punjab Boundary Force. 
 
Abstract June 14, 2005: General Wajahat Husain talked primarily about the Punjab 
Boundary Force, its aim, its tactics, and the traumatic events of the Partition.  He 
describes how he was able to help his family to leave India and to come to Pakistan as 
well as the aid provided to him by other officers in the Indian and Pakistani armies who 
arranged for transport.  He concludes by describing the Golden Jubilee reunion of his 
class from the Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun. 
 
Abstract June 16, 2005:  General Wajahat begins by speaking about the development of 
communal or ethnic identity amongst Indian Muslims and the early years of the Pakistan 
Movement in Aligarh.  He describes his personal visits with Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Jinnah’s 
views on governance, religious conservatism, and the future of the Pakistani state.  He 
moves on to the rise of religious conservatism in Pakistan, the influence of Zia ul-Huq’s 
policies and the history of communalism and class tension in India.  He describes the role 
of the British Indian army when it is called “in aid to civil power,” and his training in 
preparation for that event.  He describes the traditions of excellence and judiciousness in 
the British Indian Army and its effect on the relationships between officers and enlisted 
men.  He describes at length the problems within the Pakistani state in terms of 
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governance, education, and civil administration.  He closes with some more thoughts on 
Jinnah’s relationship to the army, its importance, and the development and effect of 
communal and sectarian identity between Muslims and the tensions that have arisen in 
Pakistan between Sunni and Shi’a communities. 
 
Abstract June 18, 2005: General Wajahat speaks about his time as ADC to General 
Gracey in 1948-49.  He describes in detail the day-to-day responsibilities of the ADCs, 
their relationship to Gracey and to other important country builders at the time.  He 
described Gracey’s unfailing dedication to the Pakistan Army, the long hours he worked, 
and Gracey’s desire to raise a professional army.  He further describes Jinnah’s role and 
his relationship to the army.  He goes on to describe the two leading officers of the early 
1950s, General Iftikhar and General Sher Khan who looked poised to take over after 
Gracey’s departure, but were killed in a plane crash, opening the door for Ayub Khan to 
become Chief of the Army.  He closes by describing how supportive General Gracey was 
of him personally and how they maintained a relationship after Gracey left Pakistan.  He 
maintained an interest in the Pakistan Army and its development, and even predicted 
Ayub’s takover 3 years before it actually took place! 
 
Abstract June 21, 2005: Husain begins by speaking about the conflict in Kashmir that has 
persisted since 1948. He describes the “tribal incursion,” the Indian army’s response and 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s stunned reaction because he “had not been informed of the 
operation.” Jinnah and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Gracey, 
formulated Pakistan’s response without engaging the regular army. He says that the 
Kashmir issue is important because of water and strategic defense. Although it is a drain 
on Pakistan’s resources to fight for it, he says the fight is worth it, and that a sovereign 
Kashmir is not sustainable. He lays the blame for partition at the feet of the Indian 
National Congress but argues that partition was inevitable. He goes on to tell me about 
the deaths of Jinnah in 1949 and Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951. At the national level, this led 
to a vacuum of leadership. He describes the relations between India and Pakistan and the 
series of crises that beset Pakistan in the early years. He speaks at some length about 
General Akbar Khan, one of the accused in the 1951 Conspiracy Case, and describes his 
lavish social life and Wajahat’s own brush with the conspiracy! 
 
Abstract June 23, 2005: General Wajahat continues his discussion of the Pindi 
Conspiracy Case and it’s effect on army morale and discipline.  He discusses at length his 
experience during the 1958 martial law and the activities of his regiment in Rawalpindi 
and their responsibilities as martial law administrators.   He then discusses his course at 
Fort Knox, in Louisville, KY, USA.  He talks about his impressions, his friends, and 
institutionalized racism in the 1950s.  He was welcomed warmly by the Americans, 
though he often found them ignorant about his country and lifestyle.  He compares and 
contrasts his many educational experiences in training courses around the world.  He 
concludes by discussing an experience in 1959 when an Indian airplane penetrated 
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Pakistani airspace on ‘Id day and he was sent to recover the Indian officers who had been 
ejected from the plane. 
 
Abstract June 27, 2005: General Wajahat discusses his marriage, his relationships with 
his in-laws and their political history.  His father-in-law Mr. Amjad Ali was very well 
connected politically, having been a member of the Unionist Party in the Punjab and the 
Muslim League.  When General Wajahat met Talat, his wife, her father was serving as 
Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C. He discusses the 
property that his father-in-law provided for them at the time of the marriage, its fate, and 
some of their experiences early in their marriage.  He concludes by discussing his role 
and his father’s role in resettling refugees and their refusal to accept bribes of choice 
land, preferring instead to allot the property to the displaced persons. 
 
Abstract June 29, 2005: General Wajahat talks about the early days of the Kashmir 
situation including the circumstances and tactics by which it was started and his 
involvement when he was ADC to General Gracey.  He fielded the telephone calls from 
the Indian Commander-in-Chief to negotiate the cease-fire and he describes that 
experience and the events that led up to it.  He talks about building the infrastructure of 
the army in the wake of the Kashmir dispute and the strain that the conflict put on 
resources. He goes on to talk about what it means to be a soldier, to fight for your 
country, and what it means to be a Pakistani.  He concludes by talking about the meaning 
of martial law and how it was administered during different regimes. 
 
Abstract June 30, 2005: General Wajahat tells more specifically about the events that 
took place when martial law was declared in October 1958, his role as a martial law 
administrator, and his relationship with his brigadier.  He then talks about the origins of 
corruption in the civil service and why the common people were ready for martial law.  
He discusses the success stories of the martial law.  He discusses at length his interactions 
with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from the time Bhutto was a young man, until he was in Yahya 
Khan’s Cabinet.  He goes on to talk about his experience as a Special Envoy, hand-
picked by President Yahya to secure arms agreements from Turkey and Iran during the 
1971 War.  He describes in detail his visit to Tehran to secure aid.   
 
Abstract July 7, 2005:  General Wajahat speaks in detail about his experiences during the 
1965 War with India.  He expands upon his thoughts about a solution to the Kashmir 
dispute and considers the history of that conflict.  From here he discusses Pakistan’s 
strategic alliances and the lessons that Pakistan learned about them as a result of the two 
wars fought with India during this period.  In the wake of my interviews with M.A.K. 
Chaudry we have a lengthy conversation about the role of the military and police and 
their relationships under martial law.  He then talks about the origins and ubiquity of 
corruption, and the problems with the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan and it’s role and 
relationship with the military, particularly under martial law.  He concludes by talking 
about Pakistan’s priorities and concerns in 1947 and 1948. 
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Abstract July 8, 2005: General Wajahat begins by outlining the political forces that came 
into conflict in the period after the 1965 War with India and that led, in his opinion, to the 
1971 War and the “loss” of East Pakistan.  He describes his mission during the 1971 War 
as a special delegate to Turkey and Iran attempting to secure war supplies.  He discusses 
the effect of US and Russian allegiances during that conflict, and Pakistan’s surprise and 
the failure of their trade partners to follow through with providing supplies.  General 
Wajahat concludes by speaking about Zia-ul-Huq’s government takeover.  He describes 
in detail his relationship with Zia-ul-Huq throughout their careers, which ran roughly 
parallel, though Zia was slightly senior.  He describes Zia’s fear that Wajahat would pose 
a political threat due to Prime Minster Bhutto’s admiration.  General Wajahat then 
describes how their relationship changed when he was sent to Greece and Australia as 
Ambassador.   
 
Abstract July 10, 2006: General Wajahat tells me about his work on the Punjab Boundary 
Force under General Rees and Colonel Bell. He describes the breakdowns in 
communications and chain of command that plagued the boundary force during the 
disruptions to civil power and in the police in the Punjab in 1947. He describes operations 
evacuating Muslim refugees from East Punjab and the relative preparedness of Hindu 
refugees leaving the west. Both groups were beleaguered, but as the columns of refugees 
passed one another on the road, no fighting broke out. He describes the difficulty of 
working with the refugees with limited resources and manpower. He moves on to speak 
about the meaning of independence. He concludes by discussing his mission to Turkey to 
secure military aid for Pakistan during the 1971 war, and his disillusionment at the failure 
of Pakistan’s allies to come to her aid.  
 
Abstract July 11, 2006: General Wajahat begins by speaking about Saudi Arabia’s King 
Faisal. We quickly shift to discussing life in Aligarh and he tells me about his father’s 
social relations with Muslims and Hindus. He describes his neighborhood and the fact 
that the university, and the university mosque, though farther away than the main city 
mosque, felt like the center of their world and it was there that they went for the 
important ‘Id prayers. He tells me about his life as a “day scholar” at Aligarh and what 
the environment was like including what courses he studied. He lauds the academic 
environment of the university, naming several well-known professors. Unfortunately, he 
says, nothing similar exists in Pakistan. He notes the atmosphere of tolerance at AMU 
and the difficult decision its professors faced at partition when they were torn between 
their desire for Pakistan and their loyalty to the institution. He speaks about the role of 
Aligarians in Pakistan and the fact that the political parties that represent mohajirs, or 
migrants from India do not seem to incorporate the progressive values of his generation 
of Aligarians. He suggests that although his family gave up a lot to get to Pakistan, they 
did not miss India or feel a sense of loss. He speaks of Pakistan as a land of opportunity 
and outlines the origins of provincialism and sectarianism.  He says that Pakistan needs a 
renaissance and the force that should draw Pakistanis together as one is the resistance to 
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Islamic fundamentalism. As we close he speaks about the importance of commemorating 
the sacrifices people made during partition and for Pakistan. In conclusion, he argues that 
August 14 is the real independence day and that the celebration of March 23 as Republic 
Day is misleading and possibly shines too much attention on the idea of the “Islamic 
Republic.” 
 
Abstract January 7, 2008: Wajahat Husain begins by telling me in some detail about the 
annual Exhibition in Aligarh, and its role as a major social event, one where young men 
could sometimes catch a glimpse of young women! Another special attraction was the 
food, kebab and paratha. I asked him about the purdah arrangements in the classroom, 
and he told me more about how the girls had a separate entrance and sat in the back of the 
class in the graduate classes. He describes the tradition of purdah in India and his own 
family’s progressive approach to purdah and his mother’s rejection of it. This was 
significant because, in his mind, Aligarh represented a progressive Muslim outlook. He 
speaks of Jinnah’s visits to Aligarh, where he stayed at Chattari Manzil, and would 
sometimes meet with the students.  He speaks briefly about Hindu students in the law 
classes, though none of them were his friends, and they lived in a separate hostel. He tells 
me about evacuating his family from Aligarh, where communal tensions were rising, 
after his experience on the Punjab Boundary Force. When he returned to his regiment in 
Ahmednagar, he found a changed environment and felt excluded, grateful to be opting for 
Pakistan. He discusses the conditions under which the Boundary Force was formed, and 
the challenges of authority and management that it faced. He tells a story about 
evacuating refugees from a camp in Jullunder under Colonel Bristow during flood 
conditions. He mentions Bristow’s Book, Memories of the British Raj.2 He suggests that 
when I am in Aligarh I should try to understand the situation now, and the relationship 
between Aligarh and Pakistan. We speak about his old colleagues and friends from East 
Pakistan in preparation for my visit there. He especially points out General Bacchoo. He 
concludes by noting the bitter feelings between officers after the 1971 war.  
                                                
2 He misidentifies the book as Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1962). The correct citation is Brigadier R.C.B. Bristow, Memories of the British Raj: 
Soldier in India (London: Johnson, 1974). 
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Interviewee: Justice Javid Iqbal (Ret’d) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Lahore, Pakistan 
Date: Thursday July 13, 2006 
 
Biographical Notes: Javid Iqbal is the son of Pakistan’s Poet Laureate Mohammad Iqbal. 
He was born October 5, 1924 in Sialkot, now in Pakistan. He was educated in the 
Government College of the Punjab University in Lahore, where he grew up. He 
completed his Ph.D. from Cambridge University and was admitted to the bar. In Pakistan 
he served in the High Court and retired as Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. 
 
Abstract: Justice Iqbal begins by speaking about his childhood in a Punjabi railway 
colony and the fact that his childhood home in Lahore—on old Meo Road, now Allama 
Iqbal Road—has been converted into a museum because of his father’s iconic fame. He 
describes his writing and his ancestors’ history. Several generations back, he notes, his 
family of Kashmiri Brahmins converted to Islam as a result of the influence of Sufi 
adepts. He was educated in the Government College of the Punjab University before 
completing law at Cambridge. He made a brief foray into politics before rising through 
the legal ranks and finally retiring as a Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court. His parents 
both died before he was a young teenager; thereafter he and his sister were raised 
primarily by a German governess. He describes his wife’s qualifications--she retired as a 
judge of the High Court—and their courtship and marriage. He describes his parents 
relationship and his mother’s minimal education. He describes his early education in 
Sanskrit and Arabic, his minimal religious education and a bit more about his governess 
(whose brother-in-law was a Professor of Botany in Aligarh University: A.A. Hyder). He 
discusses the influence of Sayyid Ahmad Khan on the development of Muslim national 
identity. He describes the tension between Hindus and Muslims over political power prior 
to 1947, and elaborates on a discussion in Pakistan over “the beginning” of Pakistan’s 
history and Mohammad Iqbal’s notion of Muslim nationalism. He speaks of meeting 
Jinnah as a boy, his own involvement in the Pakistan movement, and his gratitude that 
Pakistan earned independence. He speaks of his own Ideology of Pakistan and the 
challenges of separating Church and State in Pakistan, in contrast to Europe and the 
United States. As he says, “although the source [of law] claims to be revelational its 
import is mundane, secular.” He speaks about the relationship between criminal law, and 
banking law, and the laws of Islam. He speaks about his memories of partition, what 
Pakistan gained in independence and the challenges it faces constitutionally today. He 
concludes with a lament on the absence of young leadership in Pakistan.  
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Interviewee: Anonymized as IQ  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Date: May 26, 2010  
Location: Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan 
Release: REQUESTS ANONYMITY; RELEASED ONLY FOR BONA FIDE 
RESEARCH PURPOSES AND FOR DEPOSIT IN A RESEARCH LIBRARY OR 
ARCHIVE 
 
Biographical Notes: IQ was born in Azamgarh on June 15, 1929. He was brought up in 
Banaras, but attended the Aligarh University. After partition he traveled to Pakistan and 
after holding a variety of odd jobs, he joined the Army. He is now retired from the army 
but serves on the Board of Governors of the Sir Syed University of Engineering and 
Technology. In addition, he runs the “co-curricular” program, organizing drama, sports, 
and debate contests and other extra-curricular activities.  
 
Abstract: IQ begins by offering some history of the Sir Syed University of Engineering 
and Technology—how they procured the land, funding and equipment. He describes his 
role on the Board of Governors.  Then he speaks about his childhood in Banaras, a city 
that was “famous” for riots, and how he chose to attend the Aligarh University. He 
describes the allure of the Muslim League Two Nation Theory and why Jinnah enjoined 
the students to campaign for it. He describes his adventures while electioneering for the 
League in Punjab and Sindh only to return to Aligarh too short of attendance to be 
allowed to sit for examinations. The Vice Chancellor intervened and allowed the boys to 
take the exams. He describes the disturbances during partition and the efforts the students 
made to defend the university against potential threat. He traveled to Pakistan along with 
some military officers in an official train. After arriving in Karachi, he describes, he and 
his friends struggled to find a safe place to live, and to find work. He was encouraged 
when another Aligarian he met helped them. He found work, with several non-Muslims 
in the Air India office, and though he was afraid of being discriminated against, he found 
his superiors to be open and helpful. He describes his decision to join the army, and 
spend two years in military school. We then return to some basic details, his birthdate and 
early childhood, religious education and his father’s position as a policeman. He speaks 
about his recently deceased friend, Shah Hasan Atta who had also been active in the 
demand for Pakistan. He describes being on a hunting expedition and seeing a tiger run 
through their camp! He describes the importance of Pakistan and attending Jinnah’s 
funeral. I then asked him, and others in the room about their decision to come to Pakistan. 
Other persons in the room speak briefly about their own experiences of migration and 
settlement in Pakistan. The interview concludes with a discussion of my research.  
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Interviewee: Abdul Rashid Khan 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Date: Thursday August 10, 2006 
Location: Sir Sayyid University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan 
Release: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Abdul Rashid Khan was born in Saharanpur. He completed his 
matriculation and started at Aligarh in 1944. As a student at Aligarh he worked for the 
elections in 1945-46 and later he migrated to Pakistan in late 1947. Khan became a 
government servant, first serving in Sukkar District and then later with the Karachi 
Development Authority. He now serves on the faculty of the Sir Syed University of 
Engineering and Technology in Karachi. 
 
Abstract: Abdul Rashid Khan describes his early childhood and choice to join the Aligarh 
Muslim University.  He goes on to discuss his evacuation to Pakistan, at the compulsion 
of the government of East Punjab.  He speaks of communal harmony at Aligarh, and the 
support of professors.  He suggests that the beneficiaries of Pakistan have largely been 
landlords and landed interests, at the expense of democracy and the poor.  There is no 
Aligarh in Pakistan, he says, where character-building is a fundamental part of the 
educational agenda.  He laments that Aligarh’s objective was to prepare men for nation-
building, and that feeling is missing in Pakistan. 
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Interviewee: Professor Iftikhar Alam Khan (Ret’d Alig) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Alam Manzil, Zora Bagh, Aligarh 
Date: June 6, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Iftikhar Alam Khan first arrived in Aligarh’s Minto Circle School in 
1949 after his father was arrested and shortly after the partition. He found the student 
population much depleted by the changes wrought by 1947’s migrations. His landowning 
family was largely split between Muslim League and Communist sympathies before 1947 
and both he and his brother Iqtidar were active in Leftist student demonstrations during 
their tenure in Aligarh. He completed his High School in 1951 or 1952. He became a 
Professor of Museology and was active in the dramatic arts at Aligarh. He directed the 
Aligarh Museum and the Sir Syed Academy. He is an expert on Aligarh’s architectural 
history, and has written several books on this subject.  
 
Abstract: Iftikhar Alam Khan (known to most as Iffan Mian) begins by telling me about 
his family, in which he is the second oldest of six. He remembers some events of 1947 
and ’48 including his father’s arrest and the fear he felt because he was Muslim. He 
feared that the non-Muslims in his locality hated him because he was Muslim. He would 
hear stories of people killed in trains and it made him afraid to travel and he only felt safe 
when he was near home and people recognized him. When he arrived in Minto Circle, 
there were only a few students there, the warden would take the boys hunting for 
chickens, and Iftikhar felt safe because the warden had a gun. He dwells throughout the 
interview on his extreme fear during the partition days. He describes himself as a sort of 
incomplete Communist, torn by his need to obey the Headmaster and his desire to attend 
meetings. Because of tardiness he avoided being arrested during a protest in 1951 (when 
his brother Iqtidar Alam Khan was arrested) but was chastised by the student leadership. 
He describes hiding his identity when traveling by train, and what the threats were. He 
looks back and credits Zakir Husain with saving the university and remembers his 
involvement in Nehru’s Youth Festivals and drama at AMU. He discusses factionalism 
and politics in the university during the early years. He laments the resurgence of 
communalism in the 1970s which resulted in the banning of girls from the stage. We 
speak about scholars we both know, and his own recent scholarship, I asked him about 
what publications he read as a student, where he got the news, and he describes the 
culture of the common rooms and Hall magazines. He details at some length the 
difficulties of working in Aligarh’s archives and the compilation of the Alumni 
Directory. He concludes with some laments about the effect of the Muslim League period 
on Aligarh’s culture and his difficulty in accepting the official uniform of the sherwani. 
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Interviewee: Professor Iqtidar Alam Khan (Ret’d Alig) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: 4/758 Friends Colony, Aligarh 
Date: May 31, 2009 
 
Biographical Notes: Iqtidar Alam Khan was born in a village near Kaimganj in District 
Farrukhabad in 1932. His father’s family were landlords though his father also 
maintained a small law practice. His father, Ghulam Rabbani Khan, also developed a 
reputation as a poet known as “Taban.” His mother was a homemaker and proficient in 
reading Urdu and Arabic. One of his brothers, Iftikhar Alam Khan also became a 
professor in AMU, and another brother has had a political career. He first arrived in 1945, 
and then returned in 1950. During his first experience at Aligarh he was initially attracted 
to the Muslim League idea of Pakistan, though he later became affiliated with the Leftist 
Students’ Federation. Alam became a professor of History at AMU, from where he 
retired, though he still frequently visits campus. 
 
Abstract: Iqtidar Alam Khan begins by telling me of his family’s origins, and their 
relation to prominent nationalist Zakir Husain. He tells me about his family’s political 
activities, and the fact that family members were allied with different parties: the 
Agriculturalist (Landlord) Party, the Muslim League, the Congress and the Communists. 
He remembers that his father and uncle were well-respected in the village and the 
biradari came together to prevent them from leaving for Pakistan. His father increasingly 
turned to the Leftist party and was eventually arrested in 1949. Alam goes on to tell me 
about his experiences at Aligarh, first as a school student, and later in his Intermediate. 
He recalls that he was sent to Aligarh at first because he had been unsuccessful in school. 
He describes his political identity at Aligarh and the influence of his father’s Leftist 
views. He mentions that he was “intensely religious” for a period, much to his father’s 
chagrin! He describes his arrest for being involved in a Leftist Students’ Federation 
protest at Aligarh, and how he learned to be a Communist from all the comrades who 
were imprisoned with him. He tells me about his experience of partition in Aligarh and 
the “deadly fear that something very horrible is happening around.” He tells me about his 
fear of the sharnyartis—the refugees displaced by partition. After partition he describes 
his experience at Aligarh, getting admission, life in the halls, how other students 
responded to his arrest and detention. He speaks of how he came to study history, his 
relationship with Irfan Habib, and Habib’s influence on the Students’ Federation. Finally 
he speaks about his efforts to thwart communalism at the university. 
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Interviewee: Mohiuddin Khan 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Gulshan 2, Dhaka, Bangladesh  
Date: March 28, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL  
 
Biographical Notes: Mohiuddin Khan was born in Sylhet in 1924. His father was a police 
inspector and as he was growing up they lived in different places throughout Sylhet and 
Assam. He passed his matriculation in 1941 and his intermediate from Calcutta 
University. He completed his Bachelor’s in 1945 from M.C. College in Assam. Then, due 
to a shortage of seats for Muslims in Engineering Colleges, he applied to Aligarh 
University. During his stay at Aligarh he was involved with the Progressive Students’ 
Federation and even attended conferences in New Delhi. He was also a supporter of 
Pakistan. After completing his engineering degree in 1949, he settled in then East 
Pakistan. For most of his career he served in the East Pakistan Government in the 
Communications and Building Department. Until his retirement in 1982, he was a 
government engineer and finally Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department. At the 
time of our interview he was serving as President of the Aligarh Muslim University Old 
Boys’ Association, Dhaka.  
 
Abstract: Mohiuddin Khan begins by telling me about his early education and decision to 
apply to Aligarh University after not getting admission in engineering programs in East 
Bengal as a Muslim. He tells me about the train journey to get the long distance to 
Aligarh and how he shared a room with a childhood friend. He describes his family’s 
education background and his early training in reading Qur’an. He describes his activities 
at Aligarh and his sympathy for both Pakistan and the leftist Students’ Federation. He 
describes the changes in Aligarh during partition, the population decline, as well as the 
difficulty of adjusting to living so far from home. He details his career path as an 
engineer and his activities during the movement for the liberation of Bangladesh with 
which he was sympathetic. Although it was risky for him, he sheltered freedom fighters 
in his home in Chittagong and displayed signs of resistance against Pakistan. We speak 
about the difficulties of linguistic difference both in Aligarh and in East Pakistan, and 
about the relationship of Aligarh University to Bangladesh. He speaks of the “self-
reliance” he learned at Aligarh and the atmosphere there. In conclusion he describes the 
role of the Old Boys’ Association in Bangladesh in developing educational and medical 
services for the poor. 
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Interviewee: Anonymized as KPS (d. 2011) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Indira Nagar, Lucknow 
Date: September 27, 2009 and October 8, 2009 
RELEASE: ANONYMITY 
 
Biographical Notes: KPS was born July 1, 1931 in Hardoi. He completed his intermediate 
from the U.P. Board in 1945, and then went to Aligarh where he lived in V.M. Hall. He 
completed his Intermediate, B.Sc. M.Sc. (Botany) and Ph.D. by 1956. He then went to 
work as a scientist in the National Botanical Research Institute. When I met him he was 
retired and an active member of the Aligarh Old Boys’ Association in Lucknow. KPS 
died in 2011. 
 
Abstract September 27, 2009: KPS begins by speaking about some of the challenges he 
faced in being a Muslim in government service. He chose to defy the communalism 
surrounding him by maintaining a high standard of work and by maintaining his identity. 
He also said it is important to remember that Muslims live in a Hindu majority country. 
He recounts a couple of stories in which he shows how he did this, once when 
entertaining foreign scientists who were surprised to discover he was a Muslim when he 
refused an alcoholic drink, and once when he defied his Director for behaving 
inappropriately during scientific discussion. In closing, he described the virtues of the 
different Vice Chancellors, especially Sir Ziauddin Ahmad and Zakir Husain who he 
credits with having saved the university after partition. Partition had been a frightening 
time at the university and he describes how the students kept watch from the roof of V.M. 
Hall.  
 
Abstract October 8, 2009: KPS had begun talking before I attached the microphone and I 
followed up on some of these points at the beginning of the interview. He began by 
speaking about the challenges of Muslim leadership in India. Though India has faced a 
challenge in producing Muslim leaders, he cites several Aligarians who were prominent 
in India and abroad. He also notes that not all of India’s successful Muslims were 
Aligarians, though “most” of them were. He spoke briefly about Leftists at the university, 
the impact of the death of Mahatma Gandhi, and the significant impact of Zakir Husain as 
Vice Chancellor of the university after the 1947 partition. At my request, he compared 
and contrasted Zakir Husain with Sir Ziauddin, the pre-independence VC. He talked 
about his experience during partition, and how important those days were for 
understanding the position of the university today. Both KPS and his son speak about the 
mistaken suspicion that Aligarh is filled with partisans of Pakistan—particularly in 
cricket. He speaks about the arrest of Iqtidar Alam Khan in 1951 and the interview 
concludes with a recap of some of the basic details of his life: birthplace, family, etc. 
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Interviewee: Major General (Ret’d) Sahibzada Yaqoob Ali Khan 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Islamabad F-7/3 
Date: August 7, 2006 
RELEASE: DECLINED 
 
Biographical Notes: Sahibzada Major General Yaqoob Ali Khan was born on December 
20, 1920. He hails from the Princely State of Rampur, where his father was the Dewan. 
He attended the Royal Indian Military Academy from the age of twelve and received his 
commission at 19. He served in Europe and North Africa. After opting for Pakistan in 
1947 he served in the military before embarking on a diplomatic career as Ambassador to 
France and Foreign Minister of Pakistan.  
 
Abstract: General Yaqoob began by speaking about his family’s role in the 1857 Mutiny 
(also known as the First War of Independence). He speaks briefly about his educational 
history at the Royal Indian Military Academy, and his commission in the British Indian 
Army during World War II. He describes his “Two Azan Theory”—the conflicting calls 
of Islam and State—that he feels has created complications for citizenship in Pakistan 
that he links to “cognitive dissonance.” He speaks at length about the history of the 
Pakistan movement.  He tells me about about the importance of Aligarh in the demand 
for Pakistan and though he is very knowledgeable about these matters, he frequently 
laments his inability to help me, calling himself a “distorting mirror.” He tells me about 
his experience in Europe and North Africa during World War II and his own family’s 
history in Rampur. Before partition he served in Viceroy Mountbatten’s personal guard 
and by August 14, 1947 he was serving in Jinnah’s bodyguard because he had been 
attracted to Jinnah as an individual and the idea of Muslim sovereignty. During partition, 
his detachment remained in India and he describes the horrors of partition in the city. He 
describes the importance of South Asia in International Relations, the changes in Pakistan 
after the 1971 War and the importance of peacefully resolving the India-Pakistan conflict 
over Kashmir. He again protests his unhelpfulness and suggests that the “movement of 
ideas” is much more interesting than his personal experiences. He is more concerned with 
the present than the past, he suggests. He concludes with his perspective that Jinnah was 
forced into agreeing to the partition after the Congress declined the Cabinet Mission Plan. 
When I asked more questions about Jinnah, he removed the microphone and told about 
his personal experiences with Jinnah. 
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Interviewee: Zafar Mohmmad Khan 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Gokhale Vihar Marg, Lucknow  
Date: April 4, 2009 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Zafar Mohammad Khan was born in the old city of Lucknow. His 
grandfather came from Qaimganj, district Farrukhabad and married in Lucknow. His 
father, Aziz Mohammad Khan worked in an office in the Railway Dept. in Lucknow and 
later Calcutta. He completed his early education, up to his Bachelor’s in Lucknow and 
then took an Engineering degree from Aligarh (1955). He arrived there in 1952. He lives 
in Lucknow. 
 
Abstract: Zafar Mohammad Khan begins by telling me how his family landed in 
Lucknow. His grandfather did not care for his home place because the people were 
illiterate. He tells me that “in India, all Muslims know” about Aligarh because of the 
presence of old students. His cousins had also studied in Aligarh.  He tells me that his 
tenure in Aligarh was quite peaceful and Zakir Husain was Vice Chancellor. He describes 
the atmosphere—though it has changed now. He was a “regular go-er” to the mosque and 
interested in translation of the Qur’an so he would read to others in the mosque. Two of 
his sisters migrated to Pakistan for their marriages. Neither he nor his father was involved 
politics, but remembers the uncertainty about the future, about whether they would move 
to Pakistan or remain in India. He outlines he violence of partition and the numbers who 
migrated and died. His father was in Calcutta during the riots of 1946 but he remained 
safe. Zafar Mohammad Khan never considered going to Pakistan since he found work in 
the Public Works Department, and says that engineers had no trouble finding jobs in 
India; there was a big demand. He spent his early career in Aligarh. After becoming a 
gazetted engineer he was transferred to Almora and later to Gorakhpur, Kanpur and other 
places. He returned to Aligarh as the University Engineer (1978-1981) about the time his 
children reached university age. At this time he noticed a decline in discipline in the 
institution. He speaks about the demographics of the university. He speaks about the 
agenda of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and why he wanted AMU to be English medium. He 
speaks about old Lucknow and the arrangements for refugees. After partition, however, 
he says, conditions in education and jobs have improved for Muslims, though this has not 
had a marked effect on social class. We speak about my stay in Aligarh and I give him 
my contact information. 
 388 
Interviewee: Zakir Ali Khan (d. Feb. 7, 2012) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Sir Sayyid University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan 
Date: Thursday August 10, 2006 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Zakir Ali Khan was born in the princely state of Rampur on July 8, 
1926. His father served there as Superintendent of Police. As there was no university in 
Rampur, Khan was sent to Aligarh after completing his matriculation. His older brother 
was also there. During his stay in Aligarh he was captain of the hockey team and had the 
opportunity to tour all over India. He graduated in Civil Engineering in 1948 and in 1949 
he chose to migrate to Pakistan where there was a shortage of engineers. His mother 
permitted him to go, but did not follow. He initially worked in the Karachi Metropolitan 
Corporation until 1979 when he became Chief Engineer of the [Karachi] Metropolitan 
Corporation. He retired in 1986 as Managing Director of Karachi Water and Sewerage 
Board and has been the General Secretary of the Aligarh Old Boys’ Association of 
Pakistan since 1960. In 2009 Zakir Ali Khan was awarded the the first Sir Syed Ahmad 
Khan International Award for lifetime achievement in support of the ideals of Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan. 
 
Abstract:  Zakir Ali Khan received his degree in Engineering from Aligarh Muslim 
University.  His father was Superintendent of Police and also an Aligarh graduate.  He 
made the decision to migrate to Pakistan because he felt there was no future for Muslims 
in India.  He describes the culture of sport in Aligarh, and also his early encounters with 
Nehru and Jinnah at the University, especially on the hockey field.  He describes how the 
students trusted Mr. Jinnah, and how deeply invested he was in them, their education and 
views.  He describes Sir Sayyid’s vision for character building and the agenda of the 
university.  He remembers the atmosphere during Partition in Aligarh, and his home state 
of Rampur.  He describes his early education at home in Islam, guided by his mother, and 
completing his M.A. in Engineering before migrating to Pakistan to work.  The SSUET 
and the Aligarh University Old Boys Association seeks to carry on Sir Sayyid’s legacy, 
and Zakir Ali Khan laments that the nation-building spirit is gone in Pakistan.  He 
recommends a return to Jinnah’s vision of “Faith, Unity, Discipline.” 
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Interviewee: Saeeda Kidwai “Saeeda Apa” 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Date: June 17, 2009 
Location: Bangali Koti, Aligarh 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Saeeda Kidwai is originally from Delhi but was largely raised in 
Aligarh by an uncle after her fathers’s death. She has three sisters. She was admitted to 
the Aligarh Women’s College in 1926 and was the first woman to take graduate classes 
in Geography in AMU. She graduated in 1939 and began teaching in 1941. She taught in 
the Women’s College and lives in Aligarh. 
 
Abstract: Saeeda Kidwai tells me a bit about the history of the Aligarh Women’s College 
and how Sheikh Abdullah and his wife recruited teachers and generated support for it in 
the conservative town of Aligarh. She describes the environment in the college as it grew. 
It was difficult to recruit teachers because Aligarh was such a small place. Many were 
Christian, but there were some Hindus, but after Muslim girls began to graduate the 
supply of Muslim teachers grew. She tells me about the purdah arrangements for 
transportation and when she started post-graduate classes in AMU. She tells me about her 
studies in geography. She then tells me more about her own childhood growing up with 
her uncle. When she started at Aligarh, the university built her a separate entrance to get 
into the classroom unseen. She tells me that she never considered migrating to Pakistan 
and knew little about it before 1947. She credits “Mrs. Gandhi and Panditji” with the 
peace in Aligarh University during partition and with saving the institution. She goes on 
to tell me about Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination and laments the sectarian and ethnic 
strife in Pakistan where Muslims fight one another, and compares this to India. She tells 
me about the Aligarh Exhibition and the good foods available there. She suggests that I 
meet Birjees Abdullah, the last remaining daughter of Shaikh Abdullah. She tells me she 
chose Geography because she couldn’t remember history! She had no interest in the step-
by-step progression of history, but found geography rational. Still, she recognizes that 
without history, nothing could happen. She tells me about a series of illnesses she has 
survived, including a breast lump and gall bladder problems that caused her to abandon 
her Ph.D. Her son is now in Toronto. She tells me about the Students Union and the 
culture of debates that brought students together from all over the country (though girls 
did not participate).  
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Interviewee: A.K. Mathur   
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: New Hyderabad, Lucknow, India 
Date: September 30, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: A.K. Mathur was born in 1944. He is from Jaipur. However, he 
moved to Aligarh in 1951 when his father became Principal of Barahsini College, a local 
Hindu degree college. A.K. Mathur entered AMU in 1957. He had been in government 
college until 10th class in Aligarh city. He spent his career in UP State Electricity Board 
posted in Aligarh. His association remained with Aligarh after his marriage until 1978 
because his wife was teaching there. He is an engineer and lives in Lucknow. 
 
Abstract: A.K. Mathur begins by telling me about his career history and his association 
with Aligarh that began in 1951 when his father moved the family there. He tells me that 
his father was keen to develop the relationship between AMU and the Hindu degree 
colleges, and that as a result he, himself developed great affection for Aligarh.  He tells 
me what it was like to be a “day scholar” in AMU, rather than a boarder. He describes the 
disruption in AMU in 1965 and the declining state of discipline in the university. He tells 
me about the relationship between Hindi and Urdu and his own linguistic background. 
Then he speaks about the history of the Mathur clan/caste. He notes that the Hindu-
Muslim tension in Aligarh has been particularly acute after the 1950s. He notes the 
political divide in Aligarh between the  Progressives and the Fundamentalists, and claims 
sympathy with the Progressives, though not formally. He makes the point that, despite 
being a non-Muslim in the Muslim University, he never felt excluded because his father 
still had a lot of influence there. He speaks about the culture of “influence” that favors 
regional and sectarian identity, but that this holds little attraction for the students in 
AMU. He remembers the culture of the university when he was an engineering student.  
He tells me that the boys in AMU used to support Pakistan in the Pakistan v. India cricket 
matches. In conclusion he remembers a few professors: Hadi Hasan and K.G. Saiyidain 
and says he owes everything to his experience in Aligarh. 
 391 
Interviewee: S.M. Mehdi 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Alig Apartments, Shamshad Market, Aligarh 
Date: June 15, 2009  
Release: FULL  
 
Biographical Notes: S.M. Mehdi hails from Bhopal State, and was born around 1924. He 
did his early education, through high school in Bhopal before transferring to Christchurch 
College in Kanpur in 1939. He later completed his M.A. from Lucknow University. 
Mehdi’s father, Syed Mohammad Askari, was a lawyer. In Kanpur Mehdi lived with his 
paternal uncle, a prominent Congress leader, but under the influence of his teacher at 
Christchurch College he became a Socialist. Eventually he became a Communist and in 
Bombay in the mid-1940s he was engaged in distributing Communist literature in the 
Muslim areas of the city. He was a member of the Progressive Writers Group and 
ultimately served most of his career in the Soviet Embassy in Bombay. He has since 
retired to Aligarh where his daughter is a medical doctor. 
 
Abstract: S.M. Mehdi begins by describing his “allergy” to the Muslim League, initially 
born of a positive encounter with Congress leader Sarojini Naidu followed by a negative 
encounter with M.A. Jinnah in Bhopal in the late 1930s. After finishing High School in 
Bhopal, Mehdi went on to Kanpur for his B.A. and then to Lucknow for his M.A. Degree.  
During his time in both places he was involved with the Students’ Union and turned 
increasingly towards Socialism—under the influence of his teacher Christopher 
Ackroyd—and then to Communism. During 1946 and 1947 he was in Bombay putting 
out an Urdu paper for the Communist party- a post to which he had been recruited by 
Sajjad Zaheer.  He tells a long story about his experiences on the day Gandhi was killed, 
one of the few I heard in which a narrator does not suggest that they heard “immediately” 
that the assassin had been a Hindu and not a Muslim.  He describes the anxiety that 
dogged them all day wondering if a Muslim had been the assassin.  Finally he describes 
some of his friends in Bombay and suggests a book to me, written by his nephew, 
Reflections of an Indian Muslim.  
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Interviewee: Dr. Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Nazaria-e-Pakistan office, Lahore 
Date: Thursday July 21, 2006 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza was born in Ferozepur, India in 1942. His 
father was a policeman and he spent his early years in the civil lines, in the police colony. 
His family migrated to Pakistan during partition, feeling the threat of violence. He is a 
scholar of Pakistan history and the editor of several collections of documents as well as 
other books. Today he is a resident scholar at the Nazaria-e-Pakistan foundation. He lives 
in Lahore. 
 
Abstract: After describing the environment of his early childhood in Jullunder, Mirza 
immediately begins describing the disruptions of partition in East Punjab. His family 
shifted to Ferozepur right before partition in the hope that it would go to Pakistan. When 
it did not, chaos ensued. He describes his early memories of violence and migration to 
Pakistan. He speaks of his dedication to Pakistan and the role of Indian Muslims, 
especially the students from Aligarh University and Islamia College, Lahore in creating 
the conditions for its creation. He tells me of his father’s transfer to Pakistan and his own 
career path as a researcher in Punjab University. He describes Jinnah’s importance and 
his experiences on the day of Jinnah’s death, when everyone was crying “Baba Mar 
Gaya” (Our father has died). He believes that there is still much to be done in education 
and improving the values of Pakistan to fulfill Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan. He elaborates 
on the importance of independence, “political, economic, religious, cultural” and the fact 
that although the antecedents are important, Pakistan’s history began in 1947, when the 
state was founded. In conclusion, he tells me that there is no sense of loss because all that 
was left in India were material things, the real achievement has been the creation of 
Pakistan and its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah is responsible for that.  
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Interviewee: Professor Shariful Mujahid 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Karachi 
Dates: May 25, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Shariful Mujahid is a Pakistani Higher Education Commission 
Distinguished National Professor. He was born in Madras in 1926. He studied in 
Presidency College and later completed a Master’s degree in History from Madras 
University in 1950. He subsequently migrated, alone, to Pakistan. He received a Fulbright 
fellowship and attended Stanford University. He returned to Pakistan and made a career 
there as an academic. He was the founding Director of the Quaid-e-Azam Academy at 
Karachi University in 1976. He is an internationally known academic, especially for his 
work on Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He lives in Karachi. 
 
Abstract: Part 1: Shariful Mujahid begins by telling me about his educational pedigree. 
He tells me that he became involved in the Muslim League through his writing, he wrote 
for many of the League newspapers India-wide, though he cautions that his writing was 
often hagiographical. He was active in the Muslim Students’ Federation. Though hailing 
from South India, he had his sights set on Pakistan. He migrated alone. He received a 
Fulbright to the U.S., but he chose not to settle there. Though he served for many years as 
the head of the Quaid-e-Azam Academy, he lets me know about some of the difficulties 
he has had because he refused to play politics. He tells me how the Academy, and 
especially its library, has declined since his departure. He became a journalist because it 
was the only career, apart from government service, open to aspiring young men.  He 
dwells again on the actions of the establishment to remove him from service to the 
Quaid-e-Azam Academy and the challenges he faced. He tells me about what attracted 
him to Pakistan, the idea of the “restitution of power” to Muslims. He says that the 
Congress regime, especially in North India, was oppressive—less so in Madras, where he 
says he had good relations with Hindus. He remembers Jinnah’s erudition and impressive 
ability to hold a room in his thrall. He was incorruptible. Part 2: He tells me about the 
League’s infrastructure in Madras and other leadership, including C. Rajagopalachari 
who came from this part of the country. Madras housed the longest running Muslim 
League weekly, Deccan Times, one of its editors went on to become editor of Dawn. He 
tells me more about Muslims in Madras. He challenges the elevation of Mohammad Iqbal 
to the status of “co-founder” of Pakistan, saying “they wanted some one from Punjab.” 
He speaks more about Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan, and the challenges Pakistan faced, in 
terms of leadership, after Jinnah’s death. He decries the actions of the current regime and 
links them to an early absence of a democratic ethos. He describes Jinnah as an “enigma” 
in Muslim society; he was so different, honest, civilized and rational, his success seems 
unlikely! He suggests that Pakistan’s history begins in 1947 but that today, Jinnah would 
say Pakistan has abandoned his high principles. He laments the current shameless 
dynastic politics in Pakistan and the influence of conservative politicians. 
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Interviewee: Mukhtar Ahmad Naqvi  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Sir Sayyid University of Engineering and Technology 
Date: May 24, 2010 
RELEASE: Not for BROADCASTING, PUBLICATION INCLUDING INTERNET 
PUBLICATION, PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, DISPLAY OR EXHIBITION 
 
Biographical Notes: Mukhtar Ahmad Naqvi hails from Sehaswan in district Badaun, U.P. 
He was born in 1933, but his mother died when he was only two years old. He was raised 
by his father Rais Ahmad, a medical doctor, along with his brother and two sisters. After 
completing his matriculation, he began his Intermediate at Aligarh University. He 
migrated to Pakistan in 1947, crossing the deserts of Rajasthan and Sindh. He finished his 
undergraduate degree at Punjab University and his M.Sc. from Canterbury University in 
New Zealand. He worked in the Ministry of Agriculture in Islamabad for more than 
twenty years and now serves as the Convenor of Sir Syed University of Engineering and 
Technology in Karachi.  
 
Abstract: Mukhtar Ahmad Naqvi begins by telling me about his family and origins. He 
quickly begins describing the disruptions of partition. His brother was in Delhi, and 
incommunicado for some time. As a result Naqvi’s father asked him to leave 
“immediately” for Pakistan. Naqvi cross into Sindh in 1947, and his brother transferred in 
1948. He then tells me more about his experience in Aligarh, living in Aftab Hostel. He 
describes the tension between Hindus and Muslims that made Pakistan a necessity but 
also mentions that he had good friends who were non-Muslims. He speaks of his 
expectations that Pakistan would provide freedom of thought and worship and that those 
expectations have been fulfilled despite economic problems. He describes his visits back 
to India. Then he speaks again about the absence of provincialism in Aligarh and the role 
of Pakistan Radio in alerting the Muslims to the details of Gandhi’s assassination. He 
claims that unlike India, there is no prejudice in Pakistan against minorities. He describes 
his experiences on the day of Gandhi’s assassination, Pakistan’s leadership problems, and 
concludes by discussing the value of the confidence he learned in Aligarh. 
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Interviewee: Zilley Ahmad Nizami (Z.A. Nizami) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Sir Sayyid University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi 
Date: May 24, 2010 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Zilley Ahmad Nizami was born on May 25, 1931 in Amroha, India. 
He grew up in Meerut. He was educated at home as a child and then joined the High 
School and completed his Intermediate in Meerut College. His family is prominently 
associated with Aligarh, and his was the third generation to send its sons there. He is the 
younger brother of Aligarh historian K.A. Nizami and his youngest brother Taufiq,taught 
in the Political Science Dept. Z.A. Nizami was the Director General of the Karachi 
Development Authority and is President of the Aligarh Muslim University Old Boys 
Association-Pakistan and a founder and the Chancellor of Sir Syed University of 
Engineering and Technology in Karachi. 
 
Abstract: Z.A. Nizami begins by telling me about his early education and his family’s 
legacy at Aligarh. Though his father was a League supporter, he left the migration 
decision up to the discretion of each of his children. Some of Nizami’s siblings migrated, 
others remained in India. His father and mother remained in Meerut. He compares the Sir 
Syed University of Engineering and Technology’s mission to that of Aligarh, 
emphasizing the use of English and the simultaneous study of religious matters and 
technology. He speaks about partition in Aligarh and the importance of the leadership of 
Zakir Husain in saving the university from being “wound up.” He recalls seeing Quaid-e-
Azam speak and calls him “our torch bearer,” but doesn’t remember much difference 
when he arrived in Pakistan. He settled in quickly and found work eventually becoming 
the head of Karachi Development Authority. He takes responsibility for all that is good 
and bad in Karachi’s development. He says that Meerut changed after Hindu migrants 
arrived, it was hard to mix with them because their culture was different. In Pakistan, too, 
migrants had a hard time adjusting. If Quaid-e-Azam had lived longer, Pakistan would 
have been more stable because nobody challenged his authority. He concludes that 
Aligarh has made a huge contribution to Pakistan in terms of leadership and tells me that 
the best way to learn more is to read his brother’s, K.A. Nizami’s books! 
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Interviewee: Mrs. Mansoor Qamar 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: B-8 Naval Housing Scheme, Karachi 
Date: May 18, 2010 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
 
Biographical Notes: Mansoor Qamar is from Meerut where she was the youngest of her 
eight brothers and sisters. Her father, Mohammad Mukrim was a staunch Congress 
supporter. She attended Mohammad Ismail Girls School and Ragunath Girls’ College. 
After completing her Matric she went on to Meerut College for her B.A. She completed 
her B.Ed. at Aligarh University Training College. She secured a teaching job in Meerut 
and determined to stay there.  However, she went to Pakistan and ended up marrying and 
settling there in the early 1960s. Her first marriage lasted thirteen years, and he has three 
children. Her husband died and she later married one of his cousins to whom she remains 
married today. She lives in Karachi. 
 
Abstract: Mansoor Qamar begins by telling me about her educational experiences and the 
disruptions of partition. Her family moved from the country into the city where they were 
closer to other Muslims. Still, she had non-Muslim friends who would come to her home 
and invite her to theirs. They were refugees and had lost a lot. She describes some of the 
horrors and fears provoked by partition violence. She describes her first experience of 
going out without wearing the full burqa and her decision to leave it permanently. She 
repeats the stories about her education and talks about her family’s relationship to 
partition: her father opposed it, but several of her older siblings migrated. She tells me 
about her experience in Aligarh and the atmosphere there in the late 1950s. She tells a 
funny story about the “Honor List” and how busy she was in her program. She tells how 
she refused to get married, how she was considered so strange in Muslim society in 
Meerut for riding a bicycle, abandoning burqa, getting educated, refusing to marry, etc. 
She first arrived in Pakistan to help her brother while his wife was sick, was convinced to 
marry—though she insisted it must be into an educated family—and then remained. She 
returned to India only briefly but had a falling out with her Jamaat-i-Islami employer and 
returned to Pakistan. She was married for thirteen years before her husband died then she 
was alone for six years before marrying Qamaruzzaman, her current husband. She 
concludes by describing her experience teaching in St. Joseph’s school, where, because 
she was teaching Islamiat, she developed an interest in Islam and Islamic history. 
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Interviewee: Habib ur Rahman   
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Aligarh Old Boys’ Association, Motijheel, Dhaka, Bangladesh 
Date: February 20, 2010 
Release: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Habibur Rahman was born in Dhaka on January 1, 1925. His father 
was in charge of the Lal Bagh Police Station, but his family belongs to village 
Munshiganj outside of Dhaka. He passed his matriculation from Calcutta University and 
his father sent him on a tour of North India by train. After that, he began his education at 
Aligarh in 1944 and he lived in Sir Syed East. During his time at Aligarh he tried to learn 
to fly in preparation for military service, and he was very involved in Muslim League 
activities. After returned to then East Pakistan in 1949 he tried to join the Air Force to 
become a pilot but he was deemed too small at only ninety pounds! He was later active in 
the Awami League and supported the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Two of his 
brothers were killed during the war. He fled to India until Mujibur Rahman established 
his government in 1971. Rahman became an Advocate and cared for his mother for much 
of his adult life, marrying quite late. He is now married and has a young daughter. 
 
Abstract: Advocate Habib ur Rahman began by describing his arrival at Aligarh Muslim 
University and his earlier education in Dhaka.  He describes his solo tour of India, which 
he undertook before going to Aligarh. He met and became friendly with a Sikh traveler 
and his young son. He then describes the atmosphere at Aligarh, with students from 
different regions living together. He describes the privileges of Aligarh students and 
military training at the University. He talks about the wife of an another Bengali, who 
would cook fish and rice for the Bengali students. He speaks about his involvement in the 
Pakistan Movement and the Bangladeshi grievance against Pakistani governance prior to 
1971. He speaks of his involvement in the movement for the independence of Bangladesh 
as an Awami League supporter. He speaks about his experiences during the 1971 War 
when he became a refugee in India. He tells me a bit about the history of the Old Boys’ 
Assocation and the its Urdu speaking members. He describes his father’s decision that 
Habib ur Rahman should be sent to Aligarh, because he was “naughty.” He speaks about 
Aligarh’s reputation and concludes by telling me about his family and his late marriage.  
 398 
Interviewee: Professor Hakeem Syed Zillur Rahman 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Ibn Sina Academy, Aligarh 
Date: June 29, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Zillur Rahman was born on July 1, 1940 in Bhopal. His father and 
grandfather were both Unani physicians and authors of books on the subject. He was 
raised in Bhopal and attended Aligarh University, arriving in 1955. After passing out he 
became a faculty member and has settled in Aligarh. In 2008 he opened the Ibn Sina 
Academy in his home: a library, museum and reading room that focuses on Unani 
Medicine and Islamic History. 
 
Abstract: Zillur Rahman begins by telling me about his family’s history and association 
with Unani medicine. His father and grandfather had traditional education in Islamic 
knowledge and studied Unani with individual practitioners. He chose to attend Aligarh 
University because of its reputation and went on to teach there and settle in Aligarh. His 
son completed an allopathic medical degree and is a lecturer in AMU’s medical school. 
He describes how Unani medicine suffered under the British and how Aligarh helped to 
maintain the tradition with their program. He describes the system of Unani medicine and 
differentiates it from herbal medicine. Many alternative medical systems utilize herbs, he 
says, but Unani is a comprehensive, holistic system. He tells me about his own 
contribution to the field. He tells me that despite the local orientation of Unani cures, and 
the globalization of the world, all diseases can be treated by local cures.  Patients of 
Unani hakeems are Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, all kinds of people. The medium of 
instruction in Unani schools is primarily Urdu and most practitioners are Muslims. He 
goes on to tell me about the Ibn Sina Academy and its purpose. He describes how his 
own family suffered during partition, not receiving appropriate allotments in Pakistan, 
etc. Families on both sides were able to travel back and forth and he minimizes the 
differences between India and Pakistan. He credits Aligarh with bringing together many 
different kinds of people: political, regional, religious, etc. He identifies AMU it as the 
only remaining center of Urdu and Muslim culture. He speaks about the early founders 
and the early period at Aligarh and the emergence of the nationalist and Muslim League 
sentiments. Still, he emphasizes that people with differing opinions coexisted in this 
environment. He minimizes the idea that Aligarh had a special role in migration to 
Pakistan, Muslims left from all over India. However, he says that 1971 showed Indian 
Muslims that Pakistan would not make space for them, as it had failed to accommodate 
the Biharis. He also suggests that Muslims do not suffer in India, rather they have the 
freedom to join any party and wield political influence, after all there are more Muslims 
in India than in India or Bangladesh and even Saudi Arabia! In addition there are many 
resources for Muslim education, etc. Part 2: Hakeem Zillur Rahman describes himself as 
Muslim, Indian and a student of Unani.  
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Interviewee: Professor Wasi ur Rahman (d. June 21, 2010) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Al-Chemy, Sir Syed Nagar, Aligarh 
Date: November 21, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL *Please use discretion  
 
Biographical Notes: Wasi ur Rahman is originally from Shamsabad, District 
Farrukhabad, Tehsil Qaimganj. He was born on December 27, 1927. His father was a 
teacher. He was the youngest of five siblings. He completed his early education in 
Shukohabad and his B.Sc. from Kanpur (Agra University). He first came to Aligarh in 
1947-48 and completed his M.Sc. and Ph.D. He taught for some time in SUNY Albany 
and completed additional research work. He taught in Aligarh and was briefly Pro Vice 
Chancellor.  
 
Abstract: Wasi ur Rahman begins by telling me about his arrival in Aligarh. He mentions 
his father was educated in Kanpur and his mother was literate in Arabic and Urdu. His 
mother died when he was only five or six years old. He tells me then about his own 
educational pedigree and how he was inspired to study Chemistry. He tells me about his 
mentor and the inspiration he found doing research in the United States. He speaks about 
the role of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Muslim University in reviving Muslim 
education. He felt inspired by Sir Sayyid’s example to dedicate himself fully to his 
profession and teaching. Wasi ur Rahman tells me about the atmosphere in Aligarh when 
he was a student, and how they created a second home for the boys far from home. 
Independence was very exciting for him because it meant that he was free- free from 
bondage. He always had a nationalist frame of mind and but he was active in the 
Congress activities—though he never stood for elections—he identifies himself as an 
“ordinary worker.” He speaks about his tenure at Kanpur University and being in the 
minority as a Muslim. He speaks about Colonel Haider, and says he was not a great 
teacher or researcher, but he was very supportive of extra-curricular activities, including 
University Training Corps. He was appointed as Proctor of AMU and later as Pro Vice 
Chancellor during a time of crisis in the late 1980s. He tells me a bit of the politics of the 
university during his tenure. During the VC’s absence, he served as Acting Vice 
Chancellor—he is concerned here with defending his reputation and conduct. He 
describes his resignation as Vice Chancellor in 1990. He says the AMU still is important 
for educating Muslims and preparing them for competitive examinations. Though the 
university has grown, he thinks that Sir Sayyid would be disappointed by its current state. 
He believes that his role has been to uphold Sir Sayyid’s vision and to support the 
university. He becomes emotional and begins to cry as the interview concludes. 
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Interviewee: Mrs. Anjuman Rashid 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Karachi 
Dates: May 19, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Mrs. Anjuman Rashid hails from Rewa State (now in Madhya 
Pradesh), she was born in the early 1940s, and was only four or five at the time of 
partition in 1947. Her father was a medical doctor and opened his own clinic in Rewa 
State. She has spent her entire life in Pakistan, and believes that her father settled in well 
in Pakistan. She is married to Professor Shahid Rashid and lives in Karachi. 
 
Abstract: Mrs. Rashid tells a story about growing up in Rewa State (now in Madhya 
Pradesh). Her father was  a medical doctor and the tutor of the Raja’s son. Her father 
joined the Muslim League, much to the dismay of others in the state. When they left for 
Pakistan, via Bhopal, amidst growing violence, the children did not understand. They 
thought they were out for an adventure, and could not understand why their mother kept 
crying. They finally reunited with her father in Bombay and took tickets on a ship for 
Karachi. They were amazed by Karachi, and thought the people were so nice and 
wonderful. Her father treated women in Karachi, even prostitutes. After some time her 
aunt’s daughter arrived and they took admission in the school, and later met other 
relatives. They were living at the time near Quaid-e-Azam’s monument. She describes 
her mother’s grief at having left all of their possessions behind when they fled India. The 
children were enjoying themselves, oblivious of their family’s loss. Today, she loves 
Pakistan, barely remembering India. Few of her relatives migrated. She tells me about 
Quaid-e-Azam’s death. She describes her affection for him, and also for Ayub Khan, 
especially his looks! She does not believe that Pakistan fully represents the vision of 
Quaid-e-Azam. She describes his vision as one for an Islamic state, where everyone 
would get along and there would be no difference between sects, ethnicities, etc. Today, 
she says, there is no leadership. The beginning of Pakistan, she says, is Quaid-e-Azam’s 
vision. Only through hard work and love with that vision be realized; above all, 
corruption must end. 
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Interviewee: Mohammad Abdul Rashid 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Date: March 29, 2010 
Location: Motijheel, Dhaka, Bangladesh 
 
Biographical Notes:  M.A. Rashid hails from Lucknow in North India; he was born in 
1921. He studied in Amir Daula Islamia High School. At the age of seventeen, in 1938, 
he participated in the Lucknow session of the Muslim League, serving water to the 
delegates. He was the first in his family to attend Aligarh University. After passing out 
from Aligarh in 1943, he settled in Calcutta, having taken a job with M.M. Ispahani, Ltd. 
However, after communal riots in 1950 he fled to Dhaka in East Pakistan and settled 
there, “because it was Pakistan.” In the early 1950s he started his own business trading in 
jute. In 1954 he joined the East Pakistan Stock Exchange. Though he planned to leave 
Dhaka in 1971 when Bangladesh became independent, his fellow Aligarians, General 
M.A.G. Osmani (leader of Bangladesh Liberation Forces) and Captain Mansoor Ali 
(Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister) and neighbors promised to protect him and prevented 
him from leaving, even getting police officers deputed to guard his house! The Stock 
Exchange was closed from 1971 to 1975 during which time businesses were nationalized. 
After liberalization, he returned to his work in the Stock Exchange. Today he remains a 
Director of the Stock Exchange and leads an active life.  
 
Abstract: M.A. Rashid begins by telling me about his early career after leaving Aligarh 
University in 1943. He became a grain trader for M.M. Ispahani, the Chief Agent to the 
Government of Bengal. He describes his allegiance to Muslim League politics by telling 
me that Hasan Ispahani was a League man, and that he, himself had been involved in the 
Lucknow Session of the League in 1938, when he was only a student. After describing 
the route that took him to Dhaka he explained why he stayed after 1971, at the behest of 
fellow Aligarians and Bengali neighbors. Despite being Urdu-speaking and non-Bengali 
he has felt at home in Dhaka. When I asked about the wealth disparity between East and 
West Pakistan during this period he spoke about how East Pakistan presented a good 
business opportunity because a lot of development was needed. He went on to describe 
Ayub Khan’s efforts to develop East Pakistan after 1958, with the assistance of the 
Adamjees, the Ispahanis and other Calcutta businessmen. I asked him how his family 
reacted to his decision to join business and leave the family zamindari outside of 
Lucknow. As the family share had declined over generations, he described, there was 
little left for him to take over. He described his visit to Karachi, where his sister had lived 
until her recent death. He never liked it because “people had no time for social jobs,” 
whereas in Bangladesh “we help each other.” He concludes with the thought that in 
Karachi people are “business-type people” with no care for social relations. 
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Interviewee: Professor Shahid Rashid 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Karachi 
Dates: May 19, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Shahid Rashid was born in Bijnor, India in January 1938. His father, 
Mohamamd Hasan was a civil servant, the Secretary of the Municipal Corporation in 
Bijnor. He has two brothers and two sisters. He was educated in a Muslim school as a 
boy and then after High School he did Intermediate from Nagina Hindu College. He 
ultimately completed his M.Sc. in 1960 in Lucknow. He was also hockey captain there. 
He migrated to Pakistan in 1963 at the age of 25. After working and teaching in the UK 
for fifteen years and completing his Ph.D. in Bradford University, he returned to 
Pakistan. He is a Professor of Pharmacology at Karachi University.  
 
Abstract: He begins by telling me about his birth and the investment of Bijnor in Indian 
nationalism—few migrated to Pakistan. The Congressi newspaper Medina was published 
from there by his grandfather. After partition, he tells me that Hindu harassment of 
Muslims increased.  His own family was divided between the League and Congress. His 
mother, Mehmoona, was a devoted housewife, somewhat literate in Urdu and she could 
read the Qur’an. He learned Hindi, Urdu and Arabic. He describes his education and how 
he landed at Aligarh University—in Jubilee Hostel of V.M. Hall. Most of his mother’s 
family remains in India, but his father’s family is in Pakistan. He migrated to Pakistan 
because his sister had married in Pakistan, and was alone; she requested one brother be 
sent near to her.  His only reason for migrating was because of his sister, he had no 
difficulty finding work (or any other hardship) in India. Once in Pakistan, he experienced 
a “miracle,” that led him to teach in the UK. He taught in London and Slough for fifteen 
years. Another “miracle” was that after turning down a job as an Assistant Chemist, he 
met a professor from Oxford who offered him a job—and for one year he taught in 
Oxford. He then completed his M.Phil from Oxford. He used his Aligarh network to join 
Wyeth Laboratories in Slough. A third “miracle” led him to complete a Ph.D. in 1977 at 
Bradford University while at Wyeth, and at their expense. After his Ph.D. Karachi 
University offered him a teaching position, and he returned to Pakistan. Shortly 
afterward, his sister left for the United States. We speak a bit more about Pakistan and the 
effect of riots. He tells me about Aligarh traditions and the importance of  character 
building there. He felt that the Hindus discriminated against Muslims, but that the ethnic 
discrimination in Pakistan is more widespread. He feels this is not a problem generated 
by migrants, mohajirs, but by those with provincial loyalties. The interview concludes as 
the men leave for the evening prayer. Interviewee: Professor  
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Wazir Ahmad Razzaqi  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Naval Housing Colony, Karachi 
Date: May 21st, 2010   
Release: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Wazir Ahmad Razzaqi was born in Meerut, a town close to Delhi, in 
Western UP in 1942. Most of his family migrated to Pakistan in the early 1960s. His wife 
is also from Meerut; they married in 1975. He initially worked as stenographer before 
working for the Life Insurance Corporation of India in Saharanpur and later Meerut. He 
is a Professor of Commerce and has written several books on the subject. 
 
Abstract:  Professor Wazir Ahmad Razzaqi begins by telling me how much he values 
teaching and how it was only possible for him in Pakistan. I ask to go back and fill in 
some details and he tells me about his birth and the region from where he comes. He was 
born and educated in Meerut and stayed there till 1969. He attended a primary school in 
his neighborhood. He tells me of the importance of Meerut College. After 1947, he 
decided not to go to Pakistan because he, like his father, believed it was not in the best 
interest for Muslims. However, two of his brothers, sisters, and his mother went to 
Pakistan while he and his father stayed in India. His brothers shifted to Pakistan in 1961. 
The feeling of his family who went to Pakistan was that they still feel like they are 
Indian. He eventually moved to Pakistan. His father was not up to the idea of coming to 
Pakistan, but he also went after he retired because all the other family members were 
settled in Pakistan. When Razzaqi was growing up in Ismail Nagar (his neighborhood) it 
was a higher class area. He believes the educational standard in Pakistan is poor. He 
taught in Karachi University after his retirement. In his view when you study the nation 
of Pakistan the Muslims were kept backwards by the mullahs. He remains critical of 
Pakistan, despite having lived there for over thirty years. He tells me that Urdu is in 
decline, along with honesty, good record keeping and honest accounting. He describes 
the changes that have taken place in Meerut since his departure, the importance of loyalty 
to your country, and his daughters’ marriages. As we conclude we speak about the 
importance of education and he laments the poor educational standard in Pakistan, 
despite his best efforts to serve his country as an educator. 
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Interviewee: Syed Saghir Ahmad Rizvi  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Parag Narain Road, Lucknow, India 
Date: October 6, 2009 
RELEASE: Not for Broadcast, Public Display, or Exhibition. NOT AVAILABLE FOR 
OTHER RESEARCHERS. 
 
Biographical Notes: Syed Saghir Ahmad Rizvi is originally from Lucknow, the place to 
which his mother’s relations belong. After passing High School he joined Aligarh in the 
Intermediate. He left Aligarh after only a few months and completed his Intermediate in 
Lucknow. However, he returned to Aligarh to complete his Engineering degree. He was 
active in supporting candidates in the Engineering College and Union elections and 
served in some posts himself.  He was also captain of the Engineering College hockey 
team. He supported the Muslim League but rather than migrating to Pakistan, he left for 
the United States shortly after completing his education. He lived and worked in the 
United States for several years before settling down in India. 
 
Abstract: Syed Saghir Ahmad Rizvi begins by speaking about his first experience at 
Aligarh as a student of the Intermediate. He didn’t enjoy being a “junior” and obeying the 
“senior” so he left to complete his Intermediate at Lucknow University. He returned to 
Aligarh, however, to study engineering. He describes the hazing/ ragging associated with 
“Introduction Night” and how this ritual helped him to build relationships with seniors. 
He describes his mischevious activities. He speaks about Ziauddin’s role in supporting 
the students, and even offering them concessions. Even Zakir Husain, he says, recognized 
the strength of the group Rizvi led and recommended him for a scholarship. He describes 
his involvement in the Engineering College Union elections. He goes on to discuss his 
support of the Muslim League when he was a student, though when he got older he 
“realized it was not good.” He concludes by describing his journeys to the United States, 
his first marriage to a Swiss girl and his efforts to ensure that their daughter, Yasmin, 
grew up in India. He returned to India permanently in 1969 after a road journey from 
Europe during which he picked up a hitchhiker. 
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Interviewee: Professor Ahmad Saeed 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Nazaria-e-Pakistan office, Lahore 
Date: July 20, 2006 
Release: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Ahmad Saeed was born on July 21, 1942 in Jullunder, East Punjab, 
then in India. His family shifted to Lahore in 1947 via military transport. He was 
educated in the Government College and Punjab University He taught for many years in 
Islamia College, Lahore before retiring in 2002. He is now a historian with the Nazaria-e-
Pakistan (Ideology of Pakistan) foundation. 
 
Abstract: Professor Saeed begins by speaking about his professional qualifications and 
publications. He has published several collections of primary documents pertaining to the 
Pakistan movement. Speaking about his childhood, he describes the disruptions that took 
place during the 1947 partition, and the fearful experiences and migration that his family 
survived. However, he cautioned, he was just a child and didn’t remember much from 
those days. His grandfather, a government contractor, was in the Muslim League and his 
uncle owned the Pak Teahouse on the Mall in Lahore. He describes the tension between 
Indians and the British, his memories of going to hear Mohammad Ali Jinnah [Quaid-e-
Azam] speak, Hindu discrimination against Muslims and his feelings about the 
importance of Pakistan. He describes Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan, the domination of 
Punjabis, who he believes have corrupted that vision, and the disenfranchisement of 
Muslims who migrated from North India. He speaks about income inequality and the 
danger of government corruption and disrespect for the country. We speak about the role 
of religion (Islam) in his life and in the state. We speak about the meaning of democracy, 
independence and partition. Saeed argues that partition was inevitable and speaks about 
the relationship between intellectual and territorial nationalism. He speaks about the 
importance of good educational institutions, the challenges of education in Pakistan, and 
the absence of opportunities for the poor. This, he says is Pakistan’s biggest challenge to 
overcome. 
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Interviewee: Ahmad Saeed   
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Lucknow, India 
Date: October 10, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Ahmad Saeed was born in Lucknow in 1927. Ahmad Saeed was 
primarily raised in Aligarh and attended the Muslim University High School.  He got his 
degree in engineering from Aligarh University where he had served as a Senior Cabinet 
member of the Engineering College Union. He was never attracted to the Muslim League 
because his father was a nationalist. Saeed even read Leftist and Communist literature but 
never joined a party. During his stay at the university he was also into horse riding and 
won the Mr. University contest. He later served on the UP State Electricity Board from 
which he retired as Director. Both of his children also attended AMU. 
 
Abstract: Ahmad Saeed begins by telling me about his early life in Aligarh and in the 
University. He praises the system of discipline but criticizes the food. He goes on to tell 
me about the Exhibition in Aligarh and how there were a lot of restrictions on student 
movement and behavior. He then tells me about his friend and neighbor Syed Saghir 
Ahmad Rizvi and how mischevious he was during his stay at Aligarh. Saeed speaks about 
his involvement as Senior Cabinet Member with the Engineering College Union. 
Politically, though he remembers the visits of Muslim League leaders and even attended 
the meetings, he was not sympathetic to their cause because his father was a nationalist. 
He mentions, though, that almost all of his classmates went to Pakistan (Saeed left 
Aligarh in 1950). He describes the importance of Zakir Husain as Vice Chancellor and 
his role in “saving the university from the aftermath of partition.” Saeed describes his 
own political leaning as “inclined towards Progressives” though was never officially a 
party member. After Aligarh, Saeed tells me, while many of his friends left for Pakistan, 
he refused, and left his job when his employer, MacNeill and Barry, insisted that it was 
their policy to send Muslims to Pakistan. Of course, he said, those who stayed in India 
did also get jobs. Saeed returns to discussing the university, and his involvement in 
sports, socializing, the system of seniority, and the importance of the Engineering college 
for Indian Muslims. There was no tension between Hindus and Muslims, he tells me, 
even during the 1940s and before partition students came from all over India. He 
contrasts his experiences when Gandhi and Jinnah each died. He concludes by discussing 
the challenges Muslims face in India, his perception that they have a “defeatist attitude,” 
and his feeling of brotherhood with Aligs rather than the broader Muslim ummah. 
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Interviewee: Anonymized as Mrs. IS 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Karachi 
Dates: May 28, 2010 
RELEASE: REQUESTS ANONYMITY 
 
Biographical Notes: Mrs. IS was born in Delhi in 1929. She lost her mother when she 
was three months old. From then on, she lived with relatives in Meerut. Her father was an 
important official in Aligarh Muslim University. Her early education was with tutors, and 
she finished the Qur’an under the guidance of a maulvi and an aunt. Mrs. IS moved to 
Aligarh when she was fourteen years old, and completed her education there. She 
emigrated to Pakistan in 1948 and married a naval officer. She returned to India only 
twice, upon the births of her children. She lives in Karachi. 
 
Abstract: Part 1: Mrs. IS begins by telling me about Aligarh when the Pakistan 
Movement was in full swing. She was very involved in the activities of the girls’ school 
and college and was keen on the Pakistan movement. She remembers Quaid-e-Azam as a 
good listener and sharp. Her father supported Pakistan but in the end was critical of the 
infrastructural plans. She thought that Pakistan would be a paradise for Muslims, without 
Hindus. But, she says, most of the people were ignorant because this was not Quaid-e-
Azam’s vision. She remembers her terror when Gandhi was assassinated. As a young girl, 
she knew many young Hindu girls and never had any negative experience with them. Yet, 
she believes Pakistan was inevitable, but the boundary line was the outcome of Nehru’s 
relationship with Mountbatten. In 1948, before migrating, she had visited Pakistan for 
one month, with her cousin, who was in the Pakistan Navy. But when she tried to return 
to India, her relatives prevented her due to the threat of war with India. She settled in 
Pakistan with no possessions apart from what was in her suitcase! She goes back to 
describe her early childhood with her father’s mother, after her mother’s death. She 
describes her involvement in the Pakistan Movement. During the elections, girls would 
tried to recruit Muslim women in the city to vote for Pakistan. Now she describes her 
activities as “cheating” because the people she recruited could not come to Pakistan. “For 
what?” Since the separation of Bangladesh, she says, Indian Muslims were satisfied that 
Pakistan is not for all Muslims. Since then, she says, they started “building themselves.” 
She says that everybody speaks Urdu, but everyone claims “Urdu is not our language!” 
She says the beginning of Pakistan was a British idea, Rehmat Ali Choudry developed 
enthusiasm for it, and then Jinnah was selected to lead it. She laments the failures of 
leadership in Pakistan. Part 2: During partition, she felt unsafe and slept with a weapon in 
her bed. She describes the unrest in Meerut. She describes her experiences on the day of 
Jinnah’s death and her own father’s death. She speaks of her father’s dedication to 
Aligarh, both it’s students and the institution itself. She notes that “our family” was 
divided by partition—by which she means the Muslim community—seeing disconnection 
as a consequence of partition. She says, “Lots of people lost, some people gained. We 
lost.”  
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Interviewee: Dr. Tahira Minhaj Servaes 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: G.O.R. Lahore 
Date: January 4, 2008 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Dr. Mrs. Tahir Minhaj Servaes was born in Aligarh in 1931 but spent 
her first ten years in Punjab. She completed her Master’s in Aligarh and then went to 
Boston University for her Ph.D. Her father, Minhajuddin was a Chief Engineer in the 
Lahore Irrigation Department. He died when she was ten. She is the second youngest of 
nine siblings: three boys and six girls. She married an American and had a child before 
completing her Ph.D. in Physics. She married an American and has raised her family in 
Boston. She has spent most of her career working in industry as a communications 
engineer, and she has also taught. She lives in Boston.  
 
Abstract: Mrs. Servaes begins by telling me about her early childhood and education and 
her home in Aligarh. She tells me about her migration, during partition, to Lahore, where 
her elder sister lived. She traveled partly by plane and partly by convoy. She returned to 
Aligarh after one year and remained there until 1958. She describes her chilly arrival in 
Boston in October, 1958 and her difficulty coping with the “difference” of America. She 
tells me about her Ph.D. program there. She left academia and joined industry, pursuing 
another Master’s in Engineering. She describes the changes to the industry at the end of 
the cold war. She reminisces about the excitement of being in Aligarh in the 1940s and 
50s, and how beautiful it was. Her mother was literate, though she had never attended 
school; she had married at age 15. She describes Aligarh, especially the university, was 
“basically Muslim;” everything was informed by Islamic culture. She speaks about 
segregation between girls and boys in the university and the girls’ college, and the 
shortage of female teachers. She says there were only a few Hindu girls in school with 
her, mostly they went to Banaras Hindu University. She tells me that she “had to be an 
Engineer” because her brothers and father were engineers, and how she was disallowed 
from doing it in Aligarh in 1948. She tells me more about the year she spend in Lahore 
when she and all of her cousins were “shipped to Pakistan” for their safety, and how 
much she missed her family in Aligarh. Aligarh, she says, was totally safe, though there 
had been trouble in Delhi. She says that when she returned to Aligarh, the journey was 
very harrowing. Her sisters, Khadija and Fatima join in the conversation, speaking about 
this period. She tells me that the girls in the Lahore College for Women were given some 
civil training with guns. She still visits Aligarh and the university, even after her mother’s 
death, she feels deep affection for the place, though she scarcely recognizes it today!  
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Interviewee: Brigadier Iqbal Shafi  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Islamabad, Pakistan 
Date: May 9, 2010 
Release: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Iqbal Shafi was born in Aligarh in 1927. His father was an Aligarian 
and a professor at the University and his mother ran a small school for the children of the 
university’s staff. Shafi began his education in Zahoor Ward and went on to the Muslim 
University High School where he passed out in 1943 before he attended Aligarh Muslim 
University. From 1940 he was attracted to the Muslim League platform and became a 
member of the Baccha (Children’s) Muslim League. He actively campaigned for the 
elections in 1945 and 1946. Shafi migrated to Pakistan in late 1947 and served as a career 
officer in Pakistan’s army. He co-founded the Sir Syed Memorial Society in Pakistan and 
continues to be active in educational development and leadership.  
 
Abstract: Part 1: Brigadier Iqbal Shafi begins by describing his father’s academic 
pedigree which included degrees from Aligarh and the London School of Economics 
before he settled in as a professor in Aligarh to teach Economics and Commerce. Shafi 
describes their family home on the campus of Aligarh University in great detail. He goes 
on to describe his grandfather’s medical and diplomatic work under the British. He 
speaks about his mother, her background and philanthropic educational work in Aligarh 
with the children of the university’s labor force. He remembers a trip when he returned to 
Aligarh and met the family of one of his mother’s former students. Throughout the 
interview, he uses anecdotes to illustrate the “atmosphere” of Aligarh in which support 
for fellow Muslims and the advancement of education were top priorities. He speaks a bit 
about his own educational and political experience as a student of Aligarh. When 
speaking about Aligarh’s atmosphere, and its relationship to the Pakistan movement he 
becomes very emotional and cries several times. Part 2: Brigadier Shafi begins with a 
description of Jinnah’s presence and frequent visits at the university and Shafi’s own 
experience as a Muslim League election worker in Punjab and the Northwest Frontier. 
The descriptions and stories are very colorful. After returning to Aligarh, he decided to 
join the army because he was so fed up with academics. He describes his experience in 
Dehra Dun during partition when the Muslim students of the Indian Military Academy 
opted for Pakistan and took forty school boys from the Doon School, Joseph Cotton, and 
Colonel Browns’ Schools along with them in the military transport. As we conclude he 
speaks about his own decision to come to Pakistan, his father’s belated arrival and 
educational work in Pakistan, his own experience in the Union elections in Aligarh, 
hostel and social life and the importance of the atmosphere. In the end, he describes the 
sense of loss that Aligarh is not in Pakistan, but the sense of triumph over Pakistan’s 
mere existence. 
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Interviewee: Colonel Mohsin Jalil Shamsi 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Gomti Nagar, Lucknow 
Date: August 11, 2008 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Colonel Shamsi belongs to Gonda, he was born in the late 1930s. His 
family were in business, and belonged to the Punjabi biradari, converts to Islam from 
several generations back. His father, Hafiz Abdul Razzaq was a hafiz and a businessman, 
and he taught English administrators Urdu and Persian. He passed away while Shamsi 
was in High School. Shamsi matriculated at the medical college in Lucknow in 1957. He 
joined the army and served for more than 25 years. He lives in Lucknow. 
 
Abstract: Part 1: Colonel Shamsi tells me about his family’s ancestral history and 
conversion to Islam by Shamsuddin Turk of Panipat. His family was involved in goods 
transport ranging from Sialkot to Calcutta. Shamsi decided in ninth class (1950) that he 
would become a doctor. The loss of his father when he was in High School prevented 
him from traveling to Germany for medical training. During his childhood, the family 
was in retail of general merchandise. He resisted the family’s pressure to join the 
business in favor of continued studies. After his medical degree, he joined the army. He 
speaks about the cooperation of Hindus and Muslims during his childhood. He speaks 
about the importance of Islam in his life. He makes an argument for Muslim equality in 
India, right from the beginning, though they may be underrepresented in services. 
Muslims should study and compete, he argues. He blames Muslims for their position. He 
speaks about his parents’ role in his early Islamic education. He speaks about the 
cooperation of Hindus and Muslims in putting on religious festivals. We speak about 
partition, which took place when he was in 6th class. In 1947 he attended the 
independence ceremony in the police lines, he remembers seeing the flag go up and 
down. He also remembers a riot in 1948 in Agra in one in Gonda. He says this “went on.” 
He remembers the departure of educated Muslims from Gonda. He describes the arrival 
of “hopeless” refugees from Pakistan areas, and Muslims entered a decline after partition 
for at least ten years. He says India is “very flexible” and can accommodate many 
religions and cultures. He speaks about how he has tried to mentor young Muslim boys in 
his neighborhood, to inspire them. We take a break so that he can say his prayers. Part 2: 
I meet Colonel Shamsi’s young granddaughter and have tea. Part 3: Colonel Shamsi 
speaks about Sufi tradition and veneration of saints as a corruption of true Islam. We 
speak of his views on Islam. He says you can respect saints, but never ask anything from 
them. We speak about his first marriage (his first wife died) and how he met his wife 
during an eye examination! 
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Interviewee: Professor Riazur Rahman Sherwani 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Habib Manzil, Aligarh, India 
Date: July 6, 2008 and November 20, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Riazur Rahman Sherwani began his schooling in Minto Circle 
School in the 1930s. His family were large landholders in UP, and his father a well-
known politician and, during the 1940s, a League sympathizer. Riazur Rahman 
Sherwani’s early education was traditional, in Arabic, Persian and the classical Islamic 
subjects. After joining the school he went on to complete his M.A. and Ph.D. in Arabic 
and taught both in Aligarh Muslim University and in Kashmir University. Sherwani 
never sympathized with the League despite his father’s allegiances and in fact, worked on 
the side of Congress during the 1945-6 elections. He still lives in his family home, Habib 
Manzil in Aligarh, reportedly where Mohammad Ali Jinnah used to stay during his 
Aligarh visits. 
 
Abstract July 6, 2008: Sherwani Sahib joined Minto Circle school in the 1930s. As a 
result of his difficulty hearing, he misinterpreted my question about his “student days” as 
being about his “feudal days” and begins by speaking to me about his family’s history as 
landowners. I redirected the conversation to AMU and asked about his political 
involvement in the 1940s. He keenly communicates to me that there were different 
groups in AMU, and there was always some group, of which he was a part, that opposed 
the administration. During the 1940s most of the students followed the Muslim League, 
but he remained a nationalist, though he hesitates to blame Muslims for partition. He says 
that the working of the university was unaffected by partition’s migrations, classes 
continued and there was no discrimination against non-Muslims. He speaks briefly about 
the unrest in the university in 1965. He speaks about the visits of political leaders to 
AMU, and the shift that occurred during the 1940s when nationalist leaders “were not 
allowed” to come. He clarifies that the Aligarh movement was essentially about 
education, not politics. As a child, he received religious education before he went to 
school, which delayed his school entrance by two years, but also set him on his 
professional path as a scholar of Arabic language.  His mother was literate in Urdu and 
Persian, but not English. Sherwani describes himself as a rebel, when his father was a 
League sympathizer who eventually ran for office in the 1946 election on a Muslim 
League ticket. At the end, he asks me about myself and American politics. 
 
Abstract November 20, 2009: Part 1: Riazur Rahman Sherwani begins by telling me that 
from 1942- 1948 he studied in AMU when politics in India had reached a high level, it 
was “epoch making.” Though the period 1945- 1947—from the time Congress leaders 
finally came out of jail to partition—was especially critical for the nationalist movement, 
he says that in AMU, it was as if nothing was happening; everything was “calm and 
quiet.” But most in AMU supported Pakistan. He tells me he had no part in the Students’ 
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Union, because it was dominated by “aggressive” Muslim Leaguers. Rather, they sided 
with those Leaguers who were somewhat better. He tells me about his father, who ran for 
the assembly on the Muslim League ticket—thus the university and his household were 
both opposed to his own way of thinking. He formed a small students’ organization for a 
small number of like-thinking students: Nationalist Muslim Students’ Federation. They 
worked for Congress candidates but they had a lot of problems. He tells me about his 
father’s brief tenure as Vice Chancellor, during which there was peace in the university, 
under the protection of the government. But the student’s numbers had dropped and those 
Muslims who remained would not send their children to AMU for a couple of years out 
of fear. Dr. Zakir Husain came in late 1948 and then things began to change. Immediately 
after partition, Muslims, whether they joined political parties or not, faced discrimination 
from Hindus. The minority parties were unsuccessful and demoralized. Zakir Husain’s 
real value was that he was a real academic administrator and raised the standards, as 
opposed to Ziauddin whose main concern was to get Muslims employed. Sir Sayyid’s 
concern had been purely for to get them Western education, he argues, it was not for 
employment. And this agenda is still necessary; Muslims lag. Part 2: Riazur Rahman 
Sherwani critiques the term “nationalist”—it only had meaning before partition. The 
problem is with “liberalism” and “orthodoxy” among Muslims.  Today, he says, this is 
the main problem among Muslims, and both groups exist in Aligarh. He speaks about the 
debates over girls wearing hijab and again there is a movement for forming an 
organization for Muslims—but he feels that the only reason the League was successful 
was because of separate electorates. He concludes by telling me about living in Aftab 
hostel, where he had a single-seater room, though he did not play any sports. 
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Interviewee: Professor Ather Siddiqi   
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Sir Syed Nagar, Aligarh, India 
Date: May 11, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Ather Siddiqi is originally from Saharanpur. He was admitted to 
Aligarh University in 1947 for his Intermediate. He completed his M.Sc. in Aligarh and 
his  Ph.D. in Zoology in the United States and became a professor. During his tenure at 
Aligarh he supported the Muslim League and his sibling and parents all eventually 
migrated to Pakistan. He chose to remain in India having been appointed as a professor in 
Aligarh University. He is retired and lives in Aligarh with his wife, fellow academic Dr. 
Zakiya Siddiqi. 
 
Abstract: The formal interview begins with Professor Ather Siddiqi speaking about the 
culture of tolerance among Hindu Indians who did not even punish Muslims for dividing 
the country. He first says that he had decided “from the beginning” not to go to Pakistan 
though the rest of his family did migrate by the mid- 1960s. He describes visiting 
Pakistan for his niece’s wedding in 1971 where he was caught on the outbreak of war 
between India and Pakistan and the Civil War with East Pakistan. He describes his escape 
aboard a flight organized by the Swiss Embassy. He criticizes Pakistan and repeats that 
India has no interest in annexing Pakistan or Bangladesh. His older brother had been a 
League sympathizer and chose to migrate to Pakistan; at this point Siddiqi admits that he 
had wanted to go to Pakistan, but his father would not allow him to go. Instead, he 
finished his education at AMU, and became a professor of Zoology. He briefly describes 
the changes in AMU during partition. He describes the “atmosphere of fear and danger” 
that prevailed after partition as a result of all the killing that had taken place. He speaks 
about the threat of violence to the university during the riots in Aligarh City in 1951 and 
1961, but argues that only Hindus could start riots because Muslims would get a “guilty 
conscience” if the do. He describes his daughter’s business, Harvest Gold Bread, as 
evidence that Muslims can attain any level of success. He speaks about relations with 
Hindus at AMU, his involvement in sports, and the Union. He describes his experience 
on the day of Gandhi’s assassination, and the fear of repercussions if a Muslim had been 
the assassin. He praises Zakir Husain for supporting study leave for faculty. He returns to 
why he did not support the creation of Pakistan, because he had grown up in a secular 
environment and he is disappointed that Pakistan has claimed Sir Sayyid for themselves 
when he simply sought to uplift Indian Muslims. In conclusion, he offers to give me his 
autobiographical writings (which I eventually photocopied).  
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Interviewee: Majid Ali Siddiqi  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: 10 Butler Road, Lucknow, India 
Date: October 2, 2009 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Majid Ali Siddiqi was born in 1935 in Gorakhpur, India. He arrived 
at Aligarh in 1952 to study engineering. He was also involved in sports, hurdles and 
hockey. He completed his B.Sc. in Civil Engineering from Aligarh University in 1956. 
He was married in 1957. His first job was in the Uttar Pradesh Irrigation Department as a 
Civil Engineer. He completed a post-graduate degree from Roorki University. Siddiqi 
still works after a long career with Jayaprakash Associates he is now Director, JP 
Karsham Hydro, Corporation, Ltd. 
 
Abstract Part 1: Majid Ali Siddiqi begins by describing his professional life as a Civil 
Engineer. In the first section he talks about his early education, and why he chose to do 
his engineering in Aligarh. His father was a small landowner, but he grew up in the city 
of Gorakhpur where he lived in a mixed neighborhood.  He speaks much about tolerance, 
and the absence of Hindu-Muslim tensions. When I asked him if he knew anyone who 
had left for Pakistan he became agitated, asked me to turn off the microphone and told 
me that he would not speak about Pakistan. Part 2: Siddiqi speaks about the organization 
of the Sir Suleiman Engineering Hall at Aligarh, and the fact that the Engineering 
College was evenly divided amongst Hindu and Muslim students. Part 3: Majid Ali 
Siddiqi speaks about Urdu, the organization of early education and he begins to speak 
about his reading habits and television habits. Part 4: Siddiqi speaks at length about the 
importance of understanding other faiths. He returns to why he attended Aligarh, and the 
importance of character building there. He tells me about playing hockey and billiards, 
and more on the system of seniority/ juniority and the Introduction Night events. He tells 
a lengthy story about trying to convince his first boss why Aligarh Engineering students 
were at least as good, if not better than those from Roorki, which hinges on the fact that 
Aligarh boys were better administrators. Then he speaks about the Aligarh Old Boys’ 
Association, and tells some anecdotes about playing hockey. He concludes with an 
anecdote about the hockey team photo taken with Zakir Husain in which a conflict over 
seniority arose and Zakir Husain diffused the situation. 
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Interviewee: Professor Zakiya Siddiqi     
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: Sir Syed Nagar, Aligarh, India 
Date: December 9, 2009 
Release: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Zakiya Siddiqi was born in Allahabad in 1936. Her father was an 
advocate who also served as an MLA. Her elder sister Saeeda was educated at Aligarh 
before her and went on to become a teacher. Zakiya Siddiqi did her early education in her 
sister’s school and then in Lucknow’s Karamat Husain Girls’ School where she 
completed her Intermediate in 1952. She then shifted to Aligarh’s Women’s College 
where she lived in the hostel. She completed her Bachelor’s of Education and M.A. in the 
Aligarh University. After her marriage to Ather Siddiqi, she moved to the United States 
and pursued an M.S. in Guidance and Counseling at Purdue University. After teaching 
for many years in the Aligarh Women’s College, she became the Principal and Provost. 
After retiring from that position she established the Center for Women’s Studies at 
Aligarh University and now she oversees the Aligarh Public School. She also enjoys 
caring for her garden. 
 
Abstract: Zakiya Siddiqi begins by describing her early childhood, family origin and 
education. She describes her father as very “forward-looking,” willing to educate his 
daughters despite resistance in his community. She compares her lifestyle in Lucknow’s 
Karamat Husain Girls’ School with the relative openness at Aligarh, which she liked very 
much. She discusses the benefits of residential education, and the religiously mixed 
hostels. She discusses her religious background, and the fact that she never forced her 
children to maintain religious observance. She describes her advocacy for girls’ education 
and the resistance to it that is still prevalent in the Muslim community. She tells me about 
her tenure as Principal and Provost of the Women’s College, which she calls a “vacation” 
not “vocation.” Although she has been criticized for it, she continues to encourage girls to 
establish a career and delay marriage. She talks about her refusal to retire and her success 
in rejuvenating the Aligarh Public School. She speaks at length about the problems 
Muslims face in India and how to turn to the University into a premier institution. I 
redirect her narrative to her time at Aligarh and partition, though she was too young to 
experience it personally. Her father was vehemently anti-Pakistan and refused to allow 
his daughters to marry there. However, since her husband’s family is in Pakistan, Zakiya 
Siddiqi speaks about her experiences there, and contrasts Pakistan and India. She 
concludes by speaking about how Muslims need to work harder to achieve more success 
in India, and the role of the intellectual class in encouraging hard work. 
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Interviewee: Mrs. Masooda Siddiqui  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Date: March 12, 2010  
Location: Dhaka, Bangladesh   
 
Biographical Notes: Masooda Siddiqui was born in Faridpur in the early 1930s. She was 
77 at the time of this interview. She grew up in Faridpur and Calcutta but fled Calcutta in 
1946. She was married in 1948. Today she lives in Dhaka.  
 
Abstract: Masooda Siddiqui speaks of her childhood and the liberal environment in which 
she was allowed to ride a bicycle.  She started school in Calcutta at age 7. She studied 
English and Bangla together under English and Bengali teachers. She lived with her 
brother in Calcutta in 1946, during the Great Calcutta Killings. They lived in a Muslim 
area, near Park Circus. She speaks of the resistance to British colonialism and anger that 
erupted over restrictions on indigo. She describes the Hindu-Muslim violence in Calcutta 
and how she became trapped in her house because of the danger outside. She speaks of 
Pathans who helped her family escape, and Sikhs who went into Muslim houses and left 
no one alive. She says that she had no understanding of Pakistan, but immediately notes 
that in East Pakistan they were not allowed to speak their language. Though she did not 
want to get married, she did in 1948, after corresponding with her betrothed. After her 
marriage, she moved with her husband to Kulna.  
 417 
 
Interviewee: General Ghulam Umar (d. January 18, 2009) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: 84/II, 23rd St. Khayaban-e-Sahar, D.H.A. Karachi, Pakistan 
Date: Monday August 8, 2006 
Release: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Ghulam Umar was born on October 1, 1922 into a family of Islamic 
scholars in Ambala. His father served in the Post and Telegraph Department and Umar 
was mostly educated in Aligarh, but his family lived in Simla and Delhi. He joined the 
army during World War II and opted for Pakistan in 1947 where he served in 10th Punjab 
Regiment (then 2nd 15th Punjab) and also as Military Secretary to King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia. He served as a Brigadier General in the Pakistan Army in the 1965 War, and he 
served General Yahya Khan as Secretary of the National Security Council (Military 
Intelligence) during the 1971 War, but fell out of favor with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and was 
held under house arrest in the early 1970s. After his retirement from the Pakistan Army 
he has been involved in people-to-people peace diplomacy between India and Pakistan. 
 
Abstract: General Umar begins by telling me where he is from and then begins outlining 
the history of Indian Muslims from the early days of the British period and leads directly 
into a brief description of Sir Sayyid and the Aligarh Movement, what Umar calls “the 
politics of educational reform.” He speaks about the Khilafat Movement, and the 
emergence of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a leader, and the intellectual leadership of 
Allama Iqbal. He credits the Congress with creating the conditions for the independence 
of Pakistan, as a last resort after the failure of the Cabinet Mission. He describes the role 
of Aligarians in establishing Pakistan. He goes on to speak about South Asia as a region, 
and the fact that India should lead it, due to its size and resources, though India has a 
conflict with all of its neighbors. He tells me about his experience with Track 2 
Diplomacy, and then I redirect him to speak about his life. He tells me about the 
intellectual evironment of his early childhood and jumps to a description of Jinnah’s 1940 
visit to Aligarh. He goes on to discuss his relationship with Quaid-e-Azam and how he 
came to join the army and later to become Military Secretary to King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia. He goes back to speaking of his childhood and life in the Aligarh hostels. He 
speaks about the importance of unity and democracy in Pakistan, and the fact that neither 
exist. He speaks about leadership, and the importance of education. He describes his 
experiences during 1947 when he was in central India after returning from Japan. He 
opted for the Pakistan Army because of his connection to Quaid-e-Azam and the idea of 
Pakistan. He tells me a bit about his military career. He offers some solutions to 
Pakistan’s difficulties, suggesting that Pakistan needs to believe in itself. He outlines a 
plan for distributing power among the provinces more evenly and reducing the strength 
of Pakistan’s standing army, and he addresses the question of Pakistani disintegration. He 
concludes by suggesting the importance of an educational institution like Aligarh that 
could obscure regional and sectarian identities. 
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Interviewee: Mrs. Khadija Minhaj Umar 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: G.O.R. #6 College Road, Lahore, Pakistan 
Date: January 4, 2008 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes:  Mrs. Khadija Minhaj Umar was born in Aligarh, India.  She was 
educated in Aligarh, Lahore, Sargodha and Lucknow where she received a Master’s 
Degree.  She married in 1944 and settled in Lahore just before partition because her 
husband was based in Punjab.  She taught Mathematics at Islamia College, Lahore and 
then at Kinnaird College, Lahore.  Since 1947 she has resided at #6 College Road, just 
off The Mall in Lahore, Pakistan. 
 
Abstract: Khadija Minhaj Umar speaks about her education and moving around to 
different schools before becoming a teacher of mathematics first at Islamia College, then 
Kinnaird College, Lahore. Mrs. Khadija was married in 1944 and describes her early 
marriage and her experiences during partition.  She details how she was able to secure the 
home in which she now lives, and discusses her husband’s refugee recovery work. She 
tells me a little bit about living in Dhaka, and her experiences there in the early years of 
East Pakistan.  She describes her father’s attitude on veiling and how she and her sisters 
used their veils as a disguise. Midway through the interview, Mrs. Khadija’s sisters begin 
to participate and we have a conversation about common friends and relatives.  Mrs. 
Khadija then remembered her experiences when Jinnah died and when Gandhi died 
which brings us to the recent assassination of Benazir Bhutto.  In conclusion she tells me 
about her children, and how successful they have been in their careers, which brings her 
great satisfaction.
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Interviewee: Anonymized as YM 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Lucknow, India 
Date: Thursday August 7, 2008 
RELEASE: FULL BUT REQUESTS ANONYMITY 
 
Biographical Notes: YM is from Shahjahanpur.  He studied at Aligarh Muslim University 
from 1952-55, but did not receive a degree from there.  He opened an eyeglass lenses 
business in Lucknow with his brother and has made his home in Lucknow.  His sons 
were educated at La Martiniere College and Aligarh Muslim University. 
 
Abstract:  Part 1: YM begins by telling me about his early childhood and his family’s 
business in supplying cloth, sugar and tobacco. He began his eyeglass business in 1952. 
He speaks about the atmosphere in Aligarh and emphasizes the importance of the 
uniform of sherwani/pajamas. He tells me that Aligarh Old Boys celebrate Sir Syed Day 
(October 17) internationally. He tells me that he did not complete his degree from 
Aligarh because of his family’s investment in business. Prior to arriving in Aligarh, he 
had only studied one subject, science, in English. Part 2: We speak with his wife about 
my research and visit to India. YM tells me more about prominent people in Aligarh, 
some of whom I had already met. He tells me that he was, and is, anti-Pakistan. He tells 
me that during the British period Muslims were primarily involved in service, and Hindus 
in business. He mentions the brain-drain to Pakistan. He speaks about the disruptions to 
Muslim life in Aligarh and elsewhere as a result of partition, and the re-allotment of 
properties. He speaks about the influence of Chinese manufacturing on prices of products 
in India. He speaks about the oppressive separation of Indians and British under the 
colonial system. He describes his grandfather’s lifestyle as simple, devout, despite having 
money. He tells me that all of his children have been educated in English from the 
beginning of their education to prepare them for their futures. He describes his early 
Qur’anic education according to the traditional method. He says that, in his time, children 
of all status played together, they played sports in the open grounds. We speak about my 
own background for some time and the fact that although I come from a Muslim family, I 
was not raised Muslim. He tells me that Islam and Christianity are similar, but that Islam 
teaches that God had no son, Jesus was a prophet of God. He reads to me from the 
Qur’an, Surat Miriam. YM Sahib praises the joint-family system and the loyalty of his 
sons and daughters-in-law. We speak further about my family and background. His wife 
tells me that she also had a business, a boutique. YM tells me that all of his family has 
some kind of business. I meet one of his daughters-in-law and we speak about her 
children and my large family. YM Sahib advises me to track down my roots in India. We 
speak about my Urdu program in Lucknow.  He concludes talking about the fluctuation 
in international manufacturing and how China has eclipsed Japan. He critiques the 
American stance towards the Muslim world.  
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Interviewee: Mrs. Anis Zaidi and Mrs. Rais Sultana 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: 11/A North Avenue, Phase I D.H.A., Karachi 
Date: May 20, 2010 
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Anis Zaidi was born on April 19, 1928 in Chindausi. Her sister Rais 
Sultana was born in 1926. The sisters were raised in Meerut where their father was an 
Income Tax Lawyer. Sultana married young and moved to Moradabad. Zaidi pursued her 
B.A. at Aligarh, but as she was ailing he completed her degree as a private candidate. 
During partition both sisters moved with their family to Pakistan. They both pursued 
higher education in Pakistan and became educators. The women are now retired and live 
together in Karachi. 
 
Abstract: I spoke with two sisters, Anis Zaidi—who was wearing the microphone—and 
Rais Sultana, who also weighed in from time to time. We start off speaking about their 
parents, in particular their mother’s activism on behalf of the Muslim League. Then we 
speak about their family’s educational history and the emphasis placed on education by 
several generations of women. They describe their own early education and Rais 
Sultana’s early marriage (at 17) to a law graduate who ultimately practiced income tax 
law (like their father) in Moradabad. We speak about Zaidi’s experience in Aligarh (the 
bad food) and then about the disruptions to the family during partition. She speaks about 
the violence of partition on both sides and we speak at length about the importance of 
Urdu and her own mother’s work on behalf of Urdu. Anis Zaidi speaks of the importance 
of Pakistan and Quaid-e-Azam’s leadership. We conclude with her lament that Pakistanis 
do not appreciate their freedom because most Pakistanis did not fight for it—that the bulk 
of the sacrifice was made by UP Muslims. The final minutes of the interview are devoted 
to Rais Sultana. I speak with her first about her education. She describes her move to 
Pakistan, despite the fact that her husband was a “Congressi,” sympathetic to India. He 
died shortly after arriving in Pakistan. As Sultana raised her children, with her father’s 
help, she continued her education. Ultimately, she began teaching Political Science. After 
retirement she tried living outside Pakistan with her children but she returned. Today she 
feels disappointed in Pakistan and suggests that perhaps Jinnah “misled” us. In closing, 
Anis Zaidi counters that she thinks Pakistanis are “lucky” to have a free country. She 
conludes by telling me about the educational institution she led and developed in Wah, 
the site of the Pakistan Ordinance Factory. 
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Interviewee: Professor Zahida Zaidi (d. January 2011) 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: ADA Colony, Aligarh, India 
Date: November 20, 2009 
RELEASE: NOT FOR BROADCASTING PURPOSES OR PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, 
DISPLAY OR EXHIBITION. REQUESTS ANONYMITY FOR THE NAMES OF 
OTHERS MENTIONED 
 
Biographical Notes: Zahida Zaidi was born in Meerut. She was one of five sisters and one 
half-brother. Her father died when she was quite young. After some time in Aligarh, the 
family shifted to Panipat. Zaidi received her primary education in Panipat  and at this 
time she finished her Qur’an under the guidance of Maulana Hali’s son, Khwaja Sajjad 
Husain. She was a professor of English in Aligarh as well as a poet and a playwright. 
 
Abstract: Part 1: Zahida Zaidi begins by telling me about the hardship she and her mother 
and sisters endured after her father’s death.  Her mother shifted her children to Aligarh 
where she could stay with her brother, K.G. Saiyidain, a prominent Aligarh educationist. 
Zaidi remembers little of this period, but says that her uncle’s house was a center of 
literary and intellectual life. The family shifted to Panipat after Saiyidain shifted to 
Kashmir. She tells me about studying Qur’an under Hali’s son. Her family shifted again 
to Aligarh. There, she also experienced her first drama, performing the lead role in a play 
at the age of 14. In tenth class, she became a residential student in the Aligarh Women’s 
College. She describes this period as a “glamorous time” in Aligarh. She played 
basketball and was interested in fashion, drama, debate and poetry. She celebrated Indian 
independence in Bombay and decided to give up purdah. She describes the disruption 
and violence in Delhi during partition and how she and her sisters were saved by a Sikh 
family who warned them against attack. Part 2: Zaidi continues by telling me that 
Maulana Azad sent a jeep to protect them and take them to his house. They stayed with 
Maulana Azad for over a month, having lost all their possessions and jewelry. She 
mentions that, as young children, they enjoyed this a lot! They later shifted to the home 
of relatives who were not as kind, and they made their way back to Aligarh. Zaidi 
refocused attention on her studies and her mother returned to Aligarh. In Aligarh she 
became involved in leftist and Communist activities and  was eventually arrested during a 
protest along with her two sisters. The girls were sent to Banaras jail. She says that it was 
at this point that she lost faith in the Congress and Pandit Nehru because of the 
crackdown on Communists. She began her teaching career in Lady Irwin College, Delhi 
and then she shifted to Aligarh as a lecturer in Women’s College. She later went to 
Cambridge and studied drama and art, and “tasted freedom” and independence. This 
inspired her to leave the Communist party. She had also begun writing poetry. She tells 
me about her early teaching career in Delhi and her creative work in drama and poetry 
and the banning of dramas in Aligarh. She worked with famous playwrites and actors like 
Nasiruddin Shah and Muzaffar Ali. She discusses her involvement in the Progressive 
Writers Association. She concludes speaking about her mother’s open-mindedness. 
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Interviewee: Mubarak Shah Zuberi  
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Date: May 26, 2010  
Location: Karachi  
RELEASE: FULL 
 
Biographical Notes: Mubarak Shah Zuberi is the grandson of Dr. Sir Ziauddin, the Vice 
Chancellor of Aligarh University during the 1940s. He was born in Meerut on October 7, 
1935 and attended Aligarh University. His father was a civil servant who was killed in a 
train accident near Lucknow. After graduating from Aligarh he remained in India until 
1961, though much of his family migrated to Pakistan. At the request of his mother, he 
finally shifted in 1964. He has also lived and worked in the United States, both California 
and New York. He currently splits his time between Karachi and California. 
 
Abstract: Part 1: Mubarak Shah Zuberi begins by telling me about the egalitarian 
atmosphere of the Aligarh university, and how he saw it as a “family home.” As a student 
of Aligarh University, he lived at home because his grandfather was Vice Chancellor. 
Zuberi tells me about Sir Sayyid’s significance as the “founder” of the Two Nation 
Theory. He expounds on Dr. Ziauddin’s talents in public life and his role in the 
university. He describes the experience when Ziauddin’s body was returned to Aligarh 
after his death, and the students’ effort to have him interred next to Sir Sayyid. Part 2: 
Zuberi speaks about other members of his family that I will be interviewing. He describes 
the purpose of the Sir Ziauddin Memorial Society, and the importance of preserving 
Ziauddin’s memory, which he says has suffered in Pakistan. He laments the 
marginalization of important figures like Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar and Maulana 
Hasrat Mohani and even Liaqat Ali Khan who he argues have been largely forgotten. He 
speaks about the problems with ethnic strife and marginalization of Urdu speakers in 
Bangladesh. Then he begins speaking about his cousins, Ziuaddin’s daughters, with 
whom I also spoke. He speaks about the potential of Pakistanis, and the failure of the 
vision of Pakistan due to poor execution. His guest, Dr. Navid, speaks at length about the 
sources of ethnic strife in Pakistan. Zuberi then speaks about Aligarh and his participation 
in the Muslim League elections in 1945-46. Then he speaks about tolerance in the United 
State and India and the fact that his Muslim family had good relations with non-Muslims 
(and still does) in India. He speaks at length about the difficulties facing Pakistanis and 
the internal strife. As he concludes, he tells a couple of stories about working in America 
and his experience in a more egalitarian environment. 
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Interviewee: Professor Viqar Ahmad Zuberi 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas  
Location: Karachi 
Date: May 19, 2010 
RELEASE: ORAL 
 
Biographical Notes: Viqar Ahmad Zuberi was born in 1938 in Lucknow. However, he 
did all of his early education in Moradabad before shifting to Pakistan after his 
Intermediate. He completed his higher education in Pakistan and taught Zoology and 
Environmental Biology for his entire career, including two years in Iraq early on and two 
years in Abu Dhabi after his retirement. His parents migrated to Pakistan in the mid- 
1960s. Professor Zuberi lives in Karachi. 
 
Abstract: He tells me about his early life, and we discover a mutual acquaintance. He tells 
me about his choice to learn sciences in an Urdu medium institution in Lahore, where his 
brother lived, and a bit more about his educational history. He describes the division in 
his own family on the issue of Pakistan, one side was with Congress and one side was 
with the League. He then shifts and begins giving me the history of Muslim nationalism 
and the importance of Aligarh and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. He speaks about the decline of 
Muslim education, discrimination against Bengalis and the conspiracy that led to the 
breakup of Pakistan. He feels that Pakistan was deprived in the boundary negoatiations 
and that it would have been impossible for Muslims to remain. He speaks of his 
memories of Moradabad during partition. He speaks of his family’s decision to migrate, 
the tension between Hindus and Muslims and the “humiliation” of being a Muslim in 
India. We conclude speaking about his mother’s unhappiness in Pakistan, having left her 
property in India. His father, he says, was happy, because the whole family was together 
again. 
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Interviewee: Waqar Ahmad Zuberi 
Interviewer: Amber Abbas 
Location: North Nazimabad, Karachi 
Date: May 28, 2010 
 
Biographical Notes: Waqar Ahmad Zuberi belongs to the family of Aligarh University’s 
Vice Chancellor, Sir Ziauddin Ahmad and originally hails from Meerut. Though he never 
attended Aligarh Muslim University, he was active in the Pakistan Movement as a 
student in Meerut. 
 
Abstract: Waqar Ahmad Zuberi tells me about the history of the Muslim League and the 
importance of Aligarh Muslim University and the Muslim Students’ Federation. He 
shows me printed materials referencing the involvement of his family in Muslim League 
activism. He describes making a map of Pakistan from his own blood. He tells me how he 
migrated, by train, and was able to bring his papers and evidence of his dedication to 
Pakistan. He tells me about Muslim involvement in other anti-imperial movements, 
including the Indian National Army. He and other students protested the punishment of 
INA men though Jinnah tried to stop them. He speaks of the importance of Pakistan’s 
“Objectives Resolution” and the importance of incorporating Islam and Islamic justice 
into governance in Pakistan. He describes his efforts to meet Mohammad Ali Jinnah.  
He describes the pre-partition period, under British and Hindu domination as an “unjust” 
time for Muslims. He tells me about his early life and education in Meerut. He tells me 
about learning Qur’an from a poor Muslim maulvi who used to come to his home. He 
describes working for the election of Liaqat Ali Khan in the Meerut District. He describes 
his aspirations for Pakistan with “Islami Nizam” (Muslim Rule). He laments the rampant 
corruption and Muslim vs. Muslim violence in Pakistan, despite which, Pakistan will 
survive. He says that the problem with the Two Nation Theory is that it was formed when 
Muslims and Hindus were in opposition. The absence of Hindus in Pakistan has meant 
that the conflict will necessarily be amongst Muslims. But he also blames the intervention 
of the United States and greed for “the dollar.” We conclude speaking about my research 
and my own connections to Pakistan. He says he is happy to share his information, that it 
should be shared. He says that Pakistan’s history begins in 1947, but really with the 
founding of the Muslim League. He notes that the goal was “Muslim unity.”  
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